

Peter Kemp (Ed.)

History in Education

Proceedings from the Conference *History in Education*

Held at the Danish University of Education
24-25 March, 2004

The Present Publication is Financially Supported by
Korea Research Foundation
and the Danish University of Education

Danish University of Education Press

History in Education

Author: Peter Kemp (Ed.)

Proceedings from the Conference History in Education
Held at the Danish University of Education 24-25 March, 2004

The Present Publication is Financially Supported by Korea Research Foundation
and the Danish University of Education

Published by Danish University of Education Press
The Danish University of Education
54, Emdrupvej
DK- 2400 Copenhagen NV
www.dpu.dk/forlag

© 2005 Danish University of Education Press and the authors

No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Typeset and Cover: Pitney Bowes Management Services – DPU
Cover Illustration: Armageddon, 2000,
Bandung, Indonesia. Polyester resin, 48x40x70 cm
Print: IKON Document Services

1. edition
ISBN 87-7684-006-9

How to buy:
National Library of Education
101, Emdrupvej, DK – 2400 Copenhagen NV
www.dpb.dpu.dk
bogsalg@dpu.dk
T: +45 8888 9360
F: +45 8888 9394

Contents

- 5 Peter Kemp (Denmark):
Preface
- 9 Lars-Henrik Schmidt (Denmark):
'History' of the Present regarded as the Past of the Future
- 23 David Evans (N. Ireland):
Poetry, History and Philosophy: the message of Aristotle Poetic
- 31 Yiehoun Yao, (China):
Philosophical Tradition and Education of Civilization History
- 43 William L. McBride (USA):
*Should we Teach the History of Philosophy?
Or, Should we Teach History at All?*
- 53 Dermot Moran (Ireland):
*What is Historical in the History of Philosophy?
Towards an Assessment of Twentieth-Century European
Philosophy*
- 83 Ove Korsgaard (Denmark):
Transformation of the Concept of People
- 91 Hans Poser (Germany):
Enlightenment Top Down Leibniz', Lettre sur l'éducation d'un p
- 101 Jean Ferrari (France):
Le rôle de l'histoire dans l'enseignement
- 111 Evandro Agazzi (Italy):
What Kind of History Should we Teach?
- 119 Basilio Rojo Ruiz (Mexico):
Aesthetic Immersion and Education

We are living, in fact, at a time at which hatred and fear abound. And the invocations of historical referents about which I have been speaking seem not to have contributed to ameliorating that situation; on the contrary. Should history, then, be taught?

What is Historical in the History of Philosophy? Towards an Assessment of Twentieth-Century European Philosophy¹

Dermot Moran

'Lack of a historical sense is the hereditary defect of philosophers ... So what is needed from now on is *historical philosophising*, and with it the virtue of modesty.'
(Nietzsche 1878)

The Project:

A Critical Assessment of Twentieth-Century Philosophy

Thanks to a Senior Fellowship from the *Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences*, I am currently collaborating with a team of international philosophers on a challenging philosophical project, namely, a critical assessment of twentieth-century philosophy, one that identifies its significant innovations and accomplishments, as well as the problems bequeathed to our current generation of philosophers. In this paper I want to reflect on some aspects of this problematic: how to approach twentieth-century philosophy; how to gain an overall perspective on its traditions, and specifically on the commonalities between these emerging traditions, commonalities that are, in many ways, more significant than their opposition and divergences. The overall aim is to identify the challenges still being generated by the legacy of the twentieth century. To paraphrase Croce's 1906 question concerning Hegel: what is living and what is dead in twentieth century philosophy?

¹ Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the Plenary Session, Society for European Philosophy Conference, *European Philosophy and the Human Condition*, University College Cork, Saturday 14th September 2002, and at the Organization of Phenomenological Organizations (OPO) Conference, Prague Academy of the Sciences, Prague, Friday 8th November 2002. I also acknowledge gratefully the support of the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS).

There are, currently, remarkably few overall studies of twentieth-century philosophy; even the 10-volume *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* contains no entry for 'Twentieth-Century Philosophy'.² Yet it is clear that the very meaning of philosophy changed in profound ways over the last hundred years, ways that are certainly not even documented, never mind fully understood. How are we even to begin to appreciate the philosophical legacy of that turbulent, terrifying, but enormously productive twentieth century? Historians are apt to speak of 'long' centuries, and certainly the twentieth century must seem to us now to be one of the longest. Extraordinary technological advances coupled with political catastrophes are marks of the age. Moreover, philosophy bears a grave responsibility: like it or not, disastrous ideologies have been inspired in part by the appropriation or misappropriation of various philosophies – Marx-Leninism, Maoism, fascism, and so on. There is, undoubtedly, a fascinating chapter to be written in the sociology of knowledge concerning the relation of philosophy to other developments in the century, here however I shall be concerned with philosophy's self-representation, philosophical reflection on its own history. I shall largely exclude external factors, and largely concern myself with an *internalist* account of the history of philosophy, philosophy as interpreted by philosophers.

