Amor amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship

Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy

Edited by

Thomas A. F. Kelly and Philipp W. Rosemann
The Problem of Empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein

DERMOT MORAN

1. Introduction

In this paper I want to trace the development of the phenomenological approach to the problem of empathy (Einfühlung), the experience of another’s consciousness or subjectivity, through an examination of the work of Theodor Lipps, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein.

1.1. The Emergence of Empathy as a Philosophical Problem

What would later be characterised as the "problem of empathy" originally emerged in the discussions of British moralists (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Alexander Bain) in the eighteenth century, who postulated affective "sympathy" as the basis of morality and aesthetic experience. David Hume, for instance, writes in the Treatise on Human Nature:

No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however, different from, or even contrary to our own. ... Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from my own

natural temper and disposition. So remarkable a phenomenon merits our attention, and must be traced back to its first principles. Hume's tracing of the phenomenon back to its sources means that he attempts to explain it in terms of his usual impression/idea relation. Hume characterises sympathy as an idea which is transformed or "converted" by us into an impression: "In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression".

The German term *Einfühlung* is of more recent provenance. The Munich philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps is usually credited with coining it from the Greek *empathia*, literally: "feeling into". *Einfühlung* thus refers to the phenomenon of feeling (or thinking) one's way into the experiential life of another. The concept received considerable attention from German psychologists, for example, Hugo Münsterberg, Stephan Witsack, Johannes Volkert, Benno Erdmann, O. Kiilpe, A. Meinong, Max Scheler, and Moritz Geiger, who continued to use the older term "sympathy" — although sometimes reserved (by Lipps and Scheler) for the ethical response — alongside


3. Ibid., 320.

4. "Empathy" is formed from the Greek prefix *em*, a rendering of *en* (before *p*) meaning "in", and *pathos* ("feeling"). In German *ich einfühle* is a reflexive verb which literally means "to feel one's way into". A. J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 49, suggests the translation "introversion", which helpfully dissociates the term from the large psychological literature of empathy as a benevolent concern for others' states of suffering.


in all its aspects, a domain of knowledge that has recently been christened “alterology” by Natalie Depraz.14

1.2. Empathy and the Geisteswissenschaften

As Lipps, Scheler, Husserl, and others all quickly recognised, empathy does not constitute a single phenomenon but is a rather loose term for a large constellation of interrelated and many-layered activities, central not only to philosophy and psychology, but also to sociology, moral theory, politics and the whole edifice of the Geisteswissenschaften. Lipps and Scheler both saw that a philosophical clarification of empathy was central to the philosophical foundation of sociology, and it was often discussed by Husserl and Stein15 as central to the human sciences. Indeed, Dilthey also saw empathy as part of the methodology of Verstehen in contrast to the approach of Erklären taken in the natural sciences. Einfühlung was seen to reach even into theology, when both Scheler and Stein saw it as involving the question of the relation of the person to God. Scheler writes that the interaction of persons with persons extends to God: “But it is precisely the realm of spiritual actuality that is articulated as strictly personal, substantive, and intrinsically individual, right up to God, the Person of persons.”16 Similarly, in her 1917 book, Stein claims that believers comprehend the precepts of God through empathy and adds:

God can comprehend other people’s lives in no other way. As the possessor of complete knowledge, God is not mistaken about other people’s experiences, as people are mistaken about each other’s experiences.17

15. See OPE, chap. IV.
17. OPE 11: 11.

Thus, empathy is seen to run through the social and human sciences. Indeed, empathy has been revived in recent discussions concerning the manner in which one person understands another as a kind of “simulation” theory to be contrasted with the “theory” theory, whereby one understands another through having a general theory of how minds behave.18

1.3. Understanding Others and Self-Understanding

How I understand others inevitably leads to reflection on how I understand myself, and particularly how I integrate earlier and future possible experiences into my present awareness. In this respect, Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein all emphasise the close connection between empathy (understood as the experience of other persons) and aspects of one’s self-knowledge. Lipps recognised that self-understanding (especially the recognition of one’s past and future states as one’s own) involves the empathic ability. For instance, to know how the room looks from the other side I have to project myself to that point of view. Or if I remember myself as a child swinging on a swing, in a certain sense I am, in remembering, an observer on that scene, not directly experiencing the scene through the eyes of the child but as it were an onlooker on myself, yet convinced of the identity of onlooker and child, and the irrepeatability of that situation. Similarly, Husserl repeatedly (for instance, in the fifth Cartesian Meditation) discusses the experience of one’s earlier states in memory as a kind of representation similar to that given in empathy.

Indeed, Lipps, Husserl and Stein all begin their analyses of empathy by distinguishing between what one immediately (unmittelbar) intuits and what is gained by some kind of “founded” or “mediated” intuition. For Husserl, I grasp my own self-experiences (my conscious stream, my feeling of warmth, my sense of time passing, of everything that belongs to what he calls my Eigenheitssphäre, a conception which became more prominent and indeed more complicated in his later writings) immediately, at first
hand, in the flesh, *selbst da*. I know my own personal experiences in a personal manner, *in propria persona*. Besides this vast sphere of givenness that appears to me personally, directly, without intermediary, there is also a sphere of what is gained through analogy, or is founded (to use the language of the third Logical Investigation) on something given directly. According to Husserl I have an immediate and lived experience of my own body and this is present in all my perceptions of things transcendent to me. Thus he makes a distinction between *Empfindnisse*, that is, sensations (the sensations or touchings) which communicate my states to me, and *Empfindungen*, which communicate properties of external bodies, for instance, their roughness or coldness. Then there are the different kinds of givenness of the different objectivities and transcendences I encounter, from physical corporeal things, animate bodies, and so on, right up to mathematical objectivities. Everything outside myself is "other" in this sense: all material entities, living things, animals, humans, social institutions, and so on. But this problem of the constitution of "otherness", of the "not-me" (non-egoic) and of the experience of the region of "ownness" is extremely difficult to articulate, and in a way covers the whole range of phenomenological problems, the whole range of the spheres of givenness.

1.4. Rejection of Inference from Analogy

A standard approach to empathy claimed that I grasp others through some kind of analogical inference based on my understanding of my own psychic states, motivations and actions. Defenders of the inference theory — such as Benno Erdmann — saw empathy as based on a kind of "hypothesis", But the new discussions of empathy in the first quarter of the century — in Lipps, Husserl, Scheler and Stein — were united in their rejection of "inference by analogy" (*Analogieschluss*) as an explanation of empathy. Empathy is not any kind of inference (*Schatz*), whether deliberately and calculatively performed, or even as carried out unconsciously. Thus Husserl counters Erdmann's claim by remarking that, if empathy is a hypothesis, then so must be my memory of what I had for lunch. As he puts it in 1907–8, inference is a sophism: *Auch ist der Schluß ein Sophisma*.22 Husserl usually quotes Lipps on the inference from analogy theory of empathy, but it is important to underscore that Lipps lays out this theory only to criticise it himself. Scheler too rejects the view that our knowledge of others originates from, or is justified by, some "argument from analogy".23 In agreement with Husserl, Scheler denies that we experience the other's state by inference. We do not first experience the body and then infer to a state, only a doctor or scientist does that who has already adopted an abstractive stance.24 Rather we experience the other's state directly: we see an angry face; we don't see a face and infer anger: "It is in the blush that we perceive shame, *in the laughter, joy*", Stein comments that we not only hear a person make an inappropriate remark and blush, we also discern that the person is embarrassed by the remark; but this motivated judgement is not revealed in any sensory appearance.25

1.5. Witasek and the Contrast between Representation and Genuine Experience

Another frequently encountered contrast is between genuinely lived-through experiences and imaginatively represented versions of the experience. Stephan Witasek's discussion of aesthetic empathy involves a contrast between a cognition and a kind of "representation" (*Vorstellung*), where the other's feelings are directly experienced and a "representation view" (*Vorstellungsansicht*), where the other's feelings are pictured in the mind in an *anschauliches Vorstellen*, but not immediately felt. Lipps discusses Witasek critically in his 1905 article, "Weiteres zur

19. See Hua XIII, 36.
22. Hua XIII, 38.
23. Sympathy, xlvii.
24. Ibid., 10.
25. Ibid.
26. See OPE 5–6; 4.
According to Lipps, in the case of aesthetic empathy, in identifying with the other, I am not having a real experience but a "fantasy feeling" (Phantasiegefühl), and in regard to this he departs from Witasek. Similarly, Scheler argues, empathy does not need to "represent" its object in order to have it. Edith Stein maintains that this supposed distinction between intuition and representation conceals the essential "doublesidedness" (Doppelseitigkeit) of the empathic act, which involves an original personally undergone experience which "announces" (bekundet) another actual experience as present but not as personally experienced.

