EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF HABITUALITY AND HABITUS
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Introduction

The concept of habit enfolds an enormous richness and diversity of meanings. According to Husserl, habit, along with association, memory, and so on, belongs to the very essence of the psychic. Husserl even speaks of an overall genetic “phenomenology of habitualities”. In this paper, as an initial attempt to explicate the complexity of phenomenological treatments of habit, I want to trace Husserl’s conception of habit as it emerged in his mature genetic phenomenology, in order to highlight his enormous and neglected original contribution in this area. I shall show that Husserl was by no means limited to a Cartesian intellectualist explication of habitual action (as commentators such as Bourdieu and Dreyfus have claimed), but attempted to characterize its complexity across the range of human individual, sub-personal, personal, social and collective experience. Habit, as we shall see, for Husserl, is intimately involved in the constitution of meaningfulness (Husserl’s Sinnhaftigkeit) and forms of sense (Sinnesgestalten) at all levels, from the level of perceptual experience, through the formation of the ego, to the development of society, history and tradition, indeed to our whole sense of the harmonious course of worldly life and to the genetic constitution of worldhood as such. Habituality, furthermore, is a key structural principle in the genetic constitution of the transcendental ego itself, as it unfolds as a concrete living and acting person in an intersubjective, cultural and historical world.

Habit in the Contemporary Human Sciences: A Short Survey

The concept of habit (Greek hexis; Latin habitus) has long been recognized by philosophers as playing a central role in human intentional practical activity, in the acquisition and solidification of practical knowledge, and in the formation of character and selfhood. Plato, in his Theaetetus (197a-b), invoking the image of captive birds in an aviary, discusses latent knowledge as a kind of ‘having’ (epistemes heksin) or ‘possessing’ (epistemes ktesin) at one’s disposal; and Aristotle, especially in his Nicomachean Ethics Book Two 1106b, considers disposition or habit (hexis, ethos) to be a key feature of moral action; habitual performing of good actions literally builds ‘character’. In the eighteenth century, habit was again a matter of discussion among the Scottish moralists (e.g. Hutcheson). In his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), for instance, David Hume argues that “Custom or Habit” is a basic “principle of human nature” that allows us to infer causal relations between events, where we
perceive only contiguity, succession, constant conjunction, and so on. Hume writes:

Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.6

Hume then gives habit an extended role beyond the subject in that it is involved in the constitution of the world as meaningful (something which Husserl particularly applauds).

Habit was also a matter of interest to the nineteenth-century psychologists, including William James,7 for whom “habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent”.8 Twentieth-century Anglophone philosophy has discussed habit under the title of ‘knowing how’, which Gilbert Ryle, for instance, presented as a kind of ability, a complex of dispositions.9 Others such as Polanyi or Fodor have preferred to speak in terms of ‘tacit knowledge’,10 whereas Bertrand Russell and others have spoken of ‘knowledge by acquaintance’. Unfortunately, standard accounts of habit in philosophy have traditionally ignored the contribution of Edmund Husserl.11

Habit became an important and recurrent theme in twentieth-century sociology from Max Weber to Pierre Bourdieu.12 Bourdieu13 has discussed what he calls ‘habitus’ in a number of studies, characterizing it as a set of “systems of durable transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures… principles that organize and generate practices and representation”,14 an “acquired system of generative schemes”. Bourdieu sees habitus as an overlooked structuring principle or force, which generates objectively real social distinctions not through deliberate intervention of agents, but through a kind of dispersal. One can think, for instance, of the classifications that have appeared in record shops such that broad differentiations such as ‘rock’, ‘folk’ and so on have been progressively differentiated into ‘heavy metal’, ‘classic rock’, ‘folk-rock’, ‘indie’, ‘world music’ and so on. Bourdieu has been criticized for over-emphasizing the objectivist side and underplaying the role of individual agency in the adoption and promulgation of habits.

In fact, Bourdieu does explicitly acknowledge his debt to Husserl,15 along with the contributions of Alfred Schütz, Max Weber, Marcel Mauss,16 Lévi-Strauss, and Norbert Elias (who discussed psychic and social habitus in the evolution of European manners17). In a 2001 reply to critics, Bourdieu claims that his “aim [is] to integrate phenomenological analysis into a global approach of which it is one phase (the first, subjective phase), the second being the objectivist analysis.”18 He is critical of Husserl for locating habitus within the
domain of conscious subjectivity and for failing to give habit the status of practical knowledge. More generally, Bourdieu believes that phenomenology offers at best a “complicitous description” of the life-world, i.e. a description of surface features that does not uncover the underlying structures and forces at work. Thus he writes that the …prerequisite for a science of commonsense representations which seeks to be more than a complicitous description is a science of the structures which govern both practices and the concomitant representations, the latter being the principal obstacle to the constitution of such a science.

Habit, finally, has resurfaced as a matter of intense interest and debate in the philosophy of action and of the cognitive sciences, where it is often linked with a kind of skilful coping that does not need explicit conscious representation. Hubert L. Dreyfus, for instance, draws liberally on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of motor intentionality and Heidegger’s analysis of everyday being-in-the-world to articulate a conception of everyday expertise, which prioritizes bodily response and claims to avoid a Cartesian intellectualist and representationalist construal. Dreyfus has been drawn into a debate with John McDowell on precisely the amount of conceptuality, deliberation and “responsiveness to reasons” involved in this everyday ‘coping’, or what Aristotle and McDowell call ‘practical intelligence’ or ‘practical wisdom’ (*phronesis*).

Both agree that *habitus* involves a certain degree of generalization (that its practicality and conceptuality is situation-specific), but they disagree about the amount of intelligent purposiveness and awareness involved. Dreyfus argues that, for an expert practitioner, the action must be a form of absorbed coping (where no degree of self-aware ego is prominent), whereas McDowell insists on practice being permeated by a degree of self-awareness. Much depends on the conception of egoic involvement at stake here, and this is one of the issues that Husserl has carefully addressed in his analyses. He maintains, for instance, that self-reflection presupposes an unreflected consciousness. Unfortunately, neither McDowell nor Dreyfus specifically addresses Husserl’s contribution in their debate.