The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century

Nevertheless, some 'external' features need to be mentioned. Certain aspects of philosophical practice are in direct continuity with patterns set in the nineteenth century. For instance, the academic *professionalisation* and specialisation of philosophy that began in the early nineteenth century (usually dated to Kant) becomes pervasive in the twentieth, with the end of the 'man of letters' (Descartes, Leibniz, Hume). Scholarly interest in the history of philosophy also becomes completely professionalized (stimulated largely by Hegel's interest in the subject) and has been carried to new heights in the twentieth century.

While the critical review of the history of philosophy begins with Aristotle, and there are many ancient compendia of philosophical positions, e.g. Cicero and

² Routledge has devoted three volumes in its *History of Philosophy* series but two volumes deal with analytic philosophy (seen as the dominant tradition – including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, ethics, philosophy of science) whereas one volume – edited by Richard Kearney dealt with Continental philosophy. The opportunity to compare and contrast was lost by this decision to go for separate studies of the traditions. A useful collection of articles on the analytic tradition is Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh, eds, *Future Pasts. The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy* (Oxford: OUP, 2001).

Augustine, nevertheless the history of philosophy practised entirely for its own sake seems to be a product of nineteenth century. Both the Hegelians and the Neo-Kantians (e.g. Windelband) wrote histories of philosophy, as did the Neo-Thomists (Gilson), who for instance, emphasised the dominance of classical realism in medieval philosophy to the detriment of the nominalist or even Neoplatonic influences. It is important to recognise how recent many of our historical discoveries are in philosophy, to realise, for example, that more has been learned about all aspects of medieval philosophy in the twentieth century (its figures, texts, sources and influences) than in the whole period from the 17th to the 19th centuries. Similarly, thanks to the 1844 manuscripts, a new version of Marx emerged in twentieth century. European universities especially in Germany, France and England developed critical editions of Plato, Aristotle, and so on. But compare what we know of Heidegger now, based on the *Gesamtausgabe* and, similarly, what we knew at the time of his death in 1976. The same can be said of Kant, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard who receive their critical editions in twentieth century.

An important innovation in the practice of philosophy in the twentieth century that cannot go unnoticed is the admission of women into the profession in large numbers from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The First World War played a role in ensuring that Husserl's classes consisted largely on women in the late war years. Edith Stein, for example, who wrote her doctorate under Husserl, demanded the right to be accepted for the Habilitation degree, and wrote letters to the Education ministry in an attempt to force reluctant academic professors to take on women.³ Hannah Arendt was prevented from completing her Habilitation because she was Jewish. Simone de Beauvoir attended the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris in the twenties, and Elizabeth Anscombe was a student of Wittgenstein in the forties, but it was not until after the Second World War that women began to graduate in philosophy in large numbers and to enter the profession.

The Reaction to Idealism

German philosophy provided the dominant inspiration in European thought during the nineteenth century. The first half of the nineteenth century in Ger-

³ Gerda Wälther, another student of Husserl's in Freiburg, records his reluctance to see women in the academic profession.

many was dominated by the philosophy of Hegel and his immediate students. But, contrary to the claims of the early phenomenologists and logical analysts, Hegel never really went away, although interest in his work went underground so to speak in the latter half of the nineteenth century, to resurface in different fashions in the course of the twentieth century. Russell was initially a committed Idealist, strongly influenced by the Hegelianism of Bradley and McTaggart. In fact, Russell and G.E. Moore saw their own 'analytical' philosophy as directly opposed to Hegel's 'synthetic' philosophy.⁴ Refracted through the early Marx's writings, Hegel influenced the Frankfurt school, e.g. Herbert Marcuse or Theodor Adorno (especially his 'negative dialectics'). Georg Luckacs: *History and Class Consciousness* played a role also in the rehabilitation of Hegel via Marx. In the thirties, a new 'phenomenological' Hegel emerges in the writings of Alexandre Kojève, Jean Wahl, and later Jean Hyppolite. Hans-Georg Gadamer claims to have revived interest in Hegel in post-war German philosophy. In the sixties Walter Kaufmann and John Findlay helped 'translate' Hegel for English-speaking audiences and analytic interest in Hegel developed with Charles Taylor and others. Most recently, in the US, we have seen the social Hegelianism of Brandom and McDowell and Brandom has even written of seeking to introduce the 'Hegelian' phase of analytic philosophy (paraphrasing Sellars who spoke of Wittgenstein's Investigations as the Kantian phase of analytic philosophy that succeeded its earlier 'Humean' phase). Interestingly, for the twentieth century, as Terry Pinkard has observed, Hegel's most influential text, one that he himself regarded as merely introductory to his system, is *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), a work largely ignored by nineteenth-century philosophers.

The latter half of the nineteenth century in German philosophy was dominated by the slogan 'back to Kant' ('*zurück zu Kant*'), and Neo-Kantianism had a strong influence both on Frege (whose teacher was the Neo-Kantian Hermann Lotze) and on Husserl (who was in close contact with Paul Natorp and Heinrich Rickert). The influence of Kant can also be traced through the twentieth century especially in debates over the nature of the a priori and the rule of reason. Rawls' political philosophy, for instance, owes a heavy debt to Kant. Indeed, it is extraordinary how influential Kant continues to be in the sphere of moral philosophy.