For Stein, as for Husserl, from Witasek. Similarly, Scheler argues, empathy does not need to empathise experience. The other is still, as it were, indexed to the empathic object is not given its object in order to have it. Edith Stein maintains that this supposed distinction between intuition and representation conceals the essential "doublesidedness" (Doppelseitigkeit) of the empathic act, which involves an original personally undergone experience which "announces" (bekundet) another actual experience as present but not as personally experienced. For Stein, as for Husserl, we shall shortly see, empathy is a first-person experience but does not have first-person access to it; for example, I recognise the other's sorrow, but I do not undergo the other's unique experience (although I may enact or undergo a similar or even possibly identical experience of my own). The other is still, as it were, indexed to the empathised experience.

Alexius Meinong, in his Über Annahmen (On Assumptions, 1902, revised 1910) also attacked Witasek's representation view (Lipps also argues against it). He claims that the contrast between "actuality" and "representation" is forced; the actuality view postulates too much, the representation view too little. If persons actually experienced the feelings of a dark tragedy, then the audiences for such theatre would be quite reduced. On the other hand, it is not that I simply intellectually entertain the idea of the suffering: there is genuine affect. He reasons that we do not represent our own inner self-feelings to ourselves and neither do we experience other's feelings as representations. Meinong argues for a third state between direct experiencing and imagining (analogous to assumptions which stand between presentations and judgements). It is "feeling-like" but it is not a feeling and Meinong confesses he cannot further describe it.

2. Theodor Lipps' Introduction of the Concept

Although Meinong, Witasek and others offered accounts of co-experiencing (Mit erleben), it was Theodor Lipps who made the most significant attempt to understand Einfühlung in a number of studies. Indeed, Husserl gives a helpful list of Lipps' passages on empathy in his own notes; Ezhe Grundfragen (1899; 2nd ed. 1905), Ein­

29. See ibid., 478.
30. OPE 19; 20.
31. Scheler, in the second edition of his Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympa-

32. See Meinong, On Assumptions, 223.
33. See Hua XIX, 76 n. 2.
37. See Hua XIII, XIV, XV.
them, desire them, and so on, but I can also find myself thinking of things, judging, striving, and so on. This "self-objectivation" (Selbstobjektivation) or "appresentation" is already Einfühlung. Through this self-objectivation my own experiences become objects for me and, so to speak, foreign to me. As we have seen, Lipps employs the term Einfühlung for the manner in which I relate to earlier states of my own self, for example, in the sphere of memory. When, for example, I recover a past experience, I have to transfer my fear into the other. It will be part of Husserl's critique of Lipps that he does not give a clear account of the kinds of expressions (bodily, emotive, linguistic, etc.) or of the establishment of the kind of apperception involved:

Lipps does not distinguish between the hierarchy of "expressions" and the differentiated intentional sense of expressions. (Lipps scheidet nicht die Stufenfolge der "Ausdrücke" und den entscheidenden intentionalen Sinn der Ausdrücke.)

Husserl himself says in 1913 that he never made these "expressions" of the other a central part of his own analysis of empathy. He finds it difficult to grasp what empathy is for Lipps. It is clearly an apperception of a special, novel kind, but Lipps has not spelt out the conditions for its being evidenced. Clearly, it cannot be originary (ursprünglich) apperception, unlike the experience of Leib as Leib which Husserl will make basic.

2.1. Lipps' Leitfaden der Psychologie

A classic source for the discussion of empathy is Lipps' Leitfaden der Psychologie, written in the style of an elementary psychology textbook. Following the tradition of Brentano, Lipps divides psychology into descriptive (beschreibende) and explanatory (erklärende). He characterises psychology as a "science of experience" (Erfahrungswissenschaft) and as the "doctrine of consciousness and of conscious experiences" (die Lehre vom Bewußtsein und den Bewußtseinservorkeim), 45 For Lipps, the experiences in question are always attached to the expressions of others. In the second edition of his Leitfaden der Psychologie (1906) Lipps himself concedes that I don't see my own expressions first but those of the other. Lipps argues that we do not judge the other to be in fear. I can hear a cry of fear and feel the other is fearful without feeling fear myself so it is not the case that I transfer my fear into the other. It will be part of Husserl's critique of Lipps that he does not give a clear account of the kinds of expressions (bodily, emotive, linguistic, etc.) or of the establishment of the kind of apperception involved:

Lipps does not distinguish between the hierarchy of "expressions" and the differentiated intentional sense of expressions. (Lipps scheidet nicht die Stufenfolge der "Ausdrücke" und den entscheidenden intentionalen Sinn der Ausdrücke.)

Husserl himself says in 1913 that he never made these "expressions" of the other a central part of his own analysis of empathy. He finds it difficult to grasp what empathy is for Lipps. It is clearly an apperception of a special, novel kind, but Lipps has not spelt out the conditions for its being evidenced. Clearly, it cannot be originary (ursprünglich) apperception, unlike the experience of Leib as Leib which Husserl will make basic.

2.1. Lipps' Leitfaden der Psychologie

A classic source for the discussion of empathy is Lipps' Leitfaden der Psychologie, written in the style of an elementary psychology textbook. Following the tradition of Brentano, Lipps divides psychology into descriptive (beschreibende) and explanatory (erklärende). He characterises psychology as a "science of experience" (Erfahrungswissenschaft) and as the "doctrine of consciousness and of conscious experiences" (die Lehre vom Bewußtsein und den Bewußtseinserlebnis). For Lipps, the experiences in question are always attached to

41. Hua XIII, 76 (Beilage XVI).
42. See Hua XIII, 70.
43. See Lipps, Leitfaden, 1-2.
44. Ibid., 1.
45. Ibid. It is to be distinguished from natural science, which studies the regularities of sensuous appearances (Erscheinungen) of the real (das Wirkliche) without questioning what it is to be real. Psychology, on the other hand, studies consciousness as the actual, but since it questions what that actuality is, psychology belongs to philosophy.
an ego. Indeed, in his personal copy of Leitfaden Husserl underlines the words "the primary and immediately experienced I" in reference to the "I" of which Lipps speaks: *Das Ich, vom dem Ich im Obigen redete, ist das primäre oder unmittelbar erlebte Ich.* Husserl also underlines Lipps' discussion of "my immediately lived sphere of control" (mein unmittelbar erlebte Machts-Sphäre), which includes my body. It is important to note that the ego had played little role in Husserl's *Investigations,* and it is likely that it was Lipps (along with Natorp) who drew his attention to the importance of the ego and the lived body (a theme also prominent in Scheler).

In *Leitfaden,* Lipps' discussion is wide-ranging, including topics such as the meaning of psychic energy, the nature of perception, apperception, and judgement. The fifth section of the book treats of "Knowledge and Error" (*Erkenntnis und Irrtum*), and there, in chapter XIV, he discusses "the sources of knowledge" (*Erkenntnisquellen*), among which he includes Einfühlung. Lipps postulates: "There are three regions of knowledge (*Erkenntnisgebiete*). I know about things, about myself, and about other I's." He lays down a rule that in the first region knowledge has its source in sensuous perception, in the second region in inner perception, and in the third in Einfühlung, which he explains as "an objectivation of my experiences in an object which is distinct from me" (*Objektivierung meiner in einem von mir unterschiedenen Gegenstandes*).

There are different forms of empathy according to the chapter in *Leitfaden.* The first kind is "general apperceptive empathy." The second is die Stimmungseinfühlung, mood empathy. The third kind is an empirically conditioned apperceptive empathy, *empirisch bedingte apperceptive Einfühlung* which I find in nature. If I see a line and say, "the line is pointing upwards", this "pointing upwards" is experienced through empathy. (Similarly presumably: the house is "facing" west.) Following Hume, Lipps does not limit empathy to human beings but sees it as based on an imitative tendency across animals and living organisms.

One of the most important distinctions Lipps introduces is that between positive and negative empathy. Possibly borrowing from Husserl's account of *Einfühlung* in the *Investigations,* Lipps defines empathy in terms of a tendency towards fullness or completeness of experience. In fully positive empathy there exists first of all for me a unique I which is projected into the other organism. Lipps speaks of "inner participation" (*inneres Miteinander*) in the experiences of others, and he characterises the most "complete" or "full" kind of empathy in the situation where there is oneness or identification between my state and that of the other. All our experiences tend towards this "full" kind of experiencing. There is a tendency towards "fulfilment" (*Erfüllung*). Stein will criticise Lipps for confusing the tendency towards fullness of an experience with the identification of oneself with it. She says I can remember being embarrassed but instead of again becoming one with this embarrassment, I may now find it amusing. Stein denies that the tendency towards fulfilment of experiences is itself empathy as Lipps seems to think. In contrast to full and positive empathy, there is an "empty" empathy when I try to empathise with someone but something in me opposes it and renders it null. Here the tendency towards fullness breaks down, my efforts at empathy are checked.

