EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

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Phenomenology as a way of seeing and as a movement

Phenomenology may be characterised initially in a broad sense as the unprejudiced, descriptive study of whatever appears to consciousness, precisely in the manner in which it so appears. Phenomenology as thus understood emerged as an original philosophical approach at the end of the nineteenth century in the school of Franz Brentano, and was developed by Edmund Husserl and his successors to become a major tradition of philosophising throughout the world during the twentieth century. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it continues to offer a vibrant and challenging alternative to contemporary naturalistic accounts of consciousness and meaning.

Phenomenology is usually characterised as a way of seeing rather than a set of doctrines. In a typical formulation, the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), in his late work Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936 – hereafter Crisis), presents phenomenology as approaching ‘whatever appears as such’, including everything meant or thought, in the manner of its appearing, in the ‘how’ (Wie) of its manifestation. Similarly, Husserl’s colleague and protégé Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) could proclaim in his methodological discussion of phenomenology at the beginning of his Being and Time (1927), section 7: “The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a methodological conception. This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research” (SZ § 7, 27; 50).

This approach involves the practice of taking a fresh unprejudiced look – i.e. untainted by scientific, metaphysical, religious or cultural presuppositions or attitudes – at the fundamental and essential features of human experience in and of the world.

According to Husserl’s own slogan, phenomenology aimed to return to ‘the things themselves’, avoiding constructivist system-building so prevalent in traditional philosophy, or reasoning on the basis of some preconceived and uninterrogated starting-point (as traditional rationalisms and empiricisms were wont to do). Instead, fundamental philosophical issues are examined through attention to the manner in which things and meanings show themselves, come to self-evidence, or come to be ‘constituted’ for us, as Husserl put it, invoking a concept from the Kantian tradition. The phenomenological approach is primarily descriptive, seeking to illuminate issues in a radical, unprejudiced manner, paying close attention to the evidence that presents itself to our grasp or intuition. Husserl frequently speaks of phenomenological description (Beschreibung, Deskription) as clarification (Klärung), illumination...
(Erhellung), enlightenment (Aufklärung), even as conceptual analysis (Begriffsanalyse), whatever assists in elucidating the meaning of the phenomenon in question without resorting to purely causal or ‘genetic’ explanation (Erklären). Due to its concern to treat the phenomenon concretely in all its fullness, phenomenology stands opposed to naturalism, scientism and reductionism, and to all forms of explanation that draw attention away from the manner of the appearance of the phenomena in question. Or, as the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) put it, phenomenology seeks to restore the richness of the world as experienced; it wants to be present at the birth of the world for us.

It is important to grasp the difference between the phenomenological approach and other kinds of scientific approach, for example, the psychological, physiological or causal-explanatory approaches prevalent in the natural sciences. Husserl insisted on this point, but it still gives rise to endless confusion. First of all, Husserl is emphatically not challenging the importance, necessity or validity of explanatory scientific accounts. Investigations into the physical and chemical nature of the brain and its processing are a necessary part of science. But that is not the function of a phenomenological description, which is a mode of approach that can be used in all areas of science, but which specifically focuses on the manner objects are constituted in and for subjects. It focuses on the structure and qualities of objects and situations as they are experienced by the subject. What Husserl calls the paradox or mystery of subjectivity – as the site of appearance of objectivity – is its theme.

Phenomenology aims to describe in all its complexity the manifold layers of the experience of objectivity as it emerges at the heart of subjectivity. It is critical of all forms of objectivism that attend only to what appears and not to the relation of the appearing to the subject. Put in another and perhaps less satisfactory way, phenomenology describes, in its own terms, the essential and irreducible nature of the experience of consciousness in the world – less satisfactory, because the appeal to consciousness can hardly avoid invoking the spectre of Cartesianism, with its ghostly isolated subject and its problematic dualism (and for this reason Heidegger tended to avoid the term ‘consciousness’ altogether). In fact, however, in their attempt to do justice to the essential and irreducible relations between human comportment and the world, phenomenologists seek to overcome the traditional dichotomies of modern philosophy, especially the subject–object distinction of traditional epistemology, with its attendant account of knowledge as a representation of the object immanent in the subject.

Husserl insisted that phenomenology as the fundamental science of all sciences had to be presuppositionlessness, i.e. its descriptions had to avoid the presumptions both of the modern philosophical and the scientific traditions. Of course, this claim to a presuppositionless starting-point is itself highly problematic and soon came under scrutiny within the phenomenological movement. Given the historically rooted nature of human knowledge, the total absence of all presupposition would be impossible in a science, and thus what is aimed at is, at best, as Gadamer has suggested, freedom from undisclosed prejudices. In fact, the manner in which phenomenological description had to come to terms with the recognition that some presuppositions are necessary for any form of understanding led to the fusion of phenomenology with the older discipline of hermeneutics, the art or practice of interpretation, beginning with Heidegger, who, as we shall discuss below, drew on the hermeneutical tradition of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Wilhelm
Dilthey (1833–1911), and continuing with the explicitly hermeneutical orientations of, for instance, the contemporary German thinker Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900) and the contemporary French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (b. 1913).

Husserl cherished his own role as founder of a new science, even characterising himself as a Moses leading his people to new land of what he came to call – invoking the language of German Idealism – *transcendental subjectivity*, i.e. the a priori structure and content of object-constituting subjectivity. Husserl also liked to see himself as a radical follower of the French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), who sought to provide the sciences with a secure epistemological foundation, immune from all sceptical doubt, by starting with the unshakable truth of one’s self-presence in each act of one’s own thinking, expressed in his *cogito ergo sum*. Husserl sometimes portrayed his own efforts as a revival of the Cartesian project of founding the sciences on strict certainty, an attempt to explore the essence of the *cogito* without falling prey to naïve metaphysical assumptions involving substance, as he believed Descartes had. Thus he characterised phenomenology as “the secret nostalgia of all modern philosophy” in his programmatic 1913 work *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (*Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book* – hereafter *Ideas I).* In other words, phenomenology actually provided the secure science sought by Descartes and by Kant (whom Husserl also criticised for getting lost in a purely speculative faculty psychology). Husserl’s best-known formulation of his transcendental idealist analysis of the structures of consciousness came in his *Cartesian Meditations*. First published in French translation in 1931, it remains the most popular introduction to his work. But, over the course of his long career, and in various universities in which he worked, Husserl characterised the essence of phenomenology in many different ways. While his official theoretical allegiance was to a radicalised form of transcendental idealism, his research manuscripts suggest other ways of developing phenomenological themes, often with more attention to corporeality, intersubjectivity and the experience of otherness or alterity. Thus, in *Crisis*, Husserl was drawn to analyse the ‘life-world’ (*Lebenswelt*), which is indissolubly linked with and grounds human experience, the analysis of which offered a corrective to the reductive scientism which Husserl felt had become enmeshed in the modern scientific outlook and practice. As more of Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts finally see the light of day, new dimensions of phenomenology are being uncovered, which are attracting renewed attentions from philosophers worldwide.

For Husserl, phenomenology unfolded as a living, endlessly expanding field of ‘infinite tasks’, which could be carried forward only by inquirers philosophising together (*symphilosophen*), co-workers concerned about the future of humanity itself, a humanity conceived of as a rational community of knowledge, where science fulfils rather than dehumanises the human world. In laying out these ‘infinite tasks’, he assigned regions to be explored by the many gifted disciples gathered around him. Thus, his Göttingen assistant Adolf Reinach (1883–1917) would undertake the phenomenology of law, and his Freiburg assistant Martin Heidegger would develop the phenomenology of religion. But Husserl was rarely satisfied with their efforts, which he tended to see as misinterpretations or distortions of his own work, leading him to feel unappreciated and even betrayed. Husserl, too, was rather unfortunate in his choice of would-be successors. His most controversial choice of successor was Martin Heidegger, whom he had warmly embraced since their first meeting in...
Freiburg in 1916 and whom he supported for appointment to his own Chair in Freiburg on his retirement in 1928. Heidegger, however, went on to promote a rather different vision of phenomenology in Sein und Zeit (Being and Time, 1927), as we shall see, which inspired many philosophers to abandon Husserl and his transcendental idealism for an existential analysis of Dasein.

