The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity

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The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity

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Editors' Introduction

Introduction: Some Themes in the Phenomenology of Embodiment

This volume, *The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity*, aims to explore the rich legacy of phenomenological thinking about the embodied subject, including the phenomenon known as 'intercorporeality', i.e. the interaction between living embodied subjects. Original and innovative phenomenological explorations of embodiment are currently taking place not just through critical and creative appropriations of the classical analyses of embodiment found in the phenomenological tradition (specifically Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein and Scheler) but also through close dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind and action, scientific psychology and the cognitive sciences, the medical sciences as well as psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

As many of the contributors to this volume point out, phenomenology is all too often portrayed in a rather narrow manner as a philosophy of consciousness, an account of the first-person perspective, a description of experience as it is experienced, a philosophy of subjectivity. Indeed, many critics of phenomenology have seized on the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl's allegiance to Cartesianism (he even characterised phenomenology as a 'new Cartesianism') to highlight phenomenology's supposed preference for the subjective standpoint of an individual consciousness, the 'I think' (*ego cogito*). But phenomenology has from the outset, i.e. from the beginning of the twentieth century (usually marked by the appearance of Husserl's two-volume *Logical Investigations* in 1900/1901), always had a much richer appreciation of the complexity of subjective experience and has recognised that subjects are intrinsically embodied, embedded in social and historical life-worlds, and essentially involved with other embodied subjects and in an intersubjective cultural world. Indeed, Husserl himself said that we should not say '*ego cogito*' ('I think') so much as '*nos cogitamus*', ('we think') (see Husserl 1965: 316). But even emphasising the inherently intersubjective, social and cultural nature of our conscious lives does not fully capture the manner of our 'being in the world'

(*In-der-Welt-sein*) to use Heidegger's term (Heidegger 1962). Human beings are embodied intentional agents—expressive, meaning-construing and meaning intending beings embedded in a world that is loaded with significance, overlain with fantasy, imagination, memory and all kinds of projection. The overall term 'embodiment', then, is meant to capture this idea that human conscious subjects are intrinsically connected to the world in complex and irreducible ways, some of which are explored in depth in this volume.

Of all the philosophical movements of the twentieth century, phenomenology in particular has been to the forefront in the exploration of embodiment. Embodiment, corporeality, incarnation—these are all terms that express the conception of *Leiblichkeit* found especially in the writings of Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and other members of the phenomenological movement. Husserl himself speaks of 'the phenomenology of embodiment' (*die Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit*) in his *Phenomenological Psychology* lectures of 1925 (Husserl 1968, 1977, § 39). Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the French inheritors of the Husserlian tradition, similarly speak of 'the flesh' (*la chair*)—their translation of Husserl's *Leib*—and of 'incarnation' (*incarnation*) to express the idea that human beings, as embodied, are embedded in a very specific way both in the material world and in the cultural and symbolic world (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 1968; Sartre 1943, 1986).

In general, the classic phenomenologists begin their reflections from the distinction they draw between two aspects of the body—between *Leib* and *Körper*—between the living, animate, organic 'lived body' (what Merleau-Ponty calls '*le corps vecu*'), the body as it is personally experienced, and the body understood as a purely physical, corporeal thing, extended in space, the material body, the body as the object of science, or as 'corpse'—as Sartre puts it in his illuminating chapter 'The Body' in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre 1943, 1986). The term 'physical body' (*Körper*) is used by Husserl primarily to refer to the physical body which occupies space and is subject to causal laws as described by physics and the natural and biological sciences. He used the term *Leib* (e.g. in his *Ideas* II § 18, Husserl 1952, 1989), translated usually as 'lived body' or 'animate body', to refer to the body as a living organic entity. In one sense the body is a physical thing like other physical things; it is governed by gravity, has the character of weight, impenetrability, having 'parts outside of parts', is affected by cold and heat, can be cut or damaged, is affected by disease, and so on. In another sense, the body is the animate body which I possess or which more accurately *I am*. This lived body is much more difficult to describe, precisely because it is experienced so close to me that it is indeed, as Husserl puts it, the living centre of my experience. It is with this animate body that I navigate in the world, experience the physical world as such. All my perceptual interaction with the world is mediated by this body which I am. The world appears to me in colours, shapes, textures, tastes, smells, hardness and smoothness, resistance and penetrability precisely because of the way my living organic body is constituted and coordinated with the physical world that surrounds me. I am constantly adjusting my body in relation to the world, shifting my balance

while walking, tilting my head to listen better, turning around to see what is behind me and so on. The body is a centre not just of sensation and perception but of proprioception and kinaesthesis.

Moreover, I also experience other human beings and animals (across a very wide range of living things) primarily through encountering their living bodies—their outward forms, movements, expressive faces, and gestures. Even a phone call is experienced as communication with the other person embodied in his or her voice. Everywhere our bodies meet and interact, as in handshakes, sports, fighting, or making love. Moreover, our bodily movements, functions and needs always rise above the material realm and are constituted as meaningful in complex symbolic terms. All our bodily organs are saturated with excess meanings and functions. The mouth, for instance, is an instrument for breathing, eating, but also for speaking, kissing, and even—a phenomenon regularly observed in car-parks—for temporarily holding parking tickets. The body contains a number of organs that can be used as signs—pointing is a very important part of the body's actions. The body is involved in symbolic activity at all levels—in dance, mime, singing, speaking and writing, in ritual and religious activity. The body not just writes but can be written on, the skin can be tattooed and so on. Everyday bodily activities such as eating and washing can be invested with extraordinary symbolic significance in religious ceremonies.

Edmund Husserl's and—following him—Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologies, in particular, provide very rich accounts of the experience of embodiment, including the crucial encounters with other living bodies in what Husserl, following the German psychological tradition of his day, called '*Einfühlung*' (empathy). The encounter with others and the manner in which humans are co-subjects cooperating together or conflicting with one another is given the general name of 'intersubjectivity' (*Intersubjektivität*), and many of Husserl's research manuscripts in this area are only now being studied and mined for their insights, a mining that is undertaken by a number of papers, in particular in Part II and III of this volume. Husserl describes the lived body as a 'bearer of sensations' (*Ideas* II § 36, Husserl 1952, 1989) and as the 'organ of my will' (§ 38). It is, in Husserl's terminology, the centre of my 'I can' (*Ich kann*), i.e. it is through my body that I exercise powers such as movement, touch, turning my heading, seeing things, gripping things and so on. Indeed, Husserl claims—and here he is followed by Merleau-Ponty—that the body is present in all our perceptual experience and is involved in all other conscious functions (*Ideas* II § 39), and yet at the same time the body is peculiarly absent or transparent in our perceptions. We normally focus on the objective element in experience. When we have a visual experience we normally directly experience how things are in the world and only start to thematise our eyes if they are blurred, or affected by grit or tears. Similarly, we normally just feel the cool surface of the desk and only focus on our finger tips if in some sense they are blistered or experiencing discomfort.

With regard to visual perception, Husserl gives extensive, detailed descriptions of just *what* we see and *how* we see it, involving the nature of the act of perception, the nature of the perceived object, the sense of perception, the role of temporal awareness in the structure of perceiving, the dynamic nature of perceptual content, the nature of the indeterminate accompanying horizons, and so on. Perception, of course, is much more than visual perception, and from very early on Husserl (e.g. in his 1907 *Thing and Space* Lectures, Husserl 1973b, 1997) was attentive to the complex relations between sight and touch (he has much less to say about the senses of hearing, smell and taste) and how the sense of space is constituted from the interplay between these sensory modalities combined with kinesthetic movements (movements of the eyes, head, hands, etc.). Perception is also integrated with action and here phenomenology has offered very deep accounts of freedom and agency. These accounts have recently become the centre of attention in the McDowell-Dreyfus debate (Schear 2013), which is also taken up in the essays of Erik Rietveld, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc and Rasmus Thybo Jensen in this volume.

