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Husserl and the Logic of Experience

Edited by

Gary Banham
Reader in Transcendental Philosophy
Manchester Metropolitan University

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The Meaning of Phenomenology in Husserl’s Logical Investigations

Dermot Moran

Edmund Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations, 1900/1901) is generally regarded as the foundational work for the new science of phenomenology that quickly grew to become the most important philosophical movement in Germany and France during the first half of the twentieth century and, in the second half of that century, established itself worldwide, albeit chiefly in non-English-speaking countries. In keeping with its inaugural status, Husserl later termed it his ‘breakthrough work, not so much an end as a beginning’ (eine Durchbruchsleistung, und somit nicht ein Ende, sondern ein Anfang, LU I 3; Hua XVIII 8). It announced a programme of work that determined the course of his subsequent career. It even gave definite purpose and direction to his personal life after many years of depression and stagnation. As he wrote in 1906: ‘Since the publication of the Logical Investigations my life has taken on an inner stability.’

It is not easy to give a quick summary of the central thrust of the Investigations. It is a wide-ranging, many-layered, and ultimately unfinished work. It has to be seen as a living development of philosophical ideas, an unfinished journal of philosophical discovery. As Husserl himself insisted, it is a work in progress. Its key technical terms are clarified only in the course of the work itself, and new themes are introduced at every stage (and often left undeveloped). He claimed that the Investigations proceed by lifting the reader from lower to higher levels of philosophical insight, moving in a ‘zig-zag manner’ (im Zickzack, LU Intro. § 6 I 175; Hua XIX/1 22), employing concepts that only later receive clarification in a reflective ‘turning back’ (zurückkehren). In the Third Investigation, for instance, he remarks on the need to clarify certain concepts in order to pursue his investigation:

Here again we cannot allow our analytic investigation to wait on the systematic development of our subject matter. Difficult notions employed by us in our clarificatory study of knowledge, and made to work rather in the manner of a lever, cannot be left unexamined, till they spontaneously emerge in the systematic fabric of the logical domain. (LU III, Intro., II 3; Hua XIX/1 228)

In this sense, it is a work of ‘construction’ (Aufbau, LU II § 15) and ‘dismantling’ or ‘deconstruction’ (Abbau). Indeed, he warned that the work could not be considered as a finished exposition of scientific results or as ‘one book or work in the literary sense’ (LU Foreword to Second Edition, I 5; Hua XVIII 11), but rather should be seen as a ‘systematically bound chain of investigations’, ‘a series of analytical investigations’ (eine Reihe analytischer Untersuchungen, LU Intro., § 5 I 173; Hua XIX/1 20), which would need further elaboration through ‘resolute cooperation among a generation of research-workers’ (LU Intro. § 3 I 171; Hua XIX/1 16–17). (Despite his own practice of solitary meditation and monologue, Husserl envisaged phenomenology as a collective practice, as his commitment to the Journal Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung attests.)

The primary aim of the Investigations is to contribute to epistemology. Husserl was convinced that he made a significant contribution to this discipline, as he indicated in a note written on the envelope containing his lecture notes for the Winter Semester of 1902–03: ‘From time to time I am borne up by the conviction that I have made more progress in the critique of knowledge than any of my predecessors ...’ He sees the ‘cardinal question’ of epistemology as that of ‘the objectivity of knowledge’ (LU Prol. § 3), that is, establishing and justifying the objectivity of scientific knowledge in a broad sense. He is concerned with the ‘basic questions of epistemology’ (Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie, LU, Foreword I 2; Hua XVIII 7) thrown up by the effort to define and acquire scientific knowledge in all its forms. Moreover, he is convinced that the philosophical understanding of logic will unlock the meaning of the epistemic accomplishment of the sciences as such:

Our Investigations so far have, we hope, made plain that a correct grasp of the essence of pure logic (ein richtiges Verständnis des Wesens der reinen Logik), and of its unique position in relation to all other sciences, is one of the most important questions in the whole of epistemology. (LU Prol. § 6 I 141; Hua XVIII 225–6)
Besides epistemology, the *Investigations* also includes extensive, intricate philosophical contributions to semiotics, semantics, mereology (the study of wholes and parts), formal grammar (the a priori study of the parts of any language whatsoever in regard to their coherent combination into meaningful unities), and, finally, the nature of conscious acts, especially presentations and judgements. Indeed, the most significant and revolutionary feature of the work is its philosophical clarification and elucidation of the experiences of thinking and judging through what he calls 'strict phenomenological analysis' (die strenge phänomenologische Analyse, LU Intro. § 3).

Rather surprisingly, however, phenomenology as such receives only a tentative - indeed somewhat confused - explication in the text of the *Logical Investigations*, chiefly in the Introduction to the Second Volume. Neither the term 'phenomenology' nor any of its cognates appears in the First Edition of the First Volume, the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1900), which had widespread popularity among philosophers in Germany. In his 1901, 'author's announcement' (Selbstzusammen) to the Second Volume, Husserl says that he is conducting a 'phenomenological clarification' (phänomenologische Aufklärung) of knowledge, something he contrasts with what - following Brentano - he calls a 'genetic psychological explanation' (genetisch-psychologische Erklärung, Hua XIX/2 779).

Husserl maintains that the clarification of epistemology begins with the clarification of the concepts of pure logic whose meanings must be traced back to concrete intuitions that underlie them. This is the meaning of his clarion cry, 'we must go back to the things themselves' ('Wir wollen auf die 'Sachen selbst' zurückgehen, LU Intro. § 2 1 168; Hua XIX/1 10), repeated in *Ideas I* and in his 1910/11 *Lagos* article. In the Introduction, Husserl articulates a central principle: 'Logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition' (LU, Intro. § 2 1 168; Hua XIX/1 10). Intuitions are experiential acts in which what is intended is directly given. Intuition is, therefore, a kind of knowledge by acquaintance, to employ Bertrand Russell's phrase, except it is not limited to the sensory, non-cognitive sphere. In a sense, then, Husserl is an intuitionist. According to his radical version of empiricism, 'lived experiences' (Erlebnisse) become cognitions (Erkenntnisse), only when they are 'confirmed' or 'illuminated' by fulfilling intuitions. To know something is to be able to verify it, by tracing it back to some evident experiences that ground it fully: 'Scientific knowledge means as such knowledge from grounds' (Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis ist al solche Erkenntnis aus dem Grunde, LU Prol. § 63), and evidence involves the intuitive fulfillment of an empty intention. Phenomenology is especially concerned with the kind of evidence with which objects, concepts and laws appear. It brings the logical concepts and laws 'to epistemological clarity and distinctness' (zu erkenntnistheoretischer Klarheit und Deutlichkeit, LU Intro. § 2, note the deliberate Cartesian echo) through 'a return to the adequate fulfilling intuition' (LU, Intro. § 7 1 178, trans. modified; Hua XIX/1 27). Concepts have their 'origin' in intuition, but not a great deal is said in the First Edition as to how this origin in intuition is to be located and mined.

