ers do actually do so (he need not). One actualizes one's possibility of becoming a shoemaker when one learns how to make shoes, and then gains the capacity to be a shoemaker. Needless to say, Heidegger borrows many of the relevant distinctions here from Aristotle.

20. "Formally, it is unsuitable to speak of the ego as consciousness-of something that is cognizant or self-consciousness. In effect, both these formal determinations, which provide the framework for idealism's dialectic of consciousness, are nevertheless very far from an interpretation of the phenomenal circumstances of the Dasein" (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 128-59).

"Our Germans Are Better than Your Germans": Continental and Analytic Approaches to Intentionality Reconsidered

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1. THE HISTORY OF CONCEPTS AND THE NATURE OF TRADITION

In this paper I want to show how attention to the history of problems and concepts can shed light on how these problems and concepts come to be understood within a particular tradition. Remarkably, few studies have been undertaken concerning the roles central philosophical concepts have played in different traditions. As a very general characterization, European philosophers of the Hegelian tradition have been quicker to recognize the historical roots of concepts, and to value the tracing of the different configurations of the concept in different periods as crucial to understanding and resolving problems connected with the concept. If the meaning of a term is its use, then the history of that use cannot be simply ignored. This outlook is increasingly being fruit in analytic philosophy also, though the "history" involved usually stretches back only to the 1950s. 

I shall focus in this study on the concept of intentionality, not only because it is central to the development of so-called continental philosophy—specifically phenomenology—from Brentano onwards, but also because
vigorously reaction to one metaphysical interpretation of this concept stimulated the development of analytic philosophy. Indeed, in a reversal of roles, intuitionalism has re-emerged as an intractable problem in recent analytic traditions of hermeneutics, deconstruction, and in the focus on narrativity. Tracing the complex evolution of the problem of intentionality in analytic and continental philosophy, then, may provide some insight into the nature of these traditions and the relations between them. Such a review of the complex history of the concept of intentionality in the main European traditions will make clear that the various debates about the concept may be fruitfully understood as episodes in one enlarged tradition, yielding a more accurate picture of the development of twentieth-century philosophy as a whole.

Tracing the contours of the concept of intentionality, as it has emerged in the complex discussions of philosophy since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, is precisely a way of understanding philosophy across the supposed divide, and serves to reinforce a Hegelian conviction, strongly held in continental philosophy, but rarely, if ever, addressed in the analytic tradition, that a fine-grained understanding of a concept involves understanding the historical trajectory to which it remains bound. Even the elimination of a concept from our mature vocabulary is a way of relating to its problematic history, in this case, by discharging the effects of the tradition. A wider challenge, outside the scope of this paper, would be to develop a concept of "tradition" and the forces, causal and otherwise, governing it, which will assist in making explicit the manner in which thinking is itself governed by tradition. Do continental and analytic approaches differ as to how to characterize the very notion of tradition itself?

II. MAKING SENSE OF TWO GERMAN TRADITIONS

There is a story, probably apocryphal, that, on hearing of the successful launch of Sputnik by the USSR, the U.S. president called in his advisors and asked them to explain the Soviet success. The advisors answered: "Their Germans are better than our Germans!" After the defeat and division of Germany, German scientists were asked to work for the Americans and for the Soviets, with the latter managing to assemble the better team. Something analogous happened in philosophy in the twentieth century. The analytic tradition fields its team of German-speaking philosophers, e.g., Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, et al., whereas so-called continental philosophers looked to Husserl, Heidegger (and their French disciples), Nietzsche, Gadamer, Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas. Whose team is better? If political circumstances, especially the rise of Nazism and the Second World War, had been different, would these figures still be grouped into the distinct traditions that now characterize professional philosophy in English-speaking countries, or would they represent competing trends within a more broadly conceived common tradition of European philosophy?

Of course, in many ways, the supposed opposition between the "analytic" and "continental" traditions or styles of philosophizing is deeply misleading. As Richard Rorty and others have pointed out, there is often as little unity or common ground among analytic philosophers themselves, or among continental philosophers themselves, as there is between both camps. The problem of describing the analytic tradition is compounded by the fact that "analytic" is often used by Ayer and others as an honorific to include all that is good and worthwhile in Plato, Aristotle, and so on. Furthermore, if "analysis" in its classic sense means specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for using a concept, then many Continental philosophers, including Descartes, could be described as "analytic." On the other hand, the term "continental," which probably first gained currency in job descriptions in the United States, is no better, being repudiated by most European philosophers to whom it is applied, who see themselves as participating in the central tradition of European philosophizing since the ancient Greeks (often operating with a narrow conception of this tradition as excluding developments in British philosophy). Moreover, not just these continental philosophers, but many analytic philosophers too, operate with the tacit assumption that analytic philosophy is somehow inextricably Anglophone, or "Anglo-Saxon," as the French say, or, alternatively, "Anglo-American," which excludes Australian analytic practitioners, among others. This peculiar mixture of geographical and linguistic labeling is wholly confused and should simply be abandoned. This is not to deny the obvious, that there are radical differences among practitioners of this subject called 'philosophy,' and that these differences can be grouped into general tendencies, and that the different underlying assumptions about the historical tradition to which each group belongs may be discerned. But the traditions do not divide simply on linguistic or geographical lines. Thus, with respect to intentionality, the French philosophers François Recanati and Pierre Jacob see themselves as belonging exclusively to the analytic tradition, whereas many American philosophers style themselves as continentalists.

When analytic philosophy began to set its agenda in the early part of the twentieth century, it saw itself as deliberately and profoundly anti-historical. There was philosophy and there was the history of ideas, just as there was science and stamp collecting. The former was concerned with problem solving, with pushing forward the frontiers of scientific knowledge; the latter was an antiquarian discipline, a mild, harmless way of documenting how things used to be done in the bad old days. Only recently has this
image of analytic philosophy began to be challenged and a new, almost oxymoronic conception has emerged—the history of analytic philosophy. It has gradually come to be recognized that the very idea of philosophy is to be involved in a tradition, though there is little reflection on what this means. Furthermore, the frontiers of the analytic tradition are constantly widening, to include Kant and the pragmatists, for example. Whereas Wilfrid Sellars claimed that with Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations analytic philosophy passed from its Humean to its Kantian phase, most recently, at the World Congress of Philosophy held in Boston, Robert Brandom, with his emphasis on the social and historical basis of normativity, suggested it was time to usher in the "HegeJian phase of analytic philosophy." Some philosophers present expressed outrage—how could analytic philosophy stomach Hegel, when its whole raison d'être was to repudiate Hegel and all his pomp and ceremonies? What passed almost unchallenged in the discussions was the degree to which the analytical tradition had already absorbed former outcasts such as Kant into their canon, and, indeed, some analytic moral philosophers (e.g., Bernard Williams) have seriously reading Nietzsche, something which would have scandalized Russell. For a long time, especially in Britain, analytic philosophers were as hostile to Kant as to Hegel, and, as Peter Hylton has shown, it was in fact Kant more than Hegel who was the object of Russell's criticisms. Since the 1960s, the work of Peter Strawson, Graham Bird, Henry Allison, and, more recently, Hillary Putnam and John McDowell, has seamlessly reintegrated Kant into analytic philosophizing. In fact, even earlier analytic philosophers, especially the kind developed by the Vienna circle, can be securely located as a specific development of an aspect of the neo-Kantian tradition, namely, its concern with specifying the conditions for the possibility of scientific knowledge. In contrast, the "continental" tradition is shrinking, so that recent postmodernists tend to ignore Brentano or Husserl in tracing the paternity of their tradition.