*Disambiguating Different Conceptions of Habit*

Given our brief survey of recent theoretical approaches, it is evident that there is a pressing need for philosophers of mind and action to describe carefully and to distinguish between various kinds of habitual and routine behaviour: between instinctive and reflex reaction, natural corporeal tendency or mannerism, learned and incorporated skill, expert practice, and so on. Habits may be, on the one hand, individual, corporeal, perceptual, and personal, or, on the other hand, social, cultural, collective, historical and traditional. Habits can be good (e.g. daily exercise) or bad (e.g. smoking); there is a historical evolution of habits (e.g. eating habits), and there is a great fixity and resistance to change so that habits may be said to be intensely conservative.
Habit is intimately connected with disposition, the exercise of a skill, the carrying out of routines, and the embodiment of activities such as typing, playing music, dancing, driving, reading and so on, but it is also connected with knowledge, expertise, moral practical wisdom and character. Some commentators, for instance, want to distinguish between habits, properly speaking, which have a degree of purposive intentionality, and other kinds of more ‘automatic’ or ‘mechanical’ behaviour. At least one commentator regards addictions (e.g. alcoholism), compulsions (e.g. obsessive compulsive disorders) and phobias (e.g. claustrophobia) as automatic behaviour rather than habitual action, but the grounds for this classification are somewhat obscure. Perhaps the most focus, as illustrated by the Dreyfus-McDowell debate, has been on whether habitual action requires conscious deliberation and to what extent it is illuminated by recourse to reasons or even some kind of self-awareness. Dreyfus, for instance, quotes Sartre’s famous description of running after a streetcar, when, preoccupied with running and catching the vehicle, there is no ego at play in the activity. These debates show that careful conceptual differentiation is required; right now, the terminology is fluid and the concepts involved are not carefully delineated. But I believe this ought to be carried out on the basis of a highly nuanced and highly self-reflective transcendental phenomenology of habitual action, and the current proposals and differentiations are simply not convincing because they are not grounded in attentive phenomenological description (with attendant exclusion of pre-judgement through the practice of the epoché).

A thorough-going phenomenological account of habit has to acknowledge the different roles played by habit at the individual and the collective levels. From the standpoint of the individual, there is a corporeal or bodily habitus and indeed that is the primary meaning of the term in a medical context (referring to a person’s overall ‘bearing’, ‘form’, how they physically present (Husserl does invoke that notion of Habitus, for instance when he criticizes Theodor Lipps’ understanding of human bodily expressions and talks about expression as a ‘bodily habitus’). Memories, skills, and practical abilities are literally incorporated in the body, in the way we hold ourselves, move our bodies, walk, sit, eat, look weary, adopt a defeated air, and so on. Some people have a more or less ‘innate’, ‘natural’ or ‘given’ sense of balance, an ability to feel their way through water when swimming, a joy in hearing sounds; Husserl speaks of this as belonging to sheer facticity. Such natural senses (proprioceptive, perceptive and other) can of course be isolated and indeed fine-tuned (balance can be tuned by visualization techniques, for instance). Training can build on and amplify these natural abilities and capacities. For Edith Stein, for instance, capacities can be strengthened through “habituation”.

Habit has to be located between reflexive behaviour and intellectually self-conscious deliberate action. It is not to be understood as something merely
mechanical or automatic, a matter of sheer mindless repetition. Nor, as Merleau-
Ponty points out, is habit a matter of intellectual knowledge, an outcome of explicit deliberation or informed by the representation of reasons or ends. Rather it is a kind of embodied praxis that is actually extremely individualized. Each individual has his or her own ‘style’. That is not to say that habit has nothing to do with rational deliberation and intellectual scrutiny. There are intellectual habits – ‘bedding down’ or ‘burning in’ good practices and procedures, e.g. reading a poem every day, learning a new French word, performing the phenomenological epoché, and so on. Developing or changing a habit, moreover, may require deliberation and scrutiny. Giving up or resisting a habit, e.g. smoking, requires the development of new habits, new overriding and deflective routines. It also requires a certain second-order stance towards my first-order instincts: I desire to smoke; I desire to stop smoking; I desire to curb my desire to smoke. Indeed, almost one hundred years ago, Husserl specified these lower and higher order relationships involving habits. In Ideas II he writes:

the personal Ego constitutes itself not only as a person determined by drives…but also as a higher, autonomous, freely acting Ego, in particular one guided by rational motives… Habits are necessarily formed, just as much with regard to originally instinctive behaviour…as with regard to free behaviour. To yield to a drive establishes the drive to yield: habitually. Likewise, to let oneself be determined by a value-motive and to resist a drive establishes a tendency (a “drive”) to let oneself be determined once again by such a value-motive…and to resist these drives.33

Merleau-Ponty and Schütz on Habit and Habituality

The discussion of habit in the broad phenomenological tradition is usually associated with Scheler, Heidegger, Schütz and Merleau-Ponty, rather than Husserl. Among phenomenologists, however, Husserl offers the most detailed discussions of habit and lays the basis for the further interpretations of Merleau-Ponty and Schütz. Despite the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of ‘motor habit’ in Dreyfus’ account of skilful coping, the term ‘habit’ is not particularly prominent in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945).4 Indeed there are only a handful of occurrences of the term ‘habitus’, although Merleau-Ponty does discuss the “habitual body” (corps habituel), with its “body-image” (schéma corporel). According to Merleau-Ponty, habitus has to do primarily with bodily or corporeal insertion in the world (mon insertion dans le monde humain).36 In discussing the case of the phantom limb he distinguishes between the “customary or habitual body” and the “body at present”:

In the case under consideration, the ambiguity of knowledge amounts to this: our body comprises as it were two distinct layers, that of the habit-body and that of the body at this moment. In the first appear manipulatory movements which have disappeared from the second, and the problem how I can have the sensation of still possessing a limb which I no longer have amounts to finding out how the habitual body can act as guarantee for the body at this moment.37
Merleau-Ponty is keen to argue against habit as involving an initial mental act of recognition or the performance of an intellectual synthesis. Rather, “the cultivation of habit is indeed the grasping of a significance, but it is a motor grasping of a motor significance.”38 Here he offers the examples of walking through a doorway without first measuring if one can fit through it, or driving my car through a narrow opening and knowing intuitively that my car will fit through. We essentially incorporate ourselves in the car, into the door, which are not encountered as external objects but rather as instruments expressing my abilities. As Merleau-Ponty summarizes: “Habit expresses our power of dilating our being in the world, or changing our existence by appropriate fleshly instruments.”39

Habit, for Merleau-Ponty, is embodied as a certain kind of capacity for motility (as in the case of the fingers and hands ‘knowing’ where to move when typing), an opening up of a motor space: “it is the body which ‘understands’ in the cultivation of habit”; there is a “harmony” between what is intended and its fulfilment, “between the intention and its performance—and the body is our anchor in a world.”40 The body mediates the world; it constitutes motility,41 indeed in the end the body knows better than us about the world:

