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Review Article

Adventures of the Reduction: Jacques Taminiaux's *Metamorphoses of Phenomenological Reduction*
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Adventures of the Reduction: Jacques Taminiaux's *Metamorphoses of Phenomenological Reduction*

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Abstract. In his illuminating Aquinas Lecture Jacques Taminiaux offers a bold interpretation of certain contemporary European philosophers in terms of the way in which they react to and transform Husserl's phenomenological reduction. He highlights issues relating to embodiment, personhood, and value. Taminiaux sketches Husserl's emerging conception of the reduction and criticizes certain Cartesian assumptions that Husserl retains even after the reduction, and specifically the assumption that directly experienced mental acts and states are not given in adumbrations but present themselves as they are. Heidegger too does not escape a certain Cartesian dualism with his privileging of the individual authentic self over and against the inauthentic *das Man*. Taminiaux portrays post-Heideggerian philosophy (specifically Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas) as responding to failures or dualisms haunting Husserl's reduction. Taminiaux is right to insist on the importance of the reduction in Husserl and also, despite appearances, in Heidegger, but it is not clear that the meditations of Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas can really be seen as responding to failures in the reduction. Furthermore, Taminiaux downplays the centrality of Husserl's commitment to transcendental idealism and his representation of the *époché* and reduction as ways of breaking through the natural attitude to reach the transcendental attitude of the non-participating spectator.

In this thoughtful essay, Jacques Taminiaux aims, through a series of "remarks," to trace the metamorphoses that took place within phenomenology with regard to the understanding of the phenomenological reduction, central to Husserlian philosophy and an enormous challenge to other philosophers who struggled to think it through, re-think, and re-vision it. In particular, he highlights some blind spots in Husserl's and Heidegger's approach to our embodied condition. For Taminiaux, broadly following Merleau-Ponty (for whom the "reduction is much less a method defined once and for all than

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an index of problems”)?, the reduction is not a rigid piece of Husserlian machinery but “a constellation of flexible approaches” (p. 27), an “adventure” (p. 56). Merleau-Ponty was right to draw, from Husserl’s own research notes, the moral of the impossibility of a complete reduction.

Taminiaux begins with the story of Husserl’s development of the reduction in 1907, followed by a discussion of Heidegger’s transformation of this phenomenological concept in Being and Time, and then further post-Heideggerian transformations in Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas. Husserl presents the reduction as involving the suspension of the natural attitude and a careful return to intentional consciousness. For Heidegger, it involves returning from an everyday, average understanding of Being to Dasein in its singular, authentic resoluteness. Taminiaux finds that both Husserl (with his contrast between sensory and ideal meaning) and Heidegger (with his contrast between everydayness and authenticity) harbor a concealed commitment to Cartesian dualism. Taminiaux’s post-Heideggerian philosophers rethink the relation between Dasein and the world, adding more transformations to the theory of the reduction. Taminiaux goes on to find larger themes concealed in the reduction, specifically embodiment, personhood, and valuation. Perhaps, in the effort to maintain a unified exposition, he makes the reduction to stand for too many themes; in the last part of the essay he construes it as the attempt to relate human being back to the natural world, or to the world of others that surrounds it.

Phenomenology may initially be characterized as a practice of seeing, aiming at an unprejudiced, descriptive account of whatever appears to consciousness, precisely in the manner in which it so appears, without the imposition of theorizing or assumptions drawn from one’s background, religious assumptions, scientific education, Weltanschauung, or whatever. The phenomenologist wants to get to “the matters themselves,” to describe the phenomena in their modes of appearing. For example: how does some thing manifest itself not just as a physical object to be neutrally perceived, but as a tool to be employed, or as an artwork that calls forth our aesthetic contemplation, or as a religious object of veneration? When Hindus see a cow as sacred, precisely what and how do they see this? How does the stranger appear as stranger? How does the appearance of things in words differ from their mode of appearance in the flesh? How does the scientific characterization of objects differ from their appearance in our ordinary life-world? What is a life-world and how does it appear? And so on.

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Phenomenology is a field of infinite tasks. But it also requires a particular mode of approach. Husserl insisted that it is not possible to grasp the appearance of phenomena without practicing the phenomenological reduction. What problems does this insistence set up?

For Taminiaux, the reduction has both a negative moment of suspension or bracketing (epoche) of whatever blocks access, and a positive moment of return (Latin: reducere, "to lead back") to the specific mode of appearing of the phenomenon. Whatever appears in human experience must be grasped without interference or systematic distortion, which makes it necessary to exclude assumptions drawn from the sciences and from tradition. Taminiaux claims that a certain concept of body is already implicit in this methodological conception of the reduction. Despite his best efforts, already in the initial account of phenomenological procedure, Husserl presumes a certain conception of body and mind. To show this, Taminiaux embarks on a short account of Husserl's reliance on nineteenth-century epistemology.

