

- and Hans-Johann Glock (eds), *Wittgenstein and Quine*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 80–96. See also my closing remarks in this chapter.
- 52 See Quine, *Quiddities*, pp. 108–9, and ‘Relativism and Absolutism’, *The Monist*, 1984, vol. 67, pp. 243–96. Compare Burton Dreben’s discussion of these passages in his ‘In *Mediis Rebus*’, *Inquiry*, 1995, vol. 37, pp. 441–7.
- 53 Quine, ‘Relativism and Absolutism’, p. 295.
- 54 Quine, ‘Reply to Jaakko Hintikka’, in Lewis Edwin Hahn and P.A. Schilpp (eds), *The Philosophy of W.V. Quine*, Library of Living Philosophers vol. XVIII, expanded edn, Chicago, Open Court, 1998, p. 227.
- 55 Quine, *Theories and Things*, p. 22.
- 56 See *Word and Object*, §§7–10.
- 57 W.V. Quine, ‘Progress on Two Fronts’, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1996, vol. XCIII, no. 4, pp. 160–61.
- 58 See, for an emphasis on the circularity, Quine, ‘Natural Kinds’.
- 59 Quine, ‘Reply to Jaakko Hintikka’.
- 60 I would like to thank for their very helpful feedback the audiences who heard earlier versions of this chapter at McGill University, the universities of Tromsø and Oslo in Norway, MIT, Vassar College, and the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science at Boston University. I owe a large debt of gratitude to Henry Allison, Burton Dreben, Akihiro Kanamori, W.V. Quine and Camilla Serck-Haussen for conversations about the philosophical questions treated in this chapter.

### 3 Making sense

#### Husserl’s phenomenology as transcendental idealism

*Dermot Moran*

##### Uncovering absolute consciousness

As is well known, Edmund Husserl’s philosophy underwent a transcendental turning a few years after the publication of his ‘ground-breaking’ *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900–01),<sup>1</sup> according to which phenomenology – originally understood as descriptive psychology – was reconceptualized as a pure, *a priori*, transcendental discipline and eventually as the way into transcendental philosophy. The discovery of the *epoché* and the reduction (in his research manuscripts of 1905, but first treated publicly in his 1906–7 lectures *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*)<sup>2</sup> enabled him to bring a new clarity to a problematic that he originally conceived of as an *epistemological* problem, namely, the constitution of objectivity in, by and for subjectivity. This problematic had emerged first in modern philosophy but had hitherto been misconstrued; phenomenology would provide a new mode of access to this problematic. The reduction allowed Husserl to gain a clearer conception of the *object as perceived, thought, or consciously grasped*, which from around 1908 he termed *noema* and which is to be contrasted with the object that is thought.<sup>3</sup> It was a short step to consider consciousness in an entirely new light, no longer as a part (*Bestandstück*) of nature, but as a set of pure noetic acts with their own distinct essences. Transcendental phenomenology is a descriptive eidetic science,<sup>4</sup> reached through the *epoché* and in the performance of the reduction, ‘the most fundamental of all methods’ in philosophy.<sup>5</sup> It took Husserl somewhat longer to recognize the need to locate these noetic acts in the transcendental ego. In his mature philosophy Husserl is a fully fledged transcendental idealist: all meaning and being are conceived as productions or accomplishments of transcendental subjectivity, and transcendental subjectivity itself must be conceived not as some ‘dead’ identity pole but as living, communalized spirit, a notion Husserl never succeeded in articulating with clarity.

The absolute primacy of pure transcendental consciousness became central to Husserl’s philosophy. His central insight is that transcendental philosophy is ‘absolute’, self-justifying knowledge, positioned to ask the most radical questions even about its own essential possibility and validity. Moreover, his attempt to found transcendental philosophy is one with his project of philosophy as a rigorous science. Transcendental phenomenology expressed both the essence of

phenomenology and the essence of all genuine philosophy. He himself understood transcendental phenomenology primarily as a reflective, descriptive philosophical approach, albeit one that requires a particular attitude, a specifically adopted stance. He came to the view that even *a priori* sciences such as mathematics were in a sense 'positive sciences', proceeding in 'transcendental naïveté', and suffering periodic *crises of foundation* from which only transcendental phenomenology could rescue them. True philosophy can never remain within what Husserl calls 'naïve' standpoints (within what Plato called *doxa*) and is inevitably committed to becoming true knowledge (*epistémé*), an insight requiring the *transcendental* turn.

Husserl first set out his new idealist position in print – although not named as such (he speaks of 'pure' or 'transcendental' consciousness) – in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book* (1913), where it is introduced as a way of doing justice to Descartes' *Meditations*,<sup>6</sup> and thus as realizing the true essence of the modern philosophical tradition. He did not employ the term 'transcendental idealism' (*transzendentaler Idealismus*) until around 1915, but thereafter it is explicitly embraced, as in his *Fichte Lectures* of 1917–18.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, it is clear, in *Ideas I*, that phenomenology as an eidetic science radically distinct from all empirical sciences<sup>8</sup> must be reconceived in transcendental terms if it is not to be misunderstood in a naturalistic way. *Ideas I* introduces pure consciousness understood as 'a new region of being never before delimited in its own peculiarity',<sup>9</sup> and 'the all of absolute being [*das All des absoluten Seins*]'.<sup>10</sup> Husserl asserts the absolute existence of consciousness as a self-delimited, self-contained sphere with a 'peculiar ownness' entirely distinct from all factual nature.

To complicate the picture somewhat, Husserl, after he moved to Göttingen, began intensively to engage with Kant in his lectures and seminars. Thus, for example, in his 1907 *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (*The Idea of Phenomenology*) lectures,<sup>11</sup> he acknowledges the affinity between his own problematic and that discussed by Kant in his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, namely, how objectivity comes into play in the difference between *judgements of perception* and *judgements of experience*. But Husserl distinguishes himself from Kant, who could not free himself from the grip of 'psychologism and anthropologism':

Kant did not arrive at the ultimate intent of the distinction that must be made here. For us it is not a matter of merely subjectively valid judgements, the validity of which is limited to the empirical subject, and objectively valid judgements in the sense of being valid for every subject in general. For we have excluded the empirical subject: and transcendental apperception, consciousness as such, will soon acquire for us a wholly different sense, one that is not mysterious at all.<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, in his *Ding und Raum* lectures of 1907,<sup>13</sup> he denies that he is posing the problematic of the constitution of objectivity in terms of Kant's question (in his famous 'Letter to Markus Herz' of 1772), how subjective representations reach outside themselves to gain knowledge of the object.<sup>14</sup> To pose the question

in this way is already to surrender to representationalism. As Husserl says, such questions are 'perversely posed'.<sup>15</sup> It is not the existence of the perceived that is in question for Husserl but the *essence* of perception or cognition and the *essence* of the perceived thing or the cognized thing as such. As he will later say in the *Crisis*: 'The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it'.<sup>16</sup>

In this sense, Husserl agrees with Kant that a 'transcendental' inquiry is one which seeks 'conditions of possibility'. In Husserl's case, this is to be understood as the conditions of the possibility of all formations of *sense* (*Sinn*), of *meaning* (*Bedeutung*, *Meinung*), and indeed how the world as such comes to be given as something senseful. Moreover, conditions of possibility refer to *essence*:

Conditions of the possibility of experience signify ... nothing else than all that resides immanently in the essence of experience, in its *essentia*, and thereby belongs to it irrevocably. The essence of experience, which is what is investigated in the phenomenological analysis of experience, is the same as the possibility of experience, and everything established about the essence, about the possibility of experience, is *eo ipso* a condition of the possibility of experience. To expect of experience something that contradicts its essence as experience of things ... means to interpret experience and the objects of experience in a countersensical way. That is absurd.<sup>17</sup>

For Husserl, phenomenology must take up and purify Kant's initial beginnings by offering a clarified and scientifically grounded sense of the *a priori* understood as essence. What was not entirely clear to Husserl when these words were written in 1907 was that the analysis of the eidetic was merely the first step on the way to the transcendental. In his later years, and even as he reworked the *Investigations* for the Second Edition of 1913, Husserl would reinterpret the 'breakthrough' of the *Investigations* as a breakthrough into transcendental phenomenology, although he had not realized it at the time. As he would later write in *Crisis of European Sciences*:

The first breakthrough of this universal *a priori* of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my *Logical Investigations* around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this *a priori* of correlation.<sup>18</sup>

At least as far as Husserl himself is concerned, he was always reaching towards transcendental philosophy, although specific problems concerning the nature of transcendental subjectivity (understood both as monadic egology and as intersubjective community of monads) emerged only after Husserl wrote *Ideas I* (he sketches his first account of the constitution of subjects and spirit in *Ideas II*),<sup>19</sup> and as he struggled with the issue of the relation between nature and spirit. Husserl's engagement with spirit (*Geist*) led him to a new accommodation with Dilthey and with the tradition of German critical and absolute Idealism.