A good decade before Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological sociologist Alfred Schütz in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932)43 – again drawing on Husserl’s discussion of ‘types’ – closely associates the notions of habit, habituality, and ‘familiarity’ with typification, according to which our experience is organized around identifiable empirical types, such as ‘dog’, ‘tree’ and so on, that come about through association.44 Schütz later collaborated with the sociologist Thomas Luckmann to offer an extended account of “habitual knowledge” in *The Structures of the Life-World* (1973).45 For instance, one lives in one’s native language in a completely familiar, habitual way; speaking other languages may involve degrees of familiarity. Daily life, for Schütz, consists of mastery of typical, recurrent situations. I meet a dog on the street, and even if its particular breed is unfamiliar, I recognize it as belonging to the ‘type’ dog.46

Following Husserl, Max Scheler in his *Formalism in Ethics and the Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (1913), published in Husserl’s *Yearbook*, also emphasizes habitus in terms both of bodily and of social incorporation. He instances the case of the national Chauvinist who in each country has the same gestures, the same statements, the same opinions.47 Bourdieu has similarly analyzed the ‘habitus’ of life-styles associated with different social classes, groups of scientists, and so on.48
These phenomenologists (especially Schütz, Stein and Scheler) were developing ideas which were in discussion in Husserl’s circle and on which Husserl was writing in his private research manuscripts, many of which also circulated in typescript. Let us turn now to a deeper exploration of Husserl’s analyses of habitual action and comportment (Verhalten), but first a word concerning his technical vocabulary.

A Note on Husserl’s Terminology

Habit is one of Husserl’s “operative concepts”, an appellation his student Eugen Fink invented to label concepts Husserl routinely employs rather than makes explicitly thematic. Indeed, as we shall see below, habit is discussed only infrequently in the works Husserl published during his lifetime. He routinely employs a wide range of terms to express his concept of habit, namely, Gewohnheit, Habitus, Habitualität and, occasionally, ‘the habitual’ (das Habituelle) as a noun. Occasionally he even uses the Greek hexis, and he often speaks quite generally of ‘possession’ (Besitz), or ‘having’ (Habe) of a skill, a routine, or a decision, that has been incorporated and embedded as a trait in one’s character. Most frequently, adjectives meaning ‘habitual’ (gewohnheitsmässig, habituel) are employed to qualify different kinds of intentional behaviour.

In German, as in English, the term ‘Habitus’ can have a quite specific medical meaning to refer to the overall bodily condition, including physique and posture, the way the lived body presents itself, disposition. Husserl also uses ‘Habitus’ to express the concept of ‘demeanour’, ‘comportment’, ‘bearing’, ‘manner’ in so far as this is individually formed through routine actions, sedimented beliefs, personal style, and so on. In this sense, ‘Habitus’ refers to something with a degree of stability and permanence – “abiding habit” (bleibender Habitus).

Generally speaking, Husserl employs the normal German term for ‘habit’ (Gewohnheit) to refer specifically to habits of thought, ways of thinking influenced by science, psychology and so on. Thus, for example, in Ideas I (1913) Husserl speaks of psychological and psychologistic deeply entrenched “habits of thought” (Denkgewohnheiten), including scientific habits of thinking which are accepted without question and which it is the function of the epoché to disrupt.

Husserl often speaks of ‘Habitualitäten’ – dispositions, in the plural. He frequently refers to a person’s “abilities and dispositions” (Vermögen und Habitualitäten): in his Phenomenological Psychology lectures (1925) he speaks of the personal ego as having various abilities and habitualities. Similarly, in his 1927 Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on ‘Phenomenology’ he talks about Habitus in terms of “abilities and habit” (Vermögen und Habitus). Habituality in this sense is usually combined with human personal abilities and
activities to form what Husserl calls an “overall personal style”. Husserl sometimes uses the word ‘dispositions’ (Dispositionen) alongside the notion of ‘abilities’ (Vermögen), and ‘habits’ (Gewohnheiten).65

Habit in the Works Husserl Published During his Life

As we have noted, habit is not encountered frequently in the works Husserl published in his life-time (Logical Investigations, Ideas I, Cartesian Meditations and Crisis of European Sciences). Thus, for instance, the term Habitus does not appear at all in the Crisis of European Sciences; Gewohnheit has only a few occurrences there; and Habitualität probably appears at most about a dozen times. Similarly, the term Habitus appears only twice in the Cartesian Meditations where Habitualität is more common.66 Indeed, Husserl’s readers initially encountered the concept of ‘habit’ and ‘habituality’ primarily through the few references in the Cartesian Meditations (especially sections 27 and 32) and Experience and Judgment. Section 32 of Cartesian Meditations is entitled ‘The Ego as Substrate of Habitualités’ (Das Ich als Substrat von Habitualitäten,67 and this section is drawn on by Bourdieu, for instance. Here Husserl primarily talks about the manner in which a conscious decision (a freely performed act of judging, e.g. ‘I decide to vote for the Green Party’) can become sedimented down into a habitual property attaching to one’s character (I become a Green Party voter) such that the original decision can even be forgotten. This may have given rise to the impression that Husserl primarily understands habitus as functioning in an individual ego and in intellectualist action (as in the sedimentation of active judgments into dispositions). However, habituality as encountered in Husserl’s posthumously published Experience and Judgment (1938) suggests a rather different picture.68 This text appeared just after Husserl’s death, edited by his former assistant Ludwig Landgrebe, who—with the master’s encouragement—selected liberally from among Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts. In this account, there is a much closer focus on the original upsurge of an experience in consciousness (in “primary passivity”, i.e. in original passive experience as opposed to the “secondary passivity” which involves the intervention of the will) and on the gradual settling down of that experience into something that is merely habitually retained, perhaps at the lowest level of sensory experience (e.g. we can get used to the hum of the computer fan and no longer notice it after a while).

For many years, Cartesian Meditations and Experience and Judgment were the main sources where Husserl’s explorations of habituality could be read. However, as a result of the publication of the Nachlass in the Husserliana edition (almost 40 volumes since 1950), we now know that habit is very much in thematic discussion in several of Husserl’s works, most notably in Ideas II (Husserliana volume IV, especially sections 29 and 56), which both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty had read in typescript; in the Intersubjectivity volumes
Delineating the Concept of Habit in Husserl

‘ Habit’, for Husserl, picks out an extraordinary range of complex behaviour, both individual and social, both corporeal and cultural. Habits first and foremost attach to individuals understood as persons: “Each individual has his or her habits” (Jedes Individuum hat seine Gewohnheiten). I am who I am on the basis of my habits. The ego is a “substrate of habitualities”. There are different perceptual manners (Habitus), from simple seeing to the kind of picture-consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) one operates in looking at a painting or postcard of a subject.