Late in his career, and also due to his official exclusion from university activities by the Nazi anti-Semitic laws, Husserl felt particularly isolated, characterising himself as a ‘leader without followers’. In 1935, he bitterly acknowledged the impossibility of achieving the ideal of philosophy as a science, when he proclaimed: “Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science – the dream is over” (der Traum ist ausgeträumt, Crisis, p. 389; Hua VI 508). But even here, in this poignant farewell, Husserl is not renouncing the ideal as an ideal; he is simply acknowledging the bitter truth that philosophers have not understood this ideal and have been tempted away into irrational substitutes for scientific philosophy. It is not Husserl who has ended the dream but those supposed followers who have been seduced by historicism and an irrational philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie), and indeed have been drawn into anthropology of the life-world, as he understood Heidegger’s account of human existence (Dasein) to be. As he himself put it, ‘the phenomenological movement! I now count myself as its greatest enemy.’ Nevertheless, post-Husserlian phenomenology tended to lead off from various starting-points, most of which were – at least tentatively – first explored by Husserl. Thus, the first fifty years of phenomenology can be seen correctly, as Paul Ricoeur has put it, as a series of heresies devolving from Husserl. For this reason, we have included selections from different phases of Husserl’s career.

Over the course of the twentieth century, the originally German phenomenological movement spread through Europe, North and South America, and to Asia, especially Japan and Korea but increasingly in China. It broadened into a loosely defined collection of original thinkers committed to a certain orientation in thinking. In understanding the development of phenomenology, it is useful to invoke the categories of the American phenomenologist Lester Embree who has identified four “successively dominant and sometimes overlapping tendencies”: realistic phenomenology (early Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Scheler); constitutive phenomenology (the mature Husserl, Gurwitsch, Becker); existential phenomenology (Heidegger, Arendt, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry); and hermeneutic phenomenology (Gadamer, Ricoeur, et al).6 In this introduction, we shall have something to say about these four tendencies within phenomenology, although we shall not attempt to keep them distinct. Heidegger, for example, had both an existential and a hermeneutic orientation, whereas Scheler is both a realistic and a constitutive phenomenologist. We should also note that phenomenology in the contemporary setting has incorporated postmodern, gender and even environmental elements in its efforts to understand the nature of living in the age of global technology and interculturalism. We can offer merely an outline sketch of some of these developments here.

The ‘phenomena’ of phenomenology and the science of essences

As we have seen, phenomenology means literally the science of phenomena, the science which studies appearances, and specifically the structure of appearing – the
how of appearing – giving the phenomena or manifest appearances their due, remaining loyal to the modes of appearance of things in the world, whether they belong to the physical, mathematical, cultural, aesthetic, religious, or other domains. The phenomena of phenomenology are to be understood in a deliberately broad sense as including all forms of appearing, showing, manifesting, making evident or ‘evidencing’, bearing witness, truth-claiming, checking and verifying, including all forms of seeming, dissembling, occluding, obscuring, denying and falsifying. In short, phenomenology studies, in the words of the contemporary French phenomenologist Michel Henry (b. 1922), the essence of manifestation,7 or, as the American phenomenologist Lester Embree puts it, the varieties of evidencing.

In examining the nature of manifestation and disclosure, phenomenology also comes to recognise that many things are not disclosed or can only be approached through a detour, specifically the conditions which enable disclosure, which allow manifestation to take place, for example, the background of the ‘world’ itself. In its focus on meaning, phenomenology paid particular attention to the living experience of meaning, or intending to mean (Ricoeur’s vouloir-dire), and hence to the peculiar nature of the human encounter with the ‘surrounding world’ (Umwelt) and the kind of objectivities normally encountered there. Indeed, phenomenology was the first movement to focus on the specific conditions of human embeddedness in an environment, and to make visible the phenomenon of the environment itself. In his mature work Husserl focused on the structure of our everyday manner of human being in the world, the structure of what Husserl termed ‘the natural attitude’ (die natürliche Einstellung), first publicly discussed in Ideas I, which at once both revealed the world in a certain way while itself remaining concealed. In other words, the very ‘naturalness’ of the natural world acts to conceal the manner in which this ‘normal’ world is constituted by the activities of the conscious subjects who inhabit that world. The phenomenological attitude, then, is not the normal engaged or absorbed attitude, but requires, as we shall see, a change of orientation, a detachment or disengagement – what Husserl called epoché and reduction – to bring the nature of the experience more to light.

It is crucial to emphasise at this point that phenomenology does not subscribe to the assumption that the phenomena are somehow to be distinguished from things in themselves. To say that phenomenology is interested in appearings does not mean that it is committed to phenomenalism, the doctrine that claims that all that exists is the appearances to the senses, or, on the other hand, to a Kantian bifurcation between phenomena and things in themselves or noumena. Phenomenology neither wishes to claim that all that exists can simply be reduced to appearings, nor to affirm an unknown and unknowable reality behind appearances. Both claims distort the essence of the phenomenological point of view, which begins from the experience of things appearing to the subject, to consciousness. Since all showing or manifesting or evidencing is precisely of something to someone, it is fundamental to phenomenology to attempt to think through the nature of the essential correlation between mind and world, rather than beginning with one or other as given, as traditional idealisms and realisms have done. Phenomenology begins with the essential correlation between objectivity and subjectivity, between the thing that appears and the conscious subject to which it appears, what Husserl calls in Ideas I the noetic-noematic correlation uncovered by reflection on the nature of intentional acts and their objects.
The phenomena, then, are the things themselves, as they show themselves to be, in other words, what is self-given, and not something that is a representation of an outer world. Thus, for example, in the phenomenology of religion, the focus is on the manner in which the sacred is experienced by the religious practitioner – or indeed as denied by the atheist – rather than on the attempt to ascertain if there really is or is not a domain of the sacred as it were ‘behind’ the belief. Phenomenology seeks a direct intuition of the essence of the object or situation. According to the phenomenologist Max Scheler, it attempts to achieve full self-givenness in realms currently approached only through the mediation through symbols. Thus Scheler writes:

Phenomenology has reached its goal when every symbol and half-symbol is completely fulfilled through the “self-given,” including everything which functions in the natural world-view and in science as a form of understanding (everything “categorial”); when everything transcendent and only “meant” has become immanent to a lived experience and intuition. It has reached its goal at the point where there is no longer any transcendence or symbol. Everything which elsewhere is still formal becomes, for phenomenology, a material for intuition. And the attitude phenomenological philosophy has toward a religious object or an ethical value is exactly the same as the one it has toward the color red.

