What Does Heidegger Mean by the Transcendence of Dasein?

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Abstract

In this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger’s concept of ‘transcendence’ as it appears in Being and Time (1927), ‘On the Essence of Ground’ (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907, and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, ‘transcendence in immanence’ is a leitmotif of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations §11 in a manner that is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of consciousness and intentionality and Heidegger deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his ‘On the Essence of Ground’, his submission to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence.

Keywords: phenomenology; Heidegger; Husserl; transcendence; immanence; Dasein

The transcendence of knowledge is what perplexes me.¹

In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer on what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence.

Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit is, by his own admission, an essay in transcendental phenomenology.² He writes: ‘Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis’ (SZ, § 7, p. 38). At the same time, Being and Time presents itself as an anti-subjectivist manifesto, and
Heidegger emphasizes this anti-subjectivism in his later writings, including the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ (Brief über den “Humanismus”). This is puzzling as usually the transcendental turn is understood as a turn towards the subjective grounding of knowledge. How does Heidegger reinterpret the transcendental and especially transcendental subjectivity? It should be noted that the passage quoted above from Being and Time alludes to the medieval concept of the transcendentals (bonum, unum, verum ..., which were super-categories that can be applied to all entities) and not directly to Kant. This complicates the sense of ‘transcendental’ in the early Heidegger but it is also true that Kant himself was aware of and invokes this Scholastic usage. Heidegger himself in Being and Time not only invokes the Latin term transcendens but also the German notion of Transzendenz which owes to Husserl, Jaspers and others as we shall explore in this paper.

Between German Idealism and Life-Philosophy

When Heidegger returned from Marburg to Freiburg to take up the Chair vacated by Edmund Husserl on his retirement, he was regarded by the students as someone who had a high regard for German Idealism, specifically Hegel and Schelling, as is evident from his first Freiburg lecture course. Indeed, in a 1927 letter to Heidegger’s Marburg colleague Rudolf Bultmann, Heidegger proclaimed:

The fundament of [my work] is developed by starting from the ‘subject’, properly understood as the human Dasein, so that with the radicalization of this approach the true motives of German idealism may likewise come into their own …

In his correspondence with Bultmann, Jaspers and others, Heidegger makes clear that he is seeking to rethink the mode of being of the transcendental subject (opposing all typically Hegelian formulations which he took to be mere dogmas). This rethinking of the subject is informed by his independent reading of life-philosophy as he had found in it in the works of Wilhelm Dilthey. He is drawn especially to Dilthey’s account of human being ‘as he exists as a person, a person acting in history [als Person, als handelnde Person in der Geschichte existiert]’ (GA 20, p. 163), as Heidegger puts it in his 1925 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs lectures, essentially a first draft that eventually became Being and Time. Heidegger was also beginning to confront Kant on whom he had begun to lecture in Marburg in 1925. Indeed Heidegger writes to Jaspers on 10 December 1925: ‘I am beginning to really love Kant’. His relationship with Kant grew in the late 1920s but remained critical. In this regard, he considered that Kant had not properly interrogated the being of the subject, as he wrote in Being and Time: ‘[Kant] failed to provide an ontology with
Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject’ (SZ, § 6, p. 24). Heidegger had planned to include the ‘destruction’ of Kant in Being and Time (as we know from SZ, § 6), but this project had to be postponed to his 1929 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (GA 3). A decade later, in his 1938 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger will speak of ‘using force’ (GA 65, p. 253) against Kant in order to break open his concept of transcendental subjectivity and its relation to being. Sometime in the 1930s, Heidegger came to realize that even his efforts to articulate Dasein as transcendence (and as an open projecting) ended up caught in a kind of Platonism and the whole language of transcendental philosophy is seen as hopeless.

What Heidegger wants to do in the 1920s is to reinterpret subjectivity in a way that – inspired by Wilhelm Dilthey – conveys its sense of living, temporal historical existence, living a life (Leben, a term with particular resonance for Dilthey) with all its connotations of, on the one hand, immediate insertion into and absorption in the world and also of some kind of way of gaining an authentic stance towards one’s temporal existence. As Heidegger had earlier proclaimed in a 1921–22 lecture course given while he was still at Freiburg, ‘the phenomenological category “world” immediately names – and this is crucial – what is lived, the content aimed at in living, that which life holds to’ (GA 61, p. 86). Indeed, already in 1925, Heidegger had been reading Hegel (in order to teach him) and wrote to Jaspers complaining that Hegel’s abstract conception of being, nothingness and becoming, showed no true understanding of ‘life – existence – process and the like’. He explains:

He [Hegel] didn’t see that the traditional stock of categories from the logic of things and the world is fundamentally insufficient, and that we must question more radically, not only about becoming and motion, happening and history – but about being.

The inquiry into being is supposed to revisit the underlying issue that was obscured in traditional ontologies – thinking the uniqueness of human existence and its way of being. Heidegger had been seeking a proper way of accessing human being-in-the-world and a new way of articulating his radical conception of ‘concrete [konkret]’ human existence. The remarkable result of these interrogations is the ontological analytic of Dasein from the standpoint of temporality in Being and Time and specifically its conception of Dasein and its ‘thrown-projection’ (SZ, § 31).