For Husserl, in his elaborate and multi-layered analyses, habits operate not just at the level of perceptual experience (where we group similar experiences together in various regulated ways), at the level of the embodied self, but also at the level of judgments and what Husserl calls ‘convictions’ (Überzeugungen). When I make a decision, this is not just an atomic element of my knowledge, but it actually affects my whole self. I become, as Husserl puts it, abidingly thus-and-so decided.

For Husserl, these convictions attach themselves to the ego. I become a Labour-supporter, etc. These convictions become possessions or ‘havings’ of an ego. Having a conviction is not at all the same as remembering that one once decided something. Furthermore, what was decided can be returned to and reactivated without having to run through the associated judgments of evidence. Through these convictions, I have the constituted sense of being as a ‘fixed and abiding personal ego’ (als stehendes und bleibendes personales Ich).

As Husserl puts it in Intersubjectivity volume XIV:

I am not only an actual but I am also a habitual ego, and habituality signifies a certain egoic possibility, an ‘I can’ or ‘I could’, or ‘I would have been able to’, and this ability become actual refers to ego-actualities, to actual ego-experiences, that is, as actualization of ability. In a word, I am (and without this would not be an I, I can not think of myself otherwise), an ego of capacities.

Husserl occasionally talks as if the ego were an empty ‘I-pole’ (Ichpol) that simply guarantees continuities in my experience (in the manner of the Kantian transcendental ego), but in fact, in Cartesian Meditations and elsewhere, he speaks of the fully concrete ego which is always laden with ‘habitualities’ and world-engaging acts. Husserl talks about a “style” (Lebensstil) and indeed an “overall style” (Gesamtstil). Thus, in Cartesian Meditations § 32, Husserl introduces the term habitus as an enduring “state” whereby I can be said to “abide” by my decision. The decision informs me. Through these acquired decisions as convictions I constitute myself as a stable and abiding ego, someone with, Husserl says, “a personal character”. These habits are not just
individual ways of behaving but include lasting decisions, values, and judgments made by an individual that have been adopted in the course of his or her life. In this regard, Husserl says that the word ‘custom’ (Sitte) summarizes this idea of habitual action and behaviour in the social sphere. Overall, as Husserl writes in his *Intersubjectivity* writings, the ego is stabilized by its fixed habits and possessions: “I with my firm habitus, with determinate habits of self-having, acting, thinking and speaking, and so on” (Ich mit seinem festen Habitus, mit bestimmten Gewohnheiten des Sich-gehabens, Wirkens, des Denkens und Redens usw.).

Habitus, moreover, is not just a matter of intellectual attitude or conviction, for it can also be a matter of desire, feeling, or emotion. In this sense, Husserl describes personal love as a “lasting habitus” (dauerender Habitus). Husserl recognizes the complex character of our feelings (Gefühle), as well as our intertwined emotional and affective states (Zustände), acts of empathy, sympathy, love, fellow feeling, and so on, as well as acts of willing (important for our ethical lives). All of these can have a habitual character, a particular style of being lived through.

*Association (Assoziation) and Habit*

According to Husserl’s genetic phenomenological analysis, as we have been emphasizing, habit plays a crucial role on all the different levels of human experience. At the lowest level are the habits associated with our pre-conscious and certainly pre-egoic desires and drives (Triebe). Contrary to the portrayal of Husserl as a Cartesian, in fact Husserl does acknowledge the role of instinct, drives, and what he broadly calls “interests”. He recognizes that something has to awaken consciousness in the first place, that there belongs to it at a most primitive level a passive being-affected but also a kind of reaching out or desire, a focusing of interest, leading to something becoming a “theme” (Thema) for consciousness. Conscious life is a “life of interests” (Interessenleben), beginning with sensuousness and gradually focusing outwards and rising to rational desires. So habituality has a non-cognitive, passive character, but at the higher levels it is penetrated by egoic involvement.

Already in his *Logical Investigations*, the general notion of “association” is discussed (at LU I § 4) as a connection being forced on us between two psychic experiences and not just the co-presence of these experiences in consciousness. Husserl discusses the “associative connections” between similars. There is a “felt mutual belongingness” between experiences. Furthermore, although we never have exactly the same experiences again, Husserl notes that we do speak about having the same wish, the same feeling, and so on. The idea is that we have the same species of feeling, even though the individual tokens of that feeling may be different. While each episode of experiencing is unique, there is a consciousness of identity (an experience of synthesis) across different
individual episodes. But, at this point, Husserl does not explore in greater detail the nature of the intentional processes that go to make up the sense of similarity, identity, and so on.

By 1912, however, as exemplified in Ideas II, Husserl has identified the notion of 'habit' (Gewohnheit), especially in §§54-56 where he is discussing motivation as "the fundamental lawfulness of spiritual life" (Die Motivation als Grundgesetz der geistigen Welt). Here again he explains habit in terms of the functioning of a primitive "association" (Assoziation) which functions unnoticed in our comportment. The seeing of A "reminds" us of the seeing of B; "the similar motivates the similar under similar circumstances". Many years later, in Cartesian Meditations §39, Husserl discusses "association" as a principle of passive genesis. Association is never blindly mechanical for Husserl; intentionality is always involved. The true nature of association can be understood only in terms of eidetic laws, not empirical laws: "association is a fundamental concept belonging to the transcendental phenomenology".

Association is a concept that Husserl takes from the empiricists (specifically Berkeley and Hume) but which he construes as a feature of transcendental life rather than a matter of empirical regularity. In fact, Husserl regularly criticizes Hume and the empiricists for their mechanical concept of association (and Scheler makes similar criticisms in his Formalism in Ethics). Husserl accuses Hume of circularity in attempting to understand habit in terms of causality, while at the same time explaining causality in terms of custom and habit. One has to be careful in linking Husserl’s notion of Habitus or Habitualität too closely to Hume. It has been pointed out that German translations of Ferguson and Hume often rendered ‘custom’ or ‘habit’ as ‘Fähigkeit’ or ‘Art’. Husserl himself usually employs Gewohnheit in reference to Hume’s ‘habit’, e.g. he characterizes Hume as talking about the empirical-psychological laws of “association and habit” (Assoziation und Gewohnheit) as regulating experience. Indeed, Husserl had already recognized Berkeley as explaining natural causality in terms of habitual association and "expectation" (Erwartung). For Husserl, Hume is a philosopher who explains the laws of nature in terms of laws of habit which simply belong to human nature as such.