Embodied experience is not just a matter of deliberate intentional willed action, but also a matter of routines, habits, practices, skills and intended but non-deliberative actions generally. The nature of habit has been extensively discussed in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and others, in a manner that has been taken up by contemporary sociologists (e.g. Pierre Bourdieu) and philosophers (e.g. Hubert Dreyfus). Dreyfus places a very heavy emphasis on a kind of motor intentionality in habit which takes places at the pre-personal or pre-reflective levels, and here Dreyfus draws his inspiration from Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* as well as a certain reading of human behaviour as found in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. A major part of our acting in the world involves a kind of pre-reflective expert navigating—what has come to be called by Hubert Dreyfus 'coping' (his rendering of Heidegger's *Verhalten*, comporting oneself, or behaviour in a rich sense, see Dreyfus 1991).

This concept of coping has led to a rich discussion in the contemporary literature that has drawn in not just Charles Taylor but also John McDowell, Sean Dorrance Kelly and others. Similarly, the concept of 'affordances' found in the ecological psychology of the American psychologist James J. Gibson (1904–1979) has been productively used to explain how the world appears to the embodied agent (Gibson 1977). A rock can present itself as a good place to sit, a rock-climber will perceive potential grips in the rock face, and so on. In the papers in this volume, the notion of affordance as a kind of significance that also invites a certain action is one of the recurring themes (see especially the papers in this volume by Rietveld, Romdenh-Romluc, Morris and Ratcliffe). Romdenh-Romluc, for instance, endorses Dreyfus's interpretation of Merleau-Ponty to say that perceived opportunities to act can draw forth the agent's behaviour without the need for any intervening mental representation.

Perception, for Husserl, is the bedrock of consciousness, but it is not the only form of consciousness he explored. As he saw it, all other forms of conscious experience are in one way or another *founded* on perceptual, sensory consciousness. In this

regard Husserl contrasts the 'self-givenness' (*Selbstgegebenheit*) of perceived objects with a very large class of conscious forms that he characterizes as 'representational' (*vergegenwärtig*) in one way or another. Representation, or more accurately 'presentification', 'presentiation', or 'calling to mind' (*Vergegenwärtigung*), includes memory, fantasy, wishing, and symbolic thinking—all forms that do not have the sense of the immediate presence of the object. When one remembers, imagines, or fantasizes about an object, there is not the same sense of the immediate, actual, bodily and temporal presence of the object. Indeed, in memory and in expectation, the object is experienced as not presently there, but there is some kind of reference to its being, it is still being posited (as future or past) in a specific way. Unlike imagination, memory posits the real 'having-been' of something. Imagination entails no such positing of the real existence of its object in any temporal mode. It is increasingly recognized that perception, memory, and imagination are all intertwined. Several of the contributions in this volume discuss the nature of imagination and its close links with bodily movement, intentional action, and empathy, in particular the papers by Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Julia Jansen, Joona Taipale and Carlos Lobo.

The phenomenology of embodiment also involves close attention to the manner in which the self or ego experiences itself. The body is experienced not as identical with the ego or 'I' pure and simple, but rather as something which is 'mine', albeit that this particular 'mineness' (what Heidegger calls *Jemeinigkeit*) is subject to very many kinds of variation, intensification and even alienation. I can alienate myself from certain parts of my body (hair, nails, even inner parts of the body can be removed, e.g. the appendix or gall bladder) without feeling *myself* altered or changed in any significant way. Yet there are other experiences of my body which are experienced as violations or intrusions. There are extreme examples, such as torture, rape, sexual abuse, where bodily violation can lead to damage to one's sense of self, but there is undoubtedly a very broad spectrum of experiences where the nature of self is intimately related to experiencing one's body. Dorothée Legrand's contribution in this volume for instance examines the complexity of self-experience and the other's experience of oneself in the case of anorexia. The body—as Sartre and others have recognised—is also the 'body-for-others' (Sartre 1943, 1986). The body can also be experienced as something over and against the ego (as Husserl writes in *Ideas* II § 54). In other words, the body can be a site of resistance to my will. I want to keep walking but my legs are tired. I try to stand up but I feel dizzy. Intimately experienced with the body are of course not just sensations and perceptions, but acts of willing, feelings, emotions, moods and the whole affective sphere. In depression or melancholia, a phenomenon discussed by Stefano Micali and Matthew Ratcliffe in their contributions, I may feel unable to act, I experience time in a different way, or the world itself seems drained of meaning.

Embodiment includes the fact that humans live *temporal* lives that evolve in developing bodily form from infancy through maturity to death. The body in this regard is constantly if subtly changing. Finitude, facticity and historicity belong to the very essence of the human as embodied. Heidegger, for instance, sees

human finitude with its necessary incompleteness as belonging to the very essence of the human being as being-in-the-world. In addition Husserl, as demonstrated by Sara Heinämaa in her paper, regards the awareness of one's historical placement within a generation and the horizon of past and future generations, as an essential for the intersubjective constitution of objectivity. The fact that human lives take many forms that makes for differences between individuals and between different stages of any given individual's life gives rise to a host of questions: If we claim that we can only make objectivity intelligible by appealing to a manifold of subjects, i.e. to intersubjectivity, then who belongs to the "we" that can be said to play such a constitutive role? If certain subjects are excluded from playing such a constitutive role, can a phenomenological approach still deliver a meaningful understanding of the experiences of such subjects, for instance the experiences of infants or people suffering from psychiatric disorders? These questions are discussed by amongst others, Heinämaa, Taipale and Micali in this volume.

Several of the papers in this volume deal with Husserl's very important and influential conception of the life-world. In the *Crisis of European Science* (Husserl 1970, 1976) and related writings, Husserl provides an extensive if somewhat formal treatment of the concept of the 'life-world' or 'world of life' (*Lebenswelt*). Husserl claims to have uncovered the life-world as a fundamental and novel phenomenon previously invisible to the sciences and to have identified it for the first time as a 'universal problem' (*Crisis* § 34). Indeed, there is—as Husserl himself insists—a specific and entirely new science of the life-world itself (*Crisis* § 51) that would, among other things, offer a new basis for grounding the natural and human sciences through an investigation of 'subsoil' (*Untergrund*) for all forms of theoretical truth (Husserl 1976, 127;1970 124). Several of the papers in this volume discuss aspects of Husserl's account of human life in the life-world, specifically the papers by Sara Heinämaa, Ignacio de los Reyes Melero, Simo Pulkkinen, and Tom Nenon.

The Plan of This Volume

This volume brings together a total of 17 new contributions to many of the current issues concerning embodiment. Most of the papers collected in this volume were originally presented at an international conference on 'Embodied Subjectivity' held at the Royal Irish Academy on 25–27th of May 2010 under the auspices of the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences research project 'The Phenomenology of Consciousness and Subjectivity' (PI: Professor Dermot Moran; Postdoctoral Fellow: Dr. Rasmus Thybo Jensen). This conference brought together leading international researchers from a variety of disciplines—predominantly philosophy, but also cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and other related disciplines. The primary aim of the original conference was to explore the nature of embodied subjectivity generally and more specifically the contribution

of phenomenology as a methodology for exploring this first-person dimension of human experience.

The editors have grouped the papers in this volume into four parts in a way that highlights the research themes involved. *Part I* contains four papers that all address ongoing debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action and the cognitive sciences, drawing on resources from the phenomenological tradition, in particular Merleau-Ponty. The four papers of *Part II* are all concerned with Husserl's account of the constitutive role of the body in perception, the intersubjective constitution of the life-world and the distinction between normality and anomality/abnormality. *Part III* encompass four papers that in different ways engage with cases of disturbances of bodily self-awareness and the importance of such breakdowns for our view of the constitutive role of the body. The papers in *Part III* again draw specifically on the works of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, but also Sartre plays a crucial role. In the last section, *Part IV*, we have joined together five papers that explore the self-other relation from infancy to the level of scientific and political community where language and symbolic representation embodies idealities and ideals.

In what follows we provide a survey of the papers of each of the four parts, and draw attention to some common concerns, not only between papers within each of the four parts of the volume, but also between papers in different parts.