As is almost too well known and hence its significance has been covered up, in introducing Dasein, Heidegger wants to avoid many of the pitfalls associated with traditional metaphysical concepts of human being – both the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of human being as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον (SZ, §1) and the traditional Biblical understanding of human being made in imaginem et similitudinem dei (SZ, § 10), since they both treat human beings as
present-at-hand entities. He also rejects not just a purely biological account of human life but even the attempt by personalism to give a new conception. In this regard, Scheler’s conception of the human being as a person is given acknowledgement, if in the end it is regarded as unclear and not penetrating through to an ontological conception. Heidegger regards the current interest in ‘personalism’ as shallow. The being of the person has not been interrogated in positive terms, and the phenomenologists have been content to remain with negative characterizations: ‘The person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object [Die Person ist kein Ding, keine Substanz, kein Gegenstand]’ (SZ § 10, p. 48). Here Heidegger links Scheler’s account of the person to Husserl’s meditations on the person in the then unpublished Ideas II where the person is not to be understood as an entity in nature. Heidegger is not happy that Husserl continues to talk of human being in terms of the layering of body, soul and spirit.

Most especially, however, Heidegger is deliberately targeting and rejecting in these opening chapters his mentor Husserl’s interpretation of human being in terms of the stream of consciousness (which he sees as bedevilling modern psychology) and of intentionality. He does take over Husserl’s conception of human being as being in an ‘environing world [Umwelt]’, but he reinterprets intentionality in terms of transcendence towards this world. As Heidegger will state in his essay ‘Vom Wesen des Grundes’ (‘On The Essence of Ground’, hereafter ‘VWG’): 12

We name world that towards which Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as being-in-the-world. World co-constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence; as belonging to this structure, the concept of world may be called transcendental. 13 (VWG, 139)

Furthermore, in offering a re-interpretation of Kant’s conception of world (as unconditioned totality), Heidegger suggests that Dasein comes to be itself from out of the world. This relation of Dasein to world inevitably leads to the misconstrual of the world as something subjective. Heidegger writes:

the task is to gain, through an illumination of transcendence, one possibility for what is meant by ‘subject’ and ‘subjective’. In the end, the concept of world must indeed be conceived in such a way that world is indeed subjective, i.e., belongs to Dasein, but precisely on this account does not fall, as a being, into the inner sphere of a ‘subjective’ subject. (VWG, 158)

Transcendence has to be thought as a new way of thinking human Dasein in a non-subjectivist manner.

In Being and Time, as is well known, Heidegger more or less abandons or even suppresses the concept of intentionality and replaces it with his existential
analytic of Dasein in the course of which he emphasizes Dasein’s finite transcendence, attempting to wrest the thinking of transcendence away from the associated notion of attaining of a timeless Platonic realm. In fact, the text of Being and Time contains only two brief references to intentionality: a critical remark regarding the inadequacy of Max Scheler’s analysis of the person as the ‘performer of intentional acts’ ([Fülzahier intentionaler Akte]) (SZ, § 10, p. 48); and a single – important but dense – footnote on intentionality as ‘grounded in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein’ (SZ, § 69 (b), p. 363), to which we shall return.

In general, in his lectures from 1925 to 1929, Heidegger persistently portrays Husserlian phenomenology – not entirely unjustly given the ‘Cartesian way’ that Husserl seemed to emphasize in his public pronouncements – as in the grips of an un-interrogated Cartesian metaphysics (which is also his main complaint about Kant). To overcome this supposed defect, Heidegger proposes instead to address the ontological ‘question of the being of the intentional [die Frage nach dem Sein des Intentionalen]’ (GA 20, § 12, p. 148), as he puts it in his 1925 lectures. The suggestion seems to be that Husserl – who he acknowledges has revived ontology in the twentieth century – lacks an ontological understanding of consciousness and of intentional life. He states that it is not intentionality itself that is problematic but rather what is presumed in its structure:

> It is not intentionality as such that is metaphysically dogmatic but what is built under its structure [Struktur], or is left at this level because of a traditional tendency not to question that of which it is presumably the structure, and what this sense of structure itself means. (GA 20, p. 63)

The relation of the act of intending to its object have been left completely obscure and in phenomenological investigation, the word ‘intentionality’ is the very last one that should be used as a phenomenological slogan (GA 20, § 5).

In his Marburg lecture courses from 1925 onwards, Heidegger had been carefully preparing the way for this shift from Brentanian and Husserlian intentionality to what he calls in 1925 ‘the being of the concrete entity called man’ (GA 20, p. 148). He now explicitly proclaims that the intentionality of consciousness (and indeed the noetic-noematic structure as proposed by Husserl) has to be rethought in terms of the very peculiar transcendence of Dasein, which is not simply that a present-at-hand entity has some special quality that raises it above other entities in the world. His claim is that the manner in which beings have been revealed in the natural attitude has been understood naturalistically – man has been interpreted as experiencing himself zoologically as a ‘ζῶον’, a living being that is part of the world (GA 20, § 12). This itself, for Heidegger, is a tremendous distortion. Furthermore, only an inquiry into the manner in which human beings live in their ‘everydayness’ can begin to disclose a right way of interpreting human existence and its temporality.
Everydayness itself of course is just the proximal point for beginning the investigation into Dasein. As Heidegger will clarify in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, everydayness is not some sociological way of portraying human existence, nor is it any kind of moral category; rather it is a way of articulating disclosure and the truth of being (Heidegger 1976b, GA 9 149; trans. Heidegger, Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 242–43).