Indeed it is puzzling that phenomenology is introduced so casually in 1900-01, given the amount of energy Husserl would later expend specifying its nature in a series of methodological publications styled as 'introductions to phenomenology' from *Ideas I* (1913) to *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*. Husserl presented himself as the discoverer of the true sense of phenomenology and as the founder of a new movement. However, he also acknowledged Brentano's insight into the intentionality of consciousness as his starting point, and in his later years, even recognized that Ernst Mach, too, was also pursuing a kind of phenomenology. In fact, the concept of phenomenology, if not the specific method, preceded him by several centuries. The term 'Phänomenologie' has a history in German philosophy since the Enlightenment, appearing in Lambert, Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and, most famously, of course, in the title of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807)*. But Husserl's use of the term owed directly to his teacher Franz Brentano and his immediate followers (including Marty, Meinong and Stumpf), who had employed the term 'phenomenology' (along with the neologism 'psychognosy') to mean an exact, scientific, descriptive psychology of the acts and objects of consciousness. As Brentano writes in his *Descriptive Psychology* lectures, 'psychognosy aims to determine the elements of human consciousness and the ways in which they are connected.'

Consciousness, on this conception, is understood as essentially intentional, every act involves 'having an object' (Gegenständlichkeit, DP 155), and the method, for Brentano, involved a kind of reflection he calls inner reflection, whereby the parts of the intentional act were recognized in an act of inner attention. In fact, in the First Edition of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl relies on this conception of phenomenology as a descriptive psychology for clarifying epistemological and logical concepts and operations. Around the same time as Husserl was writing the *Investigations*, Alexander Pfänder was promulgating a view of phenomenological analysis similar to Brentano's, involving breaking down a complex conscious
state into its elements, and relating concepts to intuitions. As Pfänder writes:

To analyze a fact of consciousness means to divide it into its parts or elements and specifically both into its separable parts and those which are distinguishable only in abstracto.8

Husserl then was drawing on an established practice of phenomenological analysis, which is presumably one of the reasons he did not feel the need to thematize it explicitly in the First Edition.

Following the appearance of the Investigations, Husserl moved from Halle to Göttingen, where he began to stress the importance of essential analysis; phenomenology is to be a ‘pure theory of essences’ (reine Wesenlehre, Hua XIX/1 xxx-xxx). He also began to distinguish phenomenology from descriptive psychology, whereas earlier he had considered them identical. Thus in his 1902/03 lectures on epistemology, he distinguishes between ‘phenomenology’, the ‘pure theory of essences’, and Brentanian ‘descriptive psychology’.9 His changing stance is made clear in his 1903 publication, Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-1899 (‘Report on German Writings in Logic From the Years 1895-1899’), where he repudiates his initial characterization of the work as a set of investigations in ‘descriptive psychology’ and makes clear that the ‘clarification’ and ‘illumination’ of pure logical concepts (including arithmetical) is ‘no task for psychology’ (EW p. 250; Hua XXII 205), which is a worldly science with a presumed division of facts into mental and physical.10 Husserl sees all psychology as essentially naturalistic and requiring an ‘illumination’ from phenomenology:

As physics or natural science in the ordinary sense is the empirical science of physical facts, so psychology is the empirical science (the natural science) of mental facts. Both sciences proceed from the ‘world’ in the common, pre-critical sense of the word, with its division of facts into the physical and the mental. Both remain uncritical, however much they may modify the content of the original world-idea. As explanatory sciences they presuppose a prior objectification, whose sense, whose illumination in terms of what makes it possible, they can dispense with – as in fact is shown by the advanced state of these sciences without any help from the critique of knowledge. ... This illumination requires a phenomenology of knowledge. (EW pp. 250-1; Hua XXII 206)

Phenomenology cannot be correctly characterized as descriptive psychology since it has nothing to do with empirical persons and their experiences:

In its rigorous and true sense it is not descriptive psychology at all. Its descriptions do not concern lived experiences, or classes thereof, of empirical persons; for of persons – of myself and of others, of lived experiences that are ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ – it knows nothing. (EW p. 251; Hua XXII 206-7)

In these writings, it is already clear that Husserl was moving away from a conception of subjectivity as a ‘real’ (real!) transaction in the world, and focusing on the ideal, ectic structure of acts. In other words, he was already putting the issue of mundane factual existence to one side. His 1905 ‘discovery’ of the reduction similarly advanced him on the road he was already taking. In his 1906-07 lectures, he introduced into the phenomenological method the operations of ‘suspension’ (epoché) and ‘reduction’ that were supposed to guarantee unprejudiced access to the ectic domain. His concomitant anti-naturalism also committed phenomenology to a transcendental turn away from all positive and natural sciences and towards the critical foundation of knowledge itself. In these 1906-07 lectures Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge (Hua XXIV) he speaks of expanding the sense of logic to include a ‘critique of knowledge’ (Hua XXIV § 31 157), and in his Personal Notes of 1906 he talks of seeking to solve the general philosophical problem of a ‘critique of reason’ (EW p. 493; Hua XXIV 445), and, as a step towards this, a ‘phenomenology of reason’ (EW 494; Hua XXIV 445) through an illumination of its basic concepts and principles. Husserl saw several levels to this enterprise, beginning, as always, with a phenomenology of perception and its various modifications (memory, fantasy), and then extending to a phenomenology of time and of the thing (EW p. 494; Hua XXIV 445), including a phenomenology of space. From thence, he sought to move to ‘empty’ and ‘signitive’ intentions (the main kinds of intentions to be found in science) and then into the whole sphere of judgement. Moreover, already in these 1906-07 lectures, he is envisaging phenomenology as ‘first philosophy’. Overall, for Husserl, philosophy is concerned with clarification and critique: ‘the concern of philosophers is critical foundation and definitive evaluation’ (Hua XXIV 163). Since it must question everything, philosophy is characterized as an ‘anti-natural discipline’ (XXIV 165). This science of ultimate explication and justification, Husserl terms ‘first philosophy’
(XXIV 165). By the time of his second great work on phenomenology, *Ideas I* (1913) Husserl is announcing phenomenology as a form of philosophy itself, and, very publicly in the twenties, styling it (after Aristotle and Descartes) as *prote philosophia* or 'first philosophy', and meaning a presuppositionless philosophizing which provides ultimate ground for all knowledge.

In the revised Second Edition of the *Investigations* (1913), Husserl is insistent that his sense of phenomenology must not be understood as a kind of *empirical* descriptive psychology which he regarded as a part of natural science (LU, Intro. § 6 175), since this would mean that epistemology is built on an empirical science. Husserl uses the word 'Wesen' many times in his new characterization of phenomenology and drops the term 'descriptive'. Phenomenology is not to be called descriptive science since, as he elaborates in the Second Edition

> its peculiar 'pure' description, its contemplation of pure essences on a basis of exemplary individual intuitions of experiences (often freely imagined ones) and its descriptive fixation of the contemplated essences into pure concepts, is no empirical scientific description. (LU Intro. § 6 Note 3 p. 175; Hua XIX/1 23)

Similarly, in *Ideas I* (1913) he writes:

> Of essential necessity, phenomenology does not remain with vague talk, with obscure generalities; it demands systematically determined clarification, analysis and description (*Klarung, Analyse und Beschreibung*) which penetrate into eidetic complexes and down to the ultimate particularizations attainable of those complexes: phenomenology demands exhaustive work. (*Ideas I* § 149 p. 369; Hua III/1 314)

Phenomenology then requires clarification, analysis and description (*Klarung, Analyse und Beschreibung*) but it is description of essence not of factual particulars.