Husserl's training as a mathematician meant that, for his philosophical formation, he depended on certain concepts which he found in the prevailing traditions of empiricism (influenced by J. S. Mill) and Neo-Kantianism. Thus, he initially conceived of his project as epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie). Empiricism conceived of knowledge as embedded in certain factual occurrences in the mind—namely, sense-impressions—and despite the influence of Brentano's intentional conception of the mind, Husserl took over this conception of knowledge as dependent on certain "mental facts as they are observed by empirical psychology" (p. 14). He began, then, from the assumption that the concepts and relations of logic could be explained by psychology, and thus robbed mathematics of its independence and necessity, making it dependent on contingent elements such as the interest of the mind.

According to Taminiaux, Husserl's phenomenology emerged in the Logical Investigations when he realized the error of his earlier psychologism and the limitations of the classical empiricist account of experience that restricted the given to the data of sense. In contrast, Husserl argued that a genuine attention to the given would involve recognizing our direct intuitive access to numbers and other abstract ideal objects. This, of course, risked becoming a Platonism: the mind becomes intrinsically related to objects of an ideal character. According to Taminiaux, in the Investigations Husserl maintains a sharp contrast between empirical and ideal objects. Husserl's new view of the mind is interested less in facts than in essences. He is interested in a priori essential formations and not factual instantiations of knowing, that is to say, what perception or judgment itself is as such, not how it is empirically carried out by humans or other creatures.
Taminiaux suggests that a certain Cartesian dualism underlies the *Investigations*, including the distinction, in the Sixth Investigation, between sensible and categorial intuition (where sensible intuition is bound to the flow of sense data, whereas categorial intuition—for instance the intuitive recognition *that the paper is white*—achieves fulfillment without dependence on the sensory flux). The categorial exceeds what is given in strictly sensory terms.

Taminiaux however maintains that Husserl’s later writings are an attempt to address this dualism between the sensory and the supersensory. In his posthumously published *Idea of Phenomenology* (1907), Husserl introduces the *epoché* and reduction to overcome what is now termed “the natural attitude” and he proposes a new strictly philosophical attitude that disregards existence, focusing on “reduced” cognition with a new sense of immanence and transcendence. Husserl’s *Idea of Phenomenology* introduces a new way of grasping the relation between transcendence and immanence. The *epoché* suspends all commitment to transcendence “outside” the *cogitatio* itself. Phenomenology proceeds in “immanence,” remaining strictly with what is intuitively given, but what it finds are also certain experiences characterized by a putative transcendence—“transcendence in immanence”—for instance, the perceptual experience of a house consists not only of the profile of the side that is sensuously given in a “filled” way but also the “empty” co-consciousness of the absent other sides of the house. These co-given but not sensuously filled sides of the perception constitute a certain transcendence within the given. According to Taminiaux, this domain of phenomenological immanence is for Husserl not so much a set of facts but a set of interrelated essences. For instance, it belongs to the essence of the now-moment that it is characterized as superseding the “just-past.” It belongs to the essence of the perceived spatial object to be given in profiles, and so on.

The danger is that Husserl relies too much on the Cartesian assumption that the *cogito* is given in absolute non-perspectival givenness; its *esse* is *perception* as Husserl himself writes. Thus, Taminiaux criticizes Husserl’s Cartesian assumption that every thought or mental state (*cogitatio, Erlebnis*) is directly given as it is, whereas every transcendent object is given under profiles. Moreover, Taminiaux argues, Husserl has an ambiguous account of consciousness. On the one hand, consciousness is given absolutely to the subject, and yet, on the other hand, cognitive states such as perception cannot be understood except as states of embodiment: an account of the constitution of the object by consciousness requires reference to the already given body. For instance, the profiles of the object as uncovered in phenomenological viewing are not reached by a purely

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intellectual synthesis; rather they are uncovered bodily in a series of “I can’s.” The body here is involved as a power of approaching and withdrawing; it is not to be construed simply a material object. Furthermore, in normal perception, the perceiver is immediately aware of profiles hidden from its gaze but available to the perceptions of others. This intertwined recognition of both the embodied and the intersubjective character of perception leads Husserl to uncover a new context: the concrete life-world (Lebenswelt) as opposed to the Cartesian world of res extensa, which is an abstraction from this life-world. Husserl’s late reflections return to recognition of the status of the concrete person in intersubjective contexts.