In his Marburg lectures, Heidegger is specifically critical of Husserl’s Cartesian construal of the traditional concepts of ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’, terms upon which Husserl relies heavily in Ideas I. At this time (and well into the 1930s), Heidegger himself makes considerable use of the concept of transcendence. Indeed, throughout Being and Time, there are strong hints that the meaning of Being should be thought in terms of transcendence. Being is simply transcendence, Heidegger remarks – although it is not clear from the context if he is fully endorsing this remark: ‘Being is the transcendens pure and simple [Sein ist das transzendens schlechthin]’ (SZ, § 7, p. 38). In his ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ (1947), Heidegger returns to gloss this phrase as it appeared in Being and Time:

The introductory definition, ‘Being is the transcendent pure and simple’, articulates in one simple sentence the way the essence of Being hitherto has been cleared for the human being. This retrospective definition of the essence of the Being of beings from the clearing of beings as such remains indispensable for the prospective approach of thinking toward the question concerning the truth of Being. (p. 337)

The point is that Being has been understood as ‘transcendence’ in one way or another by the philosophical tradition. That is the way Being has revealed itself, but the manner of this revealing has not been articulated. As we shall see, Heidegger offers a number of interpretations of what ‘transcendence’ means in the philosophical tradition, and he attempts a new account. But, at least in the 1920s, he is also insistent in interpreting what Husserl calls ‘intentionality [Intentionalität]’ in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. What remains puzzling is that, although Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s retention of and interpretation of the terms transcendence and immanence, he himself continues to work within the same contrast of immanence/transcendence, albeit offering new connotations to these terms and ignoring the fact that Husserl too claimed to be investing these terms with entirely new – and phenomenologically grounded – meanings. We shall have to examine Husserl’s new conception of ‘transcendence in immanence’ or ‘immanent transcendence’ to see if Heidegger is right to criticize him for Cartesianism.

Although intentionality appears rarely in Being and Time, Heidegger offers extensive discussion of the concept in his lecture courses both in Marburg (especially 1925) and again when he returned to Freiburg. Thus, in his 1928 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz lecture
course at Marburg, he writes that ‘the intentional relation must be founded on the ‘being-with [Sein-bei]’, or ‘being-by’, of Dasein (GA 26, p. 168). He goes on to characterize intentionality as a form of ‘ontic’ transcendence that can only be understood if Dasein’s more basic ‘ontological’ transcendence is understood (GA 26, p. 170). Heidegger is trying to understand how Dasein ontologically transcends – how his mode of being is already ‘beyond’ beings and actually functions to display or disclose Being. In invoking this peculiar conception of transcendence, Heidegger appears to be striking out on a path quite different from Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology of consciousness.

Heidegger’s relationship to the concept of ‘transcendence’ is most complicated and clearly evolves in the course of his thinking. He struggles to articulate the centrality of the designation of transcendence in relation to Dasein without repeating the old conceptions of ‘transcendence’. His new approach is to link transcendence to both the questions of grounding and of truth. In the late 1920s, he often describes Dasein as itself a transcendence, a ‘stepping over’, a ‘passage across’, a ‘surpassing’. He uses both nominal and verbal forms: Transzendenz, transzenden [to transcend] as well as equivalent terms, in particular übersteigen [to climb over, surmount, exceed, transcend] and überschreiten [to cross, exceed, and also to overstep, to transgress]. As he puts it in his last Marburg lecture course of 1928, ‘Dasein is itself the passage across [Das Dasein selbst ist der Überschritt] (GA 26, p. 211). In general, as in ‘Vom Wesen des Grundes’ (1928), he interprets the meaning of transcendence quite traditionally: ‘transcendence means surpassing [Transzendenz bedeutet Überstieg]’ (VWG, p. 137.) But he also links transcendence to the individuation of Dasein and its becoming a self: ‘Transcendence constitutes selfhood’, he proclaims in the same essay (VWG, p. 137). He asserts that transcendence is something that belongs uniquely to Dasein as what fundamentally constitutes its being (VWG, pp. 136–7), but he seems not to be able to incorporate a clear account of the manner in which Dasein’s ecstatic existence, thrownness and projection somehow are also to involve the notions of inauthentic and authentic selfhood.

In his ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ (1947), Heidegger – and this reiterates remarks he had already made in the late 1920s – explains one traditional meaning of transcendence as found within Christianity: God is beyond the world. The transcendent means that which is beyond the sensible – beyond the flesh:

The reference to ‘being-in-the-world’ as the basic trait of the humanitas of homo humanus does not assert that the human being in merely a ‘worldly’ creature understood in a Christian sense, thus a creature turned away from God and so cut loose from ‘Transcendence’. What is really meant by this word would more clearly be called ‘the transcendent’. The transcendent is a supersensible being. That is considered the highest being in the sense of the first cause of all beings. (Heidegger Wegmarken 180; Pathmarks, p. 266)
Heidegger and Jaspers’ Conception of Transcendence

In relation to his own understanding of transcendence, Heidegger is quite clearly influenced by Karl Jaspers for whom transcendence is a central concept in his existential account of human existence. But one should also not ignore the influence on Heidegger of Max Scheler, who had recently died, and especially his extraordinary *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos,* originally delivered as a lecture and then published in 1928, which offers a critique of traditional understandings of human nature and a new multi-layered account that in many ways parallels what Heidegger is saying in *Being and Time.*

For Jaspers, as for Heidegger and Scheler, transcendence names something essential about the human condition. Jaspers, in particular, makes extensive use of the concept of ‘transcendence’ to which he gives his own particular inflection. For Jaspers, transcendence means first and foremost that which is permanently non-objective. Thus, in *Volume 2* of his three-volume *Philosophy* (1932), Jaspers writes:

> Just as I do not exist without the world, I am not myself without transcendence … I stand before transcendence, which does not occur to me as existing in the world of phenomenal things but speaks to me as possible – speaks to me in the voice of whatever exists, and most decidedly in that of my self-being. The transcendence before which I stand is the measure of my own depth.

According to this enigmatic formulation, I primarily experience transcendence in experiencing my own existence as possessing a depth and a possibility that surpasses me. Similarly, Jaspers relates transcendence to his unique conception of human ‘existence [Existenz]’ – a term also invoked by Heidegger (SZ, § 3, p. 12). Jaspers writes: ‘Existence is the self-being that relates to itself and thereby also to transcendence from which it knows that it has been given to itself and upon which it is grounded’. And again, he notes that ‘existence is not a self-contained unity. If there is unity it only is in transcendence’.