Part I: The Acting Body: Habit, Freedom and Imagination

Part I contains four papers which all address ongoing debates in philosophy of action and in the cognitive sciences drawing on resources from the phenomenological tradition, in the first three papers mainly the works of Merleau-Ponty and in the fourth paper by Julia Jansen by drawing on the works of Husserl.

In her paper 'Habit and Attention' Komarine Romdenh-Romluc addresses an issue that has only recently become the focus of more intense discussions within philosophy of action, namely how to account for habitual, non-deliberative actions and how to understand the role of bodily skills in the performance of intentional actions in general (see Dreyfus 2000, 2005; Pollard 2011; Levine 2012). Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's discussion of habit and motor intentionality in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 1962), Romdenh-Romluc here expands the account of bodily agency that she has been developing in a series of recent papers (Romdenh-Romluc 2007, 2011, 2012). On what is often called the standard story of human agency, a bodily movement is considered an action if it is caused in the right way by the right kind of conative state or event such as a belief-desire pair or an intention that also constitutes the agent's reasons for acting (see Davidson 1963 for the original formulation of this model). Against the standard causal theory Romdenh-Romluc argues that there are instances of actions where what one does is in fact act contrary to one's intentions namely in cases of so called "slips of actions". A case of such a slip of action would be the person who

intends to unlock her bike but, having forgotten to lock the bike the night before, instead inadvertently ends up locking the bike. In such a case, Romdenh-Romluc argues, the person responds to the perceived affordances and when she out of habit locks the bike, this cannot be considered a mere happening, but should be counted as something involving her agency. The behaviour seems to lie within the realm of her responsibility, which indicates that it should be considered an expression of her agency. She furthermore argues that contrary to what is proposed by the standard model we should think of even our successful intentional actions as often initiated and guided by perception of affordances in a way that leaves out the need to have the action in question represented by a mental state such as an intention.

In addition to drawing attention to the role of bodily habits in the performance of actions, Romdenh-Romluc also emphasises the role attention plays for the successful completion of actions. The function of attention is said to be to gather information that is salient for the task at hand. Attending to what one is doing is further described as an attunement to the action possibilities that are relevant to the completion of one's task. These characterizations of attention can be seen as attempts at capturing the characteristic kind of freedom involved in skillful, unreflective action which is the focus of Erik Rietveld's paper.

In his paper "Affordances and Unreflective Freedom" Erik Rietveld's aim is to bring into focus the specific kind of freedom that he argues is intrinsic to the kind of skillful, habitual actions discussed by Romdenh-Romluc. Rietveld argues that the understanding of freedom in unreflective action found in the works of Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly is insufficient. The reason why these accounts fail is that they do not manage to characterize the relevant kind of freedom 'on its own terms', i.e. without reference to a higher level capacity to reflectively step back from what one is doing and critically assess one's reasons. Though Rietveld recognizes that such a capacity to step back is essential for the specifically human aspects of the freedom we enjoy, he also argues that there is an important sense in which we share an element of freedom with non-linguistic infants and animals. If an account of the kind of freedom characteristic of our unreflective actions ignores this common element, there is a risk that infants and non-linguistic animals are reduced to automata enslaved by the stimuli of their environment. Rietveld argues that neither Dreyfus' nor Kelly's account avoid this pitfall because they do not provide a sufficiently rich account of how the freedom in question manifests itself in the experience of the subject engaged in unreflective, skillful action.

When Rietveld emphasises that there is a kind of freedom in action which is shared between mature human beings, infants and non-linguistic animals, he can seem to contradict the view of skillful coping activities that McDowell has put forward in his response to Dreyfus (McDowell 2009). This is not Rietveld's intention. As Rietveld points out, McDowell fully endorses the idea that there are certain aspects of our embodied coping that we share with other animals, namely a responsiveness to affordances, i.e. possibilities for action provided by the environment (McDowell 2009, 315). What McDowell opposes is the idea that we can

somehow make the specificity of our coping skills intelligible by beginning with an independent understanding of what is shared between us and other animals and then *add* capacities on top of these more basic shared capacities in order to reach a full blown rational agent. Rietveld's focus on the shared experiential elements between us and other animals does not commit him to such a building block model of rational animals. Such would only be the case if he claimed that a phenomenology of the shared features exhausts all there is to be said about the phenomenology of the unreflective actions of mature human beings.

In his contribution "Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Problem concerning Bodily Agency", Rasmus Thybo Jensen focuses on a line of argument against any theory of action that conceptually divorces our rational capacity to form intentions and our bodily capacity to carry out our intentions. Jensen argues that we find at least a germ of this line of argument in Merleau-Ponty and he exploits the works of G.E. Anscombe, Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell to articulate it. Jensen spells out the line of argument while focusing on what Romdenh-Romluc in her paper calls *the dominant view*, namely the Standard Causal Account, which basically claims that a movement is an action if and only if it is caused by the right kind of conative items in the right kind of way. What the Standard Causal Account shares with many other accounts in the philosophy of action is the basic idea that the bodily movements involved in intentional actions are themselves to be regarded as agency-neutral events. These movements are agency-neutral events in the sense that they are of the same basic kind as the movements that occur when the limbs move because of a reflex or because of the force of a heavy wind, i.e. the movements are of a kind that are not intrinsically agency-involving. Jensen compares this assumption about the agency-neutral movement with the idea that perceptual appearances are as such veridiciality-neutral; an idea criticized by both Merleau-Ponty and McDowell. Jensen argues that we find a line of argument in Merleau-Ponty to the effect that the conception of appearances that sees these as merely externally related to the appearing object, will not only make it difficult to account for our empirical knowledge, it will undermine our ability to make sense of our sensory awareness as an awareness of even appearances. It is this element in Merleau-Ponty that Jensen, alluding to McDowell's similar line of argument, calls transcendental. The argument pertaining to bodily agency that can be detected in Merleau-Ponty, Jensen argues, also has a transcendental nature. The argument, as Jensen reconstructs it, is an argument to the effect that any conception of action that begins with the assumption about the agency-neutrality of movements will not only make it difficult to see how our bodily motility could ever come to effectuate our intentions, it will also risk undermining even the possibility of making sense of ourselves as having intentions in the first place.

In her paper "Imagination, Embodiment and Situatedness: Using Husserl to Dispel (Some) Notions of 'Off-Line Thinking'" Julia Jansen challenges certain widespread assumptions in the debate about what have been called 'the 4 E's' of situated cognition research, i.e. the four related ideas that cognition is embedded, enactive, embodied and extended. In the current debate, it is most often Merleau-Ponty who is invoked when people arguing for one or more of the

4 E's appeal to the phenomenological tradition. However, as Jansen notes, there has recently been a growing realization that Husserl's work cannot so easily be associated with the kind of Cartesian internalism about the mind which proponents of the 4 E's oppose (see Zahavi 2008; Smith 2008). The argument to the effect that an externalist picture of the mind is embodied in Husserl's writing is often made via an interpretation of Husserl's analysis of perception. In her paper Jansen expands on these arguments by focusing on Husserl's analysis of sensory imagination. She argues that this analysis challenges the assumption that imagination is a cognitive phenomenon that we should all agree is in no need of any appeal to the 4 E's in order to be explained. The two aspects of Husserl's analysis of sensory imagination which Jansen's focus on are: (1) Husserl's claim about the quasi-perceptual character of imagination; (2) Husserl's claim about a foundational relation between any act of imagination and a background of actual perceptual experience.

The quasi-perceptual nature of sensory imagination is revealed by the way imagination inherits many of the essential features of perceptual experience. An imagined object is given with both an internal and an external horizon. If you imagine Pegasus flying over a lake in a mountain area you can imagine seeing Pegasus from different angles, you can zoom in and out and make Pegasus fly so as to show different aspects of its body (this example is taken from Marbach 2013); if we abstract from the freedom involved in the imaginative exercise these possibilities correspond to the way any perceptual object is given with an internal horizon of possible appearances.