Reduction can no longer be characterized as a “return to pure immanence”; rather it now recognizes that consciousness “belongs to a common world of appearances” (p. 31). Furthermore, consideration of the life-world forces Husserl to take into account temporal becoming and history, which introduces problems of genesis into constitutive phenomenology. As Merleau-Ponty points out, it is paradoxical that the reduction should end up taking us back to the natural world, which we now recognize for the first time for what it is, namely, life-world. For Taminiaux, the discovery of the life-world provides Husserl, especially in the Crisis, with new resources for doing philosophy: philosophy as an attempt, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, to describe a “universe of living paradoxes.” Reduction leads, not to ideal being, but to endless horizons.

II.

In the second part of his lecture, Taminiaux turns to Heidegger, who—no­toriously and inadequately—credits Husserl in a footnote in Being and Time (1927) for, as he puts it elsewhere, giving him the eyes to see. But, while ostensibly invoking the methodology of phenomenology in his pursuit of fundamental ontology, Heidegger quickly goes on to redescribe its nature, avoiding entirely the Husserlian terminology of consciousness, epoché, reduction, and so on. He even suggests (in a convoluted snub to the “old man”) that the essence of phenomenology is more originally thought by Aristotle! Many commentators read Heidegger as doing phenomenology without the reduction. In his Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), however, Heidegger accepts the term “reduction,” but redefines it to mean a leading back from whatever manner of “apprehension of a being” to the understanding of the “Being of this being.” Heidegger further claims that reduction has to be balanced by two further procedures: a

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phenomenological “destruction (Abbau) and “construction” (Aufbau). Destruction, as is well known from Being and Time, strips away the layers of historical and traditional conceptual accretions, whereas construction places the things within the horizon of “free projection” that points toward Dasein’s existential way of being-in-the-world. Unlike the essential structures of consciousness as such, Dasein is always individualized and historicized: “The question, Who is Dasein?, replaces Husserl’s question, What is Bewusstsein?” (p. 45). Furthermore, Dasein is always thrown into a world not of its making; it is already outside itself, sheer transcendence rather than Husserlian immanence. Constitution, moreover, is not from the transcendental ego, but comes from projective dealings with a world. At this point, I would suggest that Taminiaux’s stress on Heideggerian transcendence and being-in-the-world ignores the manner in which Husserlian consciousness is already also being-in-the-world and also, due to its peculiar time consciousness, dispersed from pure presence. From Ideas I onward, for instance, the “world” as the horizon of horizons is a constant puzzle to Husserl: how does the individual constitute for himself or herself a concept of world as infinitely beyond and always already there?

I see less contrast here between Husserl and Heidegger. Nevertheless, Taminiaux’s main point stands: there is a concealed dualism also in Heidegger. Taminiaux links these problems to the Heideggerian formulation of reduction. In its dealings with the world into which it is thrown Dasein has a tendency to fall away into the average, the public, the inauthentic. Heidegger contrasts inauthentic and authentic experiencing of the world, inauthentic publicity of the no one in particular and authentic care. Taminiaux asks whether, with this emphasis on individual authenticity, there continues to be a stubborn privileging of self in Heidegger (p. 39). This dualist suspicion is linked to Heidegger’s heavy reliance on the Husserlian account of categorial intuition in the Sixth Investigation, the reading of which was so decisive for Heidegger. Taminiaux turns to explore Heidegger’s use of the categorial intuition, and in so doing, draws on Heidegger’s remarks in his last Zollikon seminar.

Much of Taminiaux’s case is based on his reading of the Husserlian contrast, in the First Investigation, between signs—understood in their mode of indication—and expressions, the latter involving an ideal meaning. That this is by no means an easy distinction is clear from the elaborate commentaries of Derrida, Claude Evans, and others on these passages. Taminiaux thinks Husserl is guilty of Platonism and of a privileging of self in his account. He maintains that Husserl believed that in one’s private thinking to oneself one was in the immediate presence of meanings, purely intuited. Sensuous intuiting is tied to the sense data; categorial intuiting on the other hand apprehends an “excess” or surplus of meaning, which it can never sensuously experience. I see this patch of white but I can categorically grasp “color.” We can grasp being when we think “snow is
white”; nevertheless this being is imperceptible in the strict sense of not being sensuously apprehensible. As Heidegger said in his Zollikon seminar:

Husserl’s tour de force consisted precisely in this presencing of Being made phenomenally present in the category. By means of this tour de force, I was already in possession of the ground.⁵