Between 1901 and 1913, Husserl's growing dissatisfaction with the formulations of the *Investigations* was such that he intended to abandon it altogether and replace it with his new and more systematic 'Introduction' to phenomenology, *Ideas I*. In the event, however, he published a partially revised Second Edition in 1913 to accompany *Ideas I*.11 *Ideas I* was to provide the theory whereas the six Investigations provided examples of phenomenology in practice. In these Investigations the phenomenological approach is rarely directly thematized, except in the Introduction to Volume Two. In regard to this Introduction, Heidegger has commented that Husserl at that time was not in a position to survey what he had written and report on it accurately:

> 'Phenomenology is a descriptive psychology.' This self-interpretation of his own work is quite incongruous with what is elaborated in it. In other words, when he wrote the Introduction to these Investigations, Husserl was not in a position to survey properly what he had actually presented in this volume.12

Husserl’s claims about phenomenology in the *Investigations*, therefore, have to be treated with a certain caution. He had not yet arrived at the reflective clarification of his own procedures. Indeed, he only gradually discovered the depth of phenomenology as he was writing the six Investigations.

In the Second Edition, many of the sections dealing with phenomenology were rewritten and references to his later transcendental conception of phenomenonology were inserted into the text of what had been primarily a descriptive psychological work. The critical Husserlian edition of the German text signals the Second Edition’s additions and emendations using brackets, but these changes are not apparent to the reader dependent on the English translation and therefore need some explication. Due to the confused nature of the composite text, there is considerable disagreement about what precisely constitutes the actual ‘breakthrough’ to the phenomenological method that takes place therein. In fact, Husserl’s own views on the matter were less than fully clarified and his theoretical sense of phenomenology continued to evolve throughout his life. In this chapter, as a first step to clarifying Husserl’s sense of phenomenology, I shall set out to clarify the meaning of phenomenology specifically as it emerged in the course of writing the *Investigations* themselves, and I shall also try to distinguish the earlier from the later conceptions of phenomenology found in the First and Second editions in the course of this paper. But first, I want to examine the *Logical Investigations* itself in more detail.

**The aim of the Investigations**

The purpose of the first volume, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, published in 1900, is to refute misleading characterizations of logic and to give an initial characterization of logic as the ‘science of science’. The Second
Volume, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, offers a series of ‘analytical investigations’ (analytische Untersuchungen) into fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of logic.

The ostensible aim, according to the Foreword, is to specify the nature of logic through ‘general critical reflections on the essence of logic’ (LU Foreword, 1.2), amounting to ‘the phenomenological founding of logic’ (die phänomenologische Fundierung der Logik, LU I 175; Hua XIX/1 222). It is explicitly not a textbook of logic in any sense, especially not a work of formal, mathematical logic, which Husserl had already criticized as ‘blind’. In the Third Investigation, Husserl speaks of carrying out ‘epistemological clarification’ (erkennniskritische Erklärung, LU III, Intro. II 3; Hua XIX/1 228). This clarification of the essential nature of logical knowledge is to provide epistemic grounds for systematic formal logic and for the sciences overall.

Husserl has a very broad conception of logic as the ‘science of science’. He sketches a three-fold layering of logic in the Prolegomena, distinguishing between logic as a normative science, as a technique or Kunstlehre, and as a ‘pure’ logic. Without going further into the detail, logic in the Husserlian sense deals not just with the system of formal implication between judgements understood as ideal meanings, but also with possible structure of scientific theories in general. In this sense, it includes all forms of rational reflection on systematic knowledge; it critically analyses and justifies the very rationale of scientific knowledge as such, hence its connection with epistemology.

Phenomenology, understood as a descriptive study of experiences of logical knowing is introduced in the context of epistemology and reflection of scientific knowledge, as the clarification of the conceptual foundations required for any kind of knowing or cognizing in so far as this contributes to the meaning of systematic science. In the Investigations, he restricts himself to what he calls the ‘phenomenology of logical experiences’ (Phänomenologie der logischen Erlebnisse, LU I 168; Hua XIX/1 10).

As he writes in the First Edition, ‘This sphere we must explore in preparation for the epistemological criticism and clarification of pure logic: our investigations will therefore all move within it.’ It was somewhat later, in Ideas I, that Husserl recognized the need to include the phenomena of feeling, emotion and willing, indeed the whole axiological and practical spheres into the broader project of a phenomenology of reason which he began to frame around 1906. Similarly, issues to do with the unity of the ego as performer of acts, and issues concerning the identity of the self through time, and time-consciousness itself, are excluded. In the Investigations he is concerned only with the cognitive accomplishments (Leistungen) that contribute to scientific knowledge in the strict sense, and has not yet moved either to the conception of a science of consciousness as such or to a conception of an overall phenomenological philosophy (first philosophy).

Phenomenology provides a procedure for clarifying meta-logical and epistemological problems. According to Husserl, one begins by rejecting or avoiding metaphysical speculation and all the layers of encrusted opinion that have accumulated around the basic cognitive concepts. This ‘principle of presuppositionlessness’ (Prinzip der Voraussetzungslosigkeit, LU Intro. § 7) involves the exclusion of all statements that cannot be ‘phenomenologically wholly and fully realized (realisiert)’. Husserl wants to proceed without invoking or grappling with traditional philosophical theories or positions, but rather by coming to a full intuition of these concepts, ‘realizing’ concepts through relating them to intuition. Partly, this involves ‘fixing’ (festigen) the meanings of key logical concepts and operations through elaborate and careful distinctions and clarifications. For instance, he plans to provide epistemological and logical clarifications of fundamental notions (e.g., ‘expression’, ‘proposition’, ‘sense’, ‘content’, ‘object’, ‘state of affairs’, ‘consciousness’, ‘presentation’, ‘judgement’, ‘truth’ and so on) that belong to the very form of systematic scientific knowledge as such (see LU ProI. § 67). This may seem a trivial task, an exercise in ‘petty and dreary word-splitting’ (als kleinliche und öde Wortklaubereien, LU ProI. § 67), but in fact is the first step towards secure knowledge.

Some elements of a phenomenological approach – as distinct from meta-phenomenological claims about phenomenology – are initially evident in the First Investigation in the analysis of the signifying structure of meaningful expressions. Here Husserl clarifies the meaning of expressive acts that involve reference to the object through the mediation of a ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ (Sinn, Bedeutung – the terms are not disambiguated at this stage by Husserl although he had been well aware of Frege’s work on this topic for many years). But the chief phenomenological feature is its introduction of the distinction between meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfilments that will become a central topic of the Sixth Investigation.

The Second Investigation, in which nominalist accounts of the manner we can refer to the universal are refuted, is not directly phenomenological, except in so far as it appeals to our genuine experiences of universals as distinct from particulars. There are, according to Husserl, undeniable experiences of meaning the universal as opposed to the singular, meaning to refer to ‘colour’ instead of ‘red’, and so on. Nominalism simply does
not do justice to the true 'phenomenological situation' (phänomenologische Sachlage, Hua XIX/1 148) in experiences of grasping universals (just as psychologism had not distinguished between empirical generality and strict universality). Nominalism misses the specific nature of the conscious ness that intends universals:

This consciousness means what it means to us, whether or not we know anything about psychology, or about mental antecedents and consequences, associative dispositions, etc. (LU II § 15(b) I 263; Hua XIX/1 149)

Husserl illustrates this by saying that when we say 'the triangle is a species of figure', we are not pointing to or invoking a specific individual triangle but to all triangles and this generality appears in the very form of the assertion. We are now referring to the universal as such, and not the individual. This is not a matter of psychology, for Husserl, but a matter of sense-making, sense 'construction' (Aufbau).