Husserl's trenchant commitment to transcendental idealism was hugely problematic for his immediate disciples and protégés (Stein, Scheler, Heidegger, Ingarden), who saw it as an unresolved dogmatic element in his thinking, a metaphysical residue, a legacy of German philosophy (specifically Neo-Kantianism) in his day. In order to defend Husserl, some more recent commentators, invoking the presuppositionless starting point and bracketing procedures, claim that Husserl's idealism is actually a purely phenomenological stance without metaphysical commitment.<sup>20</sup> I do not agree. Although Husserl did not see himself as engaging in any arbitrary or speculative metaphysics, nevertheless his commitment to idealism is genuine, deep and more radical than that of Kant or Descartes. Husserl himself saw it as a necessary consequence of his attempt to get to the things themselves (*die Sachen selbst*). Moreover, as a deeply religious thinker, it was precisely this idealism that informs his religious sense. Transcendental idealism even provides the only basis for conceiving of God, given the absurdity of thinking of Him as an item in the factual world.<sup>21</sup> A quarter of a century later in *Crisis of European Sciences* he could still declare:

As scientists, can we content ourselves with the view that God created the world and human beings within it ... The enigma of the creation and that of God himself are essential component parts of positive religion. For the philosopher, however, this, and also the juxtaposition "subjectivity *in* the world as object" and at the same time "conscious subject *for* the world" contain a necessary theoretical question, that of understanding how this is possible.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, for Husserl, transcendental idealism expresses the inner sense of what religion presents naively.

Not only did Husserl never stop being a transcendental idealist, he actually felt that the transcendental standpoint itself required constant radicalization and purification to prevent falling back into the natural attitude. Thus, in *Erste Philosophie*,<sup>23</sup> he even speaks of 'transcendental naïveté',<sup>24</sup> that is, accepting that all knowledge has subjective origins but misinterpreting the nature of this originating. Similarly, one must be on guard against *transcendental psychologism*, which assumes the results of transcendental investigation of consciousness are *psychological* results.<sup>25</sup>

Through the 1920s and 1930s Husserl became increasingly wide-reaching, even baroque, in his conception of the transcendental. He speaks not only of the transcendental *ego* but of transcendental *experience*,<sup>26</sup> of transcendental *life*,<sup>27</sup> of transcendental *facts*, of a transcendental *past* and *future*, transcendental *rationality* and even transcendental *irrationality*, and so on. Thus Husserl writes in his draft *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article:

The transcendental reduction opens up, in fact, a completely new kind of experience that can be systematically pursued: transcendental experience. Through the transcendental reduction, *absolute* subjectivity, which functions

everywhere in hiddenness, is brought to light along with its whole transcendental life, in whose intentional syntheses all real and ideal objects, with their positive existential validity, are constituted. The transcendental reduction yields the thematic field of an absolute phenomenological science, called the transcendental science because it encompasses within itself all transcendental or rational-theoretical inquiries.<sup>28</sup>

The transcendental domain is infinite, but also it is living, that is, it grows and accrues dimensions which become sedimented in it. Transcendental philosophy is not true just of this world but of all possible worlds. Ultimately, a full account of the essence of pure consciousness must extend into a complete *a priori* documentation of the possible forms of transcendental life, not just its actual forms but everything which can be 'predefined' regarding its essence. These include, bizarrely, the transcendental life of plants, animals,<sup>29</sup> and all possible *a priori* forms of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.<sup>30</sup> In so doing, he was fully aware of extending the concept of the transcendental beyond anything envisaged in previous philosophy – not just charting the authentic essence of inexhaustible transcendental life, but also offering a *critique* of transcendental experience.<sup>31</sup> Thus, Husserl believes it is itself a transcendental problem whether something like a solipsistic transcendental ego is itself possible. For Husserl, moreover, transcendental subjectivity must be 'communicative' and hence intersubjective, though the precise manner of its relation to other possible or actual subjects was never settled by him, nor was the issue as to whether it can assume novel forms or whether it can merely instantiate elements predefined in its essence. In other words, in what sense can transcendental subjectivity be genuinely living and historical?

### The road to transcendental idealism

Already in his early Göttingen lecture courses of 1902–3, Husserl repudiated Brentanian *descriptive psychology*, understood as underpinning empirical psychology, as the correct model for exploring the newly discovered domain of the essential *a priori* correlations between subjectivity and objectivity. Specifically, he was dissatisfied with the inextricable *naturalism* of descriptive psychology, essentially of a piece with the scientific and naturalistic turn exemplified by the modern philosophical tradition. In the First Edition of the *Investigations* he had not understood that no naturalistic conceived psychology could ever appreciate the epistemic achievement of consciousness. In his 1910–11 essay *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*,<sup>32</sup> he explains that the rejection of psychologism in the *Investigations* needed to be followed by a rejection of the 'naturalisation of consciousness' itself.<sup>33</sup> The descriptive psychological approach inherited from Brentano and Stumpf and expressed in the First Edition of the *Investigations* had failed to recognize the domain of *pure* consciousness, which he now characterizes as a self-delimited, self-contained, 'absolute' sphere with a 'peculiar ownness' entirely distinct from all factual, empirical nature. Thenceforth he maintained

that consciousness cannot be understood beginning from a sensualism, whereby it is seen as containing a sensuous matter provided from without.<sup>34</sup> Rather, the essence of consciousness – and indeed of soul, spirit and reason – has to be understood as meaning production, making sense.<sup>35</sup> Already in *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*, Husserl was claiming that the domain of consciousness (understood as spirit) cannot be understood in terms of causation, time, space and other attributes of nature, but has an essence and form of its own.<sup>36</sup>

In his mature philosophy, phenomenology is explicated specifically as opposed to all forms of *naturalism*. Already in the *Investigations*, Husserl had lamented that his was an age obsessed by the natural sciences and by psychology. Psychologism and naturalism are two ever present – and even natural – orientations of the mind, which distort the true nature of consciousness and the realm of cognition. By the time of *Ideas I* Husserl is speaking of the ‘philosophical poverty’ of the worldview founded in natural science,<sup>37</sup> and emphasizing that transcendental research into consciousness is not a form of research into nature (*Naturforschung*). This anti-naturalism led him to see his affinity with Neo-Kantianism. Thus, in a letter dated 20 December 1915, addressed to the leading Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, Husserl had commented that he found himself in alliance with German Idealism against the common enemy: ‘the naturalism of our time’.<sup>38</sup>

Husserl’s attempts to penetrate the complexities of time consciousness, and the recognition that consciousness cannot be treated simply as belonging to world time but has an immanent temporal organization in its own right, appear to have been the catalyst for his transcendental turn. But his increasing interest in the *history of philosophy* also played a significant if underappreciated role. Thus, in his 1906–7 lectures, he also began to recognize the role of *scepticism* in propelling the ‘natural thinker’<sup>39</sup> into the transcendental mode and thereby opens up a new awareness of consciousness as a sphere of *cogitationes* having ‘absolute givenness’.<sup>40</sup>

It is worth noting, however, that refuting scepticism is not the main motivation for Husserl’s adopting the transcendental attitude; rather, his real motivation is to do justice to the essence of conscious experience in its objectifying, sense-constituting nature, and in terms of its own unique structure which no natural process comes close to having (leading Husserl to make the surprising claim in *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*, for instance, that consciousness has no real parts and is not in causal interaction with things of the world). Reflecting on these meaning-giving formations of consciousness, Husserl became convinced that consciousness has a kind of absolute existence not dependent on the existence of objects, whereas objects are always dependent on some consciousness. Consciousness is absolute; all other being is relative to consciousness. Recognizing the ineliminable role of consciousness in the constitution of all objecthood, however, does not turn objects into mere semblances, as he stresses in a text from 1908.<sup>41</sup> Being constituted does not mean not fully real. Transcendental idealism is also an empirical realism, and Husserl is not in any way attaching a doubtful or illusory status to the objects in the world. It is rather the *sense (Sinn)* of world that is forever altered by the transcendental approach. Moreover, Husserl endorses transcendental

philosophy’s opposition to scepticism and especially to Hume’s mitigated scepticism:

The genuine transcendental philosophy ... is not like the Humean and neither overtly nor covertly a sceptical decomposition of the world cognition and of the world itself into fictions, that is to say, in modern terms, a ‘philosophy of As-If.’ Least of all is it a ‘dissolution’ [*Auflösung*] of the world into ‘merely subjective appearances,’ which in some still senseful sense would have something to do with illusion. It does not occur to transcendental philosophy to dispute the world of experience in the least ...<sup>42</sup>

It is worth bearing these claims in mind when we have to interpret his notorious thought experiment of the ‘annihilation of the world’ in *Ideas I*, and elsewhere (for example, *Erste Philosophie*), and to which we shall return.