Though sensory imagination mimics perception, the essential difference between imagining an object and having the object "present in person" also shows up in experience. One of the ways the difference shows up is in the experiential contrast between the imagined scene and one's actual field of perception that under normal circumstances isn't confused with the imagined scene. Without such a contrastive background the act of imagination would no longer be able to establish itself as a phenomenon distinct from hallucinations or dreams. In agreement with Husserl, Jansen argues that the contrastive element is constitutive for the sensory imaginative experience.

How do the two features of imagination highlighted by Jansen feed into her arguments for a situated cognition approach to imagination? The first feature, the quasi-perceptual nature of imagination, might not immediately support the idea that the cognitive processes involved in imagination are constitutively dependent on extra-cranial features. But, as Jansen argues, it does challenge certain conceptions of sensory imagination, such as the picture theory of mental imagery, and it suggests that imagination might depend crucially on sensorimotor areas of the brain. The second feature, the constitutive relation of imagination to perception provides what seems to be the strongest argument in favour of a situated cognition approach to imagination. If sensory imagination constitutively depends on actual perceptual feedback, and if such perceptual experiences are best understood within a situated cognition framework, then it seems we need to understand imagination within such a framework too.

Part II: The Body in Perception: Normality and the Constitution of Life-World

Sara Heinämaa, in her paper "Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Normality: Constitution by Mortals," explores Husserl's controversial claim that the unique intersubjectively agreed sense of the world is constituted by 'normal' subjects only, by which he means mature, rational acculturated adults. In his research manuscripts, especially those in the Intersubjectivity volumes (Husserliana XIII, XIV and XV, Husserl 1973a) Husserl quite bluntly states that the community which constitutes the sense of the world only includes *normal* subjects. Accordingly, Husserl excludes children, the insane, the mentally impaired, those with severe disabilities, and other 'anomal' subjects from playing a role in world-constitution. For Husserl, it is important that world be constituted as an open potentially endless context of meanings that continues seamlessly from the past into the future. Subjects—for example children and animals—that cannot constitute a sense of such continuity cannot be involved in the constitution of the world. According to Heinämaa's reading of Husserl, infants and animals lack the sense of themselves as members of a generation and as members of an open series of generations. This prevents them from taking part in the constitution of the world as a temporally continuous open-ended infinity. However, Heinämaa qualifies this claim in that she points out that children, animals, the insane, and other abnormal subjects are actually constituted as belonging to the world by other subjects. They are therefore not excluded from participation in the world and in intersubjective sociality. However, it is clear that these 'anomal' subjects do not participate in the communal and communicative constitution of the *sense* of the world in so far as they operate within their 'anomalities'. Husserl claims that the very *sense* of the one common world itself includes the possibility of universal sharing, and therefore, if someone is not capable of this sharing then they lack the world, even while living in and towards it. Husserl's conception of being-in-the-world, then, is rather close to that of Heidegger. Heidegger too thinks that animals especially (he has little to say about children) are, as he puts it, 'poor in world' (*Weltarm*).

For Husserl, the world is constituted by an open set of subjectivities acting in consort. The world is an intersubjective accomplishment. This constitution has to take place across time and history and hence there is need for a process called 'generativity' according to which subjects constitute themselves and their culture across generations. Husserl uses the model of Leibniz's monadology to express the manner in which transcendental intersubjectivity cooperatively generates the concept of world and guarantees its stability across time. Husserl has been accused of racism or at least ethnocentrism for excluding Gypsies, Eskimos and 'primitive peoples' generally from his conception of an open community of humans progressing through scientific knowledge with a commitment to universal rationality. In this regard, Husserl's exclusion of the 'anomal' including children and the mentally ill may seem cruel. However, according to Heinämaa, Husserl's work also contains more explorative and philosophically interesting lines of thought,

which are in tension with his more dismissive remarks about 'primitive people'. In addition to the idea of awareness of generativity as essential for rationality, Husserl also argues that the meeting with other cultures is crucial for true understanding of the sense of the world. It is only by engaging in a self-critical communication with other "home-worlds" that are at first alien to ourselves, that we can pass from living in an environment to an appreciation of the world as such, i.e. to an understanding of the world as the horizon of all communal horizons.

Ignacio de los Reyes Melero's paper "The Body as a System of Concordance and the Perceptual World" takes up a challenge one faces if one accepts the Husserlian account of objectivity expounded in Heinämaa's paper, where objectivity is understood as intersubjectively constituted by a community which includes only mature, rational beings who are capable of acting autonomously and have a sense of possibility, past and future. The challenge arises once we take into account that no actual mature, rational subject can be said consistently and infallibly to function in an optimal way. De los Reyes Melero's focus is on the, under normal circumstances, coherent flow of perceptual appearances, where the coherence consists in a constant fulfillment of sensory anticipations correlated with the movements of the body given in kinesthetic experiences. However, as we know, appearances can be deceiving. I can be surprised by the presence of a transparent glass door, when I walk straight into it or by the absence of a door when I'm fooled by a trompe l'oeil painting. Or, unknown to me, I might be under the influence of some drug (Husserl mentions santonin) which distorts my experiences, or I might suffer from colour-blindness. It is part and parcel of the phenomenology of perception that any given perceptual appearance provides at most inadequate evidence, in the sense that it can never allow the perceiver to rule out with absolute certainty that further perceptual exploration could reveal the present appearance as illusory.

De los Reyes Melero frames the central issue of his paper in terms of a question also raised by Husserl himself: Should an acknowledgment of the constant possibility of annulment or 'cancelling out' (*Durchstreichung*) of any given appearance lead us to conclude that the two kinds of appearances, i.e. the ones that are revealed as discordant and the ones that place themselves in a stream of coherent appearances, are really equivalent in the sense of having the same epistemic validity. Related issues have recently been discussed by A. D. Smith in the context of the modern debate about externalism and the so-called disjunctive conception of appearances (Smith 2008). What makes the question raised by de los Reyes Melero distinct from the discussion of the so-called "Highest Common Factor" model of perceptual appearances is that his question does not as such concern the skeptical worry stemming from the idea that all our appearances could in principle be misleading (see Jensen 2013 for a discussion of the Highest Common Factor Model and Merleau-Ponty; see Alweiss 2013 for a discussion of Husserl and Humean skepticism); rather the issue is what entitles us to believe that the appearances we have now could not in principle be replaced by another "world of appearances" that would be just as coherent and therefore just as legitimate; or, put it in a different way, whether the constitutive relation between the normality of

bodily capacities and objectivity, does not force us to allow different, mutually incommensurable "worlds of appearances" relative to different normalities.

The central reason for Husserl's denial of such a possibility of internally coherent but mutually exclusive worlds, brought out by de los Reyes Melero, is that admitting such a possibility commits one to the idea that two distinct subjects or communities of subjects could constitute each their world without any possibility that the two subjects or communities could ever enter into meaningful communication. It is this very same emphasis on the communicability between different mutually alien home-worlds that Heinämaa argued plays a constitutive role for the notion of an objective world. We can tentatively formulate Husserl's thought here in terms of a dilemma: Either we conceive of the alternative world of appearances as having at least a minimum of overlap with our world, in which case we are not conceiving of a radical replacement of our phenomenal world with another; or there is no overlap whatsoever, in which case we lose our grip on the idea that what we have in mind is a world at all since there is, *ex hypothesi*, no possible way for us to make sense of the content of the appearances of that world. By bringing out the role of communicability and language in Husserl's conception of objectivity, Melero and Heinämaa's papers can be read as an invitation to a further dialogue with work in analytical philosophy, for instance that of Davidson (cf. Davidson 1973/1974) and with the Hermeneutic development of phenomenology through Gadamer.

