One aspect of the phenomenological movement that emerges from this book is its openness and diversity. This may, as the author recognizes, confuse readers as to what exactly phenomenology is. To counter this confusion, the final section of the book is devoted to what the author calls 'The Essentials of the Phenomenological Method'. This is intended to cater to the tastes of the more systematically minded reader who may be tempted to wonder, given the diversity of interests and enterprises of its practitioners, what exactly is that he is being told about. Mercifully we are spared any talk about family resemblances — a popular but peculiarly unhelpful metaphor that succeeds in hiding as much as it reveals. Instead, Professor Spiegelberg attempts to discover a common core 'to justify the use of a common label'. He finds this in the spirit of philosophical reverence as the first and foremost nonn of the philosophical enterprise. It points out that phenomenology deals with objective phenomena no more and no less than any genuinely empirical knowledge does, differing only in the manner of its acceptance. More contentiously he also sees a significant coincidence, not shared by this reviewer, in the 'convergence of phenomenological analysis with some principles of so-called ordinary language analysis'; but this is not pressed. Ultimately, what distinguishes phenomenology (and this can scarcely be said of ordinary language analysis) is the spirit of philosophical reverence as the first and foremost norm of the philosophical enterprise. It was, asserts the author, the violation of this norm which was instrumental in bringing phenomenology into being. Its continued importance, he believes, will depend upon the extent to which this spirit permeates other philosophies.

It should be made clear that a brief review such as this cannot begin to do justice to the wealth of detail and scholarship that has gone into the making of this book. In the circumstances it is regrettable that its price may place it beyond the reach of some. It is hoped that a brief review can do no more than encourage linguistic analytical philosophers to study the available texts of Alexander Pfänder it will not have been in vain.

Professor Spiegelberg's other book, The Context of the Phenomenological Movement, comprising some fifteen articles, dating from as early as 1936, and concerned with a variety of topics relevant to phenomenological philosophy may best be regarded as an adjunct to the more massive study discussed above. As the author points out in his preface to this book, while few of these articles have remained unchanged from their original versions, no attempt has been made to "patch up this collection by completely new pieces"; and he sees nothing shamefully wrong in following up some loose ends of the larger study with a work which will provide some of the comparative and historical background of the main movement. The collection falls into two groups: that concerned with contemporary parallels to, and that pursuing historical explanations inside phenomenology.

Clearly the essays are not intended to be read consecutively and each reader may be expected to seize upon those most relevant to his interests. In Britain the attention of many will be drawn to the attempt to demonstrate that the analysis of J. L. Austin was "moving beyond mere linguistic analysis toward a supplementary study of the phenomena which was close to an explicit phenomenology". The key figure is Alexander Pfänder. It, as the author admits, is going too far to claim that had both Austin and Pfänder lived long enough to complete their respective enterprises some sort of dovetailing bridge would have resulted. Nonetheless, he argues, their two philosophies could, if fully developed, show themselves to be not only congenial but also complementary to one another. Wisely this suggestion is not pressed too far, while the author's reference to the exchange between Van Breda and Austin at the Colloque de Roaumont indicates that on that occasion, as on so many another, there was a meeting of British and Continental philosophers but not of their philosophies. Undeterred by this, Professor Spiegelberg pursues what he calls 'this seemingly far-fetched confrontation of two historically unrelated philosophers' (in this case, Austin and Pfänder). His typically modest conclusion is that each type of philosophizing may aid the other in its task. How persuasive this is each reader must judge for himself. But if this attempt at conciliation does no more than encourage linguistic analytical philosophers to study the available texts of Alexander Pfänder it will not have been in vain.

Of more immediate interest to phenomenologists will be the essay devoted to Husserl's and Pfänder's views on the phenomenological reduction where the latter's alternative to Husserl is advocated. The main point of this study is to show Pfänder as maintaining a suspension of belief or judgment while rejecting the transcendental reduction associated with Husserl with this operation. Of course, this philosopher, this phenomenologist, was not alone in refusing to accept Husserl's terms. J. N. Findlay, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are all cited as observing either a silence on this subject or displaying scepticism towards it. It is, however, in the context of a search for a critical and cautious adoption of the cleaner and safer parts of Husserl's reductive phenomenology that attention is drawn to the works of Alexander Pfänder. The tantalizingly modest conclusion at this philosopher's thinking which the confines of these essays permits makes one regret a lack of ready access to his works. Perhaps reference should be made here to Spiegelberg's translation of Pfänder published under the title Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation.

For the rest, those items dealing with Husserl's English connections and with Wittgenstein's use of his own peculiar phenomenology, together with those on Peirce and William James, are most likely to claim the attention of British philosophers. All are of considerable interest, though, as the author admits, the historically unrelated philosophers' (in this case, Austin and Pfänder). His typically modest conclusion is that each type of philosophizing may aid the other in its task. How persuasive this is each reader must judge for himself. But if this attempt at conciliation does no more than encourage linguistic analytical philosophers to study the available texts of Alexander Pfänder it will not have been in vain.