Lipps' somewhat casual analyses of empathy were much discussed in the Göttingen circle, but in general his work was regarded as theoretically naïve. Stein believed Lipps' approach was at once too broad and not sufficiently specific in recognising the distinctive essence of empathy as a kind of experiencing of the other in its own right. Moreover, she did not accept his characterisation of *Einfühlung* in terms of identification or what she termed *Auffassung* ("feeling one with"). Husserl believes Lipps overemphasised the role of the other's "expressions" without realising that they can be expressions only if the other's body is already recognised as *Leib.* Lipps had also emphasised the immediate and instinctive nature of empathy, whereas Husserl believes it to be founded.

46. *Ibid.,* 3; Husserl's underlining.
47. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
51. Ibid., 225.
52. Ibid., 227.
The basis of empathy is some kind of imitation (Nachahmung). Scheler argues that we understand from the wagging tail that a dog is happy to see us, but not on the basis that we are able to imitate this behaviour ourselves.\textsuperscript{37} We can understand gestures we cannot ourselves perform.\textsuperscript{56} For Scheler, we already take the existence of other animate beings for granted and do not infer such animateness. He believes that we have empathy with creatures far different from us and whose affective states do not directly resemble ours in their bodily expression. Moreover, in our experience of our own bodies, it is not our bodies we experience but our intentions to move, whereas what we see in others are facial expressions and so on. These do not resemble each other. Scheler also criticises Lipps' assumption that empathy is based on the reproduction in oneself of another's experience. Scheler acknowledges that in empathy we do have the sense that the other's feelings are in some sense given, but there is no reproduction in oneself of that experience; rather it is primarily given.\textsuperscript{59} Lipps' account of empathy would restrict it to experiences we had already encountered in ourselves, whereas for Scheler:

A person who has never undergone mortal terror can still understand and envisage it, just as he can also share in it.\textsuperscript{61} Imitation theory would only arrive at my own feeling aroused by my imitating a gesture I perceive in the other body. There is a gap or discrepancy in the explanation proposed here by the imitation theory. Stein, on the other hand, believes that imitation really explains a different phenomenon, namely emotional "contagion" (Gefühlstransferung) or "transference" (Gefühlsübertragung); a child hears another child crying and she cries herself.\textsuperscript{62} There is no communication of understanding of the other's grief here, but merely one grief evoking another without specific motivation. Stein also points out that sometimes I am driven to imitate (or find myself involuntarily imitating) a facial expression without the accompanying emotion.\textsuperscript{63}

3. Max Scheler's Analysis of Sympathy or Fellow-Feeling (Mitgefühl)

Max Scheler published his Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiefühle und von Liebe und Haß in 1913, planned as the first part of a series of studies entitled, Die Sinngesetze des emotionalen Lebens ("The Laws of Meaning of Emotional Life") which would include studies of shame, fear, resentment, and the sense of honour. Here he is particularly interested in the moral dimension of true fellow-feeling as opposed to what Husserl is interested in, namely, the "apprehending, understanding, and, in general, reproducing (emotionally) the experiences of others".\textsuperscript{64} In the preface to the first edition, he says he is aiming to produce a "phenomenological basis for a philosophical ethics",\textsuperscript{65} and the work should be seen as complementary to his 1913 study on Formalism in Ethics.\textsuperscript{66} His overall aim can be found stated in a footnote towards the end of the book where he remarks:

There are few more important tasks for present-day philosophy than to provide a phenomenological basis for the knowledge of life, and hence to give biology a place in the field of epistemology that is independent of physics and chemistry, no less than of psychology.\textsuperscript{67}

In pursuit of this overall aim, he wants to identify the structural laws governing emotional life in general. He sees this as a scientific development of Pascal's idea of "the reasons of the heart which reason does not know". In the preface to the second edition, he posits "laws of

\textsuperscript{57} Sympathy, 11.
\textsuperscript{58} Edith Stein approves of Scheler's argument here, see OPE 23 n.; 24 n. 1.
\textsuperscript{59} See Sympathy, 45-56.
\textsuperscript{60} Sympathy, 47.
\textsuperscript{61} See OPE 23; 24.

\textsuperscript{62} See ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} This raises questions with regard to one aspect of Husserl's account of empathy, since he maintains that "transference" (Übertragung) is an essential element of it.
\textsuperscript{64} Sympathy, 8.
\textsuperscript{65} Sympathy, II.
\textsuperscript{67} Sympathy, 242 n. 1.
intention” which are independent of the causal laws concerning the body and the psychosomatic realm. Scheler credits Hermann Lotze in his Microcosmos as the first to identify these laws of emotional life, which, however, remained undeveloped by him.

Scheler’s specific aim is to offer a phenomenological description of sympathy and specifically “fellow-feeling” (Mitgefühl) and then to provide characterisations of love, compassion and related phenomena. He is doing eidetic phenomenology, claiming to be operating under the phenomenological reduction (bracketing issues of actual existence) in order to arrive at the essence of the phenomenon. His discussion is wide-ranging, and indeed he recognises that sympathy or fellow-feeling is a “many-sided” problem. He wants to show the primary nature of fellow-feeling as innate and belonging to the constitution of an emotional being, “an ultimate and original function of the spirit.”

The book begins with a phenomenological clarification of the nature of empathy and then goes on to examine and reject various “genetic” and “metaphysical” theories of sympathy to be found in Schopenhauer, Bergson, E. von Hartmann, Simmel, Dilthey, and others. Much more than Husserl, he draws on a huge field of evidence from psychology, anthropology, philosophy, biology, evolutionary theory, sociology, and so on. He wants to recognise the full range of feelings and their social and historical specificity (for example, the Indian feeling of “unity with the cosmos”), and therefore discusses not just Lipps and Erdmann (as does Husserl), but (unusually for the phenomenological tradition) Freud, Darwin, and anthropologists such as Lévy-Bruhl, as well as Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain, among many others. Scheler always has difficulties in being systematic and tends to jump from one theme to another.

But as Edith Stein says, Scheler is always interesting.

Scheler believes our moral relations with others already presuppose that we can understand them. Fellow-feeling, therefore, presupposes

68. Sympathy, xlv.
70. Sympathy, xlvii.
71. Sympathy, 130.
72. See Hua XIII, 36.
73. Sympathy, 8.
74. See Sympathy, 5.
75. Sympathy, 5.

the knowledge of the “fact, nature and quality” of others’ experiences. For Scheler, moreover, sympathy is essentially different from love. Fellow-feeling is blind to value, for Scheler. For instance, one can share another’s joy in someone else’s misfortune, but that is hardly moral. In a situation of love, on the other hand, values are recognised: we can regret that the other has such and such a fault while still loving him or her. We love him with his faults. Fellow-feeling is independent of this sphere of valuation.

Contrary to what British moral philosophers maintain, sympathy on its own is not capable of supporting the moral emotions. Scheler is suspicious of the British moral tradition’s account of “benevolence”, often based on pity. He argues against postulating sympathy as the basis of morality with a simple knockdown argument: one must already recognise the moral feeling as good and morally worthy before sympathising with it: “It is certainly not moral to sympathise with someone’s pleasure in evil, his chagrin in contemplating goodness, or with his hatred, malice or spite.” If one were to empathise with Hitler’s desire to exterminate the Jews, how could that empathy provide a basis for morality? Rather it is the reverse: it is because moral feelings are recognised as morally justified that we can empathise with them. The moral feeling theory had not regarded the being or character of the agent as moral, but instead had placed its emphasis on the spectator in the situation, one who experiences sympathy with another. Secondly, Scheler believes we pass moral judgements on ourselves where no sympathy is involved, and so sympathy cannot be the basis for moral sentiment. Adam Smith, on the contrary, according to Scheler, held that no man on his own would ascribe ethical value to his own conduct, but would do so only by adopting the spectator attitude towards his own conduct. Scheler dismisses this.

Scheler first tries to disentangle a number of related conditions: distinguishing between fellow-feeling (Mitgefühl), shared feeling with another (Miteinanderfühlen), imitative feeling or “feeling-after” someone (Nachgeführt), “identification” or “feeling one with” (Eingetführt) — for example in an infant or between hypnotised and hypnotist — feelings of solidarity, commiseration or pity (Mitleid), celebration-with or
rejoicing-with another (Mifreude), esprit de corps, emotional infection (Gefühlstansteckung) in a crowd (at a football match, say), or when someone else’s jollity lifts me into a state of joy, to states of mass psychosis, and so on. This is a typical attempt at descriptive psychology, first to identify the whole range of emotional types. In his second edition he admits that his first account did not fully appreciate the extent of the problem, and was not exact enough (did not separate the problems enough) or systematic enough.76

Scheler believes it is important to recognise the difference between an "apprehension" (Auffassung) or "understanding" (Verständnis) of another’s emotions, on the one hand, and their imaginative representation by us in a kind of "imitative feeling" (Nachfühlen) without it being lived through genuinely by us. For Scheler, sympathy is founded on "feeling after": Nachfühlen fundiert Mitgeführt; but is not the same as it. Scheler further wants to distinguish between merely imaginative sympathy and the cognitive sympathy by means of which we truly understand others more generally (he has little to say about this issue, which will be Husserl’s central problematic). There is the imaginative envisioning of the experience of another (for example, by a novelist) without the actual experiencing of the experience. One can “visualise” another’s feelings without actually feeling them. We can reproduce feeling in imagination or memory. Scheler distinguishes between genuine sympathy or fellow-feeling and immediate feelings of solidarity (unmittelbares Mitfühl).77 There are feelings of esprit de corps, for example.