According to Dummett, post-Fregoean analytic philosophy is distinguished from traditional speculation since Descartes in that, instead of asking "How is it possible to know anything about the world?" the question now becomes "How is it possible for our words to mean what they do?" But, of course, the linguistic turn is not an exclusive property of analytic philosophy; Heidegger as much as Wittgenstein recognized that philosophical problems are nested inside complex linguistic practices. Heidegger more than any other European philosopher apart from Wittgenstein paid close attention to the language in which philosophical problems are formulated. Furthermore, Brentano, and certainly members of his school, had, contemporaneously with Frege and Russell, recognized that the logical form of a sentence ought to be distinguished from its apparent grammatical form.

Both the followers of Wittgenstein and the followers of Heidegger are interested in linguisticality [Sprachlichkeit], in the linguistic character of our being in the world. But there appears to a difference, in that analytic philosophers in general tend to focus on the sentence as the unit of meaning, whereas post-Heideggerian continental philosophy tends to operate with the recognition that meaning resides in structures that are not "in the head," but rather are dispersed or "dissiminated" into larger, more anonymous structures—structures best examined using tools of textual analysis (structuralism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction have followed that route), employing a "hermeneutics of suspicion" that owes a deep debt to those masters of suspicion, Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche. While analytic philosophers for a long time used ordinary language situations as paradigmatic of situations in which concepts are used correctly, continental theorists tend to see concepts as embedded in ambiguous textual contexts and see one of the main aims of their analysis as making the context transparent, or showing how aspects of the context work against or undercut what the concept purports to represent. Analytic philosophers, on the whole, even when they subscribe to holism, tend to be more straightforward, even naive, in their approach to texts larger than the sentence, and, though they may be literary eggheads in their private lives, they tend not to allow such sophistication to enter into their discussions of meaning (Donald Davidson is, of course, an exception here).

Daniel C. Dennett, for example, has stated that he can claim to know Madame Bovary because he has seen the film, although he has not read the book, on the basis that one can distinguish which is represented from the mode of representing. Most continental philosophers, on the other hand, would regard this supposed ability to identify the same intentional object in different contexts as an illusion and would stress the different contextual features of film and novel which would make such an assumption deeply problematic. How one enters into a narrative that attributes sentience to some item is a very complex issue. If anything, continental philosophy is now more linguistically centered than analytic philosophy, particularly as philosophy of mind has replaced philosophy of language as the dominant paradigm in analytic philosophy.

III. THE TERMINOLOGICAL IMPEDIMENT

In attempting to mediate between analytic and continental discussions, we are initially impeded by the opacity of the different terminological traditions, with each side securing the other of using jargon. Thus, with regard to intentionality, since Bertrand Russell, analytic philosophers tend to talk about "propositional attitudes" or, since Roderick Chisholm, of intentional "idioms," leading to a focus on the linguistic and specifically sentential aspect of intentionality. This terminology has its limitations. After all, an
attitude is just one way of being in an intentional relation; it may be misleading to employ it as a neutral, catch-all phrase for all intentional states (similarly, Dennett’s explication of intentionality in terms of a “stance” seems to involve a certain circularity, as a stance is itself an intentional attitude). Searle also regards this language as essentially misleading as it tends to suggest only propositions are the objects of intentional states. Continental theorists, on the other hand, are likely to know that Russell employed the term “attitude” as a translation of the German Einstellung, a term in vogue among Brentano’s students, including Husserl (viz., the latter’s die natürliche Einstellung, “the natural attitude”). After Husserl and Heidegger, the continental tradition has preferred to talk about the way in which a world is connected with in our experience and made manifest, our ways of “cooping,” our “being in the world” (In-der-Welt-Sein). Although Brentano originally talked of “psychic acts” [psychische Akte], Husserl, following Dilthey, preferred to speak about Erlebnisse, “mental processes” or “lived experiences.” Heidegger moved sharply away from isolating mental events as if they constituted a separate Cartesian realm, and diffused talk of mental events into a more pragmatic discussion of involved human action and position taking, our “comportments” [Verhaltense] toward things. In general, in European philosophy after Heidegger, intentionality does not receive specific treatment and is absorbed into a wider story of human action involving more complex notions of interpretation and narrative.

IV. THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Although often considered to be the Grundbegriff of Husserlian phenomenology, intentionality has in fact resurfaced as a central topic in analytic philosophy since the 1950s. This analytic discussion of intentionality, still rooted in anti-Kantian suspicion, ignored continental philosophers after Brentano. Husserlian phenomenology, in particular, was seen as the mystical science of seeing these intentional objects and milking them for essential insights, transcendental structures of reality, ending in a subjective idealism. Most analytic philosophers tend to pay lip service to Brentano and have clearly not read the original texts, preferring to simply cite the famous paragraph in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint where Brentano introduced the concept. Roderick Chisholm is an exception, being the leading scholar of Brentano’s texts in English-speaking world.

Analytic philosophers in general (with the notable recent exceptions of Searle, Nagel, and McGinn) have been deeply suspicious of any claims for a genuine, first-person, mental life, fearing that it in fact harbored a kind of disguised Cartesian dualism, or a belief in “noetic rays,” or “spooky stuff,” in Patricia Churchland’s terms. In general, analytic philosophy, while wanting to get beyond the impasse of behaviorism’s feigned anesthesia toward any trace of a subjective life, has been somewhat embarrassed by this phenomenon of intentionality, and especially its supposed irreducibility, which made the concept “unnatural,” not explainable by science. mystical—a concept of interest to the “New Mysterians,” as Owen Flanagan has dubbed them. To allow undiluted intentionality into the system would be to put the ghost back into the machine, as it were, to allow in a mysterious entity that escaped the nomological net of the physical sciences. Responding to this anxiety, analytic philosophers have tended toward naturalism, wanting to restrain philosophical discussion to within the domain of science, whereas continental philosophers tend to see science as essentially a formal, abstract discipline that requires philosophical interpretation to integrate it back into the life-world.

Most analytic philosophers wish to include intentionality within the causal order, perhaps allowing it as a feature of our phenomenal experiences, but secured in the natural order of the world. The slogans of the analytic discussion of intentionality include the following: the attempt to overcome Cartesian dualism, the eliminability of mental talk, intentionality as the mark of the mental, the attempts to bring intentionality within limits of scientific explanation, and so on. Analytic philosophy is determined to explain intentionality, either by explaining it away, i.e., by eliminating it, or by reducing it to its non-intentional elements. Even Searle, who sees intentionality as irreducible, believes he has explained it in fully naturalistic terms as a high-order, emergent property of brains. Thus Jerry Fodor has claimed:

It’s hard to see . . . how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If abourness is real, it must really be something else. The naturalistic approach is telling of, to use Rorty’s word, a “down-heave” story. Thus, Daniel Dennett accuses Searle of seeking a kind of alchemy that will magically extrude intentionality from brain neurophysiology, from the “wet ware” of the brain. Searle, on the other hand, is almost a lone voice in defending the irreducibility of intentionality and the subjectivity of mental content, claiming that

You cannot reduce intentional content (oral pains or “qualia”) to something else, because if you could it would be something else, and they are not something else. The opposite of my view is stated very succinctly by Fodor: “If abourness is real, it must really be something else.” On the contrary, abourness (i.e., intentionality) is real, and it is not something else.
Despite the radical disagreements between Dennett, Searle, Fodor, and others, they all understand the central question of intentionality as essentially the Cartesian question, "How does the mind represent?" For Fred Dretske, in fact, the mind is best thought of as "the representational face of the brain." And Robert Stalnaker states: "The problem of intentionality is a problem about the nature of representation." Even Searle, who is hostile to many versions of representationalism, agrees that the problem is: "How can this stuff inside my head be about anything?" But there are huge problems articulating representation in a way that escapes the problems in which earlier modern representationalists, such as Descartes and Locke, became embedded. Indeed, both Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty see intentionality as a legacy of the seventeenth-century Cartesian view of the mind, something that must be overcome. There has been, in the analytic tradition, a huge and ongoing debate between the representationalists, on the one hand, who want to locate just how it is that the brain can look onto the outside world, and those like Robert Brandom, who, following Wittgenstein and Sellars, want to dispense with talk of intentionality into practices, linguistic and social, where concept-possession is to be understood not in terms of possession of a representation, but in terms of our ability to grasp and follow rules, a conception of concepts that derives ultimately from Kant and Frege. This whole debate is too subtle and complex to follow here, but it is interesting that it too oscillates between individualism and holism in a manner similar to the tensions between Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger in the continental tradition.

Having suggested some ways that the two traditions understand intentionality, let us now look in more detail at the evolution of the concept in modern philosophy. Let us begin, then, with Brentano, since he is, in a sense, the one who I shall explain responsible for the subsequent split of the European tradition into analytic and continental wings.

V. BRENTANO’S INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE

Although rightly credited with reintroducing the concept into modern philosophy, Brentano’s discussion of intentionality is actually quite sparse, appearing in a few paragraphs scattered through his many works. His own background was Cartesian, yet his Descartes was one who followed Aristotle and Aquinas in recognizing a triadic structure of the mind, whereby it is initially stimulated by a "presentation" [Vorstellung], which it may accept or reject (judgment), or toward which it may be drawn or from which it may be repelled (phenomena of force and hate). Every psychic act either is, or is based on, a presentation. It is through this relation to a presentation that psychic acts are distinguished from physical acts. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, Brentano’s view has been misinterpreted as seeking to provide a "mark of the mental" in order to drive a wedge between the physical and the mental, and prevent any attempt to reduce the mental to physical. Thus Hilary Putnam interprets Brentano’s thesis as the view that "intentionality won’t be reduced and won’t go away." Similarly, David M. Armstrong has said: “Brentano held that intentionality set the mind completely apart from matter,” and Hartry Field sees Brentano’s problem as just that of giving a "materialistically adequate account of believing, desiring and so forth":

The . . . problem, raised by Brentano, is the problem of intentionality. Many mental properties—believing, desiring, and so forth—appear to be relational properties: more precisely, they appear to relate people to non-linguistic entities called propositions. So any materialist who takes believing and desiring at face value—any materialist who admits that belief and desire are relations between people and propositions—any such materialist must show that the relations in question are not irreducibly mental. Brentano felt that this could not be done; and since he saw no alternative to viewing belief and desire as relations to propositions, he concluded that materialism must be false.

This—surprisingly widespread—interpretation of Brentano misunderstands his purpose of attempting to found a science of descriptive psychology. Brentano wanted a descriptive science of the a priori features of mental acts, acts that are grasped in inner perception. In describing the manner in which psychic acts either are, or are based on, presentations, Brentano struggled to describe the way in which the "presented" item is a "content" or "object" of the presenting act. Brentano’s first attempts involved explicating a sense of presentation that covered all kinds of entities, from imagined images to straightforward presentations of physical objects in sense perception, led him to borrow the term "invers" from the Scholastics, which he translated as "Inexistenz," "Psychic acts take objects which are characterized by having "intentional inexistence" [Intentionelle Inexistenz]. In other formulations, he interprets intentionality as a relation between the act and its intended object, and in his later writings he sought to avoid postulating a realm of independent non-real "objectivities" [Gegenstandlichkeit] by suggesting linguistic reconstructions that brought on the adverbial nature of intentionality. To imagine a unicorn is to be modified unicorally, as it were.

However, Brentano’s first attempts to postulate an "inexistent" intentional object led his student, Alexius Meinong, to develop hierarchies of objects of higher order, such that every intentional act was secured by being related to an objectivity of some sort. To think of a unicorn and to think of the existence of a unicorn were, for Meinong, to be related to two different objectivities. Robert Brandom has recently pointed out that traditional
intentionality in its Meinongian version failed to distinguish situations of genuine, successful referring from situations where there is only assumed, purported referring.21 Brandon is essentially repeating the diagnosis earlier made by Gilbert Ryle when Ryle wrote: The Brentano-Meinong theory of intentional objects really did rescue our thoughts from a Human Impasse in apprehending anything at all, though at the high price of shielding our thoughts from any risks of misapprehension or non-apprehension. Formerly we could not be right in our thinking; now, which is nearly as bad, we cannot be wrong in our thinking. Object-having had been an unrealizable ambition; now it is an unavailing obligation. We are choked where we had been starved.22

In response to Meinong's luxuriant ontology, his ontological "slum" or "jungle," Bertrand Russell inaugurated the analytic movement in Britain by offering logical analyses (strongly influenced by Frege) of sentences that departed from the grammatical structure and led to the systematic demotionization of various kinds of supposed objects. Russell's theory of descriptions, in fact, became the canonical version of what analytic philosophy of language could and should do. Thus, it was Brentano's student Meinong who in fact provoked the backlash that stimulated the development of the analytic tradition in the English-speaking world. But Meinong's route was not the only way to go after Brentano. Brentano's initial characterization of the intentional object as something which may or may not exist, as something with "intentional inexistence," stimulated other close followers, e.g., Anton Marty, Kazimierz Twardowski, and Edmund Husserl, to attempt to clarify the nature of the supposed inexistence or "in-dwelling" (Einhaltung) of intentional objects. One way to discharge the ontological commitment was to disambiguate the different senses in which something can be the object of an intentional act by distinguishing between the content of the act and its object.

Thus, Brentano's Polish student, Kazimierz Twardowski, arguably the first analytic philosopher of language, drew on the Austro-German logical tradition (Bolzano, Kerry, Zimmermann, Meinong, and Höffter et al.), itself owing to Kant, to propose, in his 1894 book, "On the Content and Object of Presentations," a distinction between the content and object of presentations and judgments.23 Twardowski stressed that we must distinguish the properties of the content (what is presented) from the properties of the object. The content is a real part of the act and really exists, while the object need not exist. However, his account of content was not entirely clear. At times, he spoke of the content as like a "sight" or inner "mental picture" of the object;24 elsewhere, he spoke in more Fregean terms of the content as that which is presented in the act of presentation, whereas the object appears through the content.25 Twardowski argues that a "square circle" can be the genuine object of representation, since it possesses a genuine "meaning" (Sinn), and its properties can be enumerated, even though these are contradictory properties and hence the object cannot exist in actuality.26 It will simply be the case that true judgments will not affirm these objects. Twardowski's clarification of the role of the psychological content, nevertheless, left the ontological problem of the status of intentional objectivities unresolved.

Edmund Husserl began as a follower of Brentano, seeking to apply Brenanian descriptive psychology to the domain of mathematical knowledge. In his first book, "Philosophy of Arithmetic" (1891), he tried to answer the question of how arithmetic concepts are formed in psychological acts. In the 1890s, following his own intensive reading of the Austro-German logicians, as well as through his correspondence with Frege,27 Edmund Husserl himself came to criticize Brentano's account of intentionality for failing to do justice to the trans-temporal identity of meanings grasped in temporal psychic processes. Husserl even wrote, but did not publish, a review of Twardowski's treatise,2 where in which he argued that Twardowski's refinement of the Brentanian account remained too immaterialis in its understanding of the notion of content, and hence that Twardowski could not really explain how different acts could share the same meaning. For example, when two people think of a tree, each has a specific "subjective presentation" (Bolzano) or "phantasm" (Husserl), but they also grasp a common meaning. Both Husserl and Twardowski agree that the psychic act is a real event in the natural world, subject to psycho-physical natural laws, and possessing real ("realer" in Husserl's early vocabulary) temporal parts. Its content is also a genuine, though dependent, part of the act, i.e., it cannot survive on its own apart from the act, it lives in the act, as it were. But, for Husserl, there is another dimension to the act: it tokens or instantiates an ideal meaning. Husserl is a direct realist about our perception: we see actual trees, in a straightforward, immediate manner. We really do see individual physical things, but we also see, in more complex cases of perceiving, that it is a tree, and we can see the same tree in different visual acts. We see something we know others, too, are able to see. All of this requires self-sameness, identity of the object in repeated perceptual acts, and through different "modes of givenness."

This ideal content is what guarantees sameness of reference, reiteration of the same meaning over a number of acts. The crucial point, for Husserl, is that meanings are multiply accessible ideata, i.e., repeatedly accessible by the same speaker, or shared between speakers. As such, these ideata are non-individuated, trans-temporal ideata, tokens in psychological contents.

In "The Logical Investigations" (1900-1907), Husserl articulated an account of mental processes that saw them as complex wholes that consisted
concrete and the abstract parts, elaborating on Stumpt's part-whole analysis, and, specifically, the latter's distinction between dependent and independent parts. In the first edition, Husserl treated the meaning or signification as an "abstract" or "one-sided" part of the act, a dependent element that only came to be when the act engendered it, not a "real" [real] part of the act. To see a cat is to see an object which can be reidentified and hence one has a meaningful experience that goes beyond, or exceeds, the appearance in the presentation. "Cat" signifies a species, a type. Nevertheless, we really do see a cat; we see a token of the type. Husserl insists that seeing a cat is an instance of straightforward perception, where in normal cases of perceiving, word and thing are given together. 

It is a phenomenological distorion to construe genuine perception of a cat as the judgment "this is a cat." The objectivity instantiated in a judgment is different from that given in perception. Thus, for example, to see that the cat is black, is to "constitute," in Husserl's phrase, borrowed from the neo-Kantians, or instantiate in a specific thought process, the ideal, or general, objective sense-unity, the being-black of the cat, an objectivity which Husserl, in line with the Brentanian tradition, calls a state of affairs [Sachverhalt], a concept which finds perhaps its fullest employment in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Husserl himself distinguishes a hierarchy of different kinds of objectivities in a manner not entirely dissimilar from that of Meranghi. We can group real, individual empirical objects or ideal, general objectivities, simple or complex, positive or negative. Husserl distinguishes the ideality of the species from the ideality of the state of affairs. He also holds that the statement "a is bigger than b" expresses a different state of affairs or, as in the early formulation of the Logical Investigations, has a different meaning-content from the assertion "a is smaller than b." But his whole account is meant to explain and safeguard our actual, straightforward, real experiences of perception, and to repudiate representationalist accounts.

In the first and fifth Logical Investigations, Husserl provided a far more elaborate analysis of intentional acts than anything previously found in Brentano or Twardowski. As part of this account, Husserl distinguishes the object which is presented from the object as it is presented, that is, its mode of presentation or its "mode of givenness." Different meanings [Bedeutung] could intend the same object, have the same "objective relation" [Gegenstandstheit der Beziehung]. Thus, "the victor at Jena" and "the vanquished at Waterloo" are two ways of thinking about, or presenting, the same entity, Napoleon. Husserl here is making a distinction very similar to Frege's distinction between sense and reference. Distinguishing between the meaning (Husserl, though familiar with Frege's distinction, employs Bedeutung and Sinn indifferently in the Investigations) and the objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] of the expression allows Husserl to accept that "golden mountain" is meaningful but lacks objective reference. Similarly, Husserl, agreeing here with Twardowski, holds that talk of a square circle is not meaningless, not an Unsin, as some previous logicians, such as Sigmund and Erdmann, had thought; rather it expresses a set of meanings which contradict one another, rendering the phrase a counterseasonal absurdity [Widersinn]. In other words, in Husserl's account, in intending a square circle, we are able to perform a meaning-confering act without our being able to bring it to meaning fulfillment [Bedeutungserfüllung]; to complete the objective relation. The expression carries an expectation of meaning accomplishment which will always be frustrated; it lacks a "fulfilling sense" [erfyllende Sinn]. Thus, Husserl's original contribution to the Brentanian problematic of intentionality was his elaboration of the view that every meaning or every thought has a certain signification or "meaning" [Bedeutung]—not necessarily linguistic—that itself either presents with or promises varying levels of confirmation or fulfillment. This represents a considerable advance over Brentano and actually provides an account of intentional acts in terms of their fulfillment conditions not unlike that later developed by John Searle. Like Searle, Husserl believes that to have a successful visual perception requires that the object seen be grasped as itself causing the visual perception. Similarly, both Searle and Husserl emphasize how the mode of givenness or aspatial shape under which the object is grasped is crucial for determining the conditions of success of the intentional act in which it appears.

Husserl's Prolegomena to the Investigations, published separately in 1900, was a sustained attempt to underscore the necessity of a sharp distinction between a mental act, as a particular temporal, psychic occurrence in the stream of consciousness, and the ideal meaning which it tokens in order to overcome psychologism, a collapse of the normative into the psychological, which he felt haunted his earlier Psychology of Arithmetic and almost all contemporary logic. For Husserl, as for Frege, meanings were ideal, but, unlike Frege, who—nostruously—placed these objectivities in a third realm, "ein drittes Reich," Husserl was generally unconcerned with positing a special realm of being for these entities. For him, they were simply abstract objects. In the first edition of the Logical Investigations, in fact, Husserl has a quasi-nominalist position regarding these idealities. The ideal universal is "taken in the actual. I see an individual red patch and can have an intuition that this is "species red." I grasp, by "ideational abstraction," this red patch as an instance of "redness" in general, or indeed as an instance of "color. In the Second Investigation, he disavowed a Platonism which would place these objectivities in a "heavenly place" [Topos outranis] as a doctrine that had long been refined. For Husserl, existence, understood as actuality [Wirklichkeit], always signifies existence in time, and, in that specific sense, ideal objects do not "exist." For Husserl, they are necessary conditions for meaning, "objectivities" rather than actual entities. In the Formal
The neo-Kantian transcendental orientation of Husserl’s later discussions of intentionality is intimately connected with his investigations of the world, the surrounding world of abilities and practices, which are prior to and independent of human consciousness.

Husserl was more concerned with the true features of consciousness as necessarily correlative with the natural world, and he was moved to explore various a priori transcendental-phenomenological structures of cognition. This necessitated a return to transcendental-phenomenological analysis, away from descriptive methodological assumptions that exist in empirical and intentional objects.

In later works, Husserl realized that he had made a serious mistake in his earlier analyses of mental processes. He attempted to analyze mental processes by treating them as little bits of the natural world. This naturalistic assumption was preventing him from seeing the true features of consciousness as necessarily correlated with the world and the intentional relation or the intentional object. Husserl began to re-examine these investigations as part of his later neokantianism. He began to recognize the mental processes that could be understood within the context of the intentional relation, and he began to explore various a priori transcendental-phenomenological structures of cognition.

In general, Husserl was more concerned with the true nature of consciousness and the intentional object. Heidegger’s articulation of Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” helps to overcome problems in Husserl’s still too Cartesian way of articulating the intentional relation, leading Heidegger to downplay, if not entirely eliminate, the concept of intentionality in his account of human being in the world. In a manner which may be loosely described as “pragmatic” and “externalist,” Heidegger criticizes the cognitivist and representationalist bias of traditional ways of describing human being in the world, which had led to the impasse of many philosophical problems and led to such philosophical scandals as skepticism about the very existence of the world.

Like Husserl, Heidegger wanted to safeguard the immediate realism of our perceptual experiences, but he did not want to accept that our perceptual encounter with the world translates into a cognitive seeing of things. We encounter a world in which we are already immersed bodily and in terms of our concerns and involvements. His solution was a return to the description of experience as it is lived, the practical comportment and encounter with things in the contexts of cares and concerns, an account which has been translated into more contemporary language by Hubert Dreyfus, among others. In fact, it is largely through the efforts of Dreyfus that Heidegger has been brought back into the analytic debate on intentionality, which had largely been proceeding in the shadow of Chisholm’s version of Brentano.

Without going further into post-Heideggerian developments, we can see from this brief sketch of the history of the continental discussion of intentionality from Brentano to Heidegger how the concept developed a particular set of contours. Each position developed, refined, or rejected, the analysis of the previous philosopher. The concept of “object,” of “content,” the nature of the relation between act and object, and the wider assumptions about consciousness, knowledge, and rationality, which haunt the whole discussion of intentionality, were all brought out in sophisticated ways in the continental tradition. I shall offer a similarly brief characterization of some typically analytic approaches to the problem of intentionality, to show that many of the same issues arose, and that the discussion turned on the same problems though in somewhat different contexts.
VI. THE RETURN OF INTENTIONALITY IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

The analytic movement originally sprang up in reaction to Meinong. As Gilbert Ryle put it in 1970, Meinong “vaccinated” contemporary philosophy against the theory of objects. Gegenstandstheorie.54 The reaction to Brentanian tradition, and to the embrace of scientific psychology of a purely empirical kind. Psychological behaviorism, e.g., the theory associated with B. F. Skinner, sought to reduce or eliminate all intentional vocabulary. Already in a lecture in 1930, Rudolf Carnap had proposed the elimination of psychological terms, or at least the reduction of all psychological sentences to physical sentences, defending the thesis that “all sentences of psychology are about physical processes, namely about the physical behavior of humans and other animals.” Carnap believed a future science would translate sentences involving psychological language ("A is excited") into sentences employing exclusively physical language ("A's body is physically excited, his heart is beating fast, . . . "). W. V. O. Quine has a more sophisticated view that nevertheless retains elements of Carnap's. Indeed, Quine has amusingly coined the verb “to quine” to mean “to render something theoretically harmless,” in his 1988 essay, "Quining Qualia."55 In Word and Object, Quine, relying on Chisholm's account of Brentano, agrees with explaining its members in other terms. Our present reflections are favourable to this thesis.56 Quine cites indirect quotation and belief sentences as examples of sentences that cannot be reduced to behavioral terms. Quine equates Brentano's irreducibility claim with that of the indeterminacy of translation, but he understands this as "showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of intention."54 Quine acknowledges that intentional idioms are practically indispensable, and cannot be forewarned in daily usage, but not that they belong to the "true and ultimate structure of reality" which knows only direction quotation.55 Use of a notation that accepts intentional idioms can be tolerated to dissolve verbal perplexities and facilitate deduction, but, in the end, intentional idioms have no purchase on reality.

VII. RODERICK CHISHOLM'S REVIVAL OF INTENTIONALITY

In the 1950s Chisholm sought tentatively to re-express Brentano's discovery in terms of several peculiar features of sentences.57 His aim was to find a way to express the autonomy of the mental and to argue against the possibility of reduction of the mental to the physical. In order for a sentence to express an intentional idiom, Chisholm lists four criteria:

(a) A sentence is intentional if it employs a substantive expression in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory either implies or does not imply that the object designated by the substantive expression exists, e.g., "I am thinking of the Dnieper dam" does not imply that there either is or is not such an object. In his 1967 article, "Intentionality," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Chisholm refers to this criterion as failure of existential generalization.58

The second criterion Chisholm provides is (b) A sentence whose object includes a verb (e.g., "he thinks it will rain") is intentional if neither the sentence nor its contradictory imply that the phrase following the principal verb is either true or false. This is merely a development of the first. Chisholm's third criterion refers to (c) The problem of indirect reference (or "referential opacity," as it is sometimes called). Thus, for example, the sentence "I know Scott is here" does not imply that "I know that the author of Waverley is here." This is commonly referred to as the failure of the substitutivity of identicals.59 As a third criterion, Chisholm offers (d) A compound sentence is intentional if one of its component parts is intentional. In his original formulation Chisholm admitted these criteria overlap to a considerable degree.60 The problem is whether all these criteria together are necessary and sufficient, whether each alone is sufficient but none is necessary, or whatever.

Various counterexamples may be offered to show that these criteria are not exclusive to intentional contexts. Take the sentence "I owe you £10," where the verb "owe" is not an obviously psychological verb, and yet neither the sentence nor its opposite says anything about the existence of the £10. Similarly, there are genuine intentional verbs, such as "know," which assume the existence of the object of the intentional verb. The sentence "John knows Mary" implies that Mary exists. Chisholm's criteria, then, were not sufficiently refined. A minor industry of articles grew up which sought to save Chisholm's criteria, or offer better criteria, for retaining the distinctiveness of intentional idioms. The underlying assumption was that these intentional idioms are best seen in their linguistic settings. Chisholm's own efforts to pin down precisely how intentional verbs and contexts differ from non-intentional verbs and contexts were never completely successful. In general, he failed to distinguish intentional contexts from other kinds of modal contexts. Of course, this suggested to the reductionists that there is nothing especial about intentional contexts, nothing that would prevent their absorption into logic. However, other analytic philosophers, such as Dennett and Searle, have had a strong intuition that intentionality cannot be dissolved in this way and have resorted to other, very clever ways of analyzing
it. For Dennett, intentionality must be understood by relating it to a general assumption of rationality in assessing behavior; for Searle, intentionality makes sense when it is treated as a structure that underwrites speech act theory.

VIII. INTENTIONALITY UNDERSTOOD AS A STANCE

Dennett's account of intentionality grows out of his encounters with Quine, Chisholm, Ryle, and Sellars. Dennett is a naturalist, who holds, with Quine, that "philosophy is allied with and continuous with the physical sciences." He is explicitly taking the "third-person, materialistic perspective of contemporary science" and has a deep suspicion of ontology and of allowing intrinsic intentionality into science. Though Dennett acknowledges that he had, when a student at Harvard, encountered Husserl through Dagfinn Follesdal, and possibly again when at Oxford, through Ryle, he came to regard Husserlian phenomenology as obscurantist and too "metaphysical." Instead, Dennett is securely within the analytic tradition, and draws heavily on Chisholm's description of intentionality as a feature of sentences, though without committing himself to the irreducibility thesis. Dennett wants to operate a kind of double-standard approach (derived from Quine) that recognizes the reality of intentionality and at the same time does not see it as a kind of magic ray linking the mind to intentional objects. He wants to effect a Rylean and Quinian exorcist of ontological ghosts haunting the discussion, including those which assailed the mind-brain identity theory.

Thus, in his first book, *Content and Consciousness*, Dennett sought to accept the genuineness of the intentionality of consciousness without hypothesizing consciousness into a separate mental substance. His account makes two typically analytic moves: first, he shifts to talk about language, and, secondly, he invokes Ryle's notion of "category mistake" to de-reify the referents of various kinds of noun. To do something for Pete's sake is not to commit oneself to the existence of "sakes." Similarly "voice" and "throat" are nouns that belong to different categories, and it would be wrong "to invent a voice-throat problem to go along with the mind-body problem." Dennett always claims to be exercising "deliberate ontological blindness," to be "ontologically neutral," making no commitments. Similarly, his acceptance of the pervasiveness of intentional idioms is an "innocent anthropomorphizing." In 1971, Dennett published his most influential article, "Intensional Systems," in which he argued that intentional systems are systems whose behavior can be explained and predicted only by invoking intentional notions such as beliefs and desires. Since 1971, Dennett has developed his account considerably, but without any radical change of direction. In 1987 he offered his essay "True Believers" as "the flagship expression" of his position. More recently, he has preferred the essay "Real Patterns" as "central" to his thinking. We must invoke an intentional stance whereby we attribute beliefs and desires to the system as a means of making predictions about its behavior, e.g., the mouse knows the cat is on his left and therefore the mouse has decided to go to the right. This stance is an effective heuristic device for explaining and predicting the behavior of others (e.g., road users). It is a purely "heuristic" and "pragmatic" stance, which can be dropped if it does not work. The intentional stance relies on reasoning of the following kind: "If I were the organism what would I do." Indeed, its success is unrelated to whether the system in question actually has thought processes of this kind. It proceeds instead from a general assumption of rationality, and the application of a principle of interpretation based on Quine's principle of charity. However, Dennett is never clear where this rationality is to be located; in Ends, on his view, to be free-floating across the system, and not anchored in individual minds. This displacement of intentionality outside the individual subject has led Dennett to be called an "instrumentalist" (by Ned Block), a "homuncular functionalist" (Bill Lyman's term), and even, in some respects, an "eliminative materialist." He somehow straddles these positions, taking his functionalism largely from Sellars and diffusing intentionality into linguistic practices which assume rationality in order to make predictions and explanations.

In recent writings, Dennett has become clearer about the exact purpose of intentional explanation. Intentional explanation helps to predict the future, and, as he has put it in *Kind of Minds*, a mind is a future-maker, "fundamentally an antioxidant, an expectation-generator." An intentional system is one whose a priorihood is "made visible" by the intentional stance. It be it "pseudo or genuine." All kinds of systems fit this definition—all the systems picked out by the intentional stance: "self-replicating macromolecules, thermostats, amoebas, plants, rats, bats, people, and chess-playing computers are all intentional systems." Thus, if we are analyzing a chess-playing computer we may want to talk about "pawn-recognizers" or "Knights-move predictors." Here we are using intentional language to assign functional roles. But, as the purely physical level, there are no intentional items, just switches oscillating between one and zero, current off and current on.

He has emphasized from the outset that the intentional stance is an explanatory device developed by evolution. Minds—like everything else—are products of evolutionary design and cultural redesign. Dennett is sure that complexity over a long enough time is sufficient to produce minds. His theme in *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*, for example, is that minds are the products of myriads of mindless subroutines, products of "several billion years of non-recursive R and D." As he puts it elsewhere, we are "descended from robots, and composed of robots." In line with this overall aim, he wants "to explain real intentional in terms of pseudo-intentionality." He
Dennett, intentionality is found everywhere at all levels in nature. A key may be said to carry a representation of a lock, and this is the kind of crude intentionality found in nature. Nature's "free-floating" intentionality can be seen at work, e.g., plants becoming poisonous to protect themselves against herbivores, or the baby cuckoo pushing other eggs out of the nest. But "all the higher intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of billions of crude intentional systems." Dennett boldly goes to announce what he considers to be a "solid and uncontrivational scientific fact": "These impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrips of molecular machinery are the ultimate basis of all agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the world." It is not clear where the scientific facts are embedded in this sentence. The easy use of "hence" is disturbing, the worry is that we have not just moved up from one level of organization to a more complex one, but that we have crossed categories, moving from the physico-chemical to the normative in a single (unexplained) stride, making the very kind of category mistake he himself derides.

An interesting aspect of Dennett's analysis is his acceptance that beliefs are real in some sense, and yet do not correspond to bits of the world that are just out there. In particular, beliefs do not correspond to one to one with bits of the physical world or events in the brain. For Dennett, beliefs are real (or unreal) as centers of gravity; they can be grasped from a certain perspective. Dennett likes to invoke Hans Reichenbach's distinction between illata and abstracta in a theory. For him, beliefs are abstracta, theoretical explanatory entities. There are literally no beliefs in the sense of internal states of the mind. People can be said to have beliefs in the same ways as we can say the earth has an equator. The earth really does have an equator. The content of an intentional belief is expressed in univocal terms. According to Dennett, for humans and for non-human intentional systems, rough attribution of content is sufficient. His account of content is in fact functionalist—the attribution of content is founded on the functional role the belief plays "in the biological economy of the organism." For him, the content of an intentional act is rather like its economic value. The nature of value may be expressed in different ways, and similarly there may be different ways of expressing the content. This view of meaning is actually quite holistic and congenial to the "continental" tradition. It completely side-steps the attempt to claim that there is a one-to-one correspondence between every distinct bit of mental content and some physical matching event in the brain. Rather, content becomes a part of a much larger whole, the intentional system, which itself includes the functional roles of animals in their environment. Dennett sums up his stance best in the following quotation:

My thesis will be that while belief is a perfectly objective phenomenon (that apparently makes us a realist), it can be discussed only from the point of view of one who adopts a certain predictive strategy, and its existence can be confirmed only by assessment of the success of that strategy (that apparently makes us an interpretivist).

Dennett resists Rorty's attempt to make him a perspectivist for whom there are no fixed, independent facts. In fact, Dennett prefers to invoke a proximity to Davidson in the way in which rationality is spread holistically across the system. Dennett is emphasizing that reality is a product of both observer and world, which, as Rorty has noted, brings him close to the anti-dualist position of Davidson, and represents "the final stage in the attack on Cartesianism which began with Ryle."

IX. SEARLE'S INTRINSIC INTENTIONALITY

It is a striking fact that both Searle and Dennett, who appear to differ radically, are actually self-conscious practitioners of the same style of analytic philosophy, that prevalent in Oxford in the nineteen fifties and sixties. Searle studied at Christchurch College, Oxford, from 1952 until 1959, working with Austin, Urmson, and Strawson, while Dennett wrote his D.Phil. under Gilbert Ryle at Oxford in the 1960s. Both philosophers are convinced that the language of philosophy offers a set of tools that can be usefully applied in the analysis of other areas. Both claim their interest is in "how things work." Both have compared themselves with engineers. Both are impressed by the massive predictive power of intentional explanation. Both accept that the brain and material factors (including the environment) are sufficient to produce the mental realm (denying any kind of spiritualism). Both accept evolution—our minds are the products of evolutionary selection, but Searle takes the view that there are no functions in such nature; functions are "observer-relative," that is, they depend on the intention of the observer. Thus, for example, if our science prioritized extinction over survival, then certain kinds of things in nature would be ascribed quite different functions.
Both accept that consciousness and intentionality are “real,” though they have different understandings of what this means. Both claim not to be involved in any reductionism. Their well-known, radical disagreements, then, turn on issues within the same broadly accepted tradition of philosophy of mind.

Searle’s philosophical career began with his systematization of Austin’s account of speech acts. His interest was in “explaining,” i.e., by identifying the necessary structures involved, how the uttering of physical noises or the writing of strings of marks communicate meanings. This led him to offer a systematic account of speech acts in terms of illocutionary force (e.g., request, command, etc.) and propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, aspectual shape, and so on. Later, in 1983, he applied this account of speech acts to the underlying intentional acts, now described in terms of psychological mode, propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, aspectual shape, and so on. The distinction in a speech act between propositional content and illocutionary force now becomes the distinction in an intentional act (or “state”) between “propositional” and “propositional attitude” (which Searle prefers to call a “psychological mode”). An intentional state, on Searle’s account, consists of a representative content in a certain psychological mode. Searle, of course, denies that propositions are the only objects of psychological modes, and prefers to speak of “intentional content” or “representative content” rather than propositional content. Like Husserl, Searle denies that all our mental states are intentional, since emotional states such as anxiety and depression do not have objects. For Searle, the test of whether a belief or a desire S has an object is to ask the question “what is S about?” A belief can be directed at a single object (e.g., John loves Sally) as well as a state of affairs (John believes that it is raining). Searle has set himself against all views which deny the reality of intrinsic intentional states. For him, “the actual ontology of mental states is first-person ontology.”

Pursuing the analogy with speech acts, Searle offers an analysis of intentional states which sees them as having “directions of fit,” “sincerity conditions,” “aspectual shape,” and “conditions of satisfaction.” The most significant element in this analysis is Searle’s view that intentional states have, internal to themselves, conditions of satisfaction, e.g., part of what makes my belief a belief that it is raining is that certain conditions will satisfy it. For Searle, to be conscious of a belief just is to have consciousness of the conditions that satisfy it, the intentional content is internal to the state. In the case of perception, as we have already seen, it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of a visual perception, that our experience is caused by the object seen. Moreover, the conditions of satisfaction have aspectual shape. For someone to be following the rule “drive under 60 miles per hour” is not necessarily to be following the rule “drive under 100 kilometers an hour,” though, objectively speaking, both expressions refer to the same speed. Aspectual shape is another name for Husserl’s “mode of givenness.”

For Searle, intentionality is a ground-floor property of the mind, and the intentionality of language is derived from the intentionality of the mind. It is interesting that in this progress from language to mind, Searle shocked many followers of philosophy of language by reversing the traditional priority. It is the intentionality of mind that makes possible the intentionality of language. There is no escaping intentionality, and any explanation of it involves one in a circle of intentional concepts. Nevertheless, he is a naturalist, intentional states are caused by and realized in the brain. Searle has some catchy slogans: the mind is what the brain does; there is no mind-brain problem any more than there is a stomach-digestion problem. Consciousness is a natural, physical, and hence also a mental property. But it is left to science to fulfill the program captured by the slogan.

Both Searle and Dennett may be said to accept a “soft” dualism of physical and intentional description. The key difference appears to be that Searle claims that the first-person subjective view exists and is an irreducible ontological part of the world, whereas Dennett thinks the concept lacks explanatory force. Searle believes all discussions of intentionality must move beyond the “derived” intentionality of language and signs to the “intrinsic” or “original” intentionality of the biological mind. Dennett, as we have seen, holds on the contrary that all intentionality is derived. What is at issue in this dispute? In fact, Dennett situates the central debate with Searle as precisely Searle’s conception that there is such a thing as “original” or “intrinsic” intentionality, whereas, for Dennett, there are no “unmean means” on analogy with Aristotle’s unmoved mover. Yet, Dennett’s ascription of an intentional grid to a system assumes that he has firsthand, personal acquaintance with how that grid is to be applied. In other words, on what is the interpreter or observer drawing when she or he applies the intentional stance? Dennett thinks that through evolution, some beings, using language, have learned to apply the intentional stance to themselves. But this effort to make the stance a kind of free-floating interface detached from subjects is precisely what is challenged by Searle. In particular, Searle has challenged Dennett’s dissolution of the problem of qualia and his watering down of the first-person perspective. It is important to note that Dennett does accept the phenomenon of first-person knowledge, he just does not think it is either specially mysterious—needing postulated qualia to express it—or possesses explanatory power. Dennett thinks the stance of the visiting anthropologist applying third-person “heterophenomenology” is sufficient to account for everything which is subjective in the situation. Searle argues that there must be original or intrinsic intentionality which just is representational and on the basis of which other kinds of representation...
are possible; for him, a belief just is or does represent its conditions of satisfaction. Dennett posits, in Searle's words, "whole armies of progressively stupider homunculi." 59

Searle does seem to have a point. If Dennett's intentional stance does not discriminate between genuine and pseudo, then the key to explaining minds cannot be the intentional stance itself, but rather how we experience and grasp ourselves as genuine possessors of this stance, occupying it from within, as we do. Indeed, at one point, Dennett himself concedes that an obvious place to look for minds is in these creatures "who themselves are capable of adopting the intentional stance towards others (and towards themselves)." 60 But we look in vain for an account of intrinsic possession of an intentional stance, for adoption criteria. instead we get some suggestions as to how such a "user-interface" might have evolved in higher animals. 61

Invocation of the intentional stance masks the fact that Dennett's real distinction is not between mind-havers and non-mind-havers, but between those who exhibit mind-having in an interesting way (like us) and those which do so in an uninteresting way (like thermocouples). Since everything has a mind in some sense, for Dennett, it is not being a mind that matters, but being an interesting mind. Surely, considerable ground has been conceded here. After all, we just need to stipulate that only interesting minds are true minds (as Dennett sometimes slips into saying himself), and we come upon a new philosophical problem about mind possession. What is it to be in possession of the intentional outlook? Here, Searle's recognition that bits of the world just are subjective, seems to make sense, even if Searle himself has no tools to cash out his "first-person ontology."

Searle's description of intentionality has many features in common with Husserl's account, including a strong defense of the inseparability of the subjective in attempting to understand the world. But, while Husserl's attempt to give full recognition to the role of subjectivity in our experience of the world led him in a transcendentational direction, Searle resolutely adheres to naturalism and assumes that eventually science will come up with an explanation of just how it is that the brain excites intentionality and consciousness. It is this latter move which Husserlians no doubt would criticize as a confusion of levels and would instead move in the direction of the holism of Dennett and others, which sees beliefs as nodes in a larger system of rationality, a system which is not pegged to each node into a physical ground. In a sense, Fodor and Searle make the same problematic move of accepting a full intentional realism and then attempt to plug it into the physical structure of the brain in a rather crude, entirely unscientific way. Continental philosophers would repudiate this move as a confusion of levels of explanation, the natural and the normative.

X. CONTINENTAL VERSUS ANALYTIC: MORE HOMEWORK

Having briefly sketched the development of the discussion concerning intentionality in the different traditions, it is now possible to see how these separately developing traditions may be seen to stem from the same way of setting up the problem, and struggling with the same tensions between individualism and holism, between realism and eliminationism, and so on. Of course, there are naturally differences of orientation or emphasis. After Husserl's repudiation of naturalism and Heidegger's account of the framework of technological thinking, continental philosophy has no longer engaged with natural science. There is simply no one in the continental camp who embraces behaviorism or any project of a scientific reductionism or elimination. Similarly, except perhaps among some of Merleau-Ponty's followers, there is almost no talk of the brain in relation to consciousness. Nor is there talk of the problem of representation as such, since representation is seen always to involve a deficient Cartesian inheritance. In fact, the story in intentionality from Brentano through to Heidegger sees a continual attempt to peel back the layers of Cartesian accretions, to shift from a rather limited view of the "mental act" or "mental state" to a more holistic and pragmatic view of a human insertion and orientation within a situation.

The most dominant strain of recent continental philosophy has been interpretationalism through and through, and has increasingly dropped all reference to intentionality. Intentionality is too encountered with Cartesian baggage to be worth retaining, and it tends to have gone the way of the transcendentational ego in writers such as Gadamer or Derrida. Derrida, in particular, has expressed his unease with the whole conception of intentionality, precisely because of the problematic nature of the tradition in which it became expressed, and hence can be classified with the eliminationists in his aversion of the notion. If continental philosophy has shirked the confrontation with science, analytic philosophers often invoke science in a strange and scientifically outmoded fashion. Concepts such as "naturalism," "materialism," and "physicalism," as frequently used by analytic philosophers, tend to be deeply murky notions, as Chomsky has argued. 59 As a result of this dominance of the scientific model, the whole experienced, subjective side of life is left dangling. While recent analytic philosophers seem quite happy to recognize the need to make some reference to phenomenology, by which they mean the first-person description of experience in terms of its immediate qualitative feel, their descriptions of this subjective life are notoriously thin. Thus we have Colin McGinn's reference to the "technicolour phenomenology of the brain" without further discriminations. In general, there appears
to be a distinct lack of depth in the analytic discussion of consciousness, which is portrayed as the purely qualitative—the feel or look of things, an epiphenomenal buzz floating on the surface, William James's blooming, buzzing confusion. It is quite extraordinary that analytic philosophy of mind, with its fine-grained accounts of truth and reference, should be willing to operate with strangely vapid conceptions of the subjective. For example, the problem of epiphenomenalism is again in discussion. Yet, the whole notion of epiphenomenalism, first raised by James and Huxley, is based on a false dichotomy between physical causal structure and a layer of mental feel which somehow plays its symphonies to accompany the physical configuration. The two traditions would help advance the discussion. and avoid so much buzzling confusion.

Our discussion has shown that intentionality has been an issue in both traditions, and that both traditions have useful and complex things to say about it. From a cursory examination of the traditions, it is difficult to see, aside from certain rhetorical exuberances and excesses, what exactly divides them. One cannot help feeling that a more sophisticated knowledge of both traditions would help advance the discussion, and avoid so much re-inventing of the wheel. Thus, Hilary Putnam sees the issue of intentionality as one in which both traditions remain trapped in a seventeenth-century outlook, no matter how far they distance themselves from Cartesianism. The message which Putnam draws is interestingly Hegelian: concepts have histories, and progress in philosophical understanding is not to be divorced from coming to grips with the historical provenance and prospects of the theoretical terms involved. Most analytic philosophers have yet to learn to adapt themselves to this lesson from history, while most continental philosophers have got to extend their conception of the history of philosophy to include the analytic tradition.

NOTES


4. Here we have to overcome a deliberate, conscious ignorance of tradition. Thus John R. Searle, in his study Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), is states that he has deliberately chosen not to read traditional writers on intentionality, because he wanted to get clear what his own mind thought about these issues. This appears to assume that one's own mind can be an unaided source of ideas uncontaminated by social and historical forces.


17. Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 1. In the discussion which followed, my address to the Aristotlian Society, Dublin 1996, Putnam graciously conceded the point and stated that, from then on, he was going to refer to the problem as "Chisholm's problem."


24. Ibid., 7.
25. Ibid., 16.
26. In this sense, Twadowski is not that much different from Meinong, who wants to hold that there are "objectivities" that do not exist. According to Meinong, we overcome "our prejudice in favour of the actual," we actually recognize that there are far more objects than there are existing spatio-temporal entities.
27. For this correspondence, see J. N. Mohanty, E. Husserl, and Frege (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).
33. Husserl, Logical Investigations I, 122. 287.
35. Husserl, Logical Investigations I, 145, 293.
37. Cf. Searle in Intentionality: "Thus, the intentional content of the visual experience requires as part of the conditions of satisfaction that the visual experience be caused by the rest of its conditions of satisfaction, that is, by the state of affairs perceived." (48).
41. Ibid., 155.
42. Ibid., §100, 263-64.
43. David Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 84, has argued that Husserl's phenomenology is not just an exploration of intentionality and of the essences of conscious states, but an exploration of the first-person perspective as a whole.
49. Ibid., 221.
50. Ibid.
53. See Searle, Intentionality, 23.
55. Dennett, Intentional Stance, 5.
56. Ibid., 7.
58. Ibid., 7.
59. Ibid., 9.
60. Ibid., 22.
63. Dennett, Intentional Stance, 3.
65. See Dennett, Provenance, xx.
66. Dennett acknowledges the importance of Sellars in Intentional Stance, 341.
67. Dennett, Kinds of Minds, 57.
68. Ibid., 2b.
69. Ibid., 34.
70. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 426.
71. Ibid., 55.
72. Dennett, Kinds of Minds, 49.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 55.
75. Ibid., 22.
76. See Dennett, Intentional Stance, 53.
77. Dennett, Brainchildren, 114.
78. Ibid., 359.
79. Dennett, Intentional Stance, 15.
82. Searle, Intersensibility, 11.
83. Ibid., 6.
84. Ibid., 2.
85. Searle, Rediscovery of the Mind, 10. 105
What Do We See (When We Do)?

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I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF WHAT WE SEE

My topic revolves around a very basic question. In its leanest, most economical form, this is the question: "What do we see?" In this form, however, the question admits of at least three different interpretations. We can call these the epistemological, the metaphysical, and the intentional (or phenomenological) interpretations. In this introductory section I would like briefly to distinguish these ways of interpreting the philosophical problem of what we see; in the rest of the paper I will focus exclusively on problems that arise out of the intentional interpretation. In particular, I will try to show how, if the intentional question is answered properly, two important psychological theories of perception—one empiricist and the other cognitivist—both fail to account for what we see. Along the way I will suggest that a combination of phenomenological and analytic resources is necessary for a satisfactory treatment of the central philosophical problems concerning perception.

The basic question, "What do we see?" has a rich history in modern philosophy, and so has a variety of interpretations. In the first place, one might understand it to be an epistemological question, perhaps one with skeptical overtones. On this reading, it is short for something like "What things in the world are we justified in believing we see, given the possibility of evil demon scenarios and all the other impediments to genuine sight..."