Simo Pulkkinen, in his paper "Lifeworld as an Embodiment of Spiritual Meaning: The Constitutive Dynamics of Activity and Passivity," investigates a different aspect of the way in which perceptual content is, according to Husserlian phenomenology, relative to the subject. Pulkinnen's starting point is a certain apparent contradiction in Husserl's account of the relation between *passivity* and *activity*, or to use more traditional, Kantian terms, between *sensibility* and *understanding*. On the one hand, Husserl claims that what is passively received in sensibility includes the spiritual or cultural meaning of material objects that function as implements in the life-world: When I see a fork *as* a fork we shouldn't understand this phenomena as a two-stage process, where first I have a mere material object given in sensory consciousness and then I, through the intervention of a higher cognitive faculty, project the meaning 'fork' onto the object presented. On the other hand, Husserl also claims that the content we are presented with in the 'personalistic attitude', i.e. the attitude that allows the cultural or specifically human meaning of material objects to appear, is always the product of activities of the ego and therefore something that exceeds that which is given in *pure passivity*. Pulkkinen argues that we find the resources within the works of Husserl to show why this apparent contradiction is merely apparent. In order to dissolve the contradiction, Pulkkinen suggests, we need first to we recognize the logical independence of the following two claims about the relation between passivity and activity:

> Claim (A): All active modes of consciousness are founded upon passive modes of consciousness.
> Claim (B): All content received in passive modes of consciousness is independent of the meaning-contribution of any active modes of consciousness.

Claim (A) is a claim about the formal founding relation between two modes of consciousness. It states that any active mode of consciousness, i.e. any mode that involves an attending ego, presupposes the existence of a passive mode of consciousness: something must be given passively before the attention of the ego can be activated. Claim (B) concerns the constitution of the possible content given in passive modes of consciousness, for instance in the horizon of an intentional act of attending visually to a fork on the table. According to Pulkkinen, these two claims have often been conflated within Husserl scholarship, but there is no necessary logical connection between the two. The constitution of the passively given cultural meaning of an object might very well depend on some prior activities of the ego, without this endangering the claim that in any given case of an active taking up of such meaning, either via attention or via a judgement, the meaning must be first given in a passive mode of consciousness.

In the latter part of his paper, Pulkkinen explicates how Husserl's notion of a *secondary passivity* and the accompanying concepts of habitual and associative transferences of meaning can be read as giving us exactly an account of how the meaning that is directly and passively given in perception, can encompass the cultural meaning constituted through the prior activities of the subject or the community that she belongs to.

In his analysis of the Husserlian account of passivity, Pulkkinen draws extensively on the manuscripts on the life-world recently published in Husserliana Volume XXXIX (Husserl 2008). Tom Nenon's contribution, "Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl's Research Manuscripts on the Life-world," offers an important evaluation of exactly these manuscripts. Nenon begins by tracing the evolution of the concept of the 'life-world' in Husserl's work. As Nenon points out, Husserl actually spends very little time in the *Crisis* describing the structures of the life-world itself, rather, in the first half of that book, he concentrates on retracing the stages of the emergence of the modern scientific notion of an idealized and mathematized 'nature' as the proper object of scientific knowledge (in the figure of Galileo), and later in the book on how the theoretical attitude emerges out of the life-world, and how the philosophical attitude and eventually transcendental philosophy emerge. *Ideas* II does contain a large number of analyses of everyday life in the life-world, and Nenon claims that the manuscripts in Husserliana Volume XXXIX (Husserl 2008) offer a real enrichment of our understanding of Husserl's accounts of the life-world which go beyond but do not contradict the earlier analyses in *Ideas* II.

Nenon is particularly struck by what he calls Husserl's 'ontological realism', in that he stresses the foundational role by natural objects, "realities" (*Realitäten* is Husserl's own word) that at first blush appear to reverse the emphasis that Husserl had placed in the *Ideas II* on the foundational priority of the personalistic attitude. This also appears to run counter to Husserl's explicit adherence to transcendental idealism. Nenon however argues that this impression is somewhat misleading, and that the priority of "realities" is not to an attempt to reduce all objects to natural items in the sense of modern natural science, but is rather a consequence of a recognition of the crucial role that "realities" play in mediating interpersonal communication. Nenon argues that the "realities" encountered in the life-world

have different and more complex structures than the mathematically idealized and non-intuitive entities that populate the realm of nature as described in the modern mathematical and natural sciences. Husserl's ontology of realities, according to Nenon, is actually a kind of Aristotelian everyday natural realism according to which the world is an aggregate of individual spatio-temporally located objects, including human beings and other animals, experienced through their sensibly intuitable properties that are intersubjectively identifiable and describable. With his emphasis on the ontological dimension of Husserl's notion of life-world, Nenon complements the discussion of Pulkinnen. With Nenon's interpretation of "realities" we get a notion that seems to escape the dichotomy between the natural and the cultural and as such it seems to support Pulkinnen's claim that for Husserl there is no layer of perceptual givenness that is not already permeated by meaning constituted in the personalistic attitude.

Like de los Reyes Melero, Nenon emphasises that for Husserl, the kinds of objects and properties we encounter in the life-world depend on the kinds of bodily organs we have, and he also argues that such relativity does not take away the objectivity of the 'realities' we encounter. In addition Nenon elucidates, how even our awareness of non-real objects, is, according to Husserl mediated by the ability to be affected in a bodily way through them. On Nenon's account of Husserl, it is only through the movements of our bodies that we can interact with and change the realities that populate the world; even our interactions with non-real objects such as mathematical entities are mediated by embodied activities such as writing, counting on one's fingers, and so on. Husserl, moreover, does not think of rationality as simply added on to an animal set of capacities, our whole human being is spiritual through and through, and hence even the most physical of corporeal activities is shot through with transcendent meaning. Here again Nenon and Pulkkinin's papers supplement one another as they both highlight how the idea of an interpenetration of sensibility, motricity and understanding that Jensen and Morris find in Merleau-Ponty's work was already at work in Husserl's thinking.

Part III: The Body in Sickness and Health: Some Case Studies

The four papers in Part III supply concrete examples of how the constitutive interaction between bodily self-experience, the experience of an intersubjective life-world and the experiences of others investigated in Part II can undergo dramatic changes in cases of illness. The papers of Katherine Morris and Dorothée Legrand both begin with a critical discussion of definitions found in DSM-IV (the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). Morris' focus is on pain disorders, in particular 'chronic pain syndrome', whereas Legrand investigates eating disorders, in particular anorexia. Both papers combine a phenomenological approach mainly inspired by Merleau-Ponty, with a specific

other discipline, namely medical anthropology in the case of Morris and Lacanian psycho-analysis in the case of Legrand.

In the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's integrative phenomenology, Katherine Morris in her paper "Chronic Pain in Phenomenological/Anthropological Perspective" offers us a prolegomenon to a future integration of the anthropology of medicine and the phenomenology of the body in the form of a phenomenology of chronic pain. As such her paper is a part of a growing interest in the phenomenology of illness and medicine and the phenomenology of pain in particular (cf. Svenaeus 2000; Käll and Zeiler 2013; Käll 2013). In her paper, Morris brings into focus three interrelated aspects of the experience of chronic pain: (1) the disruption of the subject's life-world, (2) the transformation of her lived body, and (3) the diminished possibility of bodily reciprocity. Morris in effect presents a case study that illustrates the general point about the intersubjective nature of our life-world and its foundedness upon a shared bodily normality made by de los Reyes Melero, Heinämaa and Nenon in their contributions to this volume. As to the first aspect, the constant pain or fear of pain affect the way the world shows up for the subject. Affordances that used to be unambiguously inviting now appear as obstacles or even deterrents. Rather than showing up as an unproblematic opportunity for action, a staircase leading up to the bathroom now raises a bodily alertness and evokes an anticipation of pain. This alteration of what Rietveld in his essay calls the field of affordances is intimately related to the second aspect investigated by Morris, namely the transformation of the lived body. Morris uses Iris Marion Young's descriptions of 'feminine intentionality' in order to articulate the kind of ambiguity she identifies in the pain-sufferer's experience. The appearance of the world as presenting obstacles and deterrents is correlated with an experience of a lack of bodily ability, an "I cannot" rather than Husserl's "I can", which should not be confused with an experience of one's body as a mere object, as *Körper*. The experience is exactly of one's body as *both* object and subject, as *Leibkörper*, partly because the habits ingrained in the body aren't simply erased with the inhibitions introduced by the pain.