That which constitutes the unity of phenomenology is not a particular region of facts, such as, for example, mental or ideal objects, nature, etc., but only self-givenness in all possible regions.8

Phenomenology then does not stop with the appearance but seeks the essence of the appearance. It aims to be a science of essences, a science that makes the essences of things that appear visible to the enquirer, similar to the manner in which geometry, another eidetic science, studies the essential relations that hold in space. The claim of phenomenology is that the facts of the matter as disclosed to consciousness may be described in such a way that the essences of those facts and their intertwined laws can be exhibited, as well as the modes of our access thereto. As Husserl puts it in the 1913 Second Edition of the Logical Investigations:

This phenomenology, like the more inclusive pure phenomenology of experiences in general, has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human or animal experients in the phenomenal world that we posit as an empirical fact. This phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences. Each such statement of essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense of the word.9

Phenomenology then is to be an a priori science of the essences of all possible objects and experiences. It aims to arrive at a pure essential intuition of ‘pure
Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of experiences in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real (reellen) or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly the theory of the essences of ‘pure phenomena’, the phenomena of ‘pure consciousness’ or of a ‘pure ego’: it does not build on the ground, given by transcendent apperception, of physical and animal, and so of psychophysical nature, it makes no empirical assertions, it propounds no judgements which relate to objects transcending consciousness: it establishes no truths concerning natural realities, whether physical or psychic – no psychological truths, therefore, in the historical sense – and borrows no such truths as assumed premises. It rather takes all apperceptions and judgemental assertions which point beyond what is given in adequate, purely immanent intuition, which point beyond the pure stream of consciousness, and treats them purely as the experiences they are in themselves: it subjects them to a purely immanent, purely descriptive examination into essence.

(II VI Appendix, II, p. 343; Hua XIX/2 765)

Phenomenology must study and bring to clarification the nature of the essence of subjective acts of cognition in their most general, ideal sense, Erkenntnis überhaupt. This is to be an investigation of the pure possibility of cognition in its non-natural essence, disregarding all empirical instantiation in humans, animals, angels or extraterrestrial beings.

**Intuition and givenness**

The chief characteristic of Husserlian and indeed all phenomenology, then, is that it is oriented entirely towards what is given immediately in intuition (Anschauung). Intuition, immediacy, givenness, are Husserl’s key interlinked terms; or, as Heidegger put it in one of his lecture courses, ‘givenness’ (Gegebenheit) is the ‘magic word’ (Zauberwort) of phenomenologists and a stumbling-block to others. Givenness and intuition are correlative terms; the character of the intuiting corresponds to the character of the givenness or manifestation. **Givenness** is to provide the measure of all comprehension. Phenomenology does not speculate about essences or make inferences, it is supposed to grasp them directly in immediate ‘intuition’. As Husserl wrote in 1930 in his Author’s Preface to the English Edition of Ideas I:

> But in the transcendental sphere we have an infinitude of knowledge previous to all deduction, knowledge whose mediated connexions (those of intentional implication) have nothing to do with deduction, and being entirely
intuitive prove refractory to every methodically devised scheme of constructive symbolism.\textsuperscript{10}

Intuition has played a major role in philosophy from Plato onwards, but especially in modern philosophy, for example, in both Descartes and Kant. For Descartes, deductions must be grounded in intuitions that are immediately and self-evidently given. For Kant, intuition (Anschauung) is one of the two key components of knowledge – the other being the concept (Begriff). Kant distinguished sharply between two separate faculties – the faculty of intuition or sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and the faculty of concepts or rules, understanding (Verstand).\textsuperscript{11} These two faculties provide two distinct ‘sources of knowledge’ (Erkenntnisquellen), as he says in the Critique of Pure Reason (A260/B316). Kant, however, understood intuition rather narrowly as the purely passive, sensuous material for knowledge, whereas Husserl wanted to attend to the kind of self-evidence manifest in various kinds of intuition and thus required a much broader notion of intuition. In the Logical Investigations Husserl presents his own phenomenological breakthrough in terms of a clarification of the precise ways that intuition and perception – understood in a broadened sense – could play a role in philosophy. In the Sixth Logical Investigation he broadened his key concepts of intuition (Anschauung) and perception (Wahrnehmung), beyond the purely sensuous, so that one can speak of intuiting a conflict or a synthesis (LI VI §37, II p. 262; Hua XIX/2 649).

Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions began with acts of simple sensuous perception and he used the kind of fulfilment achieved in these acts as his exemplar of acts of meaning fulfilment in general. But he did not want to give the impression that all our intuitive knowledge consisted of such sensuous acts. In the Sixth Logical Investigation he introduced a new notion of categorial intuition to rectify what he thought of as a falsification of the experience of consciousness being purveyed by empiricism, positivism and indeed neo-Kantianism. Husserl maintains that we must be allowed to speak of the possibility of intuition of complex situations or states of affairs such as the intuition of unity, or of synthesis, or the intuition of other categorial situations. These were a genuine and non-sensuous form of intuiting, hitherto neglected by the empiricist tradition.

Emphasising his commitment to a philosophy which based itself solely on what is validly given in intuition, Husserl – in his next major work after the Investigations – Ideas I (1913), § 24, lays down his fundamental principle, which he calls his principle of all principles (das Prinzip aller Prinzipien):

\begin{quote}
that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source (Rechtsquelle) of cognition, that everything originary (so to speak in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.
\end{quote}

(Ideas I, §24, p. 44; Hua III/1 44)

Every act of knowledge is to be legitimised by ‘originary presentive intuition’ (originärgebende Anschauung). This conception of originary presentive intuition is at the core of all Husserl’s philosophy. Indeed, he criticises traditional empiricism for naively dictating that all judgements be legitimised by experience, instead of realising that
many different forms of intuition underlie our judgements and our reasoning processes (Ideas I, §19, p. 36; Hua III/136).

Intuitions, for Husserl, or what the American phenomenologist Robert Sokolowski calls ‘registerings’ or ‘registrations’, occur in all experiences of understanding; but in cases of genuine certain knowledge, we have intuition with the highest form of fulfilment (Erfüllung) or evidence (Evidenz), or ‘self-evidence’. When I see with insight that $2 + 2 = 4$ in the sense of grasping the state of affairs itself rather than simply manipulating the symbols, I have as clear an intuition as I can have. Husserl believed that similar intuitive fulfilments occurred in many types of experience, and were not just restricted to the truths of mathematics. When I see a blackbird in the tree outside my window, I also have an intuition fulfilled with all the certainty of the sensuously given ‘bodily presence’ (Leibhaftigkeit) of the blackbird presenting itself to me. Husserl distinguished between these kinds of experience and other experiences where the object is not immediately present, for instance, in acts of memory or expectation. In general Husserl was fascinated by the contrast between intuitive self-givenness and various forms of symbolic representation. He was led by reflection on these kinds of experience to want to develop in the Sixth Investigation a classification of all conscious experiences, with an eye to considering their essential natures and the kinds of intuitive fulfilment proper to them.

The origins and forerunners of phenomenology in the philosophical tradition

Although Martin Heidegger maintained in Being and Time (1927) that a genuinely phenomenological approach to being and truth, untainted by the subjectivism of modern philosophy, could be found in its most authentic form in ancient Greek philosophy, in fact, as a distinctive philosophical method, phenomenology emerged gradually only in the context of post-Cartesian modern philosophy, and specifically in post-Kantian German philosophy which focused mainly on psychological and epistemological problems, often confusing these domains in a manner which inhibited the successful progress of scientific knowledge. Heidegger himself, in Being and Time, acknowledged that the term ‘phenomenology’ could be traced back to the late Scholastic tradition, and specifically to the school of Wolff (SZ § 7, 28; 51). In fact, the first specific reference to ‘phenomenology’ may be traced to Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777); the fourth section of whose Novus Organon bears the title ‘Phenomenology of transcendental Optics’ (Phaenomenologia oder optica transcendentalis). By this Lambert meant a ‘science of appearance’ that would proceed from the appearances to truth in itself, just as optics studies perspective in order to deduce true features of the object seen. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who greatly admired Lambert, employs the term ‘phenomenology’ in several places in his writings, ranging from his early letters to his mature treatises. Thus, in a letter to Lambert of 2 September 1770, Kant states, ‘metaphysics must be preceded by a quite distinct, but merely negative science (Phaenomenologica generalis).’ Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, 1786) has an entire section entitled ‘Phenomenology’, dealing with the area of motion or rest in relation to its appearances to our external senses. Phenomenology, on this account, is that branch of science which deals with things in their manner of appearing to us, for example, relative motion, or properties – such as
colour – are dependent on the human observer. Indeed, Kant’s whole enquiry into the conditions for the possibility of objectivity – as seen from the subjective side – may also be understood as phenomenology, and was so understood by Hegel and later by Heidegger, but it is unlikely to have influenced Husserl at least in terms of his terminological decisions.\textsuperscript{15}