The Third and Fourth Investigations are not strictly phenomenological either. In the Third, Husserl takes over Stumpf's discussion of the nature of sensory experience in terms of parts and wholes, and develops it into a formal discussion that would play a fundamental role in the theory of the object as such, in what he would later (in the Second Edition) come to designate as formal ontology. In the Fourth, he identifies the formal grammar involved in any meaningful utterance or sentence whatsoever.

The general idea motivating these Investigations is this: to talk about logical 'lived experiences' (Erlebnisse), we need to understand the relation between the parts and the whole of the concrete experience. 'Concrete' refers to the unity as a whole, but not all elements of the unity are 'real' entities. Some component elements are functions, for example, 'being the subject of the sentence' is a functional role held by the word 'dog' in the sentence 'dog bites man'. The dog is the subject. But this 'ideal' or 'abstract' feature or 'part' of the sentence is not what is heard in normal conversation, unless of course one's interest was focused on just this aspect. Being a subject is not a physical part of the sentence that might be recorded on a tape-recorder and so on. Husserl wants to specify his distinction between 'real' and 'irreal', 'ideal' or 'intentional' parts. The meaning of a sentence is an ideal entity somehow instantiated by the noises the person utters, the noises themselves being 'real' spatio-temporal, material parts. Now phenomenology not only specifies the actual and ideal parts of an experience, but also must supply clarification of the meaning or sense of the concepts 'part' and 'whole' in their formal sense. Brentano had already begun this kind of metaphysical or 'formal ontological' inquiry in his Descriptive Psychology lectures, but Husserl developed it much further. He would come to see formal ontology as complementing epistemology. But here he is interested in the part/whole relation because it is necessary to identify the intentional structure of a meaningful expression and distinguish it from other parts or aspects of the expression.

In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl is involved in a phenomenology of intentional experience. He is seeking a phenomenological analysis of acts and basic concepts (at least as a start). The Sixth Investigation attempts to explicate the relation between judgement and knowledge. But I do not intend here to summarize the Investigations; the aim is rather to clarify the operative sense of phenomenology therein.

For Husserl, concepts and logical objects generally are encountered as 'embeddings' (Einstellungen) in concrete mental states (LU Intro § 2), wrapped 'in grammatical clothing' (im grammatischen Gewande). The interpenetration of the cognitive and the linguistic affects all our cognitive life (Erkenntnisleben). In normal perceiving by adults, for instance, perceptual sense and linguistic meaning intertwine very tightly. Similarly a spoken articulation or expression intends a 'meaning' (Mehnung):

In speaking we carry out an internal act of meaning (Meinen) that melds with the words, as it were, animating them. (APS 14; Hua XI 360)

Concrete mental states (Erlebnisse) are in fact complex 'phenomenological unities' made up of various components — act, content, object and so on (noting at the outset that these terms contain ambiguities). Phenomenological analysis begins with these 'concrete' unities and seeks to distil out their necessary parts (real and ideal) and their structural interrelation. As he emphasizes in the Second Edition, phenomenological analysis aims at the essences of these concrete experiences. This might seem to be psychology, and indeed in the First Edition, Husserl did think it was a kind of psychology — descriptive psychology. But by the Second Edition he thought of psychology as a purely empirical discipline interested in concrete mental occurrences only as states of animals in the causal, physical domain. Husserl on the other hand, identified the meaning-intending and meaning-establishing or confirming character of these mental states as his main area of interest. While individuals all may make assertions in their own time, place, language, with their own intonations, accents and so on, somehow the meaning-character of
those concrete acts transcends the acts, and enters the sphere of meaning. Similarly, the logical appears in the concrete mental, but in order to separate the logical out correctly, the proper phenomenological analysis, one that identifies the a priori laws governing this sphere, has to be performed.

In his 1921 revision, Husserl inserts a new definition of phenomenology (echoing Ideas I § 75) in the revised Appendix to the Sixth Investigation (note the repeated stress on the word 'pure'):

Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of experiences in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real (reellen) or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly the theory of the essences of 'pure phenomena', the phenomena of 'pure consciousness' or of a 'pure ego': it does not build on the ground, given by transcendent apperception, of physical and animal, and so of psycho-physical nature, it makes no empirical assertions, it propounds no judgements which relate to objects transcending consciousness: it establishes no truths concerning natural realities, whether physical or psychic – no psychological truths, therefore, in the historical sense – and borrows no such truths as assumed premises. It rather takes all apperceptions and judgemental assertions which point beyond what is given In adequate, purely immanent intuition, which point beyond the pure stream of consciousness, and treats them purely as the experiences they are in themselves: it subjects them to a purely immanent, purely descriptive examination into essence. (LU VI Appendix § 5 II 343; Hua XIX/2 765)

Husserl here speaks of the difference between the 'real' and the 'intentional' components of perceptions, judgements and other cognitive acts. This replaces a paragraph in the First Edition, where Husserl had been most concerned to distinguish the sensational experiences in us from the apparent sensory features of the object. For instance, we have a certain colour-experience which must be distinguished from the colour property we attribute to the object. Sensations are real parts of the subject, colour properties are intentional parts of the object. This is an important distinction. There is a difference between the smoothness of the table and the coolness of the surface yet both may be delivered by the same phenomenon of running my fingertips on the tabletop. The sensation or feeling in my fingers is not the same as and does not 'represent' the smoothness nor the coolness. Husserl now speaks of immanent examination of essence. Husserl uses the terms immanence and transcendence in a great many different ways, as he himself acknowledges. But, at least one sense of immanence is that essences have to be grasped through special attention to the appearances in consciousness with no reference to existent reality. But before we develop this conception of phenomenology, we need to understand more the genesis of Husserl's approach.

The puzzle of the Prolegomena: a polemic against psychology

The reader attempting to grasp the meaning of phenomenology in the Investigations has to grasp the connection between the extraordinarily detailed refutation of psychologism that occupies the entire First Volume, published separately in 1900, and the studies of the Second Volume. In the Foreword to the Second Edition, Husserl records that the Prolegomena was a 'polemic against psychologism' (Streit um den Psychologismus, LU I 6; Hua XVIII 12). The initial public success of this first volume, as is evidenced by the critical praise of major figures in German philosophy at the time, such as Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Dilthey and Wilhelm Wundt, was because of its refutation of the then dominant approach to logic. Most readers (e.g., Wundt, Lask) failed to see the Second Volume as anything other than a collapse back into the psychologism refuted in the First, as Heidegger himself reports. Husserl, however, liked to emphasize its inner coherence with the second volume published the following year in 1901. Thus, in a letter to Alexius Melnong, of 27 August 1900 (quoted in Hua XVIII xvii), he stresses that the critique of psychologism was central to his phenomenology of knowledge in general. What is this connection between the refutation of psychologism and the development of phenomenology?