Emotional “infection” or “contagion” (Gefühlstansteckung) is often confused with fellow-feeling but is essentially different, according to Scheler. We can be affected by the mood in a pub or a party, swept up in the general atmosphere of a football match and so on. But this is different from fellow-feeling: “... it is a characteristic of emotional infection that it occurs only as a transference of the state of feeling, and does not presuppose any sort of knowledge of the joy which others feel.”78 Emotional infection is involuntary, non-cognitive, “unconscious” and has a tendency to be reciprocal so that one infects the other, who is infected back in turn.79 Emotional identification Scheler sees as a heightened stage of infection.

Scheler recognises quite a variety of cases of genuine identity. While he criticises Lips for assuming that empathy is essentially a kind of identification, Scheler does recognise that identification plays a role in cases of totemism in primitive thought (where, citing the Bororo tribe, an individual identifies with the totemic animal),80 in childhood games and fantasy, in the relation of hypnotist and subject, split or multiple personality, and so on, including cases of identification discussed by Freud.81 Scheler sees identification as an earlier stage than empathy when he comments: “What is empathy in the adult is self-identification for the child.”82

With regard to Mitinanderfühlen, “community of feeling”, Scheler recognises the difference between two parents — each with his or her own grief over the death of their child. Both have their own individual grief, but each also recognises the other’s grief to have the same object, to be of the same intensity, etc. They are not just grieving “alongside” one another, they share the same grief.83 Scheler believes that these emotions have their own intentional content. There is a content of sorrow which is the same for both. But he argues that the sensations present are distinct, each parent has his or her own.

However central identification is to experience, Scheler believes true fellow-feeling is different from identification. Real sympathy for Scheler consists in sympathy with the other individual; not in the fact that their feeling is fused with mine in some kind of identification. In true sympathy I respect the other’s individuality and recognise it as he or she who is having the experience, and I don’t try to...

76. See Sympathy, 216.
78. Sympathy, 15.
79. Scheler’s remarks on how public opinion is formed in this way (see Sympathy, 15) must surely have been one source of Heidegger’s discussion of Befindlichkeit (“state of mind”) and “publicity” or “publicness” (Offentlichkeit), as the kind of being belonging to the “they”, in Being and Time, §29. Scheler is mentioned there for treating affective life as not just an accommodation to cognitive life but as intertwined with it.
81. Scheler cites Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, where section 7 is devoted to studies of Identification.
82. Sympathy, 24.
83. See Sympathy, 12–3.
substitute my feeling for theirs. Indeed, in true fellow-feeling there is no reference to the state of my feelings at all: B's feeling is commiserated with and not undergone by the sympathiser A. Real sympathy preserves the other's difference. While Scheler wants to maintain that genuine fellow-feeling is distinct from identification of oneself with the other, he recognises (with Lipps) that a degree of identification is involved in our awareness that another being is animate:

The epistemological conclusion of this book will show us how, to be aware of any organism as alive, to distinguish even the simplest animate movement from an inanimate one, a minimum of undifferentiated identification is necessary; we shall see how the simplest vicarious emotion, the most elementary fellow-feeling, and over and above these the capacity for understanding between minds, are built up on the basis of this primitive givenness of "the other." Scheler maintains that this capacity for identification is stronger in "civilised" humans than in animales and children, and has atrophied into some general patterns in modern life (he allows that women have a higher intuitive sense than men).

Finally, for Scheler, as for Husserl, there is a problem with Lipps' account that what I really experience in Lipps' version of empathy will be myself in the body of the other, and not the other per se. Scheler questions the claim that what I am given primarily are my own experiences. He remarks on the dangers of assuming something as self-evident which is actually a matter of metaphysical assumption. How can I experience my own thoughts as my own? Many of our own experiences are not actually "internal" in the way previous psychology had thought. I experience the self-givenness of the other directly.

Scheler believes that this identification takes place at a level between the bodily localised sensations and feelings and those of higher spiritual consciousness. Scheler believes — with Husserl — that my bodily consciousness is mine alone. But he recognises an intermediate

84. See Sympathy, 41; also 45.
85. Sympathy, 31.
86. See Sympathy, 32. For Scheler, the loss of the capacity for identification in more "civilised" humanity is testimony that evolution is not necessarily progressive in its development.
87. See Sympathy, 244-5.
88. See Sympathy, 23.
recognises the distinctiveness of life and of the "experience of life" (Erleben des Lebens), which includes the experience of waxing and waning, growth and decline of life. He assumes an original "undifferentiated" flow of life which is only later individualised in the growth of the child.95

To summarise, Scheler offers fascinating but ultimately uncoordinated insights into the essence of empathy (fellow-feeling) in contrast to other similar states. His major influence will be on Edith Stein, who offers both summaries and criticisms of Scheler's position in her 1917 On the Problem of Empathy.

4. Edmund Husserl's Developing Interest in Empathy from 1905 to 1938

Husserl's repeated meditations on empathy over a period of thirty years are illuminating but not entirely satisfactory. He wants to clarify a concept he inherited from Lipps, Erdmann, Scheler and others. In contrast to Scheler's interest in our affective and emotional life, and his specific interest in giving a phenomenological account of "fellow-feeling" (Mitgefühl), Husserl's is a different, more basic question: how do I recognise, understand, cognise the other? His investigations into the empathic experience of the other emerged from 1905 onward when he was also examining the nature of intersubjectivity and, indeed, the nature of objectivity. These topics are closely related. As Stein puts it, "empathy as the basis of intersubjective experience becomes the condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world, as Husserl and also Royce present it."96

Husserl himself will say in his Intersubjectivity writings that, in constituting myself as a body, I am constituting a "solipsistic world", whereas, in order to constitute an intersubjective world, I must employ empathy.97 Husserl always begins with the perceptual grasp of a physical object that is before us, in propria persona, leibhaftig gegeben. Somewhat ironically, and as Edith Stein will notice, he describes the presence of objects in terms of the paradigm of the experience of other persons. But for him, the experience of another person is always founded on the perception of an object, albeit in a specific way. Even more basically, Husserl says that, genetically speaking, we must constitute ourselves as living bodies before we can grasp the other.98 The grasp of the other has a certain "relatedness backwards" (Rückbeziehung) to my body.99 The other is therefore grasped by a mediated perception.

4.1. The Emergence of Empathy as a Theme in Husserl (c. 1905)

According to Iso Kern, Husserl's earliest use of the term Einfühlung, borrowed directly from Lipps, dates from around 1905, and occurs first in his lectures on judgement.100 As Kern recognises, it is difficult to ascertain Husserl's theory of empathy in the years 1905–09 as his remarks on it are scattered and unsystematic excerpts and abstracts that he himself gathered together in the years 1914–16. Furthermore, many of his notes consist of excerpts from Lipps with interpolated brief comments. Husserl thinks Lipps is unappreciative of the multi-layered aspects of the constitution of others and sweeps everything together under the term "expression" (ignoring the complexity of linguistic expression), as well as appealing to unclarified "instincts" which Husserl labels "a refuge of phenomenological ignorance" (ein Refugium der phänomenologischen Ignoranz).101

Husserl's initial distinctive contribution to the problem of empathy is his focus on the apprehension of the other's body as sensitive, as he confirms in a short discussion note, written around 1913, when

95. Husserl comments on this aspect of Scheler's thought in a footnote, Hua XIII, 73 n. 1.
96. OE 66; 72.
97. See Hua XIV, 8.
98. See Hua XIII, 333.
99. See Hua XIV, 7.
100. See E. Husserl, Urlehrbure Vorlesung 1905, ed. E. Schuhmann, Materialienbände, 5 (Doedrecht: Kluwer, 2002). Here Einfühlung is used to refer to the "mode of consciousness relating, by a neutrality modification, to non-doxic, non-objectivating acts" (Hua XIII, xxvi): Husserl refers to the difference between an actual question and empathy in the question, an actual joy and empathy in the joy. At this point he also uses the terms sich hineindanken and sich hineinphantasieren (Hua XIII, xxvi). But Husserl goes further in these lectures and designates objectivating acts such as "quasi-judgements" as empathies: mere presentation is an empathic modification of a judgement. This is close to Lipps for whom aesthetic empathy is a "quasi judgement". But Meinong, as we have seen, uses the term in a similar manner in Über Annahmen.
he states that his researches on empathy had not made the "expression" of the psyche's movements and utterances of the other into a major theme; rather he had begun from the recognition of the other body as sensitive and as possessing a sensory field of its own. Husserl believes that the constitution of the psychic on top of the organic body is the first problematic for empathy, not, as Lipps believes, expressive movements and expressions (Aufführungen) of a foreign soul (he refers to the Leitfaden, second edition of 1906). For Husserl (as indeed for Scheler) these bodily expressions are already mediated by the primary apprehension of the foreign body as Leib. To see something as a gesture or expression is already to recognise the presence of another intentional consciousness.