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) also made use of the term ‘phenomenology’ in his \textit{Wissenschaftslehre} lectures of 1804 to refer to the manner of deriving the world of appearance, which illusorily appears to be independent of consciousness from consciousness itself.\textsuperscript{16} Although Fichte was a philosopher to whom Husserl turned in his later Freiburg years – indeed he lectured on him in 1917 – it is unlikely that Fichte influenced Husserl’s early choice of the term. Similarly, Husserl, at least when he was formulating his conception of phenomenology, knew next to nothing about G. W. F. Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} (1807), where the term ‘phenomenology’ is used in a sense closer to the twentieth-century meaning, as that discipline which describes the unfolding or coming to consciousness of truth. Hegel himself seems to have borrowed the term from Karl Reinhold who employed it in the title of his \textit{Elementen der Phänomenologie oder Erläuterung des rationalen Realismus durch seine Anwendung auf die Erscheinungen} (1802). Hegel envisaged phenomenology as only a certain preparatory part of systematic philosophy, and indeed he proclaimed: “The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the mind as consciousness, and as containing the propositions only of a \textit{phenomenology} (not of a philosophy) of mind.”\textsuperscript{17}

Although it has become usual to trace the origins of phenomenology back to Hegel, in fact the Hegelian version of phenomenology only came to be recognised by Husserl’s followers after the important lectures of Alexandre Kojève on Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} given in Paris in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{18}

After Hegel, the term ‘phenomenology’ continued to have some isolated occurrences during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Sir William Hamilton (1791–1856), the Scottish philosopher who influenced Brentano, refers, in his \textit{Lectures on Metaphysics},\textsuperscript{19} to the ‘Phenomenology of Mind’ or ‘Philosophy of Mind’. In 1894, the physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838–1916) proposed a ‘general physical phenomenology’ describing all our experiences of physics as a basis for general physical theories. Evidently, Husserl was familiar with Mach’s use of the term and acknowledged Mach as a forerunner of phenomenology in his Amsterdam lectures, where he characterises himself as involved in “a certain radicalizing of an already existing phenomenological method”.\textsuperscript{20} But the true origins of phenomenology in the sense it is discussed by the authors in the \textit{Reader} may be located in the descriptive psychology practised by Franz Brentano (1838–1917), and by his students, notably Carl Stumpf (1848–1936).

Franz Brentano attempted to found a descriptive science of consciousness. He was an admirer of the scientific empiricism of Aristotle and indeed of David Hume, of the exact descriptive psychological projects of George Berkeley, John Stuart Mill and William Hamilton, of the positivism of Comte and Mach, and of German psychologists such as Friedrich Lange. He aimed to establish philosophy on a strictly scientific basis, in deliberate opposition to what he regarded as the obscurantism and mystification of the traditions that dominated German philosophy at the time, namely neo-Kantianism and Hegelianism.

In \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint} (1874),\textsuperscript{21} now recognised as one of the
foundational texts of modern experimental psychology, Brentano proposed to specify the subject matter of the science of psychology, in the course of which he sought the defining characteristics of the domain of mental phenomena. He proposed the intentional relatedness of the mental act to its object as an essential positive characteristic of the mental. Brentano’s 1889 lectures on “Descriptive Psychology”,22 of which Husserl possessed a transcript, significantly, are subtitled “Descriptive Phenomenology”, and here he laid down the basis for his descriptive science of the a priori laws of consciousness. Brentano’s descriptive psychology, or phenomenology, then, is an a priori science of the acts, contents and objects of consciousness, described in the manner in which they appear to consciousness.

In 1900, the term ‘phenomenology’ featured in the title of Alexander Pfänder’s (1870–1941) Phânomenologie des Wollens (Phenomenology of Willing. A Psychological Analysis, 1900), his prize-winning Habilitation thesis, written under Theodor Lipps at Munich.23 Pfänder’s work related indirectly to Brentano. Pfänder wants to examine the nature of willing itself, exhibiting what he calls a ‘piety’ (Pietät) towards the phenomena.24 The observation of conscious experiences of willing must proceed using what he calls “the subjective method” by examining retrospectively what goes on when we orient ourselves towards something in willing it. Furthermore, the essence of willing has to be cleared up before we can correlate bodily processes with it.25 The procedure involves identifying the proper parts of a psychic act by bringing them to intuition. As Pfänder writes: “To analyze a fact of consciousness means to divide it into its parts or elements and specifically both into its separable parts and those which are distinguishable only in abstracto.”26

The aim of this close description of the facts of consciousness is to find essential laws of consciousness, to achieve essential insights. This is indeed a good description of phenomenological practice, but the precise moment of inauguration of phenomenology as a distinct method, however, must be credited to Edmund Husserl in his breakthrough work Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations, 1900–1901).

Edmund Husserl, a mathematician who had studied in Berlin with world-famous mathematicians such as Carl Weierstrass and Leopold Kronecker, and completed a doctorate in mathematics in Vienna with a student of Weierstrass, studied philosophy in Vienna from 1884 to 1886 with Franz Brentano from whom he absorbed a deep suspicion of what he regarded as an unscientific, mythical, speculative philosophy (Hegelianism), and a deep appreciation for the tradition of empiricism, especially David Hume. Indeed, Hume’s attempt to explain all the sciences in terms of the ‘science of man’ and, specifically, psychology, or the study of human understanding, struck a chord with both Brentano and Husserl. Thus, much later, in his 1930 Foreword to the first English translation of Ideas I made by Boyce-Gibson, Husserl claimed that Hume’s Treatise was “the first systematic sketch of a pure, although not yet eidetic phenomenology”.27 Husserl – in line with the analysis of his student Adolf Reinach – read Hume as a transcendental phenomenologist, since Hume realised that causation is not something occurring externally in the world so much as a set of connections imposed on the world, constituted in consciousness out of our experience of temporal relations (succession, contiguity and so on), that is, that objectivity had a subjective genesis.28 Hume, for Husserl, had the essentially phenomenological insight that the life of consciousness is ‘a life of achievement’ or ‘performance’ (leistendes Leben, Crisis § 26, p. 90; Hua VI 93), that is, the result of
an act of sense-giving constitution. As Husserl says, Hume was the first to take Descartes seriously and focus on the inside of consciousness as a clue to the constitution of the outside world. Similarly, much earlier in his Logical Investigations Husserl explicitly praises Berkeley for carrying out a ‘phenomenology of inner experience’ (LI III § 2, II, p. 5; Hua XIX/1 232). In other words, the empiricist tradition was in effect a proto-phenomenology.

The Logical Investigations focused specifically on the clarification of logical and formal knowledge and the rejection of psychologism; nevertheless, the work suggested promising ways of investigating consciousness in all its forms. Here Husserl announced his plan for a phenomenology of the acts of logical cognition, acts of thinking and knowing generally. In the Introduction to Volume II of that work, in discussing the need for a wide-ranging theory of knowledge, Husserl speaks of “the phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing” (LI, Intro. § 1, I, p. 166; Hua XIX/1 6). Brentano’s discussion of intentionality inspired Husserl, who saw in it the possibility of a science of pure consciousness, removed from naturalistic and causal misconstruals. Husserl initially characterised phenomenology as a method for approaching epistemological problems, ancillary to psychology, but he soon came to believe that phenomenology provided a unique approach to meaning, and hence could provide both the foundation for philosophy itself and also for the other sciences. Phenomenology could be an overall ‘science of science’. Specifically, as Husserl would later put it, it could discover “the ABC of consciousness”.