Particularly in his mature writings (especially in his Passive Synthesis lectures and Experience and Judgment) Husserl portrays association and passive synthesis as operating across the whole of psychic life, but as particularly dominant at the pre-predicative level. There are various kinds of association. One is a kind of part-whole synthesis. In Passive Synthesis he writes:

The part ‘demands’ the whole—something uniform awakens something else that is uniform, which is not yet at all constituted as a unity explicitly for itself; and it does not demand the whole by a pure and simple awakening, but rather by a co-connected ‘expectation,’ by the demand as coexisting as co-belonging to the unity. Even the force of this apperceptive expectation increases with the number of “instances”—or with habit, which amounts to the same thing.
Husserl is primarily concerned with our perceptual experiences of physical objects which are always given with a profile (Abschattung), which itself points towards and links with other possible available profiles delineated in advance by the overall horizon. Similarly, each temporal mode of the ego couples with the previous and the following ones. There are sensed continuities at the very heart of experience. Husserl in his Passive Synthesis lectures attempts to get at these basic sensed continuities, similarities and so on. At the lowest level, similar circumstances call for similar actions. When I see something, something vague stimulates me to get up and take a closer look: “Something reminds me of something else that is similar, and the similarity prods me to compare and distinguish them.”

Husserl speaks of an “entire realm of association and habits”. Most motivation is buried deep in the psyche such that perhaps it can be found only by something like psychoanalysis. There is something Husserl calls ‘passive motivation’. He describes habit as the ‘first law’: if one once believed something there is a tendency to continue to believe it, to take it up again as true. This kind of habitual motivation is not the same as active position-taking which involves the ego and which the ego must take possession of and direct.

The lowest desires and drives are not, properly speaking, acts of the ego; they do not belong to what Husserl, following Kant, calls our “spontaneity” in the full sense. He speaks of the “living and striving” (leben und streben) of the conscious self, where the element of ‘striving’ refers to the drives and interests of consciousness. The primary striving of consciousness is towards sustaining life itself: “my being is self-preservation”. Husserl analyses the complex layerings of our pre-predicative life, our drives, our being affected, our being drawn towards certain things through a kind of “attraction”, “stimulus” or “allure” (Reiz), our “habits”, “convictions”, “attitudes”, and other “sedimentations”. But besides considering the unacknowledged horizons of cognitiones as belonging to the unconscious, Husserl is more usually focused on the manner in which our conscious products settle down or sediment into convictions which I hold but which I do not consciously have to frame (the domain usually referred to as ‘pre-conscious’).

Husserl acknowledges these more or less unconscious instincts, but his main point seems to be that the appearing world is already a pre-given world appearing to a certain highly structured embodied set of sensuous perceivings. He speaks of a certain “affectedness” (Affektion) of the senses and pays attention to the manner in which this already predisposes the object to appear in a certain way. He also recognizes that these instinctive drives are layered over and appear in higher forms in more complex conscious acts. But overall, in his work it is the structure of conscious life that is the primary focus of his attention.

In his discussion of “habitualities” (Habitualitäten) in Experience and Judgment Husserl emphasizes that no experience is ephemeral, but rather leaves
some kind of lasting “trace” (Spur). Even a conviction repudiated is still a conviction-that-once-was-believed. This trace becomes accommodated into a habituality which eventually has the character of an “empty” practical possessing. These habitualities are precisely not memories. They may even have been forgotten; certainly the original awakening moments, Urstifungen, can be forgotten. Nevertheless, a new sense or meaning has been acquired, an object (substrate) is perceived with certain properties (explications). Thus he writes:

No apprehension is merely momentary and ephemeral. To be sure, as this lived experience of the apprehension of a substrate and an explicate, it has, like every lived experience, its mode of original emergence in the now, to which is adjointed its progressive sinking (Herabsinken) into corresponding non-original modes: retentional reverberation and, finally, submersion (Versinken) into the totally empty, dead past (leere, unlebendige Vergangenheit). This lived experience itself, and the objective moment constituted in it, may become “forgotten”; but for all this, it in no way disappears without a trace (spurlos); it has merely become latent. With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a possession in the form of a habitus (ein habitueller Besitz) ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active association... The object has incorporated into itself the forms of sense (Sinnesgestalten) originally constituted in the acts of explication by virtue of a knowledge in the form of a habitus (als habituelles Wissen).  

Husserl emphasizes that this level of primary association happens already at the pre-egoic level of passivity (Passivität). We are at the lowest level of egoic activity, not at all at the level of the full conscious person. Experiences are awakened in us, something (a new noise or smell) is experienced against the background of the unnoticed familiar, and has the effect of being a “stimulus” or “allure” (Reiz) on the conscious ego that apprehends it. In apprehending the stimulus, the ego turns towards it and its ‘interest’ is awakened. In *Experience and Judgment* and elsewhere Husserl offers a deep and careful account of how primary “awakening” experiences become registered in a way that they eventually are incorporated (like a snowball gathering snow as it is rolled across the snow-covered lawn) and become a lasting possession. There is a genuine sense of *Habitus* here as evolving downwards from alert experience into somnolent lasting tradition.

**Social Habituality, Normality and ‘Tradition’**

Indeed, crucially, as we have been insisting, Husserl talks of habituality not just in relation to the formation of the individual person and character but also in relation to the social and cultural spheres, the sphere of “spirit” (Geist). In this regard, in a text from 1921/1922 Husserl speaks not only of the habituality that belongs to the “single ego” (Einzel-Ich), but also of “a social habituality” (eine Gemeinschaftshabitualität) which may also be called a ‘tradition’ (eine Tradition). This social and collective character is crucial, as we have seen, for the manner in which the concept of habitus is taken up by Bourdieu. For Bourdieu, habitus produces individual and collective practices; it is a more or less anonymous collective system for instituting, passing along, and stabilizing practices in a society. Habit, as Boudieu puts it (following Aristotle), gets
“internalized as second nature”; it becomes a “state of the body” not a “state of
mind", and gets “forgotten as history”. In this sense, for Bourdieu, habitus
becomes a kind of “incorporation”, a bodily instantiation of a routine, but also
a kind of social production and reproduction (class-based habitus might include
a tendency to opt for fast food as opposed to home cooking, and so on). Indeed,
in pre-literate societies, it is precisely the body that incorporates cultural habitus:
in the pre-literate societies “inherited knowledge can only survive in the
incorporated state”. Bourdieu stresses the anonymous, passive and
conservative nature of habitus and, in declared opposition to his version of
Husserl, downplays the role of individual agents in the generation of habitus.