Jaspers is a man of pronouncements, of insights, rather than arguments, but he was deeply influential on Heidegger. Indeed, Heidegger had written to Jaspers on 24 May 1926 (just as *Being and Time* was going to its initial proof stage) that only he will understand the true intentions of the work. He continues:

> From the fact that Husserl finds the whole thing to be off-putting and can no longer find it fit under phenomenology in the usual sense, I conclude that I have *de facto* already gone much further than I believe and see myself.

Indeed, it is precisely as a result of his discussions with Jaspers that Heidegger decided to hold back on printing Part Three of Division One. Jaspers emphasizes
the historicity of human existence as precisely revealing this transcendence. Thus, Jaspers notes in his *Philosophy of Existence* (1938) that transcendence is revealed through human historicity (a thought Heidegger will develop in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*). He writes: ‘Only through historicity do I become aware of the authentic being of transcendence – and only through transcendence does our ephemeral existence acquire historical substance’.

**Transcendence in Heidegger’s Writings of the 1920s and 1930s**

The term ‘transcendence’ is relatively uncommon in *Being and Time*, but it appears more frequently in Heidegger’s writings in the late 1920s and early 1930s, especially in ‘*Vom Wesen des Grundes*’ (VWG) (1929), ‘*Was ist Metaphysik?*’ (contained in Heidegger, 1976, Wegmarken 105–122) (1929), and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (GA 3) (1929), all writings that Heidegger himself associates with the overall project of *Being and Time*. The term is challenged in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* and other writings of the late 1930s. But it reappears again in writings such as the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’. In these 1928 to 1930 writings, Heidegger explicitly ties transcendence to the essence of Dasein but also insists that transcendence is an indicator of Dasein’s finitude. Thus, he makes statements such as ‘transcendence means the being in itself accessible to a finite creature’ and that ‘transcendence is ecstatic-horizontal’ (GA 3, p. 114) and ‘ontological knowledge forms transcendence’ (GA 3, § 25). It is noteworthy too in this context that two of Husserl’s best students, Eugen Fink (1905–75) and Oskar Becker (1889–1964), take up the problem of ‘transcendence’ in their writings in the 1930s.

Indeed, in a pompous and obscure paper entitled ‘Transcendence and Paratranscendence’, delivered at the Ninth International Conference of Philosophy in Paris in 1937, Becker seeks to make a distinction between ‘transcendence’ and what he calls ‘paratranscendence’ [*Paratranszendenz*] and also suggests there is a difference between ‘Dasein’ and ‘Dawesen’ and between the ‘ontological difference’ and the ‘paraontological difference’. Becker’s paper did not go unnoticed and was singled out for criticism by Husserl’s student Marvin Farber who wrote:

> The linguistic extravagances of Heidegger may be said to have culminated in the vapid straining after unprobed depths which Oskar Becker of Bonn illustrated under the heading of ‘Transcendence and Paratranscendence’ in the 1937 meeting of the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris.

Following Heidegger’s discussions in ‘*Vom Wesen des Grundes*’ (VWG, pp. 160–62) and elsewhere, Becker distinguishes between the traditional conception of transcendence to be found in Plato (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) and a
new sense of transcendence (‘paratranscendence’) which ought to give rise to a
new science ‘parontology’. Becker asks if Kant really introduced a double
meaning into transcendence or whether something like that distinction already
permeated the tradition. The first sense of transcendence he finds in Plato’s
concept of the Good (τὸ Ἔαθόν) beyond being and in Aristotle’s distinction of
the difference between Being (τὸ ὅν) and beings (τὰ ὅντα). There is a second
sense of transcendence in Aristotle, according to Becker, when one says that
God transcends things. Becker explains his terms in a way that echoes
Heidegger: transcendence means ‘stepping-over [Überschreitung]’ or ‘passing
beyond [Überstieg]’ whereas paratranscendence means a kind of ‘insurmounta-
bility [Unentstiegenheit]’.  

Farber points out that, for Becker, ‘Unentstiegenheit’ is taken to signify something positive because the
prefix ‘un’ suspends the syllable ‘ent’. Thus, that which ‘gets away’
(entsteigende) from the existent is to a certain extent caught and held
back before it completely ‘gets away’, so that ‘Unentstiegenheit’ is a
‘dialectical’ term.

Becker equates this kind of ‘paratranscendence’ with φύσις, with the idea of
nature both as supporting and holding back. Becker attributes this kind of para-
transcendence to human existence, now articulated as ‘Dawesen’. Becker writes:

Its mode of living is neither genuine [eigentliche] nor non-genuine
(fallen) existence, neither a gaining itself nor a losing itself. It is rather
the absence of every kind of self-being, but not in the sense of a total
negation, or, rather, of an antithetical, equal position.

Here Becker is changing the emphasis found in Heidegger. For Heidegger,
it belongs to the transcendence of Dasein to live in a temporal manner and also
to live either authentically or inauthentically. Becker seems to be taking He-
idegger’s anti-subjectivism much further than Heidegger himself would have
wanted to go.

**Husserl’s Conception of Immanent Transcendence**

In his late 1920s writings, Heidegger does not attempt to articulate transcen-
dence in the speculative terms that one later finds. Rather, his main focus is to
criticize Husserl. After his discovery of the epochē and reduction in 1905,
Husserl consistently describes his phenomenology in transcendental terms. In
Ideas I, for instance, he insists that phenomenology is possible only as tran-
scendental philosophy and that the correct understanding of the epochē and the
reduction are essential for understanding the move to the transcendental
required by any genuine, ultimately grounded ‘first philosophy’. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology even presents phenomenology as the ‘final form [Endform]’ of transcendental philosophy. In describing the phenomenological domain, Husserl also speaks very often of ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’, and, indeed, he even seems to have (almost as a slogan) the idea that phenomenology is concerned with transcendence in immanence. This conception of ‘transcendence in immanence’ or ‘immanent transcendence’ makes its appearance probably for the first time in his The Idea of Phenomenology lectures of 1907, but it continues to play a central role from Ideas to the Cartesian Meditations and then seems to disappear in the later discussions of the ‘life-world’ in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. In the First Cartesian Meditation, Husserl speaks of ‘immanent transcendence’.