The third aspect of chronic pain highlighted by Morris is an outcome of the alterations in the expressive behaviour of pain sufferers which results from the constant surveillance of the body and the accompanying inhibitions of action. The sufferer is caught in a kind of intersubjectivity dilemma, because pain has become the norm rather than the exception in her life. If she expresses her pain as one would normally do, namely with what Legrand calls merely expressive symptoms, such as cries and grimaces, then these will, because of their frequency, most likely call forth suspicion and annoyance rather than empathy or sympathy in others. But if she represses such immediate bodily expressions, which is commonly the case, her verbal communication of her pain will also become the object of suspicion and disbelieve: Isn't she just someone in need of attention? Morris here appeals to Merleau-Ponty's notion of a bodily reciprocity that forms the basis for mutual empathy. If Merleau-Ponty is right that the basis for empathy lies in a reciprocity of bodily gestures and expressions which takes place at the level of the

lived body itself then a disturbance of the expressivity of the lived body is bound to have consequences for the possibility of mutual empathy.

In her paper "Inter-Subjectively Meaningful Symptoms in Anorexia," Dorothée Legrand makes a plea for a certain general conception of at least one kind of symptoms characteristic of psycho-pathologies through an investigation of the more specific symptoms of anorexia. Legrand's aim is to articulate an understanding of the symptoms which steers clear of both a purely bio-medical approach and an abstract psycho-analytic approach, where the former reduce the symptoms to those measurable from a third person stand-point and the latter reduce the specific symptoms encountered in a clinical settings to the variables of a general theory of the unconscious. The central claim of Legrand's proposal is that certain symptoms of anorexia and of psycho-pathologies in general are meaningful because they are expressive, or even communicative. The symptoms are expressive in the sense that their visible manifestation is inherently related to their meaning. Legrand here makes an analogy with Merleau-Ponty's conception of the relation between the meaning expressed by a word and the word expressing the meaning as one of embodiment rather than a merely contingent relation whose non-existence could leave the meaning intact.

Legrand's central claim about the expressive nature of the symptoms implies that they are also inherently intersubjective. The expressive symptoms are public manifestations of the experiences of the anorexic person, and Legrand argues that at least in some cases the meaningful symptoms should be understood as communicative. Such communicative expressions may be conscious or unconscious, but what distinguishes them from merely expressive symptoms is the way they must be understood as orientated towards someone, perhaps someone specific, the family of the person or even the therapist.

Legrand proposes a general understanding of the refusal of eating by the anorexic patient as a refusal to be reduced to a mere thing and a refusal to reduce intersubjective relations to a mere transaction of food or things, but she also urges that one must in each case understand the meaning of symptom's in their specific communicative context. At this point we can see how Morris' and Legrand's paper mutually supplement and perhaps to some extent challenge one another. Morris also emphasises the possibility of an understanding of the meaning of bodily expressions of chronic pain sufferers, and, like Legrand she also notes that the mere possibility does not imply that an actual understanding takes place. By bringing in the work of anthropologists, Morris substantiates the idea that the specific social context must be taken into consideration when we are trying to understand meaningful symptoms. The anthropologist S. M. Low's notion of embodied metaphors, as reconstructed by Morris, exactly regards chronic pain as a bodily expression that can convey social, cultural as well as political meaning. Morris urges that the understanding of repressed desires that find a bodily expression is not solely the task of the psychoanalyst but also of anthropologists, and in general the people around the person in question. Nothing in Legrand's paper contradicts this claim, but her paper offers a framework that, if successful, would allow us to understand how the meaning of symptoms can be at once singular and subjective and available to be understood by others.

The notion of expressive symptoms developed by Legrand has a certain affinity with the notion of a 'feature' or an 'essential characteristic' (*Merkmal*) as it has been developed in the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry pioneered by Karl Jaspers and further developed in the twentieth century by, among others, Eugene Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger, Kurt Schneider and Victor von Gebsattel. As Stefano Micali makes clear in his paper, "The Alteration of Embodiment in Melancholia," the notion of essential characteristics also supplies an alternative to the usual understanding of symptoms in medicine, where a symptom is understood as a sign that is only contingently related to that which it is a sign of, like smoke can be a sign of fire.

Micali's paper stands firmly in the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry. It offers a detailed and critical discussion of the way this tradition has conceived of severe depression or, as it is known in this tradition, melancholia, and in particular the way disturbances of the experience of embodiment has been considered an essential characteristic of the melancholic condition. He identifies three interrelated dimensions in which we find disturbances of embodiment in melancholia, which to a large degree correspond to the three aspects of chronic pain identified by Morris: (1) The relation between the body and the surrounding environment, (2) the way in which the body feels itself, and (3) the relation between the subject's body and the body of another (intercorporeality). Micali discusses how the notion of corporealization has been used by authors in this tradition to capture the way the three dimensions are altered in melancholia. The three different understandings of the process of corporealization distinguished by Micali has as their common denominator the negative claim that corporealization consist in the loss of the usual transparency of the lived body. At this level of abstraction, the notion could also be used to characterize what Morris calls the ambiguity of the bodily experiences of people who suffer from chronic pain syndrome.

In the latter parts of his paper, Micali argues that though the tradition is right to characterize the experience associated with corporealization as an experience of void, it has failed to provide a positive description of this phenomenon. According to Micali, the experience of void must be understood as involving both a distortion of the primal impression of inner time-consciousness and of the passive synthesis which normally constitutes our spatial experience of our life-world including our fellow subjects. Micali here deploys some of Husserl's basic notions investigated in other essays in this volume (Pulkinen and Nenon discuss passive synthesis and de los Reyes Melero's discusses time-consciousness). He thereby presents an alternative to the dominant approach within the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry which conceptualizes melancholia in Heideggerian terms as a vanishing of Dasein's ecstatic projection of possibilities. Such a conceptualization, Micali warns, risks simplifying the complex relationship between bodily self-experience, experience of the world and experience of others, and thereby risks overlooking that the experience of void is a positive phenomenon which cannot be reduced to the experience of "Not" (*Erfahrung des Nicht*).

In his contribution "The Structure of Interpersonal Experience," Matthew Ratcliffe also draws on the understanding of melancholia developed within

phenomenological psychiatry. However, the psychiatric cases play a different role in Ratcliffe's paper since his aim is to argue for a general phenomenological claim and then support it with phenomenological studies of depression, rather than, as does Micali, to argue for a certain understanding of a specific psychiatric illness exploiting some general phenomenological analyses.

The main claim made by Ratcliffe is that the sense of the presence of another person is an irreducible experience which consists in the appreciation of the specific kind of potential of the other to transform the possibilities or affordances offered to one by the world. Against, or at least supplementing, the approach to social cognition found in Theory Theories and in Simulation Theories, Ratcliffe argues that our basic experiential recognition of the presence of another person consist in a specific change in our bodily self-awareness that cannot be explained in terms of a theory-based inference or a simulation procedure, be they implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious. He finds his general thesis expounded in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre's famous example of a voyeur who is caught looking through a keyhole illustrates the claim. When the person hears a creaking floor-board behind him there is an immediate change in the way the world shows up for him which is inseparable from an instant change in his bodily self-awareness in the form of an overwhelming sense of awkwardness and shame. We can imagine how the world now shows up for him as empty of hiding places and how the key hole no longer appears as an alluring possibility for seeing without being seen. Ratcliffe attributes to Sartre the general insight that the sense of the presence of another person consists in a certain (potential) modification of the possibilities offered one by the world, but argues that this modification need not consist in a deprivation of one's own possibilities. The change in the appearance of the world could just as well consist in an opening up of a new horizon of relevant affordances and in that sense be an extension of the kind of freedom described by Rietveld.