Husserl’s transcendental idealism became thematic, and indeed systematic, in his lecture courses of the 1920s in Freiburg, especially *Erste Philosophie*. Here, for the first time, he worked out his conception of transcendental philosophy through a ‘critical history of ideas’. In *Cartesian Meditations*, originally delivered as lectures in Paris in 1929, he announces: ‘phenomenology is co ipso “transcendental idealism”, though in a fundamentally and essentially new sense’.<sup>43</sup> Here he affirms that this idealism is not the product of arguments against realism, but emerges rather from close investigations of constituting consciousness in all its possible modalities. Thus he asserts: ‘*The proof of this idealism is therefore phenomenology itself.* Only someone who misunderstands either the deepest sense of intentional method, or that of transcendental reduction, or perhaps both, can attempt to separate phenomenology from transcendental idealism.’<sup>44</sup>

Despite a new emphasis on the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) and its *a priori* structures in the 1930s, Husserl continued to affirm his idealism up to his last writings, focusing explicitly on history and culture as manifestations of spirit.<sup>45</sup> Thus in his 1935 *Vienna Lecture* he writes:

It is my conviction that intentional phenomenology has made of the spirit *qua* spirit for the first time a field of systematic experience and science and has thus brought about the total reorientation [*Umstellung*] of the task of knowledge. The universality of the absolute spirit surrounds everything that exists with an absolute historicity, to which nature as a spiritual structure is subordinated. Intentional phenomenology, and specifically transcendental phenomenology, was first to see the light through its point of departure and its methods. Only through it do we understand, and from the most profound reasons, what naturalistic objectivism is and understand in particular that psychology, because of its naturalism, has to miss entirely the accomplishment, the radical and genuine problem of the life of the spirit.<sup>46</sup>

Transcendental phenomenology is now the science that grasps in a fundamental way the meaning of the *accomplishment of spiritual life* in all its forms, that is, what

makes rational human intersubjective life possible as such. Moreover, as Husserl claims (in Hegelian manner but without invoking Hegel): ‘The spirit, and indeed only the spirit, exists in itself and for itself, is self-sufficient [*eigenständig*]; and in its self-sufficiency, and only in this way, it can be treated truly rationally, truly and from the ground up scientifically.’<sup>17</sup>

### Transcendental experience and transcendental life

Husserl’s turn to the transcendental aimed precisely to open up this remarkable ‘new sphere of being’ (*eine neue Seinssphäre*),<sup>18</sup> which is also a sphere of ‘pure subjective living’ (*rein subjektives Leben*).<sup>19</sup> The transcendental domain is a domain of living spirit. As Husserl makes clear, the essence of this spirit is its free, teleological activity (what Kant misleadingly calls *spontaneity*) and the transcendental uncovering of this realm must recognize the operation of teleological reasonings and motivations. Moreover, the transcendental domain is also a domain of genetic constitution. Humans move from children to adults and gain new convictions, habits and attitudes. Others become sedimented and obscured. But all together belong to the transcendental genesis of the transcendental ego (and outwards to the community and to intersubjective life). Although he presents it first as an *egology*, he also shows it to be a realm of intersubjectivity, a realm of spirit. It is, for Husserl, borrowing from Leibniz, a community of monads. The sphere of the transcendental is the sphere of life itself, but not life construed in a biological or naturalistic way, but life as ego-centred consciousness with its emotional, practical and rational motivations, interconnections and achievements. It is for this reason that the domain of the transcendental is also a domain of *experience*.

### Defining Husserl’s transcendental idealism

Husserl’s unwavering and indeed deepening commitment to transcendental philosophy has a number of distinguishing features. First of all, the transcendental domain must be uncovered by a specific method – either by the Cartesian way or some other way,<sup>50</sup> but in every case it is explored by intuition. The transcendental emerges only through adopting a new and ‘unnatural’ attitude. When we consider our consciousness in all its forms and interconnections, actual and possible, we are already living in the transcendental attitude,<sup>51</sup> we are considering pure consciousness ‘as the *absolutely self-contained realm of purely subjective being* ... with its purely immanent interconnections, abilities, sense-structures’.<sup>52</sup> We have consciousness ‘taking charge’ of itself intuitively.

*Transcendental reflection* must be distinguished from *natural reflection* (which itself has been misconstrued by philosophers such as Locke). As natural reflecting beings we discover our empirical subjectivity, as humans among humans. Transcendental reflection leading to the transcendental self has to break with the structures governing natural reflection. Reflection is characterized by ‘ego-splitting’ whereby one self is brought into view but the self viewing it retreats

into anonymity and indeed unconsciousness.<sup>53</sup> Each act of reflection can itself be reflected on, this belongs to the very essence of reflection. As usual, in considering complicated forms of self-reflection Husserl begins with the self-awareness in perception. All reflection is modelled on this self-perception – ‘the original form of all reflection’ – and self-recollection is the primary variant of this self-perception.<sup>54</sup> The key point is that natural reflection is still intertwined with the *Seinsglaube*, the belief in the world, whereas transcendental reflection neutralizes this belief.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, transcendental reflection is a practice that must be sustained against all temptations to relapse into the natural attitude. Transcendental philosophy, then, cuts the Gordian knot that ties our reflection to the world.

What transcendental reflection reveals is a new domain of meanings, senses, noemata, correlated to ideal conscious forms, according to *a priori* laws of essence. As Husserl’s former student and close critic Roman Ingarden wrote: ‘the fundamental thesis of “transcendental idealism” is obtained: what is real is nothing but a constituted noematic unity (individual) of a specific kind of sense which in its being and quality [*Sosein*] results from a set of experiences of a special kind and is quite impossible without them.’<sup>56</sup>

Every unity of meaning, every sense, depends essentially on its relation to consciousness. Husserl even concludes *Ideas II* by claiming that nature itself is always relative – relative to an absolute, namely, spirit.<sup>57</sup> As Roman Ingarden formulates Husserl’s position:

The existence of what is perceived (of the perceived as such) is nothing ‘in itself’ but only something ‘for somebody,’ for the experiencing ego. ‘*Streichen wir das reine Bewusstsein, so streichen wir die Welt*’ (‘If we exclude pure consciousness then we exclude the world’) is the famous thesis of Husserlian transcendental idealism which he was already constantly repeating in lectures during his Göttingen period.<sup>58</sup>

Husserl himself would proclaim in 1924:

With the *Ideas* the deepest sense of the Cartesian turn of modern philosophy is, I dare to say, revealed, and the necessity of an absolutely self-contained eidetic science of pure consciousness in general is cogently demonstrated – that is, however, in relation to all correlations grounded in the essence of consciousness, to its possible really immanent moments and to its noemata and objectivities intentionally-ideally determined therein.<sup>59</sup>

I shall have more to say about the meaning of the *a priori* correlation between *noesis* and *noema*, proper to the phenomenological and, as belonging to the ego, to the transcendental domain. I want first to analyse in more detail another feature of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, namely, the manner in which he understood it to be the inevitable outcome of the progress of modern philosophy and also the essential core of all true philosophy (the true first philosophy – the ‘philos-

ophy of the beginning'). In fact, Husserl, in a manner increasingly close to Hegel, believes that transcendental philosophy takes up and completes all previous philosophy; it embraces and redeems the entire philosophical tradition.<sup>60</sup>

Against Kant and Hegel, however, Husserl claims that transcendental philosophy is not the outcome of any speculative philosophical synthesis, but rather involves an uncovering of a realm of *direct experience*.<sup>61</sup> In that sense, it is not a philosophical position at all. Transcendental reflection opens up a new realm of *experience* – transcendental experience (*transzendente Erfahrung*), in itself an *infinite* and *self-enclosed* realm of self-related consciousness. This sharply distinguishes his conception from that of Kant or indeed any of his predecessors. Husserl's is not a subjective or psychological idealism nor a Kantian idealism, 'which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things in themselves'.<sup>62</sup> Rather, Husserl insists his is a new and radical idealism of a fundamentally different kind. It does not derive from speculative argumentation but from a consideration of the kinds of constitution involved in various entities – whether they be in nature, culture or world.