Initially, as in his 1906/1907 lectures on logic and epistemology, Husserl interprets the transcendental problematic in terms of epistemology. He speaks of the ‘sphinx of knowledge [Die Sphinx der Erkenntnis]’ – when we reflect on knowledge, it becomes something mysterious. He goes on to say ‘the transcendence of knowledge is what perplexes me’. In this regard, he asks the question: ‘what is immanence and what is “transcendence”?’ He asks: ‘How can knowledge, through the particular act, the particular series of acts, “reach beyond” and grasp, posit, know something that is valid independently of the individual act’. There is no doubt but Husserl is thinking of Kant and the problem of ‘representation’. How does mind transcend its own ‘immanence’ – its internal relation to its own mental states and their contents (representations) – to reach the thing or object which is defined as that which is outside of or transcendent to the mental state and its content? In fact, in his 1907 Ding und Raum lectures, Husserl invokes Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz. He believes that this question can only be understood if the phenomenological reduction is brought into operation. This reduction brackets nature and all naturalistic understanding of the mind-object relation. We have to explore the essence of knowledge in itself – without reference to nature, in just the same way as we can explore the essence of perception in imagination. The problem is that natural and philosophical ‘position-takings’ have become mixed up.

More than twenty years later, in the Cartesian Meditations Section 41, Husserl speaks of the problem expressed in Kant’s 1772 letter to Marcus Herz as being a false problem for phenomenology. He notes:

What does phenomenology’s transcendental self-investigation have to say about this? Nothing less than that the whole problem is inconsistent. It involves an inconsistency into which Descartes necessarily fell, because he missed the genuine sense of his reduction to the indubitable we were about to say: his transcendental epoché and reduction to the pure ego. But, precisely because of its complete disregard of the Cartesian epoché, the usual post-Cartesian way of thinking is much cruder. We ask: Who
then is the Ego who can rightly ask such ‘transcendental’ questions? As a natural man, can I rightly ask them? As a natural man, can I ask — seriously and transcendentally — how I get outside my island of consciousness and how what presents itself in my consciousness as a subjective evidence-process can acquire Objective significance? When I apperceive myself as a natural man, I have already apperceived the spatial world and construed myself as in space, where I already have an Outside Me. 45

For Husserl, natural life cannot even pose the problem of transcendence; we are always out there in the world. It is only a peculiar (and essentially modern) epistemological approach that can raise this question, and it misses the whole point.

In Ideas I, Husserl includes a number of sections where he explains how phenomenology proceeds in immanence and that various forms of transcendence or transcendent entities (‘transcendencies [Tranzenzen]’) have to be excluded. These include God, the ego, and the object understood as a real part of the experience. In this sense what is transcendent is the physical thing which is not a real part of any Erlebnis. For example, he notes that ‘the physical thing is said to be, in itself, unqualifiedly transcendent’. 46 He furthermore elaborates in detail:

Our considerations have established that the physical thing is transcendent to the perception of it and consequently to any consciousness whatever related to it; it is transcendent not merely in the sense that the physical thing cannot be found in fact as a really inherent component of consciousness; rather the whole situation is an object of eidetic insight: With an absolutely unconditional universality and necessity it is the case that a physical thing cannot be given in any possible perception, in any possible consciousness, as something really inherently immanent. 47

According to Husserl, the physical thing is essentially adumbrated in profiles in all forms of perception, and this eidetic truth holds true even for God. The Erlebnis, on the other hand, is always given as it is, and this is what allows phenomenological reflection to lay hold of something absolute and be given once and for all. In the application of the reduction, according to Husserl, various kinds of ‘transcendencies’ have to be excluded including both God and the ego: ‘The transcendency God excluded [Die Transzendenz Gottes ausgeschaltet]’; 48 and the ego is to be reconceived as a ‘transcendency within immanence [eine Transzendenz in der Immanenz]’ 49, since it seems to be present in every experience but also goes beyond that specific experience as it is present in the entire stream of experiences. Even after excluding these elements, Husserl goes on to exclude essences from the experience:
Having excluded individual realities in every sense of the word, we now attempt to exclude all other sorts of ‘transcendencies’ [Transzendenzen].

This attempt concerns the set of ‘universal objects’, of essences. They are also ‘transcendent’ to pure consciousness in a certain manner; they are not found as really inherent within it. Nevertheless, we cannot go on excluding transcendencies without limit; transcendental purification cannot mean an exclusion of all transcendencies since otherwise even though a pure consciousness would indeed remain, there would not remain, however, any possibility of a science of pure consciousness.

These processes of exclusion continue to be found in Husserl’s later writings, especially Cartesian Meditations. But Husserl does not have a clear way of articulating precisely what he means by the manner in which various kinds of intentional object transcend the intentional lived experiences which are directed at them.

**Husserl’s Interpretation of Immanent Consciousness as Absolute Being in Ideas I**

The procedure of reduction is meant to exclude objects that are really transcendent in the old sense and bring in a new way of considering things that asks how they can be constituted in their transcendent features from within consciousness. This seems to be dangerously close to reformulating Herz’s problem within phenomenology. Husserl conceives of the phenomenological reduction as in some sense a reduction to immanence, and, furthermore, within this phenomenologically reduced immanent sphere, we somehow discover the roots of the transcendent world. Husserl writes that ‘within this “original sphere” (the sphere of original self-explication) we find also a “transcendent world”’.  