What is then the specific kind of potential modification of the possibilities offered by one's world that is characteristic for the experience of the presence of another person? Ratcliffe argues that it is in fact a possibility for a specific kind of interaction with the other person herself which is appreciated when one senses the presence of her qua person. He explicates the characteristically personal relation involved with the Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup's notion of a trustful relation, understood as a relation of mutual openness and responsibility that allows one to enter a self-transformative interaction with the other. It is at this point that Ratcliffe brings in psycho-pathological conditions in order to substantiate his general claim. Ratcliffe argues that cases of severe depression, paranoid schizophrenia and autism in different ways support his claim that the sense of others as persons is inextricably connected to how one experiences one's own embodiment and to how one experiences the possibilities offered by the world. As is brought out in detail in Micali's paper, this is particularly convincing in the case of severe depression or melancholia, where we can find a significant alteration of one's own bodily presence accompanied by a flattening of the world and a lack of sense of the presence of the other as another person.

Ratcliffe also touches upon a theme that runs through all four papers of this chapter: When one is faced with a person who has a significantly reduced or altered ability to enter into the basic kind of mutual recognition that marks the interpersonal relation, then one can be faced with the challenge of keeping intact one's own experience of the other as another person exactly because the experience of the other as a person is confirmed through an interaction characterized by such mutual recognition. As pointed out by Micali, the phenomenology of melancholia, and we might say illness in general, should not restrict itself to the perspective of the one who is suffering from the illness, but needs to include the experience of the one who interacts with the sufferer.

Part IV: Intercorporeality and Intersubjectivity: Ideality, Language and Community

Joona Taipale's paper, "Facts and Fantasies—Embodiment and the early Formation of Selfhood," adds a new dimension to the understanding of intersubjectivity by investigating the kinds of relations we have with others who are not present but who still influence us. As Taipale suggests, other persons feature in our lives even when we are not in fact present with them, perceive, remember or imagine them. They are, as it were, embedded in our psychic stream and their absent 'presence' exercises a subterranean but very real force on us. I can be conscious of—and be guided in my action by—what my (now dead) mother would think of me if she were to see me performing some action. Or I may realize that I am aware of my father's hopes for me and may share his imagined disappointment. Furthermore, as Taipale points out, our relations with others begin from our earliest conscious moments and progress and develop through our lives. Early life experiences are sedimented in our current adult stances and attitudes, just as others are also embedded in our psyches.

Taipale simultaneously targets what he regards as two common misconception: on the one hand the idea that the psychoanalytic tradition is split between two mutually exclusive accounts of the relation between self and other in infancy, namely the 'symbiosis' theory and the 'primal differentiation' theory; on the other hand the view that Husserl's conception of the relation between self and other is incompatible with Freud's theory, as well as that of later theorists such as Margaret Mahler, exactly because these psychoanalysts adhere to the symbiosis theory whereas Husserl is committed to a version of the primal differentiation theory.

There can be no doubt that in opposition to William James, for instance, Husserl laid a strong stress on the presence of the ego in all our experiences including early infant experiences: "The infant or rather the embryo that is entering the world [. . .] is not a person, but it is nevertheless an ego-pole" (Husserl 2008: 230). It is also certain that we find explicit statements in the works of psychoanalysts such as Freud, Mahler and Winnicott to the effect that prior to any differentiation between self and other the infant lives in a state of undifferentiated fusion with the mother.

What Taipale draws attention to is the fact that the same authors also seem committed to something that looks very much like the Husserlian idea of a basic kinesthetic sense of self that is present or at least emerging from the beginning of the infant's conscious life. Taipale argues that rather than revealing an internal inconsistency, this indicates the possibility of a theoretical reconciliation of the symbiosis and the differentiation theory. The difference between the approaches should be seen as stemming from different emphases. The symbiosis theories emphasise the pleasure seeking fantasies of the infant that results in the experience of merger in an incorporation of the other; whereas differentiation theories emphasise the veridical kinesthetic self-awareness of the infant, where, as we might put it, the lived body of the infant corresponds to the body perceivable by others. It is on the basis of this interpretation of the relation between the two theories that Taipale makes his claim that rather than contradicting Husserl's account, the psychoanalysts who emphasise the symbiotic nature of the early self-other relation should be read as offering a supplementary account that highlights the crucial role of fantasy in the development of selfhood.

Carlos Lobo's contribution "Self-variation and Self-modification—or the Different Ways of Being Other" is a subtle analysis of Husserl's complex accounts of empathy, especially as conducted in the Fourth and Fifth Cartesian Meditations. In those Meditations, Husserl attempts to arrive at the constitution of the other subject through a process that begins from a rigorous examination of the nature of 'self-experience' (*Selbsterfahrung*) and through a set of variations, modifications and modalisations arrives at the possibility of the other. Husserl calls this apprehension of the other 'other-experience' (*Fremderfahrung*) or 'empathy' (*Einfühlung*). Lobo points out that Husserl was very uncomfortable with the term 'empathy' which was inherited from German psychology and aesthetic theory especially Volkert and Lipps. In the end, Husserl seems to have abandoned this task of giving an account of empathy built on self-experience as hopeless and he was heavily criticised by Emmanuel Levinas and others for downgrading the other to a mere modification of oneself, literally an *alter ego*. Lobo charts how Husserl begins by developing an 'eidetic egology'—an essentialist account of what belongs to any ego whatsoever—through the exercise of imaginative variation as well as through a genetic phenomenological account. As Lobo quotes Husserl: "The Other (unknown Other) has in advance for us a ontological sense as a variant of ourselves."

Husserl believes one can move from the direct experience of the ego to examine possible variations and thereby arrive at the essence 'ego' in general. Lobo claims that Husserl distinguishes between 'self-variation' (*Selbstvariation*) and 'self-modification' (*Selbstmodifikation*). The alter ego is constituted through a process of self-modification and through the process of taking into consideration not just motivated variations of my ego but freely imagined empty possibilities. The nature of possibility, then, is crucial and indeed possibility itself is a core question in Husserl in regard to his general account of the nature of essences. As Lobo explains, Husserl distinguishes between different kinds or levels of possibilities. There is an important distinction to be made between motivated possibilities and empty

possibilities. Furthermore, as Husserl describes it, his methodology of eidetic variation seems to consist in running through possibilities understood as unmotivated possibilities—empty possibilities rather than remaining in the sphere of motivated possibilities.

Dermot Moran's paper "The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Intertwining and Reflexivity" focuses on the concepts of 'intertwining' and 'chiasm', normally associated primarily with the late Merleau-Ponty of *The Visible and Invisible* (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 1968), and shows how prevalent these notions are in the mature Husserl. Moran argues that the concept of 'chiasm' (*le chiasme, le chiasma*) is often understood to be original to Merleau-Ponty—and indeed the term itself drawn from rhetoric and from medical science (relating to the opting nerve) is first found in him—but in fact it is part of the French phenomenologist's brilliance that he was able to identify the centrality of this conception—without the name—in Husserl, despite the paucity of references to it in the published works available to him. Husserl's idea of 'interwining' (*Verflectung*) is the original inspiration for Merleau-Ponty's '*chiasme*' or '*interlacs*'. Husserl's radical phenomenology of the lived body (*Leib*) already lays the ground for the new way of conceiving conscious embodied conduct that overcomes the Cartesian separation of thought from sensibility that comes to the fore in the late Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's brilliance primarily resides, for Moran, in identifying key themes in Husserl which Husserl himself had not made explicit. As is well known, throughout his work, beginning with *The Structure of Behaviour* (Merleau-Ponty 1942, 1963) right through to his last unfinished *Working Notes* (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 1968), Merleau-Ponty was attempting to overcome both empiricist or sensualist and rationalist or intellectualist approaches to conscious life. The living organic manner in which conscious awareness unifies with the body requires a break with the history of Western philosophy and the generation of new metaphors and images. Merleau-Ponty even coins the term 'body subject' (*corps sujet*)—although he uses it very rarely—to express the indissoluble unity of body and subjectivity. But in his last work especially, Merleau-Ponty tried to overcome the dualisms that he felt still haunted his account in *The Phenomenology of Perception*. Merleau-Ponty in fact proposes a new monism of the 'flesh'. 'Flesh', according to Merleau-Ponty's account in *The Visible and the Invisible*, is essentially characterized by 'reversibility' (*réversibilité*), 'the finger of the glove that is turned inside out' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 311; 1968, 263) and 'doubling'—'the doubling up of my body into inside and outside' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 311; 1968, 264). Indeed, he identifies 'chiasm' with 'reversibility' (see Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 312; 1968, 264). For Merleau-Ponty, 'chiasm', 'intertwining' or 'interlacing' (*l'interlacs*) essentially expresses the manner in which my bodily awareness is both drawn together into a unity and also 'doubled' and even 'reversed', e.g. when one hand touches the other. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a general 'duplicity' (*duplicité*) and, as he puts it in 'Eye and Mind', a 'reflexivity of the sensible' (*une réflexivité du sensible*, Husserl 1964b, 24, 168). Merleau-Ponty speaks of the 'insertion of the world between the two leaves of my body' and 'the insertion of my body between the two leaves of each thing and of the world' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 312; 1968, 264). Reflection and higher-level

thought, furthermore, must be reinterpreted on the model of this intertwined sensuous incarnation with its inner reversal, doubling, self-emptying and self-distantiation. The conscious subject has to be understood as 'the sensible that hollows itself out' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 260; 1968, 210).