### The historical discovery of transcendental philosophy

Transcendental philosophy is not a spontaneous acquisition but emerged historically, and had to be *discovered*.<sup>63</sup> Modern philosophy exhibits a 'steady direction of development towards transcendental philosophy'.<sup>64</sup> In the course of his *kritische Ideengeschichte*,<sup>65</sup> Husserl explicates his conception of the emergence of *transcendental* philosophy through original and bold readings not only of Descartes, but also of Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume. Up to Husserl's own time, however, it still had not achieved pure self-consciousness as to its nature and purpose, as the *Passive Syntheses* lectures attest.<sup>66</sup> Descartes is the 'epoch-making awakener of the transcendental problematic',<sup>67</sup> 'a precursor of transcendental philosophy',<sup>68</sup> in whom is first found the 'seed' (*die Keime*) of transcendental philosophy,<sup>69</sup> specifically in his application of the method of doubt,<sup>70</sup> which first made visible transcendental subjectivity as a unified self. Descartes – like Moses – saw the 'promised land', but did not set foot there. Husserl therefore must rethink Descartes' founding insights and recover their true meaning – a meaning to which Descartes himself had been blind, since he effectively restored a 'new dogmatism'.<sup>71</sup> For Husserl, the originally Platonic ideal of philosophical science, and the ideal of 'all genuine philosophy, is first put into action by Descartes. To rethink it radically is the essence of the 'new Cartesianism' Husserl speaks of in his *Paris Lectures*.<sup>72</sup>

Husserl characterizes his discovery of meaning-constituting consciousness at the heart of seemingly natural experience as an essential development of the *transcendental turn* of modern philosophy, in contrast with the *naturalism* of Locke.<sup>73</sup> Locke, who legitimately founded modern psychology, had a quest for origins that he completely misinterpreted and thus lost all possibility of transcendental viewing. Berkeley, on the other hand, though trapped in naturalism, at least recognized the possibility of a purely immanent theory and made the first

systematic attempt to provide a theory of the constitution of the world by the human knower.<sup>74</sup> As a committed sensualist, however, Berkeley could not grasp the distinction between the diverse modes of appearing and the identical object that appears in and through them.<sup>75</sup> Hume, too, is a transcendental philosopher for Husserl,<sup>76</sup> since he understands the objectivity of the world to be a product of subjective achievements. On the other hand, Hume's appeals to concepts like 'custom', 'human nature', 'sense organs', which imply transcendence of their own,<sup>77</sup> show the essential contradiction in Hume's own stance.

But more than any other philosopher, Husserl felt the need to return again and again to Descartes. The nature of the Cartesian project and Cartesian doubt have, of course, been a matter of complex debate among specialists. Husserl's view of Descartes is distinctive (though possibly influenced by Lotze's discussion of Descartes in his *Logic*, Bk III, ch. iii, par. 323),<sup>78</sup> and indeed also evolved considerably in the course of his career. Unfortunately, I do not have space here to elaborate Husserl's very interesting and provocative reading of Descartes, except to state that Husserl seems to take five items specifically from him: the idea of a radical reform of philosophy; the principle of presuppositionlessness; idea of putting into suspense all world-affirming judgements; evidence as the criterion for truth; and the idea of scientific knowledge as absolutely justified knowledge,<sup>79</sup> whereby one accords validity only to that which is given with apodictic evidence.<sup>80</sup> But, finally, Husserl's interpretation radically transforms the Cartesian project, showing that the supposed results of the Cartesian foundation of objective knowledge burst apart at the seams.<sup>81</sup>

As early as the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had been captivated by Descartes' project of securing science on the basis of evident cognitions, cognitions given 'clearly and distinctly' (*clare et distincte*), the project of founding all deductions in intuitions. Indeed, he often invokes Descartes' twin criteria of truth, namely, 'clarity and distinctness' (*Klarheit und Deutlichkeit*)<sup>82</sup> in our concepts. Central to the Cartesian way, then, will be the account of evidence, but we shall not discuss that problematic notion here. In his 1906–7 lectures *Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge*, Husserl expands on Descartes' sceptical method, and, while recognizing the similarity between Descartes' global doubts and his own method of putting everything into suspension, he recognizes the difference of intention between them.<sup>83</sup> Motivated both as a philosopher and as a scientist, Descartes wanted to identify a first principle upon which to build a demonstrative science *more geometrico*, whereas in the performance of Husserl's *epoché* the existing sciences are neither augmented nor diminished, but rather achieve clarification (*Aufklärung*) of sense. Moreover, Husserl sees it as the fundamental error of rationalism that it took mathematics as the model of philosophy, whereas one must distinguish the scientific spirit from the spirit of philosophical critique.<sup>84</sup> For Husserl, Descartes enters the way of doubt or suspension of belief in a purely voluntary manner. Anyone can voluntarily direct his or her doubt at any belief whatsoever. Whereas there are certain texts in which Descartes emphasizes the need for cogent *reasons* for doubting (and indeed he supplies reasons for doubting in the 'First Meditation', for example), Husserl thinks a new beginning will not

even assume the binding character of reasoning and logic.<sup>85</sup> Descartes' purpose and procedures for the universal doubt are different from Husserl's.

Needless to say, Husserl offers many particular (and not always consistent) interpretations of Descartes' 'putting into question' (*In-Frage-Stellen*) of the external world over the course of his career. In his *Meditations* Descartes' 'hyperbolic doubt' takes the form of a worry about the *genius malignus*, which puts in question the very existence of the world and even the existence of the inquirer in the most radical way, such that it is entirely possible for the Cartesian inquirer that the world itself is an illusion and does not exist. Husserl distinguishes his phenomenological *epoché* from the Cartesian at precisely this point.<sup>86</sup> Descartes' is a dogmatic scepticism – the denial of the existence of the world – rather than a Pyrrhonian scepticism which remains uncommitted. Husserl always argues that it is countensensical to attempt to deny the world from within the world. Husserl himself wants a rather different conclusion to be drawn from the *epoché*. We should suspend belief in the world, and instead of naively accepting it we can give it the status of 'acceptance phenomenon'.<sup>87</sup> What must be effected is 'a certain annulment of positing'.<sup>88</sup> The positing remains what it is, yet it is effectively corralled or put into brackets.

I now enter a world where the factual and contingent drops away and I experience the world and my own conscious acts as a set of correlations between intentions and their fulfilling senses. Descartes' key insight that all sciences gain their validity with reference to self-knowledge and the experience of the '*ego cogito, ego sum*' is interpreted by Husserl, in his later years at least (as he puts it in the *Amsterdam Lectures*) as:

Every real thing, and ultimately the whole world as it exists for us in such and such a way, only exists as an actual or possible *cogitatum* of our own *cogitatio*, as a possible experiential content of our own experience; and in dealing with the content of our own life of thought and knowing, the best case being in myself, one may assume our own (intersubjective) operations for testing and proving as the pre-eminent form of evidentially grounded truth. Thus, for us, true being is a name for products of actual and possible cognitive operations, an accomplishment of cognition [*Erkenntnisleistung*].<sup>89</sup>

Husserl is clear that the bracketing of the existence-positing aspect of our conscious acts is one of the most effective ways of arriving at the domain of transcendental 'self experience' (*Selbsterfahrung*), but it must never be construed as bringing our naturally existing, psychological self (*sum*) into view.<sup>90</sup> While the domain of individual self is the 'phenomenological residuum'<sup>91</sup> left over, this must be understood as the pure or transcendental not the empirical, natural ego.

Despite Husserl's life-long engagement with the Cartesian way, he nevertheless recognized its inherent problems, especially the difficulty of moving from its fundamentally ego-centred stance to uncover the realm of transcendental intersubjectivity.<sup>92</sup> In the *Crisis* he would concede that the Cartesian way to transcendental subjectivity was too abrupt in that it brought one into the

transcendental realm too quickly, and in fact the reflection on the life-world is meant to remedy defects in the Cartesian way. In fact, it is puzzling how the Cartesian method of reduction leads one to *constituting subjectivity* at all. While it is clear that one arrives at noetic-noematic correlations with their thetic character inhibited, how does one progress to view these as *accomplishments*, and specifically of an *ego*, unless one has already succumbed to the Cartesian claim that the *epoché* leads one to the *ego cogito*? It seems Husserl requires the Cartesian way to gain sight of a constituting ego, and hence its prominence in his writings. But, even as he was developing the Cartesian way in the 1920s, he was also exploring another way, through a radical meditation on the achievement of Kant (but always aware of the limitations of his formal concept of the ego as an identity pole) and of German Idealism (specifically Fichte).

### Radicalizing Kant's achievement and the encounter with Fichte

While Husserl grasped the importance of Descartes right from the beginning, it was some years before he recognized his affinity with Kant. Paul Natorp may be credited with awakening Husserl from the anti-Kantian suspicions earlier inculcated in him by Brentano, who portrayed Kant as the beginning of the demise of scientific philosophy and as opening the paths to scepticism, subjectivism and ultimate irrationality. But Natorp, himself following Hermann Cohen,<sup>93</sup> had shown Husserl a way of interpreting the Kantian *a priori* stripped of subjectivism and 'anthropologism', distancing the notion of the *a priori* from the more suspect naturalistic notion of the *innate*.

Husserl had wrestled with Kant since the beginning of his career, criticizing the latter's account of numbers in *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891). In the *Prolegomena* he acknowledged Kant's importance and endorses the latter's distinction between pure and applied logic, while rejecting Kant's restriction of logic to the Aristotelian syllogistic.<sup>94</sup> Already in the First Edition of the *Prolegomena*, he echoes Kant's characterization of his transcendental philosophy as the inquiry into the conditions that make objective knowledge possible: 'We are plainly concerned with a quite necessary generalization of the question as to the "conditions of the possibility of experience" [*Bedingungen der Möglichkeit einer Erfahrung*].'<sup>95</sup>

However, Husserl believes this search for ideal conditions of experience must be given a far stricter determination than Kant had done. He first of all jettisons all searching into psychological conditions of the real causal kind, conditions which determine how humans approach knowledge. He is interested in *ideal* conditions, which again he distinguishes into two kinds – the *noetic* and the *logical*. Noetic conditions concern the subjective elements that must be in place for any kind of 'thinking being' – truths must be grasped as truths, and as consequences of other truths, and so on. These are different from the logically objective conditions that concern the laws governing the truths themselves, which hold independently of our grasping them. But Husserl also wants a stricter determi-



nation of the meaning of possibility and of the kind of apriority involved. Even at this early stage in the First Edition of 1900, possibility is understood as 'essentiality' (*Wesenhaftigkeit*).<sup>96</sup> Husserl will never let go of this insight that what is at stake in the *a priori* is the notion of essence or *eidōs* (see *Formal and Transcendental Logic* §97, where Husserl claims that the only sense the term 'a priori' has in his writings is that of *eidōs*).<sup>97</sup> Similarly, in *Ideas I* Husserl announced that he was avoiding the term 'a priori' and instead introducing the term *eidōs*.

In a certain sense, then, and especially with regard to the strict epistemological character, the roots of the transcendental turn are already present in the First Edition of the *Logical Investigations*. In his early elucidations of phenomenological method Husserl stresses his interest in the *how* of knowledge. For Kant, the very meaning of transcendental philosophy is that it is interested in the *how* of our knowledge in so far as this mode of knowledge is *a priori*: 'I call all cognition *transcendental* that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible *a priori*.'<sup>98</sup>

To appreciate the extent of his mature transcendental idealism, I turn now to his Fichte lectures, where Husserl briefly sketches the progress of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant, which revolutionized the approach to nature by overturning the natural naive belief in things out there and instead showed that space, time, causality are 'forms of a thinking which belong inseparably to our kind of mind',<sup>99</sup> leading to the view that 'subjectivity is world-creative'.<sup>100</sup> In the last year of the Great War, on several occasions in Freiburg, Husserl delivered a series of three lectures to serving soldiers on *Fichtes Menschheitsideal (Fichte's Ideal of Humanity)*.<sup>101</sup> A proud German nationalist, Husserl here portrays Germany as a nation with a distinctive spirit now threatened from without. Germany is the land of Copernicus, Kepler, Leibniz, Lessing, Herder and Winckelmann, but in particular it produced German Idealism, 'indigenous to our people',<sup>102</sup> once fully understood but now fallen into neglect and misunderstanding. Nevertheless, it will return as the 'one-sided naturalistic mode of thinking and feeling loses its power'.<sup>103</sup>

It was Fichte who put Kant's philosophy on a secure footing by genuinely uniting theory and practice and ridding it of 'obscure "things in themselves"'. For Husserl, 'Kant's results are the points of departure for Fichte'.<sup>104</sup> Kant had maintained that the transcendent things in themselves affect our sensibility even if we cannot know anything about them. Fichte sweeps this away as a remnant of dogmatism, and also Kant's assumption that sensibility must be passively stimulated from without before it can be active. For Fichte, human subjectivity is itself the primal action that brings the experience of world into being: 'The Fichtean I ... is the self-positing action (*sich selbst setzende Tathandlung*) out of which in infinite succession ever new actions originate'.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, these actions are teleological or goal-oriented, and thus 'to write the history of the I, of the absolute intelligence, is therefore to write the history of the necessary teleology in which the world as phenomenal comes to progressive creation, comes to creation in this intelligence'.<sup>106</sup> In humans, the absolute I splits itself, and philosophy consists in grasping the world as the product of this self-splitting ego. Fichte's

particular genius is to see the moral dimension of this idealism. The aim of the self-development of the ego is a moral world order, which is the guiding ideal of reason itself. Husserl himself, looking to a universal moral community beyond any narrow national self-interest, cites Fichte's hope for a 'total rebirth of humanity'.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, human self-understanding is the self-revelation of God.

Similar to his embrace of Fichte in 1917, in his address to Freiburg University in celebration of Kant on 1 May 1924 Husserl stressed the 'obvious essential relationship' between his phenomenology and the transcendental philosophy of Kant,<sup>108</sup> and the 'inexorable necessity' that led him to transcendental philosophy. Kant offered an entirely new vision and new approach in philosophy, even the idea of it had never previously been articulated. Kant thereby set a task that remains 'the most exuberant of all scientific tasks for mankind',<sup>109</sup> 'the greatest of all theoretical tasks that could be given to modern humanity'.<sup>110</sup> Husserl's unique and deeply original transcendental philosophy must attempt a radicalization of the truth hidden in Kant.<sup>111</sup> This involves a sharpened sense of the *a priori* (including the defence of the *material a priori*) and a recognition that Husserl assumed that the form of the world was more or less as given in Newton's physics, whereas Husserl himself recognized the crucial role of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*). Nevertheless, Kant was only the 'preshaper of scientific transcendental philosophy', since he left it half submerged in mythical concepts (Husserl has no time for Kant's thing-in-itself, the doctrine of *intellectus archetypus*, the mythology of transcendental apperception, etc.).<sup>112</sup> Kant did have a genuinely profound sense of the fundamental nature of *synthesis* and was carrying out genuine intentional analyses.<sup>113</sup> Indeed, Brentano's failure was precisely his inability to connect intentionality with synthesis. Kant, then, offers Husserl a new way of entering into the nature of intentional life as a system of syntheses, either passively or actively carried out by the ego. Moreover, with Kant, Husserl held time to be the deepest form of synthesis.

So far in this chapter I have been charting the historical genesis of transcendental philosophy in Husserl's own development and in the modern philosophical tradition from Descartes to Kant and Fichte, as Husserl reads that tradition. I shall now turn to examine in more detail the manner in which the *transcendental attitude* emerges out of the normal 'natural' attitude. When Husserl simply presents the problematic of the emergence of the transcendental attitude, he begins with a discussion of our natural, practical or theoretical, worldview.

### The natural attitude and the surrounding world (*Umwelt*)

Beginning with his 1910–11 lectures *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*<sup>114</sup> and, in print, his 1910–11 essay *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*, Husserl explicitly focused on the central doctrines of naturalism and its accompanying outlook, 'the natural attitude' (*die natürliche Einstellung*). As he writes in 1913, 'natural cognition begins with experience [*Erfahrung*] and remains within experience',<sup>115</sup> the whole horizon of possible investigations is termed 'the world'. All sciences are sciences



of the world. The 'correlate' of the natural attitude is the *world*,<sup>116</sup> which itself is a limit idea, an 'idea lying at infinity'.<sup>117</sup> It is the idea of a correlate of the sense-bestowing functions of conscious life.

All activities of consciousness, including all scientific activity, indeed all knowledge, initially take place within the natural attitude.<sup>118</sup> In *Erste Philosophie* Husserl writes:

The natural attitude is the form in which the total life of humanity is realized in running its natural, practical course. It was the only form from millennium to millennium, until out of science and philosophy there developed unique motivations for a revolution.<sup>119</sup>

Everything is originally a part of this natural world, including living things, animals, humans, communities and cultural items and establishments of every kind, including scientific theories themselves.<sup>120</sup>

We live naively in this world, swimming with the flow of its givens that have the character of being 'on hand' (*vorhanden*) and 'actual' (*wirklich*).<sup>121</sup> The natural attitude itself pervades all our consciousness but is not articulated; it is 'unthematic, unthought, unpredicated'. It is always 'on hand' and yet in a sense indeterminate.

Reflecting on the manner in which all natural activity operates with a general stance, Husserl becomes aware of the phenomenon of the connectedness (*Zusammenhang*) of all experience, the 'pre-given' experience of a 'world'.<sup>122</sup> Traditional philosophy and sciences have offered a description of this world, but to that extent they have remained philosophies and sciences of the natural attitude. The natural attitude through its world belief is a source of contingency and as such it can never provide the absolute ground of science.<sup>123</sup> A revolution in attitude is therefore necessary. I shall not attempt here to explore what motivates this change of attitude. This is a controversial topic among Husserl scholars. For the purposes of this essay, it is enough to realize that the natural attitude cannot comprehend itself while remaining within its own world, and that to understand the *how* of the natural attitude is precisely to adopt the transcendental attitude. Moreover, the change of attitude, once enacted, is not temporary but permanent.