Taminiaux sees the Husserlian contrast between indication and expression as motivating Heidegger’s contrast between Dasein’s everyday absorption in a referential totality of significations and its authentic mode of being in the world. Communication with others necessarily involves publicness and aver­ageness and hence inauthenticity, whereas authentic discourse is the purely authentic response of an individual Dasein to the silent call of conscience (p. 44). Dasein signifies to itself a “meaning” (Bedeutung). However, Heidegger’s notion of authenticity continues to insist on the primacy of the individual self. “Dasein exists for the sake of itself” (p. 54). Heidegger is transforming the reduction: it now becomes a moving away from the average apprehension of Being and a return to the authentic comprehension of one’s own Being. Heidegger casts this as a return from inauthentic idle talk, Gerede (parallel to Husserl’s “indication”) to genuine speech, speech with intuitive fullness (Husserl’s “expression”). The problem is that, according to Taminiaux, in Heidegger authentic speech is the response of a “solitary Dasein” (p. 44). In this sense, for Taminiaux, the Heideggerian transposition of the reduction is as deeply troubling as its Husserlian treatment.

III.

Taminiaux portrays post-Heideggerian phenomenology as reacting in different ways to the problems posed by the Heideggerian transformation of the reduction. The thinkers he invokes (Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas) all act to reinsert the body into the reduction. Opposing Heidegger’s account of the solitariness of individual authenticity and his negative understanding of public life, Hannah Arendt wants us to understand humans in the midst of the world and questions the primacy even Heidegger accorded to the theoretical life (bios theorétikos) over the lives of labor, work, and action.

In an interesting and original move, Taminiaux turns to another one of Heidegger’s students: Hans Jonas, who finds in Heidegger a Gnostic dualism and “acosmism”—a contempt for communal life in the world. Heidegger is too focused on a detached, “purified Self” (p. 49). Jonas on the contrary wants to think

of death as a natural and intrinsic feature of the life of an organism. Heidegger, for Jonas, has overlooked "the organic basis of the life of the mind" (p. 50).

Levinas too challenges Heidegger's account of the ek-stasis of Dasein with his notion of the phenomenon that he calls "hypo-stasis" ("staying under"). The relation of being to Being is not a project, but rather is always submitted to the anonymous "it is" (es gibt, il y a). Embodiment is burdensome, and Heidegger fails to recognize what is authentic in the experiences of hunger and thirst. Levinas's emphasis on the "contentment" of human being-in-the-world is meant to challenge the Heideggerian valorization of the self by elevating the demands of the other. Guilt now does not come from me but is imposed on me by the other.

IV

Taminiaux's essay on the adventures of the reduction is an accomplished, serious reflection by a senior phenomenological thinker writing on complex issues with deceptive clarity and grace. The reduction is certainly presented in new and challenging contexts, specifically in being linked to embodiment. Inevitably, there are shortcomings involved in presenting a necessarily condensed and sketchy lecture as a self-standing essay. Some of the sketches are simply too provisional; at times Taminiaux is too tentative. When he wants to challenge Husserl or Heidegger he does so in the most delicate, interrogative way: "Is it not appropriate to suspect that some sort of Cartesian dualism underlies the case with which Husserl . . . ?"; and in the case of Heidegger: "are we not allowed to suspect . . . a commitment to a similar privilege?" (p. 38). It would have been better had Taminiaux put his cards on the table and declared his criticisms directly and more forcefully, and with some more precise textual references. There is, for instance, a lack of clarification of the importance of the different stages and levels of reduction—or even of the question as to whether one must speak, as Husserl does, of "reductions." There are some shortcomings too in the production: the bibliography could be more extensive and there are some small lapses; for example, "Heidegger, 1976" is referred to on p. 41, but is not found in the bibliography (perhaps it should read "Heidegger, 1986"). Similarly, there is the occasional typo ("epoch" for "epoche," p. 9). But the overall impression is of a deep reflection on the reduction which brings it, as Husserl himself emphasized, to the center of the phenomenological movement to which all these thinkers loosely belonged. It is certainly an original, if initially disconcerting move, to link the reduction to prevailing conceptions of embodiment. This surprising move helps to unify and illuminate the subsequent analysis. Husserl's Cartesian-inspired meditations end up highlighting the particularity of embodiment and our intrinsic and inescapable being-in-the-world with others.
Taminiaux could have made more of Husserl's own diagnosis of the illusion of solipsism that initially infects transcendental phenomenology. The methodology of self-inquiry, however, necessarily leads to transcendental intersubjectivity—about which Taminiaux says surprisingly little, given its prominence in published texts such as Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and Crisis.