Tom Baldwin's paper "Language as the Embodiment of Geometry" offers a very interesting and sustained reflection on Edmund Husserl's discussion in his late work 'The Origin of Geometry' of the role of language in the constitution of idealities. Baldwin is interested in Husserl's assumptions concerning the kind of a priori intuition involved in the apprehension of geometry and how that maps on to perceptual experiences of space in the life-world. In particular Baldwin focuses on Husserl's use of the term 'living body of language' (*Sprachleib*) to characterize the way geometric idealities (ideal objects or truths such as 'the Pythagorean Theorem') are preserved and transmitted across time through being expressed in written symbols and diagrams. Husserl's question is how we can move from the intersubjective practices of humans to the establishment of trans-temporal idealities as objective. As Baldwin points out, it is not just a matter of having written symbols temporally outlast the activities of the originating geometers, but rather that the insights of those geometers can somehow be *re-activated* and the kinds of original self-evidence that they had can be re-experienced. Baldwin's argument is that Husserl is correct to claim that language embodies geometry and mathematics but he believes the justification for this claim is not the one Husserl himself adduced. In part, this is because, as Baldwin argues, Husserl did not sufficiently appreciate the role of formal proofs and he went astray in his foundationalist attempt to anchor scientific insights in experiences in the life-world. Baldwin thus challenges Husserl's return to the life-world and thereby also challenges, at least to a certain point, points made by Nenon and Pulkkinen in their contributions in this volume.

For Baldwin, Husserl makes two basic and interrelated mistakes: first, he holds that geometrical discoveries are based upon 'prescientific' practices or experiences which can be reactivated through geometrical demonstrations; and secondly, he maintains that the content of those experiences as reactivated is *self-evident*. Against the latter claim, Baldwin suggests that what matters is the procedure of logical proof. Against the former claim, Baldwin maintains that the experiences in the life-world are of no help when it comes to understanding matters such as the curvature of space-time. These scientific concepts find their validity within the network of scientific claims that support them—and are not relatable to everyday experience. It is not the case, furthermore, Baldwin suggests, that somehow Euclidean geometry is closer to our life-world than contemporary geometry.

Baldwin contrasts Husserl's confidence in self-evidence with Bertrand Russell's strong scepticism about the possibility of arriving at self-evidence and its overall usefulness in logical and mathematical proof. In agreement with Russell, Baldwin suggests that in fact intuition involves a degree of reasoning and, moreover, reasoning that can be confirmed by others. Baldwin believes that a shared understanding of geometrical thoughts can be substantiated by adding that this shared

understanding is essentially a matter of the understanding and acceptance of patterns of geometrical reasoning *as manifested in written demonstrations*. The true criterion of evidence, Baldwin suggests, is that the geometric insight can be presented as a formal proof in which each step draws only on formal rules of inference that have been specified in advance. It is this whole *process* that language encapsulates and preserves. In sum, Baldwin argues that Husserl here is remaining a foundationalist, a position he regards as outmoded in relation to contemporary theorizing about science.

Timo Miettinen's paper, "The Body Politic: Husserl and the Embodied Community," explores the contribution of Husserlian phenomenology to the areas of social cognition and social ontology, two topics that are generating a great deal of interest among contemporary analytic philosophers. Miettinen is specifically focused on the problem of collective embodiment. He interrogates the metaphor of the body that is found in the expression 'the body politic', a metaphor that recurs in Western philosophy from Plato onwards. As Miettinen recognises, the discussion of sociality and communality was central to early—and often neglected—phenomenologists such as Gerda Walther and Edith Stein. Furthermore, there is a long tradition (referred to by several contributors in this volume, including Heinämaa) that presumes Husserl's own phenomenology was built around the solitary subject, *solus ipse*, and thus, it falls into the trap of *solipsism* or *subjective idealism*. In opposition to this view, Miettinen offers a compelling account of Husserl's own phenomenology of sociality. In his writings in the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl became very interested in the description of life lived in the plural, what he often calls 'we-subjectivity' (*Wir-Subjektivität*). He was also concerned to overcome what he took to be the rigidification of social life and to generate a creative renewal of society. Husserl was one of the first to explicitly talk about 'social acts' (a conception also developed by Adolf Reinach). He also sees social groupings, societies and corporations—what he calls generally 'socialities'—as behaving like human persons 'writ large'. Husserl explicitly speaks of these social groupings as 'personalities of a higher-order' (*Personalitäten der höherer Ordnung*). Miettinen claims that Husserl employs the analogy of the body in relation to social groupings for three main purposes: to describe the peculiar *materiality*, *autonomy* and the *normative ideal* of the social collective. Husserl discusses many different kinds of group and social collectives—each with their own principle of organisation—and he arranges them in a hierarchy. But his highest ideal—the normative ideal of community—he calls the 'community of love' (*Liebesgemeinschaft*). Husserl believes that communities have certain communal identities, can make decisions, and have a form of agency that is not equal to the agency and activity of the sum of the individual members, although the communal agency and decisions are *founded* on those of the individual members. Husserl even speaks of the 'unity of super-personal consciousness'. In several manuscripts also, Husserl speaks of communities as having a kind of body. There is a "collective bodily existence" (*kollektive Leiblichkeit*) that communities

develop through their individual members. Communal personalities are always tied to a particular place or region. A family, for instance, often defines its collective spatial orientation with regard to home, which serves as its zero-point for orientation. Higher-order personalities have specific kinds of organic unity—members can be replaced, e.g. members of a football team, without the team losing its identity.

Miettinen sees Husserl's contribution primarily as emphasising the passive elements in social experience whereas much recent social ontology (e.g. Raimo Tuomela) focuses more on active co-operation or active commitment between social agents. Husserl speaks about our participation in an "open intersubjectivity" (*offene Intersubjektivität*) where others are encountered as anonymous subjects who co-constitute the world with me. This is Husserl's version of what Heidegger calls '*das Man*'. We drive on roads that others have built and that others use. Houses, streets and parks all belong to the public 'they'. Mietinnen—and Moran—both emphasise the manner in which humans live lives that are interwoven. People do not live side by side, but intertwined, *Ineinander*, to use one of Husserl's terms.

The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Themes for Future Research

It is not entirely surprising that the majority of contributors to this volume focus on the insights of the classic phenomenologists: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, in particular and to a lesser degree Heidegger. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are philosophers of embodiment par excellence. Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have shown how much perception is an embodied activity and how it interweaves with other cognitive states such as imagination, memory, and intentional action generally. One of Sartre's great strengths as a phenomenologist is that he has many insights to convey about the emotions and about the dynamics of human intercorporeal relations generally. Heidegger, with his strong emphasis on a kind of 'ready-to-hand' coping within the lived world, is also a major inspiration to contemporary philosophers of mind and cognitive sciences as several of the contributors to this volume have shown. But it is clearly the case that there is much more to the phenomenological tradition—including the work of Edith Stein and Max Scheler on the emotions and on empathy, and the work of Alfred Schutz on intersubjectivity and the phenomenology of the social world. A further volume would be needed to explore these fruitful areas.

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