### The revolution or inversion (*Umwendung*)

In order to bring this normal natural epistemological attitude into focus, in order to bring it to self-understanding, a fundamental 'shift of attitude' (*Einstellungänderung*) or 'shift of regard' (*Blickänderung*)<sup>124</sup> must take place. Husserl frequently speaks of a 'revolution' or 'reversal' (*Umwendung*),<sup>125</sup> a 'transposition' (*Umstellung*),<sup>126</sup> a 'Cartesian overthrow' (*cartesianischer Umsturz*),<sup>127</sup> 'a total change' (*eine totale Änderung*)<sup>128</sup> of existing opinion, and indeed of normal human living. In *The Idea of Phenomenology* Husserl characterizes this shift as the move to the

philosophical attitude.<sup>129</sup> From 1906–7 onwards, he sees this shift as enabled by the *phenomenological reduction*.<sup>130</sup>

Husserl initially understands the reduction primarily as an *epistemological* move, which brings into focus the genuine epistemic structures and laws sharply distinguished from psychological accounts of the knowing process. Thus, in his 1906–7 lectures, he expressed frustration at the fact that Neo-Kantians had criticized his phenomenology as psychologistic, whereas the empiricists had misunderstood his supposed 'Platonism': 'the Kantians are blind to what is phenomenological; the empiricists to that which relates to the theory of knowledge'.<sup>131</sup> But, in line with his growing recognition of the different layers of the reduction, he realizes that the overthrow of the natural attitude provides access to transcendental experience and to the recognition that the whole sense of the world in itself and all its validities are cognitive accomplishments, productions or achievements (*Erkenntnisleistungen*) in and for human subjectivity.<sup>132</sup> The reduction is supposed to make transparent how consciousness constitutes within itself all worldly transcendencies, all objecthood. This is Kant's breakthrough: to have grasped the world as the outcome of syntheses and constitution. Its sense and its being are products of transcendental subjectivity. As Husserl says, 'there is phenomenological correlation-research, which explores the possible world and its ontic structures (as a world of possible experience) with regard to the possible bestowal of sense and the establishment of being, without which that world equally could not be thought'.<sup>133</sup>

Husserl's modes of reduction may be considered as different ways of bringing the transcendental into view and of allowing us to inhabit this domain, to really live in it. To retain the properly transcendental attitude, to stay within its space of reasons, as it were, one has to maintain vigilance against the relapse into naturalism, which is the sin of 'transcendental psychologism', against which Husserl regularly warned. Phenomenology carried out as a kind of pure psychology must be distinguished from a properly transcendental phenomenology.<sup>134</sup> The same insights occur in both sciences but their meaning changes in transcendental phenomenology. But no psychology – not even a pure psychology – can found transcendental philosophy as such. Nevertheless, in *Ideas* I §76 Husserl acknowledges that every discovery of transcendental phenomenology can be reinterpreted as an eidetic-psychological finding, and he continued to emphasize the *strict parallelism* between the natural and the transcendental. In other words, there is an essential parallelism between transcendental phenomenology and pure psychology (it is clear that the Cartesian regress to the *cogito* brings both the empirical ego and the transcendental ego into view, but the transcendental ego requires an additional change of attitude, one which puts in suspension the 'general thesis' of the world).

As Husserl says in *Erste Philosophie*, there can be only one method for transcendental philosophy: to 'study cognizing life itself in its own essence achievements [*das erkennende Leben selbst in seinen eigenen Wesenleistungen*]',<sup>135</sup> and this within a wider study of consciousness itself and how it constitutes objective senses and true senses. For Husserl, it is important to understand that the reduction does not

involve paring away of a portion of the real, but an *abstention* from reality understood as actuality, which leaves in place all conscious enactments and their products, but simply now presented to the theoretical onlooker.

It is in *Ideas I* that Husserl first declared in print that the phenomenological reduction may properly be characterized as *transcendental*:

The characterization of the phenomenological reduction and, likewise, of the pure sphere of mental processes as ‘transcendental’ rests precisely on the fact that we discover in this reduction an absolute sphere of stuffs and noetic forms [*eine absolute Sphäre von Stoffen und noetischen Formen*] whose determinately structured combinations possess, according to immanent eidetic necessity, the marvellous consciousness of something determinate and determinable, given thus and so, which is something over and against consciousness itself, something fundamentally other, non-really inherent [*Irreelles*], transcendent; the characterization of mental processes as ‘transcendental’ further rests on the fact that this is the primal source [*die Urquelle*] in which is found the only conceivable solution of those deepest problems of cognition concerning the essence and possibility of an objectively valid knowledge of something transcendent.<sup>136</sup>

Husserl places the emphasis on explaining how the miracle of the appearance of objectivity within subjectivity is brought about. How can the forms of consciousness come together according to necessary laws to generate objectivity as something other, transcendent and non-immanent in consciousness?

In *Ideas I* the new transcendental appreciation of consciousness is marked by the self-evidence of the immanent perception or of one’s consciousness of one’s own stream of mental processes. He understands the Cartesian *cogito* as showing that every conscious experience contains the essential possibility of its being reflected on in a way that confirms its actual occurrence in an irrefragable manner. As Husserl puts it: ‘To each stream of mental processes and to each Ego, as Ego, there belongs the essential possibility of acquiring this evidence; each bears in itself, as an essential possibility, the guarantee of its absolute existence [*seines absoluten Dasein*].’<sup>137</sup> As Husserl confirms further down in the same paragraph, any conscious process is ‘originarily and absolutely given’ not only in respect of its essence but also of its existence. Of course, Husserl emphasizes how limited is the evidence which is given by such ‘immanent’ seizing of one’s own processes. One cannot, for example, infer from the existence of the processes themselves that they are components of a real human being (as Husserl himself noted in a marginal entry).

In *Erste Philosophie* Part Two, Husserl further recognizes the difference between recognizing the irremovability of the self and its experience from any thought of the world and, on the other hand, the kind of transcendental self-awareness which results precisely from the critique of this mundane self-experience and which is entirely incapable of being thought away.<sup>138</sup> This requires moving beyond the ‘human I (*das Menschen-Ich*)’<sup>139</sup> to discover myself as subject for the

whole world. Even if I were to try to think away the existence of the world and of my mundane human self, I would still discover myself as there: ‘I would be and would remain someone whose being is not touched by any nothingness affecting the world [*Weltnichtigkeit*], someone who can never be annihilated in a so-called epistemological annihilation [*erkenntniskritische Vernichtung*] of my body and of all the world.’<sup>140</sup> Husserl even says, allowing himself the use of religious language (inadmissible at this stage in strict science), one could think of this as a kind of survival like that of an angel or a pure soul. There is a sharp differentiation to be made between my mundane and transcendental self-experience.

In contrast to this apodictic self-giveness of immanent experiences, Husserl claims that it is an eidetic law that physical existence is never required as necessary by the givenness to consciousness of anything physical. The transcendent physical is by its essential nature always contingent.<sup>141</sup> The self-giveness of immanent conscious processes, on the other hand, is entirely different and is absolutely given. It belongs, Husserl says, to ‘a sphere of absolute positing [*eine Sphäre absoluter Position*]’.<sup>142</sup> Against the backdrop of this contingent posited world is the positing ego that is *necessary* and *absolute*. There is what Husserl calls an ‘essential detachableness [*prinzipielle Ablösbarkeit*]’ of the whole natural world from the domains of consciousness.<sup>143</sup> Husserl presents the ‘detachability’ or one-sided separability of the world from consciousness as the discovery implicit in the Cartesian *cogito*. The essence of the transcendent world is such that it has meaning only in essential interconnection with consciousness – and not just possible consciousness but actual consciousness. It was this claim that led to his explicit adoption of transcendental idealism, especially in *Ideas I* §47, and which Husserl maintains for the rest of his life. In his *Fichte Lectures* he had criticized Kant for still retaining this mythical view of transcendent things in themselves affecting our sensibility, as if subjectivity needed a stimulus to waken it from its original passivity, whereas, for Husserl, as for Fichte, consciousness has an original activity. As Husserl explicitly confirms in the *Crisis*, he is against any ‘absolutization’ of the world which would treat it as a thing ‘in itself’ independent of our consciousness and knowledge of it.

One of Husserl’s most notorious claims in *Ideas I* §49 is that we can think the very ‘annihilation of the world’ (*Weltvernichtung*) without thereby being able to think of the disappearance of consciousness. This claim is also repeated several times in *Ideas II*:

If we think of monadic subjects and their streams of consciousness, or rather, if we think of the thinkable minimum of self-consciousness, then a monadic consciousness, one that would have no ‘world’ at all given to it, could indeed be thought, – and thus a monadic consciousness without regularities in the course of sensations, without motivated possibilities in the apprehensions of things.<sup>144</sup>

It is even conceivable that there might be no empirical consciousness at all, no world, but still absolute consciousness would be what it is.<sup>145</sup> Husserl says in *Erste*

*Philosophie* that even if God were to create an entirely illusory world (*Scheinwelt*) with us in it, we would still be true subjects of this world.<sup>146</sup>

This is a very clearly articulated transcendental idealism, which gives absolute priority to consciousness. Consciousness, and specifically *my* consciousness (all consciousness is characterized by *mineness* and thus is first person in an irreducible sense), cannot be thought away. But the consciousness referred to here is pure transcendental consciousness, not that of my natural self. Nevertheless, it is one of the mysteries of transcendental consciousness that it is only manifest in its mundane form. We shall now turn to this complicated but important aspect of Husserl's idealism.