In the *Cartesian Meditations* and elsewhere, Husserl claims phenomenology operates within an entirely new framing of the contrast between the immanent and the transcendent – a new formulation that owes nothing to the metaphysical tradition. In this regard, both Husserl and Heidegger are seeking a new way of understanding the transcendent. Husserl writes in *Cartesian Meditations*:

> This concept of the transcendental and its correlate, the concept of the transcendent, must be derived exclusively from our philosophically meditative situation … Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts. This ‘transcendence’ is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, despite the fact…
that anything worldly necessarily acquires all the sense determining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, at particular times notably the status of an evidently valid being is one it can acquire only from my own evidences, my grounding acts. If this ‘transcendence’, which consists in being non-really included, is part of the intrinsic sense of the world, then, by way of contrast, the Ego himself, who bears within him the world as an accepted sense and who, in turn, is necessarily presupposed by this sense, is legitimately called transcendental, in the phenomenological sense. Accordingly the philosophical problems arising from this correlation are called transcendental-philosophical.

Transcendence is an intrinsic part of anything worldly. That seems to mean, at least for Husserl, that anything other than conscious processes themselves are given in profiles, are essentially incomplete and are encountered within a horizon of intentional (and hence ‘non-real’) implication. Husserl goes on to distinguish between different forms of transcendence – in particular, distinguishing between the ‘first’ transcendence of physical things and the ‘second’ transcendence of persons. He explicates the phenomenological concept of transcendence in terms of intentional constitution and being somehow generated ‘within the ego’:

Transcendence in every form is a within-the-ego self-constituting beingsense. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being.

Husserl insists on this point: there is no being or sense possible outside of the domain constituted by transcendental subjectivity. He notes:

Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within the ego. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being. The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely nonsense.
Transcendental subjectivity is the ‘universe of possible sense’. It is impossible to postulate something beyond it. Every objectivity is what it is precisely through the constitution of transcendental subjectivity. Husserl is clearly interpreting the transcendental in terms of transcendental idealism.

Heidegger was uneasy with these idealist formulations, which seemed to fall back into the very trap from which phenomenology had been trying to escape. Heidegger is also – and this is very evident in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ – trying to combat the impression that somehow Dasein makes things appear and controls the manner of their appearing. This for Heidegger is too subjectivist an understanding of the peculiar transcendence of Dasein. Heidegger also criticizes Husserl for not having thought through a proper notion of grounding. In ‘Vom Wesen des Grundes’, Heidegger discusses the problem of ‘ground’ by situating it within the problem of the truth of disclosure, and then goes on to say that to understand truth is to raise the question of transcendence: ‘the question about the essence of ground becomes the problem of transcendence’ (VWG, 135). But Husserl did attempt to give a new transcendental account of groundedness and of the factual grounding of the world. Thus, in Erste Philosophie (1923/24), in an essay entitled ‘Kant’s Copernican Revolution and the Sense of such a Copernican Turn in General’, he writes the following:

The question on the part of the human being living in the natural attitude concerning the ground of the fact of this world becomes, in the transcendental internal attitude, the question as to the ground of the being of these factual subjectivities and the constitution of the world taking place in them factually, including that of all factically fulfilled conditions of the possibility of such constitutions. What meaning the concept of ‘ground’ at stake here can have and what it can be which does not let us rest in peace with this fact, that is a new question, which points to a higher level of transcendental research.55

Just as revealing is always accompanied by a concealing, so too Heidegger’s way of conceiving of ‘ground’ always connects it with the notion of the ‘abyss’ (VWG, 174). Furthermore, the manner of apprehending Dasein’s temporal transcendence has to vary depending on whether we are approaching its mode of being from the standpoint of everydayness (das Man) or the standpoint of authentic selfhood.

Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl on Transcendence

In his Marburg lectures in the 1920s, Heidegger already criticizes Husserl’s understanding of immanence and transcendence. Thus, in his discussion of Husserl’s Ideas I in his 1925 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs lectures, Heidegger writes critically of Husserl’s four determinations of
What does Heidegger mean by the transcendence of Dasein

consciousness (GA 20, § 11), which he views as continuing to harbour
metaphysical prejudices despite Husserl’s official pronouncements. These four
determinations of consciousness are:

(1) Consciousness is immanent being.
(2) Consciousness is absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness.
(3) Consciousness is absolutely given in the sense of lacking nothing for
   its existence (‘nulla re indigetadexistendum’).
(4) Consciousness is pure being.

Heidegger finds that all these determinations can be traced back to Descartes,
and he states critically:

The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back [Rückgang] to
the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philoso-

In these 1925 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs lectures, Heidegger
is particularly critical of Husserl’s conception of immanence. He interprets
immanence as meaning being-in-something else: ‘immanence implies … to be
in another [in einem anderen sein]’ (GA 20, p. 142). For Husserl, furthermore,
immanence is understood as a relation that is possible between lived experi-
ences themselves, between the reflecting act and the reflected (GA 20, §11a,
pp. 142-43). The problem is – what kind of relationship is involved here? The
concept of the ‘immanent’ is really the concept of something being related to,
but the nature of this relation has not been clarified.