Husserl describes how reflective higher-level states arise out of lower pre-
reflective states. He acknowledges that both individuals and social and ethnic
groupings have their own habitus. Thus he writes about shared physical
similarities: “we count races in this way in so far as the commonality of outer
physical habitus goes hand in hand with social characteristics”. We recognize
people on the basis of familiar patterns, family resemblances (including physical
traits), social typicalities, and so on – precisely those schemata, sometimes
called “stereotypes” (not necessarily in a prejudicial sense) by psychologists.
The ego does not constitute itself through reflection but through living
through its interests which are directed away from itself towards the world. The
ego arises out of ‘life’:

Husserl here is struggling to articulate (using, perhaps unfortunately, the stale
language of the “ego” and “life”) a dynamic conception of selfhood as lived
out: “The ego exercises itself; it habituates itself”; it acquires capacities, sets
itself goals. I learn to play the piano but I set myself the goal of playing better.
Moreover, personal development is influenced by other people: “Others’
thoughts penetrate into my soul”. On this point, Husserl says that one acquires
the habitus of others, more or less as one takes over a habitus in the individual
sphere. He offers his own version of Heidegger’s ‘das Man’ experience:

Besides the tendencies which proceed from other individual persons, there are demands which
arise in the intentional form of indeterminate generality, the demands of morality (Sitte), of
custom (des Brauchs), of tradition, of the spiritual milieu: ‘one’ judges in this way („man”
urteilt so), ‘one’ has to hold his fork like this, and so on,—i.e. demands of the social group, of
the class, etc. They can be followed quite passively, or one can also actively take a position
with regard to them and make a free decision in favour of them.
Husserl has been criticized by Habermas and others for downplaying the normativity inherent in the life-world. In his *Theory of Communicative Action* Habermas acknowledges that he borrowed his concept of the life-world from Husserl and Schütz, and is impressed by its “always already there” character of immediate certainty, its culturally transmitted and linguistically structured character. Roughly speaking, for Habermas, the life-world is the horizon within which human agents act. Society can be conceived in terms of the activities of agents or simply as a self-regulating system. The systematic approach tends to neglect the roles of individual agents. Habermas moves away from Husserl’s emphasis on “the philosophy of consciousness” to emphasize the importance of the life-world as the background for mutual understanding, for action, and for the development of communicative rationality.

For Habermas, the social world is mediated, materially reproduced, and symbolically structured. It can also be colonized by different processes, including economic ones, which he labels “system” (drawing on systems theory), leading to a distortion of communication, reification and alienation. Habermas focuses on the manner in which the life-world has to reproduce itself through socialization, communication, integration, stabilization and so on. The life-world underpins communicative action but “systems” (including that of scientific technicity) tend to distort the life-world.

I believe that Habermas—and Bourdieu—neglect the role of “normality” and “optimality” as repeatedly discussed by Husserl (e.g. in *Ideas* II in regard to the normalities and optimalities involved in perception, where, for instance, we take the colour of an object to be as it appears in bright daylight but without reflection). For Husserl, normality (*Normalität*) expresses how the world is necessarily given in a horizon of familiarity. Various objects encountered are revealed in experience through the unity of present, past and future, with the remembered experience delineating an essential order according to which we expect to experience new objects (Husserl’s pre-conception, *Vorgriff*, *Vorhabe*). Everything presented to experience is characterized as ‘normal’ (according to an outlined ‘style’) or ‘abnormal’ (where there is a break or disruption of the pre-delineated intentions or expectations). This concept of normality is extremely broad and deals not only with the way in which an individual subject experiences worldly objects, but expresses in particular the manner of givenness of the intersubjective world with its normal course or flow of harmonious confirmations. Normality is experienced as “concordance” (*Einstimmigkeit*) with regard to perceptual objects, or, as practical familiarity with certain experiences and circumstances, or, again, as lack or deficiency of certain faculties and capacities. With reference to the life-world, Husserl explicates the relationship between normality and abnormality as the experience of the “homeworld” (*Heimwelt*) or “nearworld” (*Nahwelt*) versus the “alienworld”.
Communal life, language, and so on is lived according to the familiar habits and traditions shared by a community or culture: the homeworld. Moreover, the different senses of normality can be interwoven, and have an interrelatedness. Congenital blindness, for example – an example actually given by Husserl – may be lived as normal (perhaps within a family or social group that shares this condition) and at the same time it presents something abnormal, as compared with others who have something that for the blind person is unknown. Habit is responsible for the organization of experience into horizons of familiarity and unfamiliarity and indeed for the whole process of the sedimentation of culture as tradition into something like a history (the theme of Husserl’s *Crisis, Origin of Geometry* and other late writings).

**Habitus and the Style of Nature**

Finally, it is important to understand that for Husserl, habituality is a constituting structure and principle (and, despite his own reservations, Bourdieu’s way of describing it as a structuring principle aptly captures Husserl’s intention) at work not just in the constitution of our personal, social and cultural worlds, but also in the very manner in which *nature* appears. In the discussion of modern Galilean physics in *Crisis* §9, for instance, the term ‘habit’ (*Gewohnheit*) is used in quite a specific sense to express the course of the world itself. Husserl speaks of causation in the natural and human world as having its own routine way of proceeding, its ‘habit’:

> The things of the intuited surrounding world (always taken as they are intuitively there for us in everyday life and count as actual) have, so to speak, their “habits” (*Gewohnheiten*)—they behave similarly under typically similar circumstances. If we take the intuitable world as a whole, in the flowing present in which it is straightforwardly there for us, it has even as a whole its “habit,” (*Gewohnheit*), i.e., that of continuing habitually as it has up to now. Thus our empirically intuited surrounding world has an empirical over-all style.119

The world as a whole has a habituality. Husserl speaks of nature’s “universal causal style” (*der universale Kausalstil*).120 Likewise in his *Phenomenological Psychology* lectures (1925), he speaks of the *habitus* or overall regular pattern of causation in the natural world.121 There is a kind of typicality and regularity attaching to the world of nature. Of course this regularity of nature does not manifest the strict uniformity and the necessity found in the mathematical scientific modelling of nature. The course of nature is typical but has exceptions; it settles down into a regular course of what in general happens, what is typical, and so on. Husserl is insistent therefore that the natural world—and not just the social world—discloses itself through habitualities.