4.2. Empathy as Apperception

In agreement with Lipps, Husserl classifies empathy as a kind of apperception (Vergegenwärtigung, Apperzeption), "calling to mind", "presentation" or "presentation", that is, not a perception which gives the thing directly in propria persona, in the flesh, but a certain kind of quasi-perceptual awareness "intertwoven" (verflochten) with, and founded on, these perceptions. In his Passive Synthesis lectures, Husserl defines it as "a consciousness of having something that is not present in the original." He also speaks of "co-presentation" (Koprepräsentation) or "co-perception" (Mitwahrnehmung). Husserl employs the term "presentation" (Vergegenwärtigung) to cover a huge range of experiences including memories, fantasies, anticipations, awareness of the hidden side of a physical object, and so on: "There are different levels of apperception corresponding to different layers of objective sense." For Husserl, as for Stein, empathy is an experience, by which they mean it is a first-person undergone event with a certain character which is different from that of a mode of inference or reasoning. He criticizes Lipps' notion of a non-experienced apprehension of the other as a kind of apperception since all apperception is eo ipso a kind of experience (Erfahrungssrepräsentation). But, for all this stress on Erfahrung, the particular kind of experience involved in empathy is not cashed out by Husserl. Husserl's basic contrast lies between what we experience as our own in our own immediate sphere and what we co-experience as other in some sense. Thus, in his published text, Ideas I, §1 (1913), Husserl had already made a distinction between what is experienced in an originary manner, namely external transcendent things in immediate perception, experience of our own states of consciousness, versus non-originary experiences such as the object given in memory or expectation. He already says at this point that we do not have "originary experience" (originäre Erfahrung) of others in empathy. Already Husserl characterizes empathy as an "intuitive, presentive act" (ein anschaulenden, gebenden Akt), but not one which presents, originär. That is, in normal external perception of transcendent things, there is a process whereby the whole is given in a series of profiles, and at any one time, there is actual perception of one side and a co-presentation in an empty way or an "appresentation" of the absent other sides. Now, empathy is a version of this kind of experience of another thing, but it is not exactly the same, as Husserl makes clear. Husserl distinguishes in a perception between the actual moments that are originally given or present themselves in a Darstellung in what he calls "primary originarity" (primäre Originarität), and what he calls the "secondary originarity" of the empytly co-presented other sides of the object that do not actually appear.

---

102. See Hua XIII, 70 (Beilage XVI).
103. See Sympathy, 241.
104. See Hua XIII, 70.
106. Hua XIII, 25
107. CM §50, 111; Hua I, 141.
110. See, for example, CM, §50.
Of course, in perception, we actually see the object as a whole and not just the Abschattung or profile of it,\(^{111}\) although this profile can be made the focus of another perception. When I see a box, I do not see the interior of the box. However, for external objects there is a possibility of fulfilling this empty intention by a new perception (opening the lid and looking in). If I see one side I can in principle see the other sides. This is a law of nature: "Appresentation of this sort [perceiving an external physical thing] involves the possibility of verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation (the back becomes the front)."\(^{112}\) A projective presentification is filled by a further genuine perception. But the apperceived internal life of the other will never become visible by a movement to a new position. This clearly marks off empathy from thing-perception.\(^{113}\) The other's inner experience is never given in the mode of its being perceivable. This kind of perceptual verification is excluded a priori.\(^{114}\) Husserl believes every apperception has its own kind of fulfillment or cancellation, and this is not recognised by Lipps. Moreover, its apperceptions are not fulfilled by actual perception. For Husserl, then, it is crucial to empathy that it is a presentification that in principle cannot be verified in the manner in which I verify my own projective experiences or anticipations.

4.3. The Recognition of Leib as Leib

Husserl believes empathy is constituted by Leibkörperlichkeit ("lived bodiness"). He claims that the perception of the other as a subject is founded on another analogising perception of another Leib as Leib, what he calls the lowest level of empathy.\(^{115}\) We attribute sensations, freedom of movement, a separate point of view, different aspects of things as seen from that perspective, and so on. In an early account in Hua XIII, 21ff. (written before 1909 but put together probably in 1916), Husserl speaks of the other body as given as an "analogon of my interiority" (ein Analogon meiner Innerlichkeit), a phrase that often recurs in later manuscripts.\(^{116}\) But there is a complication. I can see a pencil with a feather attached. I can see one without, and thus I can say a "pencil without a feather". The feather does not have to be there. Similarly, if I see the body of a doll or the like, I can see it as a human body without its inner psychic life.\(^{117}\) Husserl wonders what is missing. If a portrait of a person were made of flesh and blood, would we see it as the person? I grasp my own body in a special experience of my own field of sensations and sphere of movements which are given as originary presentations and not presentifications.

Husserl rejects the account of empathy in terms of reasoning by analogy. Whereas Lipps sees empathy as an immediate projection into the experiences of the other, Husserl sees it as mediated. It is a non-independent moment that belongs to, and makes possible, concrete perception. Husserl is notoriously vague about what constitutes this, and especially what constitutes its opposite, namely original presentation. In an early text (prior to 1909), Husserl even equates "originality" (Urprünglichkeit), "originarity" (Originariät), and what he calls "impressionality" (Impressionalität).\(^{118}\)

My apperception of "my body" has a kind of absolute primordiality for Husserl. My own experience of my own body is unique, given in a unique way. It is given as a unity but I am not given to myself as "human being," but rather, as Husserl says, as an "I am" with capacities of moving, fields of sensation, and so on. I can of course genuinely perceive my body externally (my hand, say) as an external transcendent object, but at the same time I have an inner sensuous awareness of it. It belongs to my "interiority" (Innerlichkeit).\(^{119}\) This leads Husserl even to speak of the manner in which my own body is given as "subjective-objective."\(^{120}\) It is not a simple "in itself". Husserl later emphasises the sense in which I am always present to myself within my own sphere of experience. I have furthermore a sense of myself as "governing" or "holding sway" (waltend) in this region. According to Husserl, in his 1910/11 course Fundamental

\(^{111}\) See Hua XIII, 26.
\(^{112}\) CM, §50, 109; Hua I, 139.
\(^{113}\) See Hua XIV, 4–5.
\(^{114}\) See CM §50, 109; Hua I, 139.
\(^{115}\) See Hua XIII, no. 4: "Stufen der Einfühlung", 62.
\(^{116}\) For example, Hua XIV, 5.
\(^{117}\) See Hua XIII, 22.
\(^{118}\) Hua XIV, 25.
\(^{119}\) Hua XIV, 4.
\(^{120}\) Hua XIV, 6.
Problems of Phenomenology, §39, however, there is no "canal" (kein Kanal) connecting my psychic stream with that of another, and one experience cannot be in the "environment" (Umggebung) of another, although (and this is important) they do belong to the same temporal frame. Indeed, this temporal coincidence is an important structural feature of empathy, as Stein will stress. The empathised experience is experienced as being in the same "now" as my own experience. The other experience is given in a presentified "now" which is identified with my "now", yet there is no road linking one "now" with the other. The other "now" cannot be brought to intuition by me. Yet it is experienced as actually present. There is recognition of a plurality of I's, a plurality of monads. 122

4.4. Empathy in Husserl's Middle Period

To represent his middle period, I cite from Husserl's Lectures on Passive Synthesis, where he gives a brief but concentrated characterisation of empathy as an empty presentifying act whose object is actually present:

We could still point to a shape of presentifying something present (Gestalt von Vermachtnissen von Gegenwärtigem), and a quite curious shape indeed. I mean empathy as the consciousness through which an alien psychic life (fremdes Seelenleben) can be given to an ego in its life of consciousness (in seinem Bewusstsein). Empathy necessarily arises in its original form in connection with transcendent perception. It is based on (sie stuft sich auf) the perception of the alien lived-corposity (fremder Leiblichkeit) as a physical thing-like body (als physischer Dinglichkeit), by this thing being apprehended through its similarity (Ähnlichkeit) to my own lived body as lived body (als Leib). In a manner similar to the way in which I become co-conscious (mitebzwulit) of the non-visible aspects of a thing through the empty intentions of perception, through "empathy" I become co-conscious of the alien psychic life, an alien psychic life that is inaccessible to direct perception as such, and for the most part in an empty manner. Thus empathy means here a level of founded presentation (Sicht aufgetrufter Vorstellung) that is connected to the perception of the lived-body-thing, a presentation which, when brought to intuition has its own mode of bringing to intuition (Veranschaulichung) and its own mode of fulfillment. It is an empathy making co-present (eine bere Mitgegenwärtigung), a presentification of consciousness that is made co-present and that belongs to the lived body, a consciousness, however, whose process of bringing to intuition certainly has to embark upon quite different paths than those peculiar to the non-visible aspects of the thing-like body. 123

This account is replicated many times in XIII and XIV and indeed a version of it is given in Cartesian Meditations V. It may be said to represent Husserl's classic statement of the nature of empathy.