The main function of the Prolegomena is to defend the ideality of logical and mathematical entities and the laws governing them, for example, the number 4 or the Pythagorean theorem. Husserl claims these entities are ideal, non-temporal, self-identical 'unities', that nevertheless can be instantiated in countless individual, temporal acts of thinking carried out by different consciousnesses at different times and in different contexts without losing their identity. The ideal laws governing these ideal entities are entirely a priori and independent of all facticity. Pure logic, then, is independent of the factual practices of thinking of actual humans. This contradicts the stance Husserl 'himself' had taken in the first book, Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) – essentially an extensive rewriting of his 1887 Habilitationsschrift, On the Concept of Number.
The Meaning of Phenomenology

Logical and Psychological Investigations — where he had explicitly used a psychological method to explicate the genesis or 'origin' (Ursprung) of 'mathematical presentations' (mathematische Vorstellungen, LU Foreword I 2; Hua XVIII 5). In the Foreword to the Prolegomena, he explicitly repudiates this approach, quoting Goethe:

*Man ist gegen nichts strenger als gegen abgelegte Irrtümer.*

There is nothing towards which one is more severe than the errors one has just abandoned. (LU I 3; Hua XVIII 7)

Whereas he had early sought a psychological explanation of our number 'presentations' (Vorstellungen) he now writes:

The number Five is not my own or anyone else's counting of five; it is also not my presentation or anyone else's presentation of five. (LU Prol. § 46 I 109; Hua XVIII pp. 173-4)

Similarly, he is not interested in the psychological operations associated with logical judgements but only in their ideal, identical content:

The pure logician is not primarily or properly interested in the psychological judgement, i.e., the concrete mental phenomenon, but in the logical judgement, i.e., the identical asserted meaning (die identische Aussagebedeutung), which is one over against manifold, descriptively very different judgement-experiences. (LU Intro. § 2, I 166, trans. modified; Hua XIX/1 8)

Since all argument presupposes the ideal validity of its principles, to follow psychology through to the end is to recognize it as counter-sensical and hence self-refuting:

The correctness of the theory presupposes the irrationality of the premises, the correctness of the premises the irrationality of the theory. (LU Prol. § 26 Appendix, I 61; Hua XVIII 95)

For Husserl, logic is 'an ideal fabric of meanings' (eine ideale Complexion von Bedeutungen, LU I § 29), and 'meanings' or 'senses' (Sinn) are understood to be ideal unchanging unities. Husserl understood these meaning-unites to be the true meaning of Bolzano's 'propositions-in-themselves' (Sätze an sich). As he wrote in 1903 in response to a critic,

I saw that what under 'proposition In itself' is to be understood what is designated in ordinary discourse — which always objectifies the ideal — as the 'sense' of a statement. (EW p. 201; Hua XXII 157)

All coherent discourse requires that the identity of the meanings employed in that discourse be fixed. To assert X is to deny not-X. Logic in fact studies the laws of consequence and entailment that hold between formal meanings considered as such. It is a purely formal science.

On the other hand, Husserl also maintains that, despite the fact that the objects of logic are Ideal and trans-temporal, they must also be accessible and graspable by the human mind. As he would later comment in his 1925 lectures on *Phenomenological Psychology,* 'it is unthinkable that such ideal objects could not be apprehended in appropriate subjective psychic acts and experiences'. Husserl wants to give an account that does justice to the essential twosidedness of our cognitive achievements by analysing the structure of this expression and grasping of meaning.

As Husserl put it in his draft Preface for the revised edition written in 1913,

The reader of the Prolegomena is made a participant in a conflict between two motifs within the logical sphere which are contrasted in radical sharpness: the one is the psychological, the other the purely logical. The two do not come together by accident as the thought-act on the one side and the thought-meaning (Denkbedeutung) and the object of thought on the other. Somehow they necessarily belong together. But they are to be distinguished.

Husserl had made clear in the Foreword to the Investigations that his interest was in 'the relationship between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known' (das Verhältnis zwischen der Subjektivität des Erkennens und der Objektivität des Erkenntnisinhaltes, LU Foreword I 2; Hua XVIII 7). As became clearer in his writings after the Investigations, phenomenology is precisely the study of these forms of correlation. According to later formulations, it is a priori 'correlation research'. In other words, phenomenology cuts across the usual distinction between the psychological and the logical. It affirms that logical entities are 'ideal and non-psychological (the anti-psychologistic move) but it also affirms that there is a corresponding 'ideal' subjectivity with a set of subjective performances that are the counterparts of the
logical forms (i.e., judgings, surmisings, assertions and so on). Already in the course of the First Edition, Husserl gradually became clearer that phenomenology, as distinct from both empirical psychology and pure logic, is concerned with acts of meaning, meaning-intentions, not as empirically occurring transactions in the world, but rather, in so far as they have essential, a priori structures or what Husserl will call 'intentional' structures, discussed in the Fifth Investigation. The structure consists between an act of intending and its object as intended (later - sometime around 1908 - he will call these noesis and noema). Phenomenology is intentional analysis. Furthermore, there is more to my act than either the objects referred to or the ideal meanings expressed. There is also the very 'intentional structure' relating act, meaning and object. As Husserl says, these acts are always present even if it is the case that objects are not always so (LU VI § 8). We shall return to the manner in which Husserl brings together the subjective acts of consciousness and the ideal objects that are meant by those acts. But first let us get a clearer sense of the original conception of phenomenology.

The first explication of phenomenology as descriptive psychology

In the Introduction to Volume Two, phenomenology is introduced, in a rather loose, inexact way, as the discipline that would provide a taxonomy of epistemic and cognitive acts, which 'serves' (dient) empirical psychology (LU Intro. § 1; Hua XIX/1 7). Husserl explicitly states in the First Edition, Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. Epistemological criticism is therefore in essence psychology, or at least capable of being built on a psychological foundation' (LU Intro § 6 I 176; Hua XIX/1 24). The 'psychological foundation' here actually turns out to be a kind of conceptual clarification of the elements involved in knowledge (acts of meaning, perceptions, judgements and so on) rather than involving any kind of empirical psychology. In the Second Edition of 1913, Husserl emphasizes that phenomenology must not be understood as a kind of empirical descriptive psychology, which he regarded as a part of natural science (LU Intro. § 6 I 175), since this would mean that epistemology is built on an empirical science. Even the concept of description must now be qualified, as he elaborates in the Second Edition:

its peculiar 'pure' description, its contemplation of pure essences on a basis of exemplary individual intuitions of experiences (often freely imagined ones) and its descriptive fixation of the contemplated essences into pure concepts, is no empirical scientific description. (LU Intro. § 6 Note 3 p. 175; Hua XIX/1 23)

Something has been added to the notion of description, namely the qualification that it be 'pure' description. 'Pure' (rein) carries the same connotations it has for Kant, namely, with everything empirical removed. It means we are focusing on the essence of cognitive acts not their empirical instantiations. Husserl uses the word 'Wesen' many times in this new characterization of phenomenology in the Second Edition. Purity and essentiality are thus intrinsically related.

In the mature Husserl of 1913, phenomenology is understood as contemplation of pure essences on the basis of exemplary individual intuitions of experiences (including freely imagined experiences). Husserl now attempts to give a strict meaning to the kind of move from individual experience to essential type in the Investigations, that in the First Edition he called 'ideating abstraction' or just 'ideation'. Husserl will see this not as abstraction but as Wesensschau or 'essence inspection', 'essential viewing', or eidetic intuition, which is given a much fuller articulation in Ideas I. The emphasis on essence merely underlines something already present in the First Edition. For example, in the Prolegomena, Husserl maintains that a phenomenological clarification of concepts is precisely 'insight into essence of the concepts involved' (LU Prol. § 67) by bringing them to 'ideational Intuition'.