**Habit as the Possession of an Attitude**

In an even larger sense, habit is also understood by Husserl as the manner in which an overall “attitude” or “stance” or “collective mindset” (*Einstellung*) is lived through. Interestingly, this is the primary meaning of habit (*Habitus*,...
Gewohnheit) as Husserl discusses it in his 1910/1911 Logos essay ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’. There, Husserl writes of ‘habitus’ as an overall disposition of, for instance, a natural scientific researcher:

In keeping with their respective habits of interpretation (herrschenden Auffassungsgewohnheiten), the natural scientist is inclined to regard everything as nature, whereas the investigator in the human sciences is inclined to regard everything as spirit, as a historical construct, and thus both thereby misinterpret whatever cannot be so regarded.

Similarly, he claims that “It is not easy for us to overcome the primeval habit (die urwüchsige Gewohnheit) of living and thinking in the naturalistic attitude and thus of naturalistically falsifying the psychical.” And again:

Experience as personal habitus is the precipitation of acts of natural, experiential position-taking that have occurred in the course of life (Erfahrung als persönlicher Habitus ist der Niederschlag der im Ablauf des Lebens vorangegangenen Akte natürlicher erfahrender Stellungnahme). This habitus is essentially conditioned by the way in which the personality, as this particular individuality, is motivated by acts of its own experience and no less by the way in which it takes in foreign and transmitted experiences by approving of or rejecting them.

There is, furthermore, a difference between the habit (Habitus) of the natural man in his daily living, and that of the phenomenologist. The mature Husserl has a sense of habitus as forming an essential part of the character or attitude of natural life and also of expressing the self-consciously adopted stance of the phenomenologist. Husserl speaks of the “theoretical habitus” of the scientist and philosopher and even of the “habitus of the epoché”. In a supplement written around 1924 to the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Husserl writes:

The habitus of the phenomenological epoché is a thematic habitus, for the sake of obtaining certain themes, the discoveries of theoretical and practical truths, and to obtain a certain purely self-contained system of knowledge. This thematic habitus, however, excludes to a certain extent the habitus of positivity. Only in its being closed off to the latter does it lead to the self-contained unity of phenomenology as “first” philosophy, the science of transcendental pure subjectivity.

He contrasts the “phenomenological habitus” of personal self-observation to the more usual habitus of anonymous living in the natural attitude. In this sense, habitus expresses the manner in which stance-taking is informed by a certain discipline or practice of viewing and considering. In the phenomenological reduction, the habitual survives but in altered form. As Husserl puts it in his Intersubjectivity volume XIV: “But through the phenomenological reduction, I put the world out of validity, only my world-experiencing, my world-believing, my world-vouching, my corresponding habituality and so on, remain available but now as purely subjective.”

In its normal course of the natural attitude, life is lived habitually. The natural attitude is an attitude that obscures itself and remains unknown to itself. It is an attitude with blinkers (Scheuklappen) on, as Husserl often says. It can therefore only be brought to light by a radical “alteration of attitude” (Einstellungsänderung). But, nota bene, the natural attitude as a habitus remains available in the light of the new attitude; it is not negated or invalidated.
Furthermore, Husserl (and many other philosophers of the period including Scheler) maintained that the natural attitude preoccupied human culture for millennia until it was awoken from its dogmatic slumbers by the breakthrough of philosophy with its discovery of the purely theoretical attitude.\textsuperscript{130} In the natural attitude, a particular habituality inhabits and permeates our own first-person bodily experience, our experience of temporality, our attitude towards physical objects, space, time, causation, personhood, continuity of existence of entities, the whole manner in which the world is presented as surrounding world, familiar world, and so on. There is a “general thesis” (Generalthesis) or universal positing in operation which includes an overall presumption of actuality, of being really there. It is from within this context of the natural attitude and of regular flowing life that any understanding of phenomenology must begin. Phenomenology steps sideways to observe the flow of life, rather as the cinema buff having initially been absorbed in the flow of the story on screen, then shifts her gaze to the flow of givenness, the manner in which shots are taken, how long they are, etc. Ultimately, for Husserl, the whole “world” becomes understood not as static “being in itself” but as the harmonious flow, consolidating, and confirmation of experiences in their respective contexts and horizons. The world’s habitualities are revealed as correlated and in tune with the habitualities of human subjects. We experience the world in a typical manner, the world has an ongoing and enduring significance for us.\textsuperscript{131}

Conclusion

Clearly, in this paper we have only scratched the surface of Husserl’s complex accounts of habit, dispersed across his writings. He does not offer a theory of habit and habituality as such (and certainly not one that involves explanation in the manner of the positive sciences);\textsuperscript{132} rather he identifies and describes the manifestations and workings of habit at different levels in conscious experience, from the habituality of drives and instincts, through the perceptual and motor intentionality of the embodied subject, on to the collective forms of habit experienced in society and which he summarizes under the notion of “tradition”. Although Bourdieu believes he is departing from Husserl’s naïve and overly subjective descriptions, in fact the French sociologist is articulating quite precisely the kinds of generative structures to which Husserl himself drew attention. Bourdieu does not fully appreciate that Husserl’s account of habituality belongs within his overall “genetic phenomenology”. This is a phenomenology which has to give an account not just of the “static” constitution of the world, but of the coming-to-be of constituted meanings. It involves a new procedure of “retrogression” (Rückgang),\textsuperscript{133} “regressive inquiry” (Rückfragen),\textsuperscript{134} a “destruction” or “de-construction” (Abbau)\textsuperscript{135} of our constituted experience to uncover a domain of constituting operations that include the passive syntheses of association and the overall functioning of habituality.
Similarly, Hubert Dreyfus presents his Heidegger- and Merleau-Ponty-inspired account of absorbed coping as a deliberate overcoming of Husserl’s supposedly Cartesian philosophy of consciousness and representationality, whereas in fact the mature Husserl recognizes the complexity of “functioning intentionality” working anonymously, and has himself described the kind of embodied habitus (leiblicher Habitus) which is later described in more detail by Merleau-Ponty.

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References

4. It has been suggested that hexis in Greek never means mindless routine but suggests a degree of awareness and self-possession in action. Aristotle also uses both hexis and ‘ethos’ and some have suggested that hexis is better rendered by disposition while ethos is translated as ‘habit’. However, in the tradition, hexis was translated as habitus in Latin whereas ethos was translated consuetudo.
11. Husserl is, for example, omitted from Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, eds, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010).