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The present collection, volume XIV of Analecta Husserliana, presents the research programme of the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological
Research and Learning for the year 1977-78. It contains important essays by Ricoeur, Levinas, Derrida, Kockelmanns, Schrag, Kaelin and others, grouped under three headings: The Phenomenology of Man in Interdisciplinary Communication; Nature Retrieved; and Man, Nature and the Possible Worlds. The editor, Tymieniecka, has written the introductory essay outlining the theme of the Institute’s research, as well as three further essays under each of the headings.

Tymieniecka states that phenomenology appears “not yet to have begun to properly tap its own abundant resources”. She divides phenomenology into three phases. The first was that of Husserl and his associates. The second phase evolved between World War II and the nineteen sixties, and in her view failed to face up fully to the challenges of technology. The third phase is witnessed by the present volume which, for Tymieniecka, taps the resources of phenomenology by concentrating on the abundant riches of the creative function and the original spontaneity of human nature. For Tymieniecka, Husserl’s account of intentionality was too rationalistic while Merleau-Ponty’s work was too fragmentary to properly found an investigation into human creative ability. Now spontaneity and creativity must be recognized as the foundation of all forms of human order and providing a link with the other human sciences. Her account of this creativity suggests that it is not to be understood within the framework of intentionality but rather “we must begin at the breaking point of intentionality, at the borderline between the meaning-giving role of the intellect and the ground whose significance eludes the mind’s tentacles”. The creative act as an irreducible function provides the key.

Unfortunately, Tymieniecka’s essays in this area remain rather vague and programmatic, and her editorial framework seeks to impose more unity on the contributions than is warranted. This leads to a certain unevenness in the book and does not help to clarify the fundamental understanding of phenomenology at the heart of the enquiry. The curious sub-divisions are not altogether helpful, and give rise to a multiplicity of themes which are only loosely interlinked. The main theme of the first section of the book is the interrelation between the human sciences. Ricoeur’s essay deals with the kind of truth which is found in fictional narratives. Following the procedure of his Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, he argues that fictional and historical narratives (including biographies etc.) display structural similarities, and both have a reference to truth. An approach - arising ultimately out of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit - which stresses that not all thought contents are accessible to just any kind of thinking. An intelligible meaning is grasped through a particular “psychic modality”, as Levinas points out: “Husserl’s phenomenology has opened up new possibilities. It affirms the strict solidarity between any intelligible and the psychic modalities through which and in which it is conceived: not just any meaning is accessible to any thought”. Thus, for Levinas, Heidegger went beyond negation to encounter nothingness through the lived experience of anxiety. It is Levinas’s hope to be able to discover a thought which proceeds to God that involves an original psychic modality. Only in such an experience can true transcendence be attained. Otherwise every meaning becomes part of a vast interconnected system where transcendence becomes relativised to something within the world. How can pure otherness emerge? Does not all encounter with meaning involve being tied within “the thread of the Same”? Levinas argues that phenomenology has always respected the irreducibility of consciousness, indeed, “phenomenology is the idea that the essences of the psyche do not constitute a ‘definite manifold’ (definite Mannig-faltigkeit)”. This means that we should approach each meaning in the manner that it gives itself without necessarily relating it to the system of objective meanings where “all sense gets relativised, and every signification closed up in a system without issue”. In searching for an experience which uncovers transcendence, Levinas recommends the study of evil by a new French philosopher, Philippe Nemo, published as Job et l’excès du mal (Paris, 1978) where the sheer excess of evil is understood as a break with inmanence in its very non-integratability and heterogeneity. Levinas regards the work very highly indeed and much of his essay is simply a repetition of Nemo’s discoveries.

The rest of the essays in this section deal with the complicated interrelations between human science and the world of nature. Of note are B. M. d’Ippolito’s study of the concept of nature in Husserl where the concept of “phenomenology as historical memory” is proposed; M. da Penha Villela-Petit’s article on the experience of nature in the Psalms seen through a Heideggerian reading; a rare study of the Prague phenomenologist Jan Patočka by J. Sivák, and an essay on Merleau-Ponty by W. S. Harwick.

In a sub-section of part two of the collection, entitled, “Nature and Mimesis”, the relationship between nature and literary expression is investigated. Kaelin and Schlack offer explicit studies of the nature of the literary context using examples from literature, and these essays I found to be rather unadventurous and dull in criticism. In contrast Jacques Derrida’s long essay, “Le retrait de la métaphore” is a most important study of metaphor which advances his position beyond the more well-known “La mythologie blanche. La métaphore dans le texte philosophique” and directly confronts Ricoeur’s critical reading of that 1971 essay in La métaphore vive. He comments on Heidegger’s relationship of metaphor and metaphysics expressed in the enigmatic statement that “das Metaphorische
evident that there is a great deal of confusion present as to what problems early and late works. Husserl is seen to have been influenced by the great logical questioning is seen as a striving for judgement even if it is not exactly a modality of interest in phenomenology.