As we saw earlier, what he is seeking is a 'phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing' (LU Intro. § 1 I 166; Hua XIX/1 6). However, in the Second Edition, he adds that these experiences are not to be understood as empirical facts, but rather grasped in 'pure essential generality' (in rein Wesensallgemeinheit, Hua XIX/1 6) and brought to 'pure expression' (zu reinem Ausdruck). Husserl adds: 'Each such statement of essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense of the word' (LU, Intro. § 1, I 166; Hua XIX/1 6). Phenomenology is, like Brentano's descriptive psychology that preceded it, an a priori discipline. If this was implicit in the First Edition, it is now explicitly stated. Whereas, in the First Edition, Husserl is concerned to distinguish phenomenological reflection from psychological introspection (and the false opposition between the 'inner' and 'outer' perception so beloved of the psychology of his day), in the Second Edition, he is concerned to clarify the meaning of 'a phenomenological theory of essences' (die phänomenologische Wesenslehre, LU Intro. § 3 I 171; Hua XIX/1 15). He highlights phenomenology as a 'pure', a priori, essentialist science.
Initially, Husserl saw himself as identifying the parts immanent in
the psychic process itself understood as an epistemic performance or
accomplishment (Leistung), specifically disregarding the object that is
'transcendent' to the act. So Husserl claims that phenomenology is
interested only in the act and its relation to the object as intended but
is not interested in the object-domain as such (other sciences deal
with this). There is, therefore, a deliberate refusal to discuss the kinds
of reality or the ontological status of the object towards which intentional
acts are directed. In the Second Edition Husserl was even clearer about
disregarding or 'bracketing' the existential status of the object in order
to focus on the essence of the acts and the essential 'sense' of the disclosed
objectivity. But we shall not discuss that move here, as we are aiming
primarily to elucidate the initial meaning of phenomenology in the First
Edition.

Phenomenology as concept clarification
for epistemology

As we have already seen, Husserl characterizes phenomenology as
clarifying epistemology or theory of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie). For him,
'theory of knowledge' or the 'critique of knowledge' (Erkenntniskritik), as
for the dominant Neo-Kantian tradition in Germany at that time, is the
science that specifies the a priori conditions for the possibility of both
the objects of knowledge and the acts of knowing, those acts that yield
cognitions (Erkenntnisse). Theory of knowledge clarifies the meaning of
knowledge. In the Investigations Husserl does not concern himself with
the attempt to refute scepticism about the very possibility of knowledge,
but rather is interested in clarifying the essential nature of knowledge as
an 'idea', as he puts it. He would later explicitly address scepticism in his
lectures on Logic and Theory of Knowledge in 1906-07 and in The Idea of
Phenomenology lectures of 1907. What is it that makes something into an
object of knowledge at all? What are the necessary subjective (or 'noetic'
to use the language of the Prolegomena) conditions that make knowledge
possible?

The Neo-Kantian echoes of the early Husserl, evident In the
Prolegomena, are often passed over, possibly because his Brentanian
training did not leave much room for an appreciation of the sage of
Königsberg. Nevertheless, Husserl was reading Kant in the late 1890s,
even if not as intensely as he would subsequently do In the early years
of the new century. Husserl was aware that his questions about the
possibility of theory and indeed of truth involve a widening of

Kant's programme for explicating the conditions for the possibility of
knowledge:

The historical echoes in the form of our question are of course
intentional. We are plainly concerned with a quite necessary general-
ization of the question as to the 'conditions of the possibility of
experience'. (LU Prol. § 65 I 149; Hua XVIII 239)

While agreeing with Kant as to the correct form of the epistemological
question, Husserl wants to be clearer in specifying what kind of condi-
tions he is talking about. The 'real' causal conditions of the subject have
to be distinguished from the ideal 'noetic' conditions. These noetic
conditions are those conditions on the side of the subject that enable
that subject to see or intuit propositions as truths, laws as laws, and so
on. The specific focus in the Investigations is on the noetic contribution,
the acts rather than the objects. Moreover, we are operating in the 'space
of reasons' or the space of meaning, not in the naturalized domain
of the states of animals in a causally determined world. But Husserl
only clarifies this anti-naturalism in the Second Edition, although he
would subsequently always portray it as merely an extension of his
earlier psychology. The noetic domain then is the domain of an Ideal
subjectivity, subjectivity as such, in its essence.

Phenomenology, then, 'serves' epistemology in one way by providing
a kind of 'conceptual analysis' (Begriffsanalyse), concerned with differenti-
tiating and disambiguating the different senses of basic epistemological
concepts (such as 'presentation', Vorstellung, 'judgment', Urteil, 'object',
Gegenstand, 'content', Inhalt and so on). But the issue will be how: how
is this conceptual analysis performed? Husserl has two specific practices.
One is to attempt to identify (usually through making fine distinctions)
the various component parts of a concept or act, including both 'real'
and 'Ideal' (sometimes he uses the word 'irreal') parts. But secondly and
more importantly, he is interested in the structure of the transition
between meaning-intentions and the experience or recognition of those
meanings as intuitively fulfilled. This latter theme preoccupies him In
the Sixth Investigation. For Husserl, phenomenology, then, is not simply
the clarification of our linguistic expressions, but a more deep-seated
attempt to analyse the a priori laws governing the composition of the
very senses or meanings that we constitute through our acts and which
receive expression in language. He was suspicious of the stranglehold of
grammar on our thinking (a suspicion he passed on to the young
Heidegger), but equally suspicious of purely grammatical analyses that
and one of the table, but involves a unified categorial intuition. To see the words connected with perceiving to include a non-sensory or 'super-certainty of belief'). Indeed, Husserl is aware he is extending the use of immediacy, givenness of the object as itself with an
that is, what belongs necessarily to perceiving as perceiving (in this case, immediacy, givenness of the object as itself with an accompanying certainty of belief). Indeed, Husserl is aware he is extending the use of the words connected with perceiving to include a non-sensory or 'supersensory' categorial intuition. To see that the cup is on the table involves a distinctive kind of perceptual object, the cup being on the table, which is not just a combination of two sensory perceptions, one of the cup and one of the table, but involves a unified categorial intuition of the
non-sensory given state-of-affairs, 'cup being on the table'. The failure of traditional empiricism lay in its inability to recognize this new and extensive domain of higher-order objects. Note here that we are not yet at the level of the linguistic act of apprehending the cup on the table through their corresponding semantic concepts. This is an even higher level of apprehension.

Phenomenology, then, is a particular kind of conceptual analysis but one that is checked not by ordinary language but by appeal to what is revealed in intuition (including intuitions generated by imaginative enactments of perceiving). In other words, concepts are linked to, or correlated with, acts on the part of subjects.