⁴ See David Bell, 'The Revolution of Moore and Russell: A Very British Coup,' in Anthony O'Hear, ed., *German Philosophy Since Kant* (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), pp. 193-208.

Most commentators agree that early twentieth-century philosophy was united in its rejection of German Idealism, and in its suspicion of speculative systems. In this it followed a certain empiricist and positivist streak found in late nineteenth-century philosophy – in Mill, Brentano, Mach and Comte. The broadly anti-metaphysical and empirical trends of the late nineteenth century ensured that the dominant approach at the turn of the twentieth century in Germany was epistemological. The chief problem was: how to secure objective knowledge in response to the challenges of *scepticism* and *relativism*. Dilthey's philosophy of world views, for example, appeared to Husserl as leading to relativism. Epistemology is still at the heart of Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*. But very soon, with the emergence of both phenomenology and the linguistic turn, epistemology was dethroned in favour of issues concerned with meaning.

The Effects of War

Even while attempting an internalist history of philosophy, the effects of two world wars on European philosophy simply cannot be ignored. The First World War was catastrophic in its human and political consequences, and it broke up the old order in Germany. In philosophical terms, as reported by Hans-Georg Gadamer, it loosened the grip of Neo-Kantianism and other nineteenth century traditions, and to open students up to the new movements, including Husserlian phenomenology, *Lebensphilosophie* (Simmel, Dilthey), existentialism (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), and mysticism (Eckhart). The First World War also had important consequences for the development of analytic philosophy in the UK. It woke Bertrand Russell up from his detached mathematical and metaphysical concerns. As Ray Monk recounts in his biography of Russell, Russell was horrified by the enthusiasm for war gripping Britain in 1914, with the Cambridge University authorities, for instance, putting up a notice recommending that every able-bodied student join the Officer Training Corps. In response, Russell embarked on writing a number of philosophical articles on the ethics of war, which, though they might not measure up to the politically correct standards of our day in that they defended the war of a more advanced civilisation on a lesser, nevertheless demanded serious reasons for war and argued against the kind of irrational pride and rivalry that was driving 'civilised States' to war. These articles were considered so shocking at the time that journals such as the *New Statesman* refused to publish them.⁵ Indeed, Russell's opposition to the war

⁵ Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell. The Spirit of Solitude* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), pp. 383ff.

and to conscription effectively destroyed his academic career. In 1916 he was dismissed from Trinity College for publishing a pamphlet defending a conscientious objector. He was prevented from taking up a job in Harvard because Britain would not issue him a passport. Particularly shocking for Russell was that his friend and protégé Ludwig Wittgenstein had enlisted in the Austrian army and was effectively fighting for the other side. Russell wrote to Ottoline Morrell, his first wife:

It seems strange that of all the people in the war the one I care for much the most should be Wittgenstein, who is an 'enemy'.⁶

The First World War gave Russell a taste for activism, and led to him being jailed in 1918, but otherwise it was more or less welcomed by other academics (Broad was also against it). In Germany, Max Scheler made a living writing patriotic pamphlets while living in Berlin. Edmund Husserl too was broadly supportive of Germany's war aims, even though he lost one son in 1916 with his second son seriously injured, and his chief assistant Adolf Reinach also died on the front. Martin Heidegger was serving on the Western front with the meteorological division, and corresponding with Husserl, while Ludwig Wittgenstein was composing the *Tractatus* while a serving soldier in the Austro-Hungarian army. Meanwhile, Gadamer escaped the call up because he (as he later regarded it) rather luckily contracted polio and was exempted from military service.

The Second World War and in particular the anti-Jewish policies of the Third Reich had an even more decisive impact on the philosophical community. The rise of Nazism had a disastrous effect on the academy in Germany, giving rise to the mass migration of intellectuals, with members of the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School moving to the UK and US. Neo-Kantians also left Germany, including Cassirer. Nazism also cost the lives of important philosophers such as Walter Benjamin and Edith Stein. Meanwhile, the War also had a motivating effect on US philosophy. In the early thirties Martin Heidegger was becoming the most prominent philosopher in Germany but he effectively linked his academic career to the National Socialist Movement when he accepted Rectorship of Freiburg University in 1933 and as a result his teaching career lay in ruins along with the collapse of Germany in 1945. The young William Van Orman

⁶ Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell, The Spirit of Solitude*, op. cit., p. 374.

Quine, who himself had studied in Vienna, was so horrified by the prospect of the rise of the Nazis that he enlisted in the Navy and fought in Italy:

I felt that Western culture was on the verge of collapse and all I was doing was philosophy of logic.⁷

According to Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, this war divided his life in two. Philosophically, he moved from an earlier 'bourgeois' idealism to a commitment to Marxism. But after the war, as Adorno too has recognised in a different context, everything changed. Scandinavian philosophers who routinely did doctorates in Germany before the