Heidegger then offers his solution: intentionality must be understood not as
an inner-outer relation (which retains all the problems of the Cartesian way
and also Brentano’s notion of Inexistenz) but as based on transcendence of
Dasein. Dasein already transcends towards the world. In his 1925 lectures,
Heidegger makes interesting remarks about the nature of ‘being-in’ and ‘being-
with [Sein-bei]’. He speaks of the manner in which the snail is in his shell.
When the snail sticks his head out of the shell, he is not now entering the
world, as if he did not belong to it before. Even in his shell, he is out in the

The 1925 discussion in Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs sets the
stage for the bold pronouncements to be found in Being and Time, § 69, enti-
tled ‘The temporality of being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcen-
dence of the world [Transzendenz der Welt]’. Heidegger interprets
intentionality in terms of transendence but then sees transendence as deeply
implicated in the individuality of Dasein. This individuality has to be generated
or constituted through the manner in which each Dasein lives out its temporal
existence. It is worth recording the later enigmatic note that Heidegger wrote
in his copy and which the editors inserted into the *Gesamtausgabe* edition of *Being and Time*: ‘transcendens admittedly not – despite every metaphysical appeal – the scholastic and Greek-Platonic but transcendence as the ecstatic – temporalizing – temporality, as rather “horizon”! Being has covered up being. Transcendence, however, of the truth of Being: the Event of appropriation’ (GA 2, § 7, p. 51n. 2). Heidegger recasts the problem of transcendence as a problem about how Dasein both belongs to the world in a very special sense and also lives out its individual existence:

The ‘problem of transcendence’ cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject comes out to an object, where the aggregate of objects is identified with the idea of the world. Rather we must ask: what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world and objectified as so encountered? This can be answered with recourse to the transcendence of the world – a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizonal foundation. (SZ § 69c, pp. 417–18, 366)

It cannot be said that Heidegger answers the question of the individuality of Dasein in a satisfactory manner in *Being and Time*. Heidegger’s effort to relate intentionality, subjectivity and transcendence continues immediately after *Being and Time*. Thus, in his ‘Vom Wesen des Grundes’, he states unequivocally that ‘to be a subject means to be in and as transcendence’ (VWG, 138). Here, he is more or less repeating the stance that he had already taken in his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* where he writes that ‘intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence. Transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality in its diverse modes’ (GA 24, § 9, p. 91). And in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger also proclaims that ‘to be a subject means to transcend’ (GA 26, § 11, p. 211).

But again, we should be clear – and perhaps this slowly dawned on Heidegger – this interpretation of intentionality in terms of transcendence remains close to Husserl. In his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), from exactly the same period as Heidegger’s writings on the topic, Husserl also speaks of intentionality as involving transcendence:

It is the universal ideality of all intentional unities over against the multiplicities constituting them. In it consists the ‘transcendence’ belonging to all species of objectivities over against the consciousness of them (and in an appropriately altered but corresponding manner, the transcendence belonging to this or that ego of a consciousness, understood as the subject-pole of the consciousness.) If, in spite of this, we still separate immanent from transcendent objects, that can only involve a distinction within this broadest concept of transcendence. In no respect does it alter the fact that likewise the transcendence belonging to the real (the objective in a pre-eminent sense) is constituted in respect of its being and
sense exclusively in the immanent sphere, the sphere of the multiplicities of consciousness, and that the transcendence belonging to the real as such, is a particular form of ‘idealit¨at’ or better, of a psychic irreality; the irreality of something that itself, with all that belongs to it in its own essence, actually or possibly makes its appearance in the purely phenomenological sphere of consciousness and yet in such a manner that it is evidently no real part of moment of consciousness, no real psychic datum.\footnote{58}

But – as Becker will recognize in his 1937 paper – Heidegger begins to associate the transcendence of Dasein more and more with ‘nothingness’ and with grounding understood as the abyss. Thus, in his 1929 ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’ lecture (GA 9, 115, Pathmarks, p. 91), he declares:

Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing [Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts]. Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call transcendence [Dieses Hinaussein ¨uber das Seiende nennen wir Transzendenz]. If in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even toward itself. Without the original manifestation of the nothing, no self-being [Selbstsein] and no freedom.

Dasein’s transcendence means that it is holding itself out in the ‘nothing’ – its grounding comes in being released for grounding. The kind of transcendence which Dasein possesses is precisely its ‘freedom for ground’ (VWG, 165). In terms close to Jaspers, if humans did not have this relation to nothing they could not have ‘self-being’. Something can only be itself if it is open to its ground, which is really transcendent nothingness. Heidegger connects that releasement towards grounding with freedom.

In ‘Vom Wesen des Grundes’, Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of the groundedness of human subjectivity. Here, he connects ‘transcendence’ with intentionality:

If one characterizes all comportment towards beings as intentional, then intentionality is possible only on the grounds of transcendence. Intentionality, however, is neither identical with transcendence nor, conversely, does it itself make transcendence possible. (VWG, 135)

Dasein transcends towards the ‘world’. Transcendence essentially characterizes Dasein as being-in-the-world. How does worldhood manifest itself? Transcendence has a temporal ‘ecstatic’ character: ‘The ecstatic unity of temporality – that is the unity of the “outside-of-itself” [in future, past, present] is the
condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists as its “there” (SZ, § 69, p. 350). For Heidegger, transcendence is always towards the world, but the world is never an object, or even something that can be said to exist. The world, in Heidegger’s notorious phrase, ‘worlds’ [Welt ist nie, sondern weltet] (VWG, 164).