Husserl's relations to speech acts and also to Heidegger of the notion of human creativity and the work of art. As J. C. Fiquet remarks in his essay, "La connaissance du monde de l'art", "il ne faut jamais oublier qu'en art le possible est subordonné au réel". Of interest here for the light it casts on Soviet interest in phenomenology is Z. M. Kakabadze's essay on the return of nature where the destructive role of industrial-technological mentality on nature and the human condition is analysed. However, without doubt the most important essay in this section is C. Struyker-Boudier's scholarly and penetrating essay, "Husserl and the Logic of Questions" which examines Husserl's approach to the question in the early and late works. Husserl is seen to have been influenced by the great logical minds of the nineteenth century — notably by Sigwart, Jerusalem, Erdmann, Jodl, Lipp and of course Bolzano. At stake is the issue whether a question can be treated logically as an incomplete judgement (unfertiger Urteil) or as an expression. Husserl's later approach differed from his early one but remains cognizant in that questioning is seen as a striving for judgement even if it is not exactly a modality of judgement. This essay is very important in that it opens up the problem of Husserl's relations to speech acts and also to Heidegger of Sein und Zeit which makes the question fundamental to Dasein and to the revelation of being.

To sum up is difficult given the range of essays in the collection. It is clear that much excellent work is being done in contemporary phenomenology, it is also evident that there is a great deal of confusion present as to what problems phenomenology can address. Here I must find fault with the confusing editorial policy of placing essays under headings and subheadings which seek to advance a view of phenomenology often at variance with the actual contributions. Moreover there are a great many typographical errors unworthy of such a distinguished publisher. However the essays by Levinas, Derrida, Ricoeur and Boudier are themselves sufficient justification for the collection to be part of every library interested in phenomenology.

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Hannah Arendt's interest in Kant's philosophy is not just a token to academic versatility but fits into the larger context of her philosophy. Those familiar with her political philosophy will remember that her key concept, action, led her to think of the political domain as a "web of human relationships" (The Human Condition, section 25). She felt that political agents had to be regarded as located in phenomenal space in which the multiplicity of action and opinion remains irreducible. Accordingly, classical recipes conferring upon the political domain a determinable structure subservient to political ends, or justifying rule and domination in order to accomplish such ends, had to be discarded in favour of a new approach. How can we understand that looser status of political unity, how can we envisage convergence of action to take place in it? As early as 1961, in Freedom and Politics, so the editor advises us, Arendt felt that Kant's aesthetics in the Critique of Judgment could point the way to the requisite account of political plurality.

Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, given at the New School for Social Research, New York, in 1970, are, first and foremost, a painstaking interpretation of Kant's analysis of the Beautiful. Whereas in the theoretical philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is dealing with constitutive conceptualization, aesthetic judgment, or judgment of taste, constitutes no more than the presumption on the part of reflective judgment, that the Beautiful is an object of universal gratification. Arendt stresses Kant's contention, expressed in § 40 of the Critique of Judgment, that it is due to a sensus communis, or common sense, that we claim universal acceptability of a judgment of taste. Now while this may mean no more than a formal condition of the validity of a judgment of taste, namely, that we place ourselves at the standpoint of others, Kant goes on to offer, in § 41, remarks on our empirical interest in the Beautiful. Here he shifts his ground from a condition of pretended universal validity of aesthetic judgment to a factual quest on our part for sociability and for feelings that prove communicable. Arendt takes a clue from these remarks and sees in Kant's remarks a human sociability in such, without reference to a beautiful object; Kant's reference to common sense seems to bridge the gap between aesthetic and politics. And while it may seem that the analogy establishes no more than the point of view of a spectator of public affairs, or of a great historical event such as the French Revolution, Arendt goes on to connect sociability due to the reflective faculty of judgment with Kant's utterances in Perpetual Peace, suggesting a practical relationship between political agents in terms of common sense.

We need not probe the legitimacy of Arendt's suggestion further except to say that common sense in its practical employment may not achieve convergence of action the way it permits of convergence of judgment in the case of the aesthetic viewer or the political spectator; as far as the actor is concerned, it may rather stand for a procedure of how to go about relating oneself to others, or for a 'practice' in the sense of M. Oakeshott. (We should, however, note the attack on the part of Ernst Vollrath, a former member of Arendt's circle, in his book, Die Rekonstruktion der Urteilskraft, Stuttgart 1977, to make out the case.) But whatever our considered view on the matter may be, Arendt's interpretation of Kant is most perceptive; at the same time, it testifies to her desire to enlist support for her new departures in political theory.

The volume under review contains three texts by Arendt herself: A Postscript to volume 1 of The Life of the Mind, indicating how she meant to continue her book on Thinking in the direction of willing and judging; a set of thirteen Sessions on Kant's Political Philosophy, drawn upon above; and material for a Seminar on Kant's Critique of Judgment under the title "Imagination". The accompanying Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner introduces the reader to Arendt's concern for judging, as exemplified by the problem of judging raised for her in connection with the Eichmann case, and goes on to give an appreciation of Arendt's interpretation.