The other living person is grasped not just as a body but perceived immediately as Leib. Husserl speaks of some kind of "apperceptive transfer" or "carrying over" (Übertragung) 124 based on association or likeness (which raises the question of how this differs from Lipps' account). According to Husserl, the experience of the other person is not that of a free-floating soul, nor do I simply attribute an inner psychic life to another body by analogy with my own. Rather I directly apprehend a "physico-psychic" complex of body and soul, an animate body which has "introjected" into it an individual psychic life. There must be similarities connecting our two bodies which form the basis of an "analogising apperception". In agreement with Lipps, this is not to be understood as an inference by analogy, since it is not a specifically thinking act. 125 There is rather a pointing back to an Unstiftung, an act of "primal instituting" where something with a similar sense was grasped for the first time. This involves an analogising transfer. As Husserl describes it in Cartesian Meditations, the child who sees scissors for the first time is then able to pick out differently shaped and coloured scissors as the same kind of thing. There is no explicit "reproducing, comparing, inferring". 126 But there is little offered in the way of explanation of the basis for the perceived similarities. There is givenness and there is a "transfer".

One of Husserl's earliest texts on the matter, dating from 1909, distinguishes between perceptions of physical, spatial objects and perceptions of "flesh", living bodies, perceptions of persons. 127 The second is divisible into two kinds: experiences of self and experiences

121. See Hua XIII, 189.
122. See Hua XIII, 190-2.
of the other. The perceiver sees his body and not a body that he infers to be his (contrary to Sartre's discussion of the alien hand). He cannot see any other living body in the same way. Part of my constitution of my own body depends on my ability to move. Perspectives of an object vary with my bodily variations. Stein will claim that even my sense of my own body as a centre of movement depends on my experience of the other.

4.5. Association and Pairing

In *Cartesian Meditations* and elsewhere, Husserl emphasises the element of "pairing" (Paarung). This is an associative relation between two bodies where the one (myself) is always present and there is a continuous "primal constituting" going on to the other self: "Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as 'association', in contrast to passive synthesis of 'identification'."¹²⁸ There seems to be a stress here on the actual presence of two conscious-nesses together, or at least of two living bodies being present to one another. There also is an element of imaginative insertion into the life of another.

Husserl has a difficult balancing act to perform. On the one hand, he notes in the *Cartesian Meditations*, §50:

> Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other is himself there before us "in person" (Leibhaftig). On the other hand, this being there in person (Leibhaftigkeit) does not keep us from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes (Erfahrungen) nor his appearances (Erscheinungen) themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence (Eigenwesen), becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same.¹²⁹

The point is that the other is real and presents himself or herself in person, but the kind of "in person" here does not provide access to the person's own viewpoints, processes, experiences, his own site of phenomenality. The other is not a moment of myself, even though it is constituted by me. It is constituted by me as other. It is given in a "co-presencing" (Mitgegenwärtig-Machen) or "appresentation". In this sense there is certain "mediation" of intentionality going on.

One of the clearest articulations of Husserl's understanding of how it is that I experience the other person is given in Hua XIV, text no. 35, which was written in preparation for lectures in 1927. Husserl states the matter simply: "The perception of another human is original perception in respect of his corporeality; in respect of the alien subjectivity it is first of all empty presentification. (Die Wahrnehmung eines anderen Menschen ist originale Wahrnehmung hinsichtlich seiner Körperelemente; hinsichtlich der fremden Subjektivität ist es zunächst leer Wahrnehmung)."¹³⁰ This presentification of foreign or alien subjectivity is experienced in the present, as actual, accompanied by a sense of presence of self, of there being a surrounding environment, as having its own "zero point" of orientation, and so on. What he sees is identified with what I see, and so on. I can imaginatively place myself in the position of the other, but the other is not a "reduplication" (eine Reduplikation)¹³¹ of myself. Rather I experience another personality governing or reigning in his lived body. I experience the other as distinct from me, apart from me: "I am fat, he is thin; I am tall, he is small", and so on.¹³² The other is an alter. But when I see him touching his arm, it awakes in me the experience of my arm being touched, and so on. Husserl claims that my lived body is an interpretative moment in the interpretation of the other, but my body in this moment is presentified and not presented as perceived. Similarly, when I remember something that happened, that event is presentified in the present and is in a situation of Deckung or "covering" with the present"¹³³ They coincide. Even if I am completely absorbed in the memory and live in it, nevertheless, it coincides with my present.¹³⁴ It is covered over

¹²⁸. CM, §50.
¹²⁹. CM §50, 108–9; Hua I, 139.
¹³⁰. Hua XIV, 523.
¹³¹. Hua IV, 525.
¹³². See Hua XIV, 527.
¹³³. According to Marianne Szwicki, *Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 103, the term Deckung is used in geometry to mean congruence. She offers the term "overlay".
¹³⁴. See Hua XIV, 528.
and yet it is still present. In the case of the perception of the other lived body it appears with a presentification of my lived body in "coincidence" (Deckung) with it.

In his middle years, Husserl likes to speak of "interpretation" (Interpretation) with regard to grasping the mind of a child, animals, and so on in a developmental or genetic manner. Husserl takes the experience of the other's subjectivity to be based on interpretation, and this interpretation to be based (like all presentification) on association, association through resemblance (Ähnlichkeitsassoziation). There is a kind of "covering" (Deckung) in which the experiences are conjoined or coincide. Stein will make the point that this overlay or coincidence is not the same as a feeling-one with. There is always a feeling of difference (even when I remember being a young boy swinging on a swing, even as I remember it being me, it is still set at a distance from me now). As Stein says, I look at my former self from the standpoint of another.

The problem is then: how is the appresentation of the other motivated from within my own sphere? Husserl acknowledges that there is a very complicated set of performances at work here. It is not merely a reflection or analogon of my world and my subjectivity. As Husserl writes in First Philosophy: "Precisely because foreign subjectivity does not belong to the sphere of my original perceptual possibilities, it does not dissolve in the intentional correlate of my own life and its rule-structure." In an 1918 manuscript written at Bernau, Husserl distinguishes "direct" (gerade) and "oblique" (oblique) reflective empathy. Direct empathy is "natural" and necessarily always primary. Husserl draws an analogy with my relation to a past event. I remember the city in which I used to live, but in recovering these memories I am focused on the object, the city, and not on my recovered memories, perceptions, and my past self which had those experiences. Those are arrived at by a different kind of reflection. Similarly, I grasp another person's states directly as object, and that objectivity is confirmed by this transcendental inter-relation of me in my experienced fantasy: "No countersense is implicit in the possibility that every other consciousness, which I posit in empathic experience (das ich in einfühlender Erfahrung setze), is non-existent." Husserl denies that the experience of the other (under the Cartesian reduction) relates in any way to the factual existence of others. We grasp the pure possibility that there is another way of looking at an object, and that objectivity is confirmed by this transcendental intersubjectivity, but this intersubjectivity is in place even if a plague has wiped out all other human beings.

In summary, Husserl's reflections on empathy and intersubjectivity span a vast domain with many distinctions and complications. But there is a certain consistency in his approach. The perception of others as subjects requires a complicated series of acts. Involved is my experience of my own body and my own psychic life, a passively experienced association with the body of another, a pairing or coupling which links the one to the other within certain limits, an imaginative transfer (Sich-Hineinphantasieren) into the life of the other, and then a dimension of Auffassung or interpretation where we interpret the expressions, gestures, speech, of the other. A key (but obscurely explained) component is association, irreducible to custom or habit and conceived as an a priori genetic law of sense. Husserl's prime example is how memories are awakened by a certain affective allure of objects, but it is difficult to see how different his conception is from some kind of Humean "contiguity and resemblance" account.

137. See Hua XIII, 400 ff.
5. Edith Stein on Empathy

In her 1917 book *Zum Problem der Einfühlung*, based on her doctoral thesis written under Edmund Husserl at Göttingen, Edith Stein characterises empathy (Einfühlung) very broadly as "the experience of foreign consciousness in general" (Erfahrung von fremdem Bewußtsein überhaupt). She refers empathy to the whole range of phenomena in which the other person (or living subjectivity) is announced or revealed in and to my consciousness. Stein's dissertation, influenced not only by her exacting Doktorvater, the "master" Husserl, but also by Scheler and Lipps, is original, and deserves recognition for its treatment of the topics of personhood, intersubjectivity, and the constitution of the social and communal world, some decades prior to the writings of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas on similar themes.