Another constant theme is that transcendence cannot be understood in any religious-Christian-Platonic sense as towards another non-sensory realm or involving any denial of or renunciation of the world. All transcendence is what he calls ‘finite transcendence’. Heidegger also wants to express this finite transcendence in terms of ‘thrownness [Geworfenheit]’ and ‘projection [Entwurf]’. Dasein exists as ‘thrown’ (SZ § 29, p. 134–40). In his later years, especially in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), the concept of transcendence recedes into the background. Heidegger continues to articulate (now more inspired by Nietzsche) a rejection of the two-world theory of Platonized Christianity. Thus, Heidegger writes:

Even when ‘transcendence’ is grasped differently than up to now, namely as surpassing and not as the super-sensible as a being, even then this determination all too easily dissembles what is ownmost to Dasein. For, even in this way, transcendence still presupposes an under and this-side [Unten und Diesseits] and is in danger of still being misinterpreted after all as the action of an ‘I’ and subject. And finally even this concept of transcendence continues to be stuck in Platonism. (Heidegger 1989, GA 65, §199, p. 322)

In Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger also acknowledges that his speaking of ‘human Dasein’ in Being and Time and elsewhere had been misleading – since it suggested there might be another kind of Dasein, e.g., animal or plant Dasein. In fact, only human beings can be Dasein: ‘Da-sein – the being that distinguishes human being in its possibility; thus Dasein then no longer needs the addition “human”’ (GA 65, § 176, p. 301). He also tries to re-interpret his talk in Being and Time of the ‘understanding of Being’ in a way that does not make being in some way ‘subjective’:

Indeed it [understanding of Being] overcomes all ‘subjectivity’ and shifts man into the openness of being, poses him as the one who is exposed to beings (and before that, to the truth of be-ing). (GA 65, p. 303)

In later years, Heidegger sought to eradicate the ‘subjectivism’ that he felt continued to haunt Being and Time. His Kehre or ‘turning’ is also a reversal, from beings to Being, from human willfulness to the ‘sending of Being’. Dasein is now said to ‘unfold in the throw of Being’ (BH, 327). Its selfhood is now something that seems to come from elsewhere and absolutely not from some kind of self-constitution of the ego, as in Husserl, or from the self-knowing of absolute subjectivity, as in Hegel. The problem remains, however, that
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Heidegger gives us no new language with which to articulate this new conception of subjectivity that he is supposed to be advocating. In the later Heidegger, as in the earlier, there is a strong sense that language – and not just the language of metaphysics but the language of thinking – has failed him.\(^{59}\)

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can recognize that Heidegger sees himself as offering a radical re-thinking of the nature of intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. He tries to articulate this notion of ‘transcendence’ in various ways but eventually abandons this language. In fact, as we have shown, Heidegger is not radically going beyond Husserl’s own understanding of the kind of ‘immanent transcendence’ that characterizes the nature of the intentional relation. Both recognize that intentionality is possible only against a backdrop of a world which always is presumed but which is never presented as an object of experience. The relations between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s conceptions of worldhood remain to be explored.

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Notes

4 See Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975 -) 28. Hereafter references to this will be with GA followed by volume number and page number where relevant. Heidegger lectured also on Schelling (1930) and Hegel (1930/1931). See Heidegger GA 32.
5 Christof and Großmann 2009. See also Pöggeler, 2009.
7 See letter of Heidegger to Jaspers, 10 December 1925, in Biemel and Saner, 2003, p. 61.
8 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, is translated in English under the title Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics by Richard Taft, 5th ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

9 See Heidegger, 1989; translated in English under the title Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).


13 ‘Wir nennen das, woraufhin das Dasein als solches transzendiert, die Welt und bestimmen jetzt die Transzendenz als In-der-Welt-sein’.

14 At the outset of Being and Time, Heidegger refers to Being [Sein] as that which, according to Aristotelian philosophy, ‘transcends’ the categories. In this regard, the Scholastics referred to Being as ‘transcendens’ (SZ, § 1, p. 3). The transcendentals are those characteristics of Being that lie beyond every genus (SZ, § 4, p. 14).

15 Heidegger seems to say this more as a kind of statement that is, in one sense, obviously true, and, in another sense, has never been interrogated as to its deeper meaning.

16 Heidegger’s ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ was originally written to the French philosopher Jean Beaufret in 1946 as a response to certain questions put to Heidegger regarding his relations to Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism. In his letter, Heidegger believes ‘humanism’ is an essentially metaphysical position deriving from Roman philosophy that fails to capture what is essential to human existence: ‘Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough’ (BH, p. 330).


18 Scheler, 1928. For the English translation, see Scheler, 2009.

19 Jaspers, 1970, p. 45. For the original German collection, see Jaspers, 1932.

20 Jaspers, 1971, p. 21. For the original German text, see Jaspers, 1938. Although strictly speaking, these written remarks of Jaspers were published after the period we are discussing, Jaspers himself was exploring these issues much earlier than they appear in published form.

21 Jaspers, 1971, p. 76.


24 For an excellent discussion, see Dahlstrom, 2005.

25 See Becker, 1937, pp. 97–104. See also Becker, 1943.

26 See Farber, 1951, p. 20.


28 Becker, 1937, p. 100.

29 Farber, 1951, p. 20.

30 See Becker, 1937, p. 104. It is translated in Farber, 1951, p. 21.

31 Husserl adopted from Descartes (and of course originally from Aristotle) the idea of an ultimate grounding science which is called prima philosophia or ‘first philosophy’.

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Husserl insists that fully clarified transcendental phenomenology (which includes even the ‘phenomenology of phenomenology’) is the ultimate first philosophy.

35 Husserl, 1931. The German text was not published until 1950. See Husserl, 1950.
37 Husserl, 1984, p. 396.
38 Ibid., p. 398.
39 Ibid.
42 Especially in various writings from the period 1906/07, Husserl frequently invokes Kant’s Letter to Herz. See for example, Husserl, 1973b, p. 139. He often alludes to Kant’s formulation in this letter in his mature works. See, for instance, Husserl, 1987.
43 Husserl, 1984, p. 400.
44 Ibid., p. 402.
55 Husserl, 1956, p. 220.
57 Husserl, 1974. For the English translation, see Husserl, 1969.
59 In his ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, Heidegger explains that the third division of Part One of Being and Time was held back because ‘thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics’ (BH, pp. 327–8). However, the ‘other thinking’ of the later Heidegger does not appear to have any adequate way of expressing the meaning of Dasein’s self-being either.

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