My most enduring worry concerns the manner in which the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism is left unaddressed in this essay. After all, Husserl's early rejection of psychologism in his Prolegomena of 1900 was simply the first run for his onslaught on naturalism in his 1906–07 Lectures on Logic and the Theory of Knowledge, at the very time when he was conceiving of the reduction. Indeed, the flight from naturalism is integral to Husserl's concept of the reduction. Naturalism, understood as the confusion of the epistemological with the psychological, is the "original sin" (Erbsünde)—the sin "against the Holy Spirit" of philosophy (Sünde gegen den Heiligen Geist der Philosophie). In one of the supplementary "Beilagen" to these 1906–07 lectures Husserl writes:

Thus, the "phenomenological reduction" is nothing other than the requirement always to abide by the sense of the proper investigation, and not to confuse epistemology with a natural-scientific (objectivistic) investigation.

The reduction is a leading away from naturalism and back into the realm of immanent consciousness, grasped in its true epistemic and transcendental character. This phenomenology "lies before all ordinary knowledge and science, and lies in a quite different direction than ordinary science." This critique of the "naturalization of consciousness" is continued quite explicitly in Husserl's Logos essay, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science (1910/1911) and thenceforth is repeated in important publications, including Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) and Crisis of the European Sciences (1936), where he says that "naturalistic objectivism" misses entirely "the accomplishment, the radical and genuine problem of the life of the spirit." Both naturalism and scientism have a misplaced objectivism that

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7Ibid., 176.
8Ibid., 410; my trans.
9Ibid., 176; my trans.
misunderstands the role of subjectivity in the constitution of being and meaning (*Sein und Sinn*). Thus, for instance, in a letter dated 20 December 1915 and addressed to the leading Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, Husserl could comment that he found himself in alliance with German idealism against the common enemy: “the naturalism of our time.”11 Husserl’s reduction, as he himself always insisted, is of a piece with his turn toward the non-participating spectator and towards the transcendental attitude that culminates in his embrace of transcendental idealism, and any reflection on the adventures of the reduction should address the difficulties associated with this idealist move.

Central to Husserl’s phenomenology is his insistence on the essential *a priori* correlation between constituting consciousness and the world as constituted, a correlation that escapes natural consciousness, which sees only the world given as “extant,” as indubitably there. In the *Crisis*, Husserl claims to have come upon this correlation in the late 1890s and to have made it the focus of his life’s work. Perhaps this is an exaggeration, but one cannot ignore Husserl’s constant emphasis that true phenomenology (and true philosophy) is transcendental philosophy, and indeed, transcendental idealism. Furthermore, whatever else Heidegger’s phenomenology in *Being and Time* may be, it too unmistakably maintains this commitment to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental analytic of Dasein, of necessity, is of a different kind than any positive scientific investigation of human nature (for example, biology, anthropology, theology, and so on). Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s being-in-the-world broadly recapitulates Husserl’s insights, with the chief difference that Heidegger insists that Dasein can be either inauthentic, having “fallen for” the world in the attitude of *das Man*, or authentic, when it as an individual freely and resolutely chooses its own end, its own purposeful Being.

While it is certainly true that Husserl retains a certain Cartesian characterization of world of things as *res extensa* and of the mental domain as given as it is (*esse est percipi*), and that Heidegger has little to say about embodiment, it is not clear that their respective conceptions of reduction are to blame. That Heidegger (at least in his lecture presentations) does retain some commitment to a conception of reduction is indisputable; but it is not clear that Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas are responding to failures or dualisms haunting this reduction even when they are addressing failures in phenomenology’s account of human existence. Jonas’ critique—which amounts to a naturalistic critique of Heidegger’s transcendental conception of Dasein—seems to miss the point entirely; Arendt’s concern to restore the importance of the practical life is itself haunted by her insistence that the highest kind of activity for humans is the life of action, by which she appears

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to mean free, unpressured, public, rational deliberation about ends. While this challenges the Heideggerian conception of Dasein’s singular authenticity as a free self-response, it does not appear to be a transformation of his concept of reduction. With Levinas, at least in the essay cited by Taminiaux (De l’existence à l’existant), the case is undoubtedly more complex and the evidence is on the side of Taminiaux’s reading.

Overall, then, this thought-provoking and insightful short essay presents, in a very clear and readable form, a richly provocative if ultimately questionable account of the adventures of the dialectic of responses to the Husserlian reductions. It should not be overlooked by anyone interested in the evolution of twentieth-century European thought.

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