The ‘ABC of consciousness’

As a kind of Aristotelian essentialist, Husserl is interested in the essences of these diverse cognitive or epistemic attitudes (perceiving, remembering, imagining, judging, surmising and so on), the building blocks of our rational and scientific lives. He is interested in the internal, that is necessary, relations between these cognitive attitudes themselves, and also in the laws of transformation whereby one attitude turns into another (uncertainty into belief, actual perception turning into memory). He will speak of this project in 1923 as an attempt to spell out 'the ABC of consciousness'. As he writes in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis:

But if one has learned to see phenomenologically and has learned to grasp the essence of intentional analysis, if one has - expressed in the form of the Goethian myth - found the way to the mother of knowledge, to its realm of pure consciousness in which all being arises constitutively and from which all knowledge as knowledge of beings has to fashion its ultimate comprehensible clarification, then one will initially make the quite astounding discovery that those types of lived experience are not a matter of arbitrary special features of an accidental life of consciousness, but rather that terms like 'perception', 'memory', 'expectation', etc., express universal, essential structures, that is, strictly necessary structures of every conceivable stream of consciousness, thus, so to speak, formal structures of a life of consciousness as such whose profound study and exact conceptual circumscription, whose systematic graduated levels of foundation and genetic development is the first great task of a transcendental phenomenology. It is precisely nothing less than the science of the
essential shapes (Wesensgestaltungen) of consciousness as such, as the science of maternal origins.\(^1\)

Although he does not explicitly speak of phenomenology as a science of the 'essential shapes' or 'forms' (Wesensgestaltungen) of consciousness in the Investigations, he does seek of speaking of the 'fundamental composition' (Grundverfassung) of consciousness in his 1910-11 lectures, Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology (Hua XIII 111).

**The intuition of meaning: intention and fulfillment**

The account of the essences of conscious acts is meant to support a general theory of knowledge. Acts of knowing are in the first place acts of 'mean-ing' (Meinen), intending to mean (well captured in Ricoeur's French rendering vouloir-dire), even if they also involve something more, for example, acts of confirmation, etc. Phenomenology, then, needs a fuller account of meaning. In one sense, meanings are always given to us. We live in the domain of the manifestness of meaning. As Husserl writes, 'What "meaning" is we know as immediately as the way we know colour and tone' (LU II § 31, I 287; Hua XIX/1 187).

As Merleau-Ponty puts it, paraphrasing Sartre, we are condemned to meaning. But phenomenology is concerned with meaning in a particular manner: the ways things present themselves to us in meaning, the 'how' of their modes of givenness. As he says in the Second Edition of the Second Logical Investigation, when he had become convinced that the application of the epoché and the bracketing of existential commitment were essential to phenomenology, in the field of phenomenology the focus is exclusively on essence and sense matter:

> But in the field of phenomenology and, above all, in the sphere of epistemology - the phenomenological classification of ideal thought and knowledge-unities - only essence and sense (nur Wesen und Sinn) matter: what we mean (was wir meinen) in general when we make assertions, what this act of meaning as such constitutes (konstituierter) in virtue of its sense, how it constructs (aufbaut) itself out of partial meanings according to its essence, what essential forms and differences it exhibits and so on. (LU II § 15 I 263; Hua XIX/1 150, translation modified)

Later in the Second Investigation he speaks of the phenomenology of meanings and in particular of an 'enactment of sense' (einen Sinn vollziehen, LU II § 31, I 287; Hua XIX/1 187).

Phenomenology is concerned with the dynamics of mean-ing in a very specific sense: it seeks to trace our meaning intentions back to those experiences (called Intuitions) which found them, and wherein the things themselves are given to us. The key to understanding the relation of concept to intuition is Husserl's analysis of the relation between intention and fulfillment. Husserl's key conception here is the relation between meaning-intending and meaning-fulfilling acts. This relation is first mentioned in the First Investigation, but it had been developing in Husserl's logical writings through the 1890s, and it is explored at some length in the Sixth Investigation. Our acts of consciousness are acts of intending meaning, 'acts of signification' (Akte des Bedeutens), or what Husserl will call in the First Investigation, 'sense bestowing acts' (sinnverleiheende Akte, LU I § 9), acts which intend meanings, acts which purport to be about something, even when these acts are not expressed linguistically and hence are not aiming at propositional meaning. Husserl thinks it is a mistake to confuse these acts that bestow meanings with the separate set of acts that fulfill meanings, and the further acts which synthesize or recognize the coincidence between what is meant and what is fulfilled. Without going further into that here, let us focus specifically on the meaning of fulfillment.

A meaning is first intended in an act that is 'empty'. A second act grasps the object fully and knowledge consists in an act of identifying these two acts by overlaying them on each other. This is the 'synthesis of fulfillment', where 'the intended' or 'meant' (das Gegebene) comes into complete correspondence with the given (das Gegebene, LU VI; Hua XIX/2 651). This is knowledge in its most genuine sense. Intuitive givenness transforms an intentional act into knowledge and thus introduces truth. This can occur either as an immediate intuition, or, more usually, as a gradual process, such as Husserl analyses in the Sixth Investigation. This Investigation - by far the longest and most difficult - attempts to connect the previous analyses of the act of meaning to the notion of truth through a deeper exploration of the relations between acts that intend meaning and the various levels of possible fulfillment, as they feature in different kinds of conscious act, for example, perceptions, imaginings, and, most importantly, acts of what Husserl calls 'signitive Intention' where meanings are handled in a purely symbolic way without intuitive fullness. The ideal of knowledge is complete coincidence between intention and fulfillment, but this precisely is an ideal, and, more usually, one experiences only partial fulfillment.

Husserl sees the Initial Intentional act as one that seeks meaning, seeks confirmation. A second act provides this confirmation but it takes
If we prefer to rule out unsuitable talk of origins, we are phenom-

enology of cognitive life that Husserl pursued in his Structures of perception and judgement form a great part of the actual emptiness. The presence of such empty Intentions in perception is a clue to their operation at the higher levels of cognition. These more intricate structures of perception and judgement form a great part of the actual phenomena of cognitive life that Husserl pursued in his Passive Syntheses lectures and elsewhere. But the groundwork was already laid in the Investigations, and one might say that the high-point of phenomenological analysis lies in its identification of the complex structures of intention, synthesis and fulfillment that are to be found in all the levels of cognitive achievement. He would return to this theme in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929).

Conclusion

From 1901 to 1938 Husserl was involved in a more and more complicated and expansive vision of phenomenology. But his research, while branch-

ing off into new areas and finding new depths (e.g., the analyses of the transcendental ego and transcendental intersubjectivity) develops in a continuous manner. There is not a sudden reversal or change of direction in 1905 with the introduction of the epoché and reduction, or again with the focus on time, the body, intersubjectivity, or the life-world. All these themes are more or less pursued together in Husserl’s writings after the Logical Investigations.

Husserl consistently emphasizes early and late his interest in the cognitive life of consciousness, Erkenntnisleben. In this respect he is interested in the essences of cognitive performances and the essences of their corresponding objectivities. This is ‘correlation research’ as Husserl termed it, and it is at the very core of phenomenology. His dissatisfaction with his early account in the First Edition of the Investigations is based on his worry that he had not completely put to one side a psychologistic sense of the subjective. In his mature years he is particularly aware that his talk of tracing the origins of concepts in Intuition can be misunderstood and indeed had been misconstrued in psychologistic terms. In the First Edition of the Prolegomena he had already made clear his opposition to psychological explanation and his orientation towards essence description:

All these concepts must now be pinned down (zu fächeren), their ‘origins’ (Ursprung) must in each case be investigated. Not that psychological questions as to the origin (Entstehung) of conceptual presentations or presentational dispositions here in question, have the slightest interest for our discipline. This is not what we are enquiring into: we are concerned with the logical [Second Edition: phenomenological] origin or – if we prefer to rule out unsuitable talk of origins, only bred in confusion – we are concerned with insight into the essence (Einsicht in das Wesen) of the concepts involved, looking methodologically to the fixation of unambiguous, sharply distinct verbal

a third act of ‘overlaying’, ‘coincidence’ or ‘covering’ (Deckung) to see the essential unity between these two acts. The peculiarity of this ‘synthesis of identification’ is given extensive treatment by Husserl. It is after all the manner in which truth is experienced. The act of meaning or signification picks something out (e.g., the inkpot) and the act of perception then stands in ‘internal relation’ to that act of meaning as its fulfillment. This occurs according to Husserl through a mediating act of recognition (Erkennen): the inkpot is recognized as an inkpot. This recognition fuses the meaning act with the perceiving act (LU VI § 7). Husserl always sees the paradigm case of a successful intentional act as an act where the meaning is fulfilled by the presence in intuition of the intended object with full ‘bodily presence’ (Leibhaftigkeit), for example, when I actually see something before my eyes, I have a fulfilled intuition. Later, I can reactivate and relive this intuition as a memory or as a fantasy, still oriented to the object, but not presented with the same presence or immediacy or locatedness in space and time. In memory or in other forms of ‘mindedness’ or ‘calling to mind’ or ‘re-presenting’ (Vergegenwärtigung) we still may have a full intuition of the object, but now no longer with the distinctive bodily presence in the temporal present that characterizes perception. There are other forms of intending which are merely ‘empty’ (Leermeinen), for example, when I use words in a casual way without really thinking about what I am saying, when I talk about something without really thinking about it and so on. Empty or ‘signitive’ intendings, of course, constitute the largest class of our conscious acts, and, from the beginning of his career, Husserl had been fascinated as to how these kinds of intentions can function as knowledge. He reminds us, moreover, that he is talking of intuition and perception in a wider sense than is customary, ‘beyond the bounds of sense’ (über die Schranken der Sinnlichkeit, LU VI Intro. II 185; Hua XIX/2 § 40). Part of the aim of the Investigations is to broaden our sense of intuition beyond sensory to include what Husserl calls categorial Intentions. In the Sixth Investigation and in his draft manuscript revisions of that crucial text, Husserl is preoccupied with the relation between the empty intention and the act that fulfills it. He is trying to express the kind of meaningfulness that already belongs to the level of the empty intention. This is the basis on which we can think of something by indicating or referring to it emptyly. The presence of such empty Intentions in perception is a clue to their operation at the higher levels of cognition. These more intricate structures of perception and judgement form a great part of the actual phenomenology of cognitive life that Husserl pursued in his Passive Syntheses lectures and elsewhere. But the groundwork was already
meanings. We can achieve this end only by Intuitive representation of the essence in adequate Ideation, or, in the case of complicated concepts, through knowledge of the essentiality of the elementary concepts (Elementarbegriffe) present in them, and of the concepts of their forms of combination. (LU Prot. § 155-4; Hua XVIII 246).

It is noteworthy that Husserl alters this passage in several crucial respects in the Second Edition of 1913, changing the phrase ‘logical origln’ to ‘phenomenological origln’, dropping the phrase ‘adequate Ideation’ (adequate Ideation), and also the qualifying ‘intuitive’ from the phrase ‘intuitive representation’. But the effect is only to strengthen the eidetic orientation of phenomenology. Note that Husserl was already conceiving of phenomenology as an a priori eidetic science, which did not consider the empirical, existential dimension in any sense but sought ‘insight into essence’ (Einsicht in das Wesen), some years before his so-called ‘discovery’ of the epoché and reduction in 1905. There is strong evidence, therefore, in support of the view Husserl himself promulgated, namely, that he already had the more mature sense of phenomenology in mind as he was writing the Investigations, but that this became clearer in his head especially as the reaction of his critics became evident. Thus, almost at the end of his career, in a footnote in the Crisis (1936), Husserl could write of his earlier breakthrough:

The first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during my work on the Logical Investigations around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this a priori of correlation. (Crisis § 48, p. 166n; Hua VI 169n1)

But neither the nature of this correlation nor the recognition that phenomenology is a science of essences was immediately clear to Husserl at the time of the First Edition.

It is clear from our examination of Husserl’s development, that there is not a single, clear, definitive conception of phenomenology at work in the Investigations. Husserl is already in the First Edition distinguishing it from empirical psychology and from the contemplation of human consciousness as such. He was already aiming at the ‘idea’ of knowledge and the ideal essence of knowing subjectivity as such. Finally, I am not convinced that Husserl is able to achieve a purely eidetic phenomenological account of cognition as such. His discussion of the nature of perception and judgement in the Fifth and Sixth Investigations, his noting of phenomena such as seeing something and forgetting the word for it, seem too closely tied to the specifically human consciousness and hence to human worldly being. His later explicit embrace of transcendental philosophy only serves to underscore his inability to entirely separate himself from the distinctly and peculiarly human. Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger recognized this failure and rejected Husserl’s purely eidetic conception of transcendental phenomenology in favour of an approach that involved mundane existence. This is not to deny the importance of the philosophical insights Husserl achieved, but rather to dispute his rather complicated and ultimately ill-formed concept of the role of the exclusion of existence claims in his mature conception of phenomenology. In particular, we should be wary of those philosophers who want to embrace the phenomenological practice of the First Edition while repudiating the theory-laden revisions of the Second Edition. Husserl, the radically honest philosopher, is to be believed when he claimed that he was only working out the conception of phenomenology implicit in the First Edition.

Notes


4. Husserl sometimes speaks of Abba in relation to phenomenology, for example, his title to 1930 C-6 manuscript: ‘methodological unbuilding of the primal-phenomenal present’.


9. Two quotations (Ms. F 125/83b and F 125/12a) from the manuscript of Husserl's lectures on Erkenntnistheorie are reproduced in the Editor's Introduction to Hua XIX/1 xxx–xxxI. Of course, it is a matter of dispute whether Husserl correctly understood the nature of Brentano's own descriptive psychology. Certainly in his own lectures on that topic (Descriptive Psychology), Brentano characterizes the discipline as a praxis. However, it is possible that Husserl is thinking more of Brentano's reluctance to allow ideal truths, abstract entities and so on, to be proper constituents of descriptive psychology.


13. Husserl has various formulas to express the aim: 'a philosophical laying down of the foundations of pure logic' (eine philosophische Grundlegung der reinen Logik, LU I 237; Hua XIX/1 112), the laying down of the 'phenomenological foundations of pure logic' (phenomenologische Fundamentierung der reinen Logik, LU VI § 34 II 257; Hua XIX/2 643).

14. At this point, Husserl did not distinguish 'sense' and 'meaning'. He later made a distinction between linguistic 'meanings' (Bedeutungen) and their non-linguistic counterparts, 'senses' (Sinne), that occur in non-linguistic acts such as perceiving, imagining and so on.


19. This is not the place to discuss the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics. Dan Zahavi has claimed that the Investigations is 'metaphysically neutral' but he thinks this is to be regretted, that Husserl ought to have given a metaphysical account of the objects of intentional acts, see D. Zahavi, Husserl's Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 40–2. Husserl himself has interesting discussions of metaphysics and its relation to epistemology in his 1903 'Report on German works in logic from the years 1895–1899', EW, pp. 207–302. However, the issue here is whether phenomenology deals only with the structure of acts and systematically excludes analysis of the hierarchy of objectivities. Clearly, Husserl believed this to be the case when writing the First Edition of LU. He later added a noematic dimension that precisely dealt with objectivities not in the sense of formal and material ontology but in the phenomenological manner in which they are meant (e.g., the object understood as noema).