### The notion of world and of the mundanization of the ego

For Husserl, there is a world essentially connected with every possible act of consciousness.<sup>147</sup> The natural world has unlimited temporal and spatial horizons stretching in all directions. Furthermore, any actual experience points beyond itself to other possible experiences, which in turn point to other experiences and so on.<sup>148</sup> But the actual existence of this world is, for Husserl, an irrational, *contingent* fact.<sup>149</sup> There is no necessity governing the fact that the world is the way it is and not some other way. Yet, it is necessary that the transcendental ego be instantiated in some world, in some body, and so on. Although the ego is the source of all meaning in its absolute nature, it is also an eidetic necessity that the ego be individualized as this or that person and that the ego be included in a factual world – ‘mundanized’ in Husserl's terminology. Even the inquiry into the possibility of a purely solipsistic consciousness outside all community is itself one of the transcendental problems.<sup>150</sup>

Questions arise how consciousness is able to effect its singularization and also how it achieves its intersubjective and communicative aspects.<sup>151</sup> Part of the complexity of the problem is that the individual instantiated ego requires communalization through contact with other egos. From early in his Göttingen years, and expressed in *Ideas* I §53, for instance, Husserl recognizes that the world contains other conscious organisms, the domain of *psycho-physical nature* as he terms it. Who can deny that other animals and humans have conscious streams like us? The question is: how are such streams constituted? How can there be such streams as events within the world and yet the the domain of consciousness be a self-enclosed region? How can purely immanent consciousness relinquish its immanence and take on transcendence in the form of corporeality? Consciousness must first be inserted into the world through a concrete body. Only thus can it apprehend or understand other consciousnesses through their bodies. Husserl spent a great deal of his time asking these questions. He attempted to resolve them within the Cartesian mode (for example, in the ‘Fifth Cartesian Meditation’), but also, as in the *Crisis*, by ‘reducing’ or distilling the essence of transcendental life by a transformed inspection of the communal life-world. Neither procedure of reduction was successfully carried through and, as

Husserl says, many times, here we stand before a great mystery. Husserl sums up this mystery or paradox, in *Crisis* §53, as the question how we can be both subjects for the world and objects in the world? Finally, in reflecting on the transcendental ego in its intersubjective pluralized life, are we not thinking of it naively as a set of human beings? But precisely this is excluded in the *epoché*. In the transcendental attitude, we must understand each human being from the reverse point of view – as a ‘self-objectivation’ (*Selbstobjektivation*) of the transcendental I,<sup>152</sup> the ‘absolute ego’.<sup>153</sup>

### Conclusion: from conditions of possibility to absolute idealism

To summarize, Husserl's idealism is primarily concerned with the inability to conceive of an object independent of a subject and to think of the object as constituted out of activities and structures of consciousness according to predetermined laws. As he says in *Ideas* I §§49–50, there is absolutely no sense to the notion of ‘thing in itself’. What we think of as this first reality is in fact always second: ‘The being which is first for us is second in itself; i.e., it is what it is only in “relation” to the first.’<sup>154</sup>

First reality is absolute consciousness. Nevertheless, Husserl, who was both familiar with and deeply impressed by Berkeley, as we know from the second of his *Logical Investigations*, always denied that he was advocating a subjective or Berkeleyan idealism,<sup>155</sup> since such idealism involves an ‘absolutizing’ of the world. Husserl believes he has determined *the correct sense* of world and consciousness and that subjective idealism is a distortion of these senses, actually turns the sense of world into a countersense (*Widersinn*). There is no question of the world being ‘swallowed up’ (*verschlingt*)<sup>156</sup> in the subject. The world only has the sense of something that has received its ‘sense bestowal’ (*Sinngebung*) from consciousness but it is objective nonetheless. Kant was the first to articulate this insight, but his version still requires purification. The next step is to grasp how the subject can both constitute itself and the world and also be a contingently occurring object within the world, among a plurality of other objectivations of transcendental egos. This, for Husserl, is the deepest problem of transcendental philosophy.

Husserl's final dream is a universal account of the pure possible forms of transcendental life itself, combining the discoveries of monadic and intersubjective transcendental life. This would include both possible and actual realizations of transcendental subjectivity, their truths and falsities, in all their structural interconnections. Moreover, there is not just the present of my transcendental life, but a transcendental past and future.<sup>157</sup> Transcendental philosophy becomes the systematic self-development (*Selbstentfaltung*) and self-theorizing (*Selbsttheoretisierung*) of transcendental subjectivity,<sup>158</sup> and the path to the realization of absolute, justified truth. It seems that Husserl has progressed to a kind of transcendental absolute idealism.

In this chapter I have tried to show that Husserl's concept of transcendental philosophy is extraordinarily radical, broad and original. Initially introduced

through the Cartesian suspension of the natural, it is also conceived by Husserl as a radicalizing of the Kantian attempt to specify the *a priori* conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Moreover, in a manner not dissimilar to Hegel, Husserl sees his own work as an *Aufhebung* of the essence of modern philosophy. Finally, transcendental phenomenology must document the possible essential forms of transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and the relation between absolute consciousness and the objectification of spirit in history. Of course, such a huge and complex set of tasks calls out for stringent criticism. The first step, and the one to which I have restricted myself here, is to understand the full range of Husserl's phenomenology as transcendental philosophy.

## Notes

- 1 The critical edition of *Logische Untersuchungen* has appeared in the *Husserliana* series in two volumes: vol. XVIII, *Logische Untersuchungen I: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, Elmar Holenstein (ed.), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1975, and vol. XIX, *Logische Untersuchungen II: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, Ursula Panzer (ed.), Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1984. The only English translation is *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols, trans. J.N. Findlay, edited with a New Introduction by Dermot Moran, London, Routledge, 2001. It should be noted that the English translation is bound in two volumes, the first of which contains vol. 1 of the German edition as well as part of vol. 2, while the second contains the remaining part of vol. 2 of the German.
- 2 E. Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07*, Ulrich Melle (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. XXIV, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1985.
- 3 Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, Investigation V, §17.
- 4 Edmund Husserl, *Wesenswissenschaft, Ideas I*, §75. The critical edition is published in *Husserliana*, vol. III/1 as *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie I*, Karl Schuhmann (ed.), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1977, trans. F. Kersten as *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1983.
- 5 E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte*, R. Boehm (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. VII, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1965, p. 234.
- 6 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §46, p. 104; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 87.
- 7 I am grateful to Robin Rollinger, currently editing E. Husserl, *Texte zum transzendentalen Idealismus (1908–1915)*, forthcoming from Kluwer, for this information. Rollinger stresses that at this time (c. 1915) Husserl uses the term to refer to the thesis that real objects cannot exist without an actual (as opposed to possible) consciousness. In *Cartesian Meditations* (for bibliographic details see note 26 below) transcendental idealism is understood as the claim that all objects are correlated to consciousness.
- 8 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §8.
- 9 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §33, p. 63; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 58g.
- 10 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §51.
- 11 Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*, W. Biemel (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. II, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973; trans. Lee Hardy, *The Idea of Phenomenology, Collected Works*, vol. VIII, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1999.
- 12 Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*, pp. 36–7; *Husserliana*, vol. II, 48.
- 13 E. Husserl, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*, U. Claesges (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. XVI, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973; trans. R. Rojcewicz, *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, Collected Works*, vol. VII, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1997.
- 14 Husserl frequently comments on Kant's 'Letter to Herz'; see, for example, his 'Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie' (1917), in E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911–1921*, H.R. Sepp and Thomas Nenon (eds), *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1986, p. 143.
- 15 Husserl, *Ding und Raum*, §40, p. 117, *Husserliana*, vol. XVI, 140.
- 16 Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, W. Biemel (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. VI, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1962, §55, p. 193; trans. David Carr, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 189.
- 17 Husserl, *Ding und Raum*, §40, p. 119; *Husserliana*, vol. XVI, 141–2.
- 18 Husserl, *Crisis*, §48, p. 166n; *Husserliana*, vol. VI, 169n.
- 19 E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, Marly Biemel (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. IV, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1952; trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer as *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, Collected Works*, vol. III, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1989.
- 20 An exception is Herman Philipse, 'Transcendental Idealism', in Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 239–322.
- 21 See Husserl, *Ideas I*, §51, note.
- 22 Husserl, *Crisis*, §53, pp. 180–81; *Husserliana*, vol. VI, 184.
- 23 Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*, R. Boehm (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. VIII, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1965, p. 166.
- 24 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil*, *Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 38.
- 25 E. Husserl, *Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie*, in *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil*, *Husserliana*, vol. VII, 255; trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl as 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 1974, vol. 5, p. 29.
- 26 Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Stephan Strasser (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. I, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1950; trans. D. Cairns as *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960, §12; The *Meditations* were first published as *Méditations cartésiennes: introduction à la phénoménologie*, trans. G. Peiffer and E. Levinas, Paris, Almand Colin, 1931.
- 27 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §12.
- 28 Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, W. Biemel (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. IX, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1968, 250. The draft of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article and the Amsterdam Lectures are translated by T. Sheehan and R.E. Palmer as *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–31). The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article. The Amsterdam Lectures 'Phenomenology and Anthropology' and Husserl's Marginal Note in Being and Time, and Kant on the Problem of Metaphysics, Collected Works*, vol. VI, Dordrecht, 1997 (for this reference see p. 98).
- 29 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §13.
- 30 I owe this point to Nam-In Lee, 'Active and Passive Genesis', in Lester Embree, Samuel J. Julian and Steve Crowell (eds), *The Reach of Reflection: Issues for Phenomenology's Second Century*, 3 vols, West Harford, Electron Press, 2001.
- 31 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §13.
- 32 E. Husserl, 'Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft', *Logos I* (1911), pp. 289–341, now collected in Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911–1921*, H.R. Sepp and Thomas Nenon (eds), *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1986, pp. 3–62; trans. as 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science', in Quentin Lauer (ed.), *Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, New York, Harper & Row, 1964, pp. 71–147.
- 33 Husserl, 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science', pp. 83–4; *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 11–12.
- 34 See Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §16.
- 35 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §86, p. 207; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 176.
- 36 Husserl, 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science', p. 108; *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 30.

- 37 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §51.
- 38 See Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1964, p. 35.
- 39 Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, p. 33; *Husserliana*, vol. II, 43.
- 40 Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, p. 24; *Husserliana*, vol. II, 31.
- 41 Quoted in R. Bernet, I. Kern and E. Marbach, *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1993, p. 57.
- 42 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 22; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 246–7.
- 43 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §41, p. 86; *Husserliana*, vol. I, 118.
- 44 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §41, p. 86; *Husserliana*, vol. I, 119.
- 45 Indeed, the point of the life-world is that it cannot only be identified and understood as such from the transcendental perspective. It is precisely to free oneself of the presuppositions of the life-world that one embarks on the transcendental reduction.
- 46 Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 298–9; *Husserliana*, vol. VI, 346–7.
- 47 Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 297; *Husserliana*, vol. VI, 345.
- 48 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 42; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 270.
- 49 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 43; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 272.
- 50 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 312–13.
- 51 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 28; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 254.
- 52 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 29; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 254.
- 53 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 35; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 262.
- 54 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 37; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 264.
- 55 Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 222; *Husserliana*, vol. IX, 313.
- 56 Roman Ingarden, *On the Motives Which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Arnór Hannibalsson, *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 64, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1975, p. 21.
- 57 Husserl, *Ideas II*, §64, p. 311; *Husserliana*, vol. IV, 297.
- 58 Ingarden, *On the Motives Which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*, p. 21.
- 59 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 12; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 234.
- 60 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 30; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 256.
- 61 Edmund Husserl, 'Author's Preface to the English Edition', in *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson, New York, Collier Books, 1962, p. 5.
- 62 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §41, p. 86; *Husserliana*, vol. I, 118.
- 63 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 78.
- 64 See Edmund Husserl, 'Phänomenologische Methode und phänomenologische Philosophie (Londoner Vorträge)', *Husserl Studies*, 1999, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 183–254, esp. p. 201.
- 65 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII.
- 66 Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918–1926)*, M. Fleischer (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. XI, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1988, p. 355; trans. Anthony J. Steinbok, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Collected Works*, vol. IX, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2001, p. 6.
- 67 Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 96; *Husserliana*, vol. IX, 248.
- 68 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 240; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 240.
- 69 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 4.

- 70 Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 237; *Husserliana*, vol. IX, 330.
- 71 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie, (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 144.
- 72 Edmund Husserl, *Pariser Vorträge, in Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Stephan Strasser (ed.), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1950, p. 3; trans. P. Koestenbaum, *The Paris Lectures*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1970, p. 3.
- 73 See the extended discussion in *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 78–140; also *Crisis*, §22, where Locke is accused of being blind to intentionality. Husserl frequently accuses Locke of missing out entirely the nature of consciousness as consciousness-of. See the first draft of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article, 'Trans. Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology', p. 94, *Husserliana*, vol. IX, 246.
- 74 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 150.
- 75 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 151.
- 76 Husserl may have been influenced by Adolf Reinach's reading of Hume in his essay 'Kants Auffassung des humeschen Problems', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 1911, vol. 141, pp. 176–209; trans. J.N. Mohanty as 'Kant's Interpretation of Hume's Problem', *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 1976, vol. 7, pp. 161–88.
- 77 Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, p. 17; *Husserliana*, vol. II, 20.
- 78 See Hermann Lotze, *Logic: Of Thought, of Investigation and of Knowledge in Three Books*, trans. Bernard Bosanquet, 2nd edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888, vol. 2, pp. 226–9. The transcendental reading of Descartes was also promoted by Paul Natorp; see his Descartes' *Erkenntnistheorie. Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Kriticismus*, Marburg, N.G. Elwert'sche Verlag, 1882, esp. pp. 36–45.
- 79 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §3.
- 80 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 76.
- 81 Husserl, *Crisis*, §16.
- 82 Husserl, *Logical Investigations, Prolegomena*, vol. I, §2, p. 168; *Husserliana*, vol. XIX/1, 10.
- 83 Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Husserliana*, vol. XXIV, 189.
- 84 Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Husserliana*, vol. XXIV, 192.
- 85 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §5, p. 13; *Husserliana*, vol. I, 53.
- 86 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §32.
- 87 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §7.
- 88 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §31, p. 58; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 54.
- 89 Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 236; *Husserliana*, vol. IX, 329.
- 90 Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Husserliana*, vol. XXIV, 216.
- 91 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §33.
- 92 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 266.
- 93 P. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*, 1st edn, Leipzig, 1903, reprinted Hamburg, Meiner, 1994, p. vii. According to Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, p. 433, Husserl had read almost the whole of this work.
- 94 Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. II. *Prolegomena*, §58.
- 95 Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. II. *Prolegomena*, §65, 149; *Husserliana*, vol. XVIII, 239.
- 96 Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. II. *Prolegomena*, §66.
- 97 E. Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Mit ergänzenden Texten*, Paul Janssen (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. XVII, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1974, p. 255n1; trans. D. Cairns, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1969, p. 248n1.
- 98 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allan W. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, B25; emphasis added.
- 99 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 272.
- 100 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 273.
- 101 See Edmund Husserl, 'Fichtes Menschheitsideal. Drei Vorlesungen', *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921)*, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 267–93, trans. James G. Hart as 'Fichte's Ideal of Humanity [Three Lectures]', *Husserl Studies*, 1995, vol. 12, pp. 111–33. The

- lecture series was delivered on 8–17 November 1917, and repeated on 14–16 January 1918 and 6–9 November 1918, just before the armistice.
- 102 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 268.
  - 103 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 269.
  - 104 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 274.
  - 105 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 275.
  - 106 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 276.
  - 107 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XXV, 279.
  - 108 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 230.
  - 109 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 236.
  - 110 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 242.
  - 111 Husserl, *Crisis*, §32.
  - 112 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 235.
  - 113 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 237.
  - 114 E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1905–1920*, I. Kern (ed.), *Husserliana*, vol. XIII, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 110–235.
  - 115 Husserl, *Ideas I*, p. 5; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 7.
  - 116 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §50.
  - 117 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 274.
  - 118 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XIII, 112.
  - 119 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 20; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 244.
  - 120 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 243.
  - 121 Husserl *Ideas I*, §50.
  - 122 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XIII, 124.
  - 123 I owe this point to Marcus Brainard.
  - 124 Husserl, *Husserliana*, vol. XIII, 112.
  - 125 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 271.
  - 126 Husserl, *Crisis*, §41.
  - 127 Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, §2.
  - 128 Husserl, *Crisis*, §39.
  - 129 See Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, p. 16; *Husserliana*, vol. II, 18.
  - 130 See Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Husserliana*, vol. XXIV, 212.
  - 131 Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Husserliana*, vol. XXIV, 202.
  - 132 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 248.
  - 133 Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 99; *Husserliana*, vol. IX, 251.
  - 134 See Husserl, *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 95; *Husserliana*, vol. IX, 247.
  - 135 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 248.
  - 136 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §97, p. 239; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 204.
  - 137 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §46, p. 101; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 85 – translation modified.
  - 138 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 70.
  - 139 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 71.
  - 140 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 73, my translation.
  - 141 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §46, p. 102; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 86.
  - 142 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §46, p. 102; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 86.
  - 143 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §46, p. 104; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 87.
  - 144 Husserl, *Ideas II*, §63, p. 303; *Husserliana*, vol. IV, 290.
  - 145 Husserl, *Ideas II*, p. 308n1; *Husserliana*, vol. IV, 294 n1.
  - 146 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 73.
  - 147 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §47.
  - 148 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §47.

- 149 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 50.
- 150 Husserl, 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', p. 20; *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VII, 257–8.
- 151 See Husserl, *Crisis*, §54.
- 152 Husserl, *Crisis*, §54.
- 153 Husserl, *Crisis*, §55.
- 154 Husserl, *Ideas I*, §50, p. 112; *Husserliana*, vol. III/1, 93.
- 155 See Husserl, *Ideas I*, §55.
- 156 Husserl, *Crisis*, §53, p. 180; *Husserliana*, vol. VI, 183.
- 157 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 169.
- 158 Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil, Husserliana*, vol. VIII, 167.