In 1911 at the University of Breslau, Edith Stein enrolled in the lecture course "Introduction to Psychology" by the Jewish developmental psychologist Wilhelm Stern (1871–1938), who thought of himself primarily as a philospher and was a critic of mechanistic laws in psychology. She studied with him for two years. It was while studying for his seminar on the psychology of thought that she came across references to Husserl's *Investigations*. However, it was another of her teachers, Georg Moskiewicz (who had studied medicine before transferring to philosophy and psychology) who knew Husserl personally, having taken courses from him for one semester at Göttingen, who encouraged her to read Husserl's *Erscheinung*. So taken was she by Husserl's approach that she decided to go to Göttingen, where her first cousin Richard Courant had just taken up a post in mathematics.

At Göttingen, Stein chose her doctoral thesis on empathy as she records in her posthumously published *Life in a Jewish Family*:

5. Edith Stein on Empathy

In her 1917 book *Zum Problem der Einfühlung*, based on her doctoral thesis written under Edmund Husserl at Göttingen, Edith Stein characterises empathy (Einfühlung) very broadly as "the experience of foreign consciousness in general" (Erfahrung von fremdem Bewußtsein überhaupt). For her, empathy refers to the whole range of phenomena in which the other person (or living subjectivity) is announced or revealed in and to my consciousness. Stein's dissertation, influenced not only by her exacting *Doktorvater*, the "master" Husserl, but also by Scheler and Lipps, is original, and deserves recognition for its treatment of the topics of personhood, intersubjectivity, and the constitution of the social and communal world, some decades prior to the writings of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas on similar themes.

In 1911 at the University of Breslau, Edith Stein enrolled in the lecture course "Introduction to Psychology" by the Jewish developmental psychologist Wilhelm Stern (1871–1938), who thought of himself primarily as a philosopher and was a critic of mechanistic laws in psychology. She studied with him for two years. It was while studying for his seminar on the psychology of thought that she came across references to Husserl's *Investigations*. However, it was another of her teachers, Georg Moskiewicz (who had studied medicine before transferring to philosophy and psychology), who encouraged her to read Husserl's *Erscheinung*. So taken was she by Husserl's approach that she decided to go to Göttingen, where her first cousin Richard Courant had just taken up a post in mathematics.

At Göttingen, Stein chose her doctoral thesis on empathy as she records in her posthumously published *Life in a Jewish Family*:

139. OPE 11: 10.
140. Edith Stein often refers to Edmund Husserl as der Meister in her correspondence.
142. See ibid., 217. In the end Stern emigrated to the USA.
143. See ibid., 218.
144. Ibid., 269.
145. Ibid.
146. See ibid., 277.
the first part of the dissertation followed Husserl's advice, but her own interest was more in the "constitution of the human person". She maintains that she added chapters on the social, ethical, and aesthetic areas, but decided against printing these in the published version of the work (which she had to pay for herself). These chapters are now lost. She came to realise that Husserl had written a lot more on this topic in the manuscripts that became Ideas II, as she notes in the foreword to her thesis.

The extant work is uneven. It is full of wonderful examples and brief discussions, but the "criticisms" of other thinkers are casual and often unclear. Stein's careful elaboration of a conception of the self and its life in community, which she would expand upon in her planned Habilitation, is perhaps the most original part of the book. Her particular focus, like that of Husserl, is the experience of understanding and intuiting the mental life of others. At least in the surviving published version of the text, she does not focus on ethical empathy, unlike Scheler, the first edition of whose Sympathiegefühle (1913) she discusses in her chapter "The Essence of Acts of Empathy".

In her first chapter, Stein discusses a basic example of empathy, which one also finds in Scheler: I look at the face of someone who has had a bereavement and become "aware of" his pain (ich gewahre seinen Schmerz), without personally undergoing his first-person experience of pain. Following Husserl, she characterises this difference as between "originary" or "primordial" and "non-primordial" or "non-originary" experiences. I primordially experience my own sensations and my own inner life. Thus Stein defines empathy as "an act which is originary as present experience though non-primordial in content (Aks, der originär ist als gegenwärtiges Erlebnis, aber nicht-ori­ginär seinem Gehalt nach)." Stein is particularly emphatic that the empathic experience is a non-primordial experience of another's primordial experience: it is absolutely not what Adam Smith or Lipps thought it was, namely, a projection of my joy into the other I.

Rather, empathy is a non-primordial experience "which announces (bekundet) a primordial one."

5.1. The Critique of Identification or Fusion

Stein begins with a critique of Theodor Lipps, whose description of empathy she acknowledges "agrees with ours in many respects." Lipps describes empathy as "inner participation" in foreign experiences, and tends to emphasise a fusion or identification with the other, with which Stein, following Scheler, does not agree. She thinks Lipps confuses the phenomenon of "being drawn into the experience" with its being given primordially. She contrasts the situation of my remembering my joy at passing an examination and my empathising with a friend who joyfully relates having passed an examination. I empathise with the other and am primordially joyful over the event myself. I can even be joyful over this joy, but neither of these is the same as the empathic experience of the other's joy. In general, she finds Lipps' account to be impoverished. It begins with an account of my own experience and of my perception of a foreign body, and it assumes I take the foreign gestures, etc., as "symbols". For Stein, Lipps is right to see that the I's consciousness of itself as individual emerges by analogy with other I's, but he stops there and leaves us with this very inadequate indication of a much deeper problematic. Stein, like Husserl, believes Lipps misses the point — to see a physical living body as a centre of organisation cannot be based on sense perception of the outer movements of the body.

5.2. Parallels with Memory

According to Stein, Lipps sees empathy as akin to memory and expectation. Stein too sees a parallel between it and our non-primordial experiences of our own experiences — for example, when we remember being in a state of joy, the remembering is primordially experienced but the joy is only non-primordially experienced.
Stein does not think this is exactly the same as empathy, although it lays a foundation for it. Empathy, for Stein, as for Husserl, is a unique experience of a particular kind in its own right. It is a "kind of experiencing act" (eine Art erfahrender Akte).\(^{157}\) The non-originary experience here is the content of a primary Erlebnis of my own in its own right. According to Stein, following Scheler, when I experience empathy with another, the empathised experience is located in the other and not in myself:

The subject of the empathized experience, however, is not the subject empathizing, but another. And this is what is fundamentally new in contrast with memory, expectation, or the fantasy of our own experiences.\(^{158}\)

The two subjects are separated and not, as Lipps thinks, joined together or fused: while I am living the other's joy I do not feel primordial joy.\(^{159}\) Nor does it have the character of once having been lived through by me. My non-primordial experience is "led by" a primordial experience of the other.

Stein distinguishes between my empathically experiencing the joy of the other and my merely comprehending that the other is joyful. There is another kind of shared joy or fellow-feeling which lays a foundation for it. Empathy, for Stein, is another kind of shared joy or fellow-feeling which Stein calls "sympathy".\(^{160}\) According to Stein's use of the term Mitgefühl ("fellow-feeling"), I am not joyful over the other's joy but rather I am joyful over what the other is also joyful over. That is, we can both be savouring the experience and knowing that the other is also savouring this experience, and that it is the same shared experience.

5.3. The Case of the Circus Acrobat: Identification

Stein, like Scheler, is particularly concerned to distinguish between empathy in general and specific cases of identification. She refers to Lipps' example of someone looking at an acrobat and feeling completely one with the artist: Lipps had even mentioned our bodily imitation of the gestures of the acrobat. This is identification, where there are not two consciousnesses but one, and, contrary to Lipps,

157. OPE 11; 10.
158. OPE 10; 10.
159. See OPE 11; 10.
160. OPE 14; 14.

she thinks this not to be a paradigm case of empathy. Scheler in the second edition of his Nature of Sympathy agrees with Stein when he comments:

Lipps has wrongly sought to construe this as a case of aesthetic empathy. Thus, according to him, the absorbed spectator of an acrobat in a circus turn identifies himself with the performer, whose movements he reproduces within himself, in the character of an acrobat.\(^{161}\) As Stein puts it: Einfühlung is distinct from Eindringen ("feeling-one-with" or "identification"). It is not a case of being one with the acrobat, rather I am "with" him. There is a fictional I distinct from the actual I, but my actual I has its attention fixed on the fictional I.