24. See *Ideas II* § 57.

accommodate Husserl, see Carleton B. Christensen, ‘From McDowell to Husserl and Beyond’, *Self and World—From Analytic Philosophy to Phenomenology* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 362-379.


28. See Hua XIII 76. In this sense, certain gestures, facial expressions, mannerisms of various kinds exemplify an individual’s style.


30. See *Ideas II* § 61.


32. See *Ideas II* § 61.

33. *Ideas II* § 59, p. 267; Hua IV, p. 255, translation modified.


35. PP 82/97. There are four occurrences of ‘*habitus*’ in this text: PP 137/160; 293/339; 327/377. Merleau-Ponty speaks both of a bodily and a cultural *habitus*. He also speaks more generally about ‘habit’ (‘*habitude*’).

36. PP 293/339.

37. PP 82/97-98.

38. PP 143/167.

39. PP 143/168.

40. PP 144/169.

41. See PP 146/172.

42. PP 238/275-76.


50. Husserl is not particularly consistent in his terminology. The term ‘Gewohnheit’, for instance, does not occur at all in Cartesian Meditations.

51. The term ‘Habitus’ occurs in byday German, formed from the Latin, and has the meaning of ‘manner’ or even ‘mannerism’, e.g. he has a funny manner’ (Er hat einen komischen Habitus). I am grateful to Sebastian Luft for pointing this out.

52. See Hua XIV 195.


55. Hua XIV 195.

56. See Hua VII 145.


58. Ideas I p. xix; III/1 5; see also § 108. See also Phen. Psych. § 5 (Hua IX 55) where Husserl speaks of the ‘habits (Gewohnheiten) of natural scientific thinking’. He speaks of such Denkgewohnheiten also at § 24 IX 142, where these scientific habits have been transferred to psychology.

59. Ideas I § 33. By contrast, Ideas I mentions ‘Habitus’ only once at § 96; III/1 224, where Husserl speaks in a positive sense of the phenomenological ‘habit of inner freedom’.


62. Hua IX 278; 315.

63. See e.g. Crisis § 67.

65. See CM p. 66; Hua I 100.
67. Hua XIV 230.
68. See Hua XXIII 38.
69. CM § 32.
70. CM § 32, p. 67; Hua I 101.
72. CM § 54.
73. Hua IV 277.
74. CM § 32, p. 67; Hua I 101.
76. Hua XIII 244.
77. Hua XIV 172.
80. LU II § 34.
81. Ideas II §56, p. 236; IV 225
83. CM § 39.
85. See Husserl, Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge (1906-1907), § 51, pp. 346-47; Hua 350-351.
87. Hua VII 173; 179, 180.
88. Hua VII 151.
89. See Hua VII 354.
91. APS § 41, p. 240; XI 190.
92. See Hua IX 412.
93. Ideas II § 55, p. 229; IV 217
94. Ideas II § 55 (b), p. 233; Hua IV 222.

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95. *Ideas* II, p. 234; Hua IV 222.
96. See Hua IV 223.
97. Hua XXIII 459.
98. Hua XV 367.
99. Max Scheler, on the other hand, took notice of Freud and Nietzsche right from the start in his phenomenological analyses of moods, feelings and the affective life in general.
100. *Experience and Judgment*, § 25 p. 122; *Erfahrung und Urteil*, p. 137.
101. EU § 15.
102. EU § 17.
106. See XIV 183: 'Die Rasse rechnen wir hierher, sofern die Gemeinsamkeit des äußeren physischen Habitus Hand in Hand geht mit derartigen Gemeinschaftscharakteren'.
108. *Ideas* II 58, Hua IV 252: 'Ich bin das Subjekt meines Lebens, und lebend entwickelt sich das Subjekt; es erfährt primär nicht sich, sondern es konstituiert Naturgegenstände, Wertsachen, Werkzeuge etc. Es bildet, gestaltet als aktives primär nicht sich, sondern Sachen zu Werken. Das Ich ist ursprünglich nicht aus Erfahrung — im Sinne von assoziativer Apperzeption, in der sich Einheiten von, Mannigfaltigkeiten des Zusammenhanges konstituieren, sondern aus Leben (es ist, was es ist, nicht für das Ich, sondern selbst das Ich).'
109. *Ideas* § 60 c, pp. 281-282; Hua IV 269. These passages clearly show that Husserl was thinking of habitus in the way in which it is developed by sociologists such as Elias and Bourdieu, as well as identifying the *das Man* character that Heidegger discusses in *Being and Time*.
114. See, for instance, *Experience and Judgment* § 46 and § 93.
115. See especially *Ideen* II § 52 and § 59.
116. See *Experience and Judgment*, § 21.
117. See *Ideen* II, § 59.
118. See *Cartesian Meditations*, § 55.
119. *Crisis* § 9b, p. 31; VI 28. 'Die Dinge der anschaulichen Umwelt (immer genommen so, wie sie anschaulich in der Lebensalltäglichkeit für uns da sind und uns als Wirklichkeiten gelten) haben sozusagen ihre „Gewohnheiten“, sich unter typisch ähnlichen Umständen ähnlich zu verhalten. Nehmen wir die anschauliche Welt im Ganzen in der strömenden Jeweiligkeit, in welcher sie für uns schlicht da ist, so hat sie auch als ganze ihre „Gewohnheit“, nämlich sich gewohnheitsmäßig so wie bisher fortzusetzen’.
120. *Crisis*, p. 345; Hua VI 358.
121. See *Phen. Psych.*, § 14.

123. PRS p. 253/294; Hua XXV 8-9.
124. PRS p. 271/314; Hua XXV 31.
125. PRS p. 284/329; XXV 48.
126. Hua XXVIII 402.
127. Hua XIII 208.

129. See Hua XIV 399: ‘Aber durch phänomenologische Reduktion setze ich die Welt außer Geltung, nur mein Welterfahren, mein Weltglauben, -ausweisen, meine entsprechende Habitualität usw. bleibt erhalten, eben als rein Subjektives’

130. See Crisis Hua VI 331.
131. See Hua XV 55.
132. Indeed, Bourdieu’s articulation of habitus has been criticized as lacking theoretical rigour and even for being a kind of deus ex machina invoked to solve certain problems.

133. EU § 12.
134. Crisis § 53.
135. See EU § 12.