The Logical Investigations was quickly adopted as the foundational text for the phenomenological movement as it developed in Germany. Gradually, however, especially in his lectures at Göttingen, Husserl himself extended the reach of phenomenology until it took on for him the role of first philosophy, borrowing from Aristotle’s conception of prote philosophia. He came to conceive of phenomenology as co-extensive with philosophy itself, and with the specifically philosophical attitude (a point on which Scheler too would insist). After 1905, he began to conceive of phenomenology as a kind of transcendental idealism, a radicalisation of Kant’s project, which recognised that all meaning had its source in the transcendental ego. In later years, he also began to recognise two aspects to transcendental phenomenology – a static and a genetic side. Husserl’s own radical reflections and corrections of his earlier work, his changes of direction and intensification of efforts in particular problematic, set the pace for the evolution of phenomenology, as Husserl gradually distanced himself from the form descriptive phenomenology had taken among the first set of admirers of the Logical Investigations. But let us first look more closely at the emergence and development of the conception of phenomenology in Husserl’s own work.

Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a breakthrough work

Husserl’s Logical Investigations does not purport to offer a ‘systematic presentation’ (eine systematische Darstellung) of formal logic, but rather an ‘epistemological clarification’ (eine erkenntniskritische Klärung, LI III, II, p. 3; Hua XIX/1 228) of the fundamental concepts required in the elucidation of the nature of thought and knowledge. Husserl was actually trying to address the foundational problems affecting formal mathematics, logic and the formal sciences, leading him to raise “questions of the essence of the form of knowledge itself” (LI, Foreword to First Edition, I, p. 2;
Hua XVIII 6), and specifically to seek to clarify the key concepts such as consciousness, mental act, content, meaning intention, meaning fulfilment, judgement and so on.

This conception of phenomenology, as a way of approaching and clarifying concepts, emerges only tentatively in the course of the Investigations themselves, especially in the First, Fifth and Sixth, though it is clear Husserl was formulating his approach gradually through the 1890s especially in his critical studies of the existing logical literature. The Fifth Investigation focuses specifically on the elucidation of the intentional structure of consciousness, in order to give a deeper characterisation of the different features involved in any expressive act of meaning. The Sixth Investigation looked at the manner in which acts of meaning intention are correlated to acts of fulfilment, leading to a discussion of the experience of truth in judgement.

In his Introduction to the First Edition of the *Logical Investigations*, phenomenology was presented as essentially descriptive psychology of the Brentanian kind: “Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. Epistemological criticism is therefore in essence psychology, or at least capable of being built on a psychological foundation” (LI, Introduction, I, p. 176; Hua XIX/1 24).

While phenomenology was to support psychology, it was opposed to psychologism. In the First Edition, he does not clearly differentiate phenomenology from what he himself refers to as *Erkenntnistheorie*, ‘epistemology’ or ‘theory of knowledge’ (LI, Introduction, I, p. 166; Hua XIX/1 7), understood in the neo-Kantian manner as the investigation of the conditions, especially the concepts and laws, which make objective knowledge possible, rather than as an attempt to refute scepticism concerning the possibility of genuine knowledge.

Husserl also initially characterised phenomenology as a kind of radical ‘conceptual analysis’ (*Begriffsanalyse*), offering a clarification of concepts. The Introduction even speaks of ‘analytical phenomenology’ (LI, Introduction, §4, I, p. 172; Hua XIX/1 17). Husserl speaks of ‘fixing’ – he uses the term ‘fixieren’ – concepts by defining their boundaries and stabilising their shifting senses by differentiating and disambiguating them into their specific essential meanings. Husserl, in this sense, proceeds in the manner of Aristotle, defining terms, then noting new uses and analogous expressions and so on. In the *Investigations*, however, Husserl does not offer an explicit theoretical characterisation of the nature of this clarification; instead he exhibits it in practice in the actual analyses he carried out there. However, in a draft of a later work known as *Ideas* III, he understands it in terms of connecting concepts back to the intuitions that found them and also to the running through in intuition of the various stages or layers of the concept itself. 30

In the Second Logical Investigation Husserl also speaks of ‘meaning analysis’ (*Bedeutungsanalyse*, LI II, §31, I, p. 287; Hua XIX/1 115), but he did not mean to focus exclusively on linguistic analysis in the manner of his contemporaries G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. Thus, in his 1913 draft Preface to the Second Edition of the *Investigations*, Husserl explicitly repudiated the interpretation of phenomenology as a kind of ‘meaning analysis’ or ‘semantic analysis’ (*Bedeutungsanalyse*), which relied exclusively on the interpretation of language. 31 For Husserl, phenomenology was not simply the clarification of our linguistic expressions, but a more deep-seated attempt to analyse the very senses or meanings which we constitute through our acts and which receive expression in language. He was suspicious of the stranglehold of grammar on our thinking (a suspicion he passed on to the young
Heidegger), but equally suspicious of purely grammatical analyses that did not focus on the essential acts involved. As Husserl says in the Sixth Investigation (LI VI § 40), grammatical distinctions offer a clue to meaning distinctions, but they are not the whole of the meaning distinction and do not simply mirror it. For Husserl, meanings are clarified through phenomenological reflection secured in intuition.

Husserl’s development of transcendental phenomenology
Gradually, Husserl realised that the true import of phenomenology could not be accommodated within psychology or even epistemology. The focus on the essential structures of acts and objects of consciousness needed to be articulated in a manner that removed all assumptions driven by scientific or indeed everyday naturalism. After his discovery of the reduction in 1905, he gradually distanced himself from his initial characterisation of phenomenology as a direct eidetic seeing driven by realist sympathies. He came to see the phenomenological reduction as the very essence of phenomenology, involving a liberation of the essence of thought acts and contents from their psychological consideration as facts of nature, and the similar exclusion of the ordinary psychological ego as the locus of these acts (see Husserl’s Foreword to the Second Edition). Husserl referred to this orientation towards the eidetic in terms of a breakthrough to ‘pure’ consciousness understood in terms of transcendental subjectivity. Thus, in the Foreword to Second Edition of the Logical Investigations, he speaks of his book as a ‘breakthrough work’ (ein Werk des Durchbruchs, LI I, p. 3; Hua XVIII 8), that is, his breakthrough into phenomenology as an eidetic science.

Husserl himself portrays phenomenology as slowly dawning on him between the Logical Investigations and Ideas I (1913) and tended to emphasise the importance of carrying out systematic removal of the natural attitude in order to gain a new orientation on the phenomena of consciousness, thought not as bits of the world, psychic occurrences, but as essential structures which have meanings entirely independent of the world. Phenomenology is now portrayed as a parallel science to psychology, and not necessarily exclusively as a clarification of logical terms and concepts. The phenomenological domain comes into view as that set of a priori conditions (not just formal conditions but material conditions, conditions which belong to the essence of consciousness itself) which determine the relation between what occurs as natural psychical acts in the world, and the purely ideal senses or thoughts which these psychical acts grasp and instantiate.

The exclusion of the natural attitude and the reduction
Husserl came to see phenomenology as facing down misleading conceptions of science, specifically the distortions latent in naturalism and psychologism, at least in the guise that these tendencies presented themselves at the end of the nineteenth century, and especially to oppose ‘the naturalisation of consciousness’ (die Naturalisierung des Bewusstseins – a phrase Husserl himself employs in his 1910–1911 essay, “Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft” (“Philosophy as a rigorous science”)) being carried out by various versions of psychology and positivism. As late as his Amsterdam lectures of 1929, Husserl was opposing this ‘prevailing naturalization of the mental’ as an enduring prejudice, originating in Descartes, Hobbes and
Locke, and which continued to haunt even Brentano’s attempts at descriptive psychology. Husserl saw phenomenology as a corrective to naturalism and continued to uphold the aim of scientific philosophy, which he acknowledged was present in distorted fashion in positivism.

Husserl announced his change of direction in Ideas I, published in his newly founded Jahrbuch in 1913. He now maintained that phenomenology excludes all psychical acts understood as natural performances in a natural world (i.e. as events in time captured within the nomological net of the natural world), and must be the science of pure or even absolute consciousness. At the basis of all acts of meaning lay the domain of transcendental subjectivity, which could not be accessed in normal reflection because all consciousness has an inbuilt world-affirming, ‘positing’ or ‘thetic’ character. This ‘position taking’ (Stellungnahme) is so deep-rooted that it distorts any attempt to study the structures which might be involved in the constitution of the world itself. Therefore Husserl proposed a kind of detour, or reduction, a series of methodological attempts to neutralise or suspend or put out of court the thetic character of our intentional acts to focus attention on the modes of consciousness in which objects appear. Since they cannot actually or literally be ‘unplugged’, they can be neutralised only by a kind of ‘bracketing’ or ‘suspension’ of the thesis of the natural attitude. This stepping back is different from the normal critical or reflective standpoint, which belongs to the natural attitude and is coloured with its prejudices, and remains, as Husserl says, within the horizon of the world (Crisis § 40). The proposed reduction is to uncover the structures involved in the original constitution.

Ideas I offered Husserl’s first published account of one of his greatest achievements, namely his identification of the natural attitude (die natürliche Einstellung) in which we live first of all and most of the time: in a world spread out in space and located at a moment in the flow of time which also spreads out before us, surrounded by objects, both natural and cultural, and by other living organisms, plants, animals and people. All other attitudes, including the scientific attitude, take their origin from the natural attitude and usually refer back to it. The natural attitude is actually a complex constellation of attitudes, attitudes which underlie our sense of a world itself with its aspects of familiarity and strangeness. Thus the notion of the natural attitude has as its correlative the notion of world, ‘surrounding world’ or ‘environment’ (Umwelt). In fact, it was Husserl who first developed the concept of world that became so central to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein in Being and Time. Our sense of the world is actually conveyed through a certain orientation or mood; traditional ontology, as Heidegger declares, was done in the mood of everydayness.

In order to gain access to the constituting nature of consciousness, Husserl proposes a radical disruption or suspension of the natural attitude, a transcendental turn, according to which the whole of nature is to be treated as nothing but a correlate of consciousness, a point missed by naturalism. The essence of the correlation between consciousness and its object is masked and systematically distorted unless we make efforts to separate out the normal, world-positing or ‘thetic’ character of the acts. The phenomenologist must operate the bracketing and reduction in order to focus only on the meaning-constituting character of the act, its act character, its nature as a noetic act embedded in a network of such acts which have essential interconnections with each other. Intrinsically correlated to the noetic act is the noema or the ‘meant’ now taken not as an ideal entity free of the world nor as
a piece of the world but as pure condition for meaning, that which makes meaning possible. The same perceptual noema can ‘found’ or ‘motivate’ different judgements. Husserl’s account of the noema has been compared favourably with Frege’s notion of Sinn, however, the noema is the correlate of an act and hence is the act plus the manner in which the act objectivates its content. The ‘logical sense’, as Husserl calls it, is only one abstracted part of the more complex noema. We cannot discuss this complex issue further here, but we have included a reading from Ideas I which discusses the noema in some detail.

Husserl’s late work all takes place within the reduction, although the reduction is construed in different ways beginning with Cartesian scepticism or with a consideration of the life-world. In whatever form, the reduction is essentially a transcendental reflection on the manner in which objectivity is constituted. Increasingly in his late writings Husserl paid more attention to the role of time in this transcendental genesis, and his work develops both static and genetic approaches. On the ‘genetic’ side, Husserl’s late work shows a marked affinity with that of Hegel. In the Crisis, for example, Husserl engages in an intellectual reconstruction of some of the moments of primary founding (Urstiftung) in Western culture, for example, the discovery of the Pythagorean theorem, which, once discovered, becomes an enduring possession of humankind.

### Phenomenology after Husserl

Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* was first given serious notice by philosophers and psychologists gathered around Theodor Lipps at the University of Munich. This so-called ‘old phenomenology’ (*Altphanomenologie*) of the Munich School, which included Johannes Daubert, Alexander Pfänder, Moritz Geiger, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Adolf Reinach and Max Scheler, understood phenomenology as eidetic description, the attempt to accurately distinguish the essential natures of the acts of consciousness and so on. Johannes Daubert is credited with being the first of the Munich students to travel to Göttingen to study with Husserl, and returned to set up a circle for the study of Husserl’s philosophy. Soon afterwards, Adolf Reinach, a trained lawyer, became Husserl’s assistant and was considered the great hope for the future of phenomenology until he was killed in action in the First World War in 1917. Max Scheler (1874–1928) was an inspirational philosopher who had an extraordinary influence in Germany during the second decade of the twentieth century. He taught in Munich with Lipps, and was deeply impressed by the *Logical Investigations* and especially its account of categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation, but he was not drawn to Husserl’s complex theorising about the nature of the phenomenological method. Scheler drew on the strong tradition of German sociological thinking (Max Weber) as well as on the philosophy of life of Eucken, Simmel and others, to develop a realistic philosophy of the experience of embodied emotions in Munich, Göttingen and later in Berlin. He was enthusiastic in his defence of the necessity of essential viewing, and was particularly drawn to the phenomenology of value and of the emotions. Scheler also argued for the experience of being as central to all experience, and on this issue, Heidegger was a huge admirer of Scheler. Scheler was especially critical of Kant’s account of ethical value. His *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Werkethik* (1913–1916) opposed Kantian ethical formalism on the basis of his phenomenology of the experience of value.
Edith Stein (1891–1942) and Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), who joined Husserl in Göttingen, developed Husserl’s realist phenomenology in exciting and original directions. Stein in particular was assigned the task of putting shape and order on Husserl’s extensive and disconnected research manuscripts, and she worked in particular on his draft of Ideas II, his attempted revision of the Sixth Logical Investigation, and his Lectures on the Internal Consciousness of Time, the published versions of which show evidence of Stein’s extensive editorial intervention. Stein followed Husserl to Freiburg where she continued to assist Husserl, but her own work developed in the directions she herself was interested in – for example, the experience of empathy and the nature of embodiment – before her conversion to Catholicism in 1922 led her in quite another direction. After her conversion she tried to graft Thomism on to phenomenology in a metaphysical way, somewhat at odds with her mentor’s approach, although she and Husserl remained firm friends. Born a Jew, she became a Carmelite nun and died in a Nazi concentration camp in 1942. Ingarden was active in developing phenomenological analyses of the literary object and of the work of art, and played a role in the development of phenomenology in Poland.

Although Husserl had already been attracting international students in small numbers at Göttingen, it was only after he moved to Freiburg in 1916, and especially during the 1920s, that he became the leading figure in German philosophy. He also developed a considerable international reputation, as is evidenced by his invitations to lecture in London (in 1922), Paris (in 1929) and Amsterdam (in 1929). But Husserl was soon overshadowed by the publication of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit in 1927, which continued to invoke phenomenology but now linked to the project of hermeneutics and fundamental ontology. Heidegger had been developing his own conception of phenomenology in his lectures at Freiburg (1919–1923) and Marburg (1923–1928). Whereas Husserl emphasised the centrality of consciousness approached in terms of the intentional correlation between subject and object, and sought to peel back the distorting layers of the natural attitude to grasp the nature of transcendental constituting consciousness, Heidegger in Being and Time offered what at first sight appeared to be a new, non-Husserlian vision of phenomenology which dropped reference to both consciousness and intentionality and introduced a new way of approaching human ‘being-in-the-world’ through its special inquiry into the nature of human existence (Dasein).

Being and Time claimed to be an exercise in fundamental ontology, seeking an understanding of the meaning of the age-old ‘question of Being’ (die Seinsfrage). Although ostensibly a treatise in phenomenology, it contained few references to Husserl and moved phenomenology away from description into hermeneutics, and away from the science of consciousness towards the study of existence and ontology. In his etymological analysis of the term ‘phenomenology’ into its component parts phainomenon and logos, Heidegger even claimed that phenomenology had been understood more originally by the ancient Greeks, although at the same time he acknowledged (SZ § 7, 38; 62) that this book could not have been written had not Husserl made the ‘breakthrough’ to phenomenology in his Logical investigations.

In Being and Time Heidegger specifically linked phenomenology with the hermeneutical tradition stemming from Schleiermacher and Dilthey, to the point of claiming that phenomenology must be understood as hermeneutical:

Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological
description as a method lies in interpretation (Auslegung). The logos of the phenomenonology of Dasein has the character of a hermeneuein, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein possesses, are made known to Dasein’s understanding of Being. The phenomenonology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of that word, where it designates this business of interpreting. (SZ § 7, 37; 61–62).

Heidegger is emphasising the importance of tradition (also taken up by Gadamer) and the manner in which all thought has to be approached in terms of presuppositions. Contrary to Husserl, there cannot be presuppositionless philosophising; rather, Heidegger endorses the view that understanding develops through a circling back and forth between presumption and surprise, the so-called ‘hermeneutic circle’. Being and Time also downplayed the analysis of human beings in terms of consciousness and intellectual cognition and gave more attention to human ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-sein), and the importance of linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit) in any attempt to understand meaning. Most of all, Heidegger’s leading concern was to use phenomenology to revitalise the age-old metaphysical question concerning the meaning of Being (die Seinsfrage), a question which had been forgotten in modern philosophy. Thus Heidegger wanted to put phenomenology in the service of fundamental ontology.

Relations between Husserl and Heidegger became strained after Husserl read Being and Time and realised how much Heidegger had departed from his vision of transcendental phenomenology. Husserl immediately embarked on a series of lectures and publications meant as a corrective to Heidegger’s distorted version of phenomenology. For Husserl, Heidegger’s Being and Time was a kind of anthropolgy undertaken in the natural attitude that failed to understand the true meaning of the transcendental reduction. Furthermore, much to the horror of the elderly Husserl, in the early 1930s Heidegger became an enthusiastic advocate of National Socialism, and in 1933 was elected Rector of Freiburg University, where his inaugural address pledged the university to the service of Hitler. During the 1930s, also, inspired by his reading of Nietzsche and of German poets such as Hölderlin, Heidegger’s thought underwent a turning away from transcendental philosophy and towards a kind of poetic, meditative thinking, directed against what he characterised as the technological framing of the age, a framing which had been enabled by but had deformed the ancient Greek approach to the ‘event’ or ‘happening’ (Ereignis) of being.

Even during his so-called ‘phenomenological decade’ (1919–1929), Heidegger was never a slavish follower of Husserl. Indeed, he rejected and even ridiculed Husserl’s conception of the transcendental ego and other central aspects of Husserl’s thought right from the beginning of his lecturing career (after 1919), and intended Being and Time to kill off the ‘old man’. As he caustically remarks in a letter: “Founder of Phenomenology – no one knows what that means anymore.”35 For example, in his lecture course for the Summer Semester 1923, Heidegger asserts that:

Phenomenology can only be appropriated phenomenologically, i.e., only through demonstration and not in such a way that one repeats propositions, takes over fundamental principles, or subscribes to academic dogmas. A
large measure of critique is initially required for this, and nothing is more
dangerous than the naïve trust in evidence exhibited by followers and fellow
travellers. If it is the case that our relation to the things themselves in
seeing is the decisive factor, it is equally the case that we are frequently
deceived about them and that the possibility of such deception stubbornly
persists. Perhaps called once to be the conscience of philosophy, it has
wound up as a pimp for public whoring of the mind, fornicatio spiritus
(Luther).36

With Heidegger’s personal falling out with Husserl, it was left to Husserl’s later
assistants, Eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe and Stephan Strasser, to carry on the
legacy of Husserlian philosophy. Indeed, it was due to the efforts of a hitherto
unknown graduate from Louvain, Fr. Herman Van Breda, who had never met
Husserl, that Husserl’s papers and manuscripts were rescued from the Nazis
and brought to safety in the Husserl Archive of the Catholic University of Louvain
in Belgium.

Heidegger’s anti-subjectivist characterisation of human being-in-the-world and his
emphasis on the ‘linguisticality’ of human experience were taken up by Hans-Georg
Gadamer (b. 1900). Gadamer, who trained as a classicist with Paul Natorp and later
Heidegger, accepted Heidegger’s claim that phenomenology must proceed in her-
meneutic fashion, sensitive to the manner in which tradition shapes and constrains
the meanings we encounter in the world. Initially, he developed his hermeneutics
through the interpretation of Plato in particular, but he was also interested in the
nature of the work of art and attended Heidegger’s 1935 lectures on “The Origin of
the Work of Art”. However, his real impact came with the publication of Wahrheit und
Methode (Truth and Method, 1960).37 In this work, Gadamer argues that humans are
essentially involved in the historically situated and finite task of understanding the
world, a world encountered and inhabited in and through language. As Gadamer
puts it, ‘language is the medium of the hermeneutic experience’ (TM 384; 361); that
is, language is the medium in which understanding is realised. Furthermore, for
Gadamer, language has its true being in ‘speech’ (Sprache), the kind of speech
which occurs in the context of a ‘conversation’ (ein Gespräch, TM 446; 422). Philo-
sophy, then, is a conversation leading towards mutual understanding, towards the
overlapping of horizons which Gadamer calls ‘fusion of horizons’ (Horizontsver-
schmelzung, TM 306; 290). Furthermore, against the Enlightenment aim of eliminat-
ing prejudice, Gadamer paradoxically wants to rehabilitate prejudice, in the sense of
recognising the presuppositions we bring to any situation or encounter with others.

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) first encountered Heidegger when she became a
student at Marburg, and was particularly impressed by his lectures on Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics and on Plato’s Sophist. Forced to leave Germany because of the
Nazis, Arendt emigrated to the USA where she developed her own independent way
of analysing human life or dwelling ‘in the midst of the world’, but drew deeply on her
contact with Heidegger, including his interpretations of Plato and Aristotle. Arendt’s
own phenomenological account of human freedom and sociality and the conditions
which make political action possible are set out in The Human Condition (1958).
Arendt was never a subscriber to a particular practice of the phenomenological
method but her approach may be understood as phenomenological in broader
terms.
Phenomenology outside Germany

Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* had an early and considerable influence on philosophy elsewhere in Europe, with followers in Russia (Gustav Shpet and later Roman Jakobson) and in Poland, due to the efforts of Husserl’s student, Roman Ingarden, who returned there. Husserl was well received in Czechoslovakia, due to his old friend Thomas Masaryk and Jan Patočka (1907–1977), and, most notably, in France, originally through Jean Héring (1890–1966), but principally due to Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), who had studied with both Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg in 1928, and had translated Husserl’s Paris lectures of 1929 into French. Levinas introduced phenomenology to French readers through his pioneering study, *Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology* (1930), which explicitly compared Husserl with Henri Bergson, the most prominent French philosopher of the time. Although Levinas published many articles on Husserl and Heidegger, he did not really achieve recognition for his own ethical approach until the publication of *Totalité et infini (Totality and Infinity)* in 1961.

Phenomenology went on to have a considerable following in France through the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Mikel Dufrenne and Gilles Deleuze, although it also gradually metamorphosed into structuralism (Michel Foucault) and subsequently into deconstruction (Jacques Derrida). Husserl even had some influence on French anthropology through Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939), who had been present at Husserl’s Paris lectures in 1929 and engaged in correspondence with him. In France, phenomenology was given a radical existential interpretation, especially in the writings of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) was a brilliant littérateur, an accomplished novelist and playwright, as well as a bohemian intellectual and left-wing political activist who popularised existentialism in post-war Europe. His first published work, *Transcendence of the Ego*, sought to repudiate the traditional view that the ego is an inhabitant of consciousness, whether as an element to be found ‘materially’ in consciousness (as some psychologists maintain), or, as in the Kantian account, as a formal organisational aspect of consciousness. Rather, for Sartre, the ego is outside consciousness altogether, “a being of the world, like the ego of the other” (*un être du monde, comme l’égo d’autrui*, TE 31). Sartre argues that if consciousness were not self-consciousness it would not be consciousness at all: “Indeed the existence of consciousness is an absolute because consciousness is consciousness of self” (TE 40). Consciousness is aware of itself because it is aware of objects.

Sartre followed up his essay on Husserl with two books devoted to a psychological and phenomenological study of imagination. The earlier 1936 study, *L’imagination*, contained more of Sartre’s criticisms of previous theories, including those of Berkeley, Hume and Bergson, as well as the psychologists Bühler, Titchener, Köhler, Wertheimer, Koffka and others. His next study, *L’Imaginaire*, in 1940, offered his own positive, descriptive phenomenological study of the nature and role of imaginative consciousness. Sartre is best known for his massive study *L’Être et le néant (Being and Nothingness*, 1943), subtitled “Essay on Phenomenological Ontology”, which suggests the influence of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, and which Sartre had begun studying in the early 1940s. *Being and Nothingness* contrasts objects and consciousness in terms of the distinction between ‘being in itself’ (*être en soi*) and
“being for itself” (être pour soi). Consciousness is pure for itself and hence has no internal content or being but is always in a process of becoming, of aiming to be something in itself. Sartre’s account of the fluctuations of consciousness is meant to underscore the fact that human existence is radically free. There are many different structural ways in which humans either face up to or occlude their freedom, the main manner of occlusion being ‘self-deception’ or ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise foi), the analysis of which is a tour de force in the book.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), who became a close colleague of Sartre’s until they fell out over political matters, offers a radical description of the primary experiences of embodied human existence and a critique of various forms of objectivism and scientism (both rationalistic and empiricist) in his major work, Phänomenologie of Perception (1945). He sought to avoid Husserl’s idealism by returning to our pre-predicative experiences. As he puts it in a late essay, “La métaphysique dans l’homme” (“The Metaphysical in Man”), the aim of his philosophy is “to rediscover, along with structure and the understanding of structure, a dimension of being and a type of knowledge which man forgets in his natural attitude”.

Jacques Derrida (b. 1930) began his philosophical career rather conventionally as a student of Husserlian phenomenology, writing a number of close, critical studies of both the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s late essay, “On the Origin of Geometry”. Derrida sought to expose the hidden metaphysical presuppositions of traditional Husserlian phenomenology, which, in his view, far from being a presuppositionless science, actually belonged to the history of metaphysics. Phenomenology, far from being a radical presuppositionless pure science of consciousness, was in fact the apotheosis of the old metaphysics. Indeed, Husserlian phenomenology, with its commitment to self-identical ideal truths, remains, for Derrida, trapped in “the metaphysics of presence in the form of ideality”. Although Derrida seeks to go beyond phenomenology and indeed philosophy, nevertheless his work takes off from the ambiguities and tensions in Husserl’s enterprise and Derrida likes to see himself as operating within the context of the Husserlian epoché.

**Phenomenology in America and Britain**

Due to the Logical Investigations, Husserl had attracted American students including William Ernest Hocking and later Marvin Farber, Dorion Cairns and Fritz Kaufmann. Through the 1920s phenomenology spread to Japan, and after the Second World War it enjoyed a major renaissance in the USA up through the 1960s. Sartre would recall that his life was broken in two by the Second World War, and phenomenology suffered a similar fate, with Husserl’s own work being threatened by the rise of the Nazis, and by the enforced emigration of so many phenomenologists – Aron Gurwitsch, Alfred Schütz, Hannah Arendt. All had to flee, first to France and then to the USA, some assisted by Husserl’s American students Marvin Farber and Dorion Cairns. A new phenomenological tradition began to take root in America, specifically at the New School for Social Research in New York, during the 1940s and 1950s.

By contrast with America, Husserl never became particularly influential in England, although he was read by philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle. More recently, however, especially through the writings of Michael Dummett, David Bell, and scholarly work on the origins of analytic philosophy, Husserl has been recognised alongside Gottlob
Frege as a major philosopher with interesting insights into the nature of logic, and issues connected with meaning and reference. Some contemporary analytic philosophers of mind in both the UK and the USA have been attracted to Husserlian phenomenology because of its rigorous attempt to provide an anti-naturalistic approach to the essence of consciousness and of cognitive acts in the broadest sense, and because of its accounts of intentionality, a concept which plays an important role in the work of Daniel Dennett and John R. Searle, among others.

The current situation: what is living and what is dead?

Having been in vogue in France in the 1950s and in the USA in the 1960s, during the latter half of the twentieth century phenomenology gradually became eclipsed as a programme and as a unique method, giving way to broader and less scientific conceptions of continental philosophy, which include critical theory, post-structuralism, hermeneutics, postmodernism and multiculturalism. However, recent developments, including the interest in the history of analytic philosophy, discussions concerning consciousness arising out of the recent revival of the programme of the naturalisation of consciousness, the critique of naturalism, and questions concerning the relation between philosophy and the sciences, have generated new interest in the contribution of phenomenology to these themes. There is undoubtedly a certain sense in which phenomenology has now receded into history as a movement and is no longer championed as the exclusive method of philosophy. It is certainly no longer viable in the form of a rigorous foundational science as originally conceived by Husserl, just as the project of producing an ideal clarified language has disappeared from contemporary philosophy of language.

Phenomenology’s enduring contribution is its patient descriptive analyses of the phenomena of consciousness with its emphasis on the ineliminable role of consciousness in knowledge and its rejection of the modern tradition of representationalism and naturalism. Phenomenology has a richer understanding of the subjective and the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, whereby objectivity is an achievement or production of subjectivity. In this world, there is no objectivity without subjectivity. Furthermore, Husserl has shown how complex even basic perceptual acts are, a complexity which will be appreciated by those trying to replicate these achievements in machines. Phenomenology’s emphasis on world-constituting consciousness is a powerful antidote to naturalism in all its forms, and it is probably the only philosophy which has attempted to concretely describe the manner of the self-relation of the ego or self, and its experience of others in empathy. In terms of its complex analysis of the nature of human being-in-the-world, phenomenology still has much to offer contemporary philosophy.

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Notes


⁵ As Hans-Georg Gadamer has confirmed in his communication to Burt Hopkins, recorded in Research in Phenomenology, Vol. XXIX (1999), p. 213.


¹¹ See I. Kant, Logic, Introduction §1, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (New York: Dover Press, 1988), p. 13: “just as sensibility is the faculty of intuitions, so the understanding is the faculty of thinking, that is, of bringing the presentations of the senses under rules.”


25 Ibid., p. 9.
26 Ibid., p. 10.
32 See also *Ideas I*, Introduction, p. xviii; Hua III/1 2, and Husserl, *Draft of a Preface*, p. 32.
Further reading