5.4. Stein on the Constitution of the Body

Stein's second chapter begins with a discussion of the psycho-physical body in terms reminiscent of Husserl's (in the, at that time, rough manuscript of Ideas II).\(^{162}\) She builds from the static perception of my body as an external corporeal object to the experience of dynamic animated movement. She begins by discussing the pure I and whether it is at this stage individuated, or whether it individuates itself in opposition to other egos. According to Lipps, this initial I is not individuated. I find myself in a flow of experiences that are not truly individuated as mine until the other comes along, for Lipps. Stein opposes this view, and believes it is individuated from the outset, but that this is thrown into relief when we meet another I. There is another sense of I which corresponds to the unity of the psychic stream. Apart from this we can recognise that this stream has a "bearer", which Stein calls soul, although for her soul is always encountered with body: "the soul is always necessarily a soul in a body".\(^{163}\)

161. Sympathy, 18.
162. The whole question of the influence of Husserl's manuscripts for Ideas II on Stein is fraught with difficulty, compounded by the recent claim by Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science, 151 ff., that Stein played a more active role as editor of this manuscript than had previously been thought. However, I think we must accept Stein's claim, in the foreword of her dissertation, that she is presenting her own work, and that she read Husserl's Ideas II manuscript, in her capacity as his research assistant, only after she had submitted her thesis (see OPE 1–2; vi).
163. OPE 41; 44.
Next, Stein asks how my body is constituted within consciousness. I can, of course, perceive it as an external body but even as such it is an external body with "gaps" (Lücken) — I cannot see the reverse side, for example, no matter what position I take. It is more stubborn than the moon in withholding its far side. This is in contrast with physical objects. Anticipating Merleau-Ponty, and repeating what is to be found in Husserl's draft Ideas II, Stein says that my body is given to me as an "incomplete (unvollkommen) physical thing," and as different from all others. Yet, the body is also present in all perception. I can approach and withdraw from physical objects but not from my body. Even when our eyes are shut we find ourselves bound to our bodies. It is constituted not just in outer perception but as Leib. Our bodies are always there in full Leibhaftigkeit — hence the name, Stein comments. My bodily sensations, amalgamated into the unity of my living body, are given to me spatially but located at a distance from me. Moreover, this distance of my bodily parts from me is not comparable to the distance of objects from me. The living body is the "zero-point" (Nullpunkt) of orientation. My body is constituted in a two-fold way, as sensed and as perceived as an outside body. So far, Stein has described the body at rest but she also describes the movement and the manner in which it experiences movement. But it can move further imaginatively: I can imagine the room free of furniture, and I can imaginatively take up different positions in the room. Meanwhile the real Leib has not disappeared during this fantasy. Rather I experience a "doubling" (sich verdoppelt) of the I. Husserl had spoken of this splitting and doubling of the I in cases of memory, fantasy and so on. I have mirror-like experiences of myself in memory and fantasy. When I remember myself as a child swinging on a tree, I see myself as another sees me. This is, for Stein, not strictly empathy itself but provides a basis for empathy.

Having given this basic account of the constitution of the self (in overtly Husserlian language), Stein turns in section five to the "foreign individual" (zum fremden Individuum). We have "originary givenness" (primäre Gegebenheit) of our own bodily experiences, which are "co-given" (mitegeben) with our other experiences of objects. There is also a "co-giving" and "co-originary" (Konoriginarität) of the other sides of the body. The whole thing is seen but the other sides can be progressively filled in by other perceptions. This is not the case in our perception of other living bodies. I cannot bring them to perception but only to "empathic representation" (Einfühlende Vergegenwärtigung), which has a kind of "co-originary" (Konoriginarität) with perception.

For Stein, as for Husserl, my perception of a physical body is the precondition for empathy. My hand lies on the table but not like another thing. It lies limply or relaxedly or stiffly, and I see it lying so. I feel the pressure of the table, and so on. If I see someone else's hand I can follow out the same pattern of experiences in a "co-comprehension" (Miteifassen) different from perception and all other kinds of representation. There is a possibility of "sensing-in" (Einempfindung) to the other living body. The kind of fulfilment (Erfüllung) possible in my empathising with another hand is not adequate but a certain degree of projection or "introjection" (Eingehersetzen) is possible. This is warranted by the fusion of my inner and outer sense and by my ability to make an imaginative transposition. My hand is not given in so fixed a type that I cannot understand a child's hand or a woman's hand, or a "hand" of whatever kind (including a dog's paw, or a cat's, feeling heat off a stove's ceramic hob, and so on). This is variable within limits, based on the type of experience. I can project myself into the dog's paw. This is based on what Husserl would call "associative pairing". But the further I deviate from the human, the more these possibilities are closed down (doubtless one could be trained: consider the example of a snake-handler or zoo-keeper). Furthermore, there is plenty of room for error, as Stein concedes in the next chapter — I can attribute adult judgement to a child, perception of

164. OPE 63; 71.
165. See OPE 41; 45.
166. See OPE 42; 46.
167. See OPE 43; 47.
168. OPE 47; 51.
169. See OPE 63; 71.
170. OPE 57; 64.
171. See OPE 87; 99.
172. Schefer makes the same point but for different reasons. He believes that sensations are always given in a first-person way such that it is not possible to know how another person or other animate being senses, but he does not think this closure also applies in the "vital" domain, so I can experience the mortal terror of a bird (see Sympathy, 48).
colour to a blind man, or aesthetic receptivity to an uncultivated person. In these instances, I am simply wrong. But there are things I can do to check. When tending a wound I look to the patient's face to see if he is in pain. When I project into the other body I experience it as having another "image" (Bild) of the world and being another "zero point of orientation". I retain my own zero-point while recognising the other in a non-originary consciousness. I also experience the other subject, not just as sensing but as carrying out acts. This image of the world is not just a replica of my own but varies with the way I constitute the other's body.

Stein's last chapter discusses the nature of spirit and the experience of spiritual life, by which she means the social and communal life of persons. Motivation is the law governing the spiritual life, Stein claims. She maintains that the sense of self is, as previous psychologists recognised, primarily based on our affective life. Mere sensations, for her, do not have an I-reference, whereas emotional feelings do: "The pressure, warmth, or attraction to light that I sense are nothing in which I experience myself, in no way issue from my I." She regards feelings as intentional acts with objects, but in many cases the object is a value (following Scheler).

Empathy with others (by encountering different personal types) can lead us to greater self-understanding as we grasp what we are not. Furthermore, the other's perception of us is also necessary to complete our own self-understanding. She ends her book by raising the question of whether all personhood is encountered bodily, and if there might be an encounter with spirits which are not bodies, but she leaves this issue with a final non liquet ("it is not clear").

6. Conclusion

Our survey of the treatment of empathy in Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein shows considerable continuity among these thinkers; nevertheless, we are left with an ill-defined and diffuse phenomenon. The phenomenological account begins from the recognition that other persons and their subjective states are directly experienced. For Husserl other persons are encountered in the "personalistic" attitude which belongs to the natural attitude. Stein and Scheler also claim we know the person directly. But to say we know the person directly is not to say that he or she is immediately perceived. For Husserl and Stein, the other is grasped in a founded apperception or co-presentation based on perception. Husserl struggled here with a limited language, even though he identified many particular aspects of the constituting process. He is limited to the concept of apperception. Furthermore, Husserl criticises Lipps for ignoring the prior constitutions of my own body and of other bodies as living centres of subjectivity. However, in discussing the experience of one's own body, Husserl invokes concepts of "innerness" or "interiority", "inner perception" or "inner sensation", and the whole sphere of ownness (Eigenheitssphäre), all of which call out for clarification, and perhaps involve more problems than they solve. Husserl also broadens the issue of empathy to the whole problematic of intersubjectivity and the constitution of the Lebenswelt. Stein, however, at least in her dissertation, remains focused on empathy between individuals. It is clear that she espouses a Schelerian concept of the person, though perhaps no different from what Husserl himself espouses in Ideas II. Like Husserl, she is constrained to the simple opposition between Wahrnehmung, as a kind of Gegenwärtigung, and all other kinds of Vergegenwärtigung, which include memory, fantasy, and experiences of empathy. But she is clearer than Husserl that empathy has its own specific structure in that it is an actual experience of another's actual present experience, captured within the same temporal series as the perceiver's. She seems more open than Husserl to the amount of filling that one can have of the empty presentification of the other's present experience, and even seems somewhat attracted to accounts of direct grasping of the other's consciousness in something like telepathy (a topic of interest to her fellow phenomenologist Gerda Walther). Empathy is an experience, as Husserl points out and Stein stresses, that belongs to the same temporal frame, but, following

173. See OPE 87; 98.
174. OPE 61; 68.
175. See OPE 96; 107.
176. OPE 100; 111.
177. OPE 118; 132.
178. Hua XIV, 55.
Scheier, she denies that empathy involves a fusion or identification with the other. The essence of empathy is recognition of the other as both individual personal subject and as other, inhabitant of a co-occurring separate psychic stream.

*University College Dublin*
This volume honors the Rev. Professor James McEvoy on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. The theory of friendship, which has been one of McEvoy's major fields of research and publication, used to be at the heart of the philosophical project, and indissociable from it. For Socrates, philosophy was possible only as the pursuit of wisdom, virtue, and beauty in a community of friends engaged in an "erotic" quest for the good. The present volume wants to make a contribution to the recovery of the friendship theme in its central importance to philosophy. It contains eighteen contributions by colleagues and pupils of Professor McEvoy from three different continents, who approach the topics of friendship, love, and charity from a variety of different angles. Several contributions are devoted to the theory of friendship in ancient and medieval thought, including its Christian appropriation. Others analyze friendship in modern and contemporary philosophy, while two contributors introduce cross-cultural perspectives (Hinduism and traditional African thought). This volume will help to throw into higher relief the importance of the philosophy of friendship, as well as stimulating further discussion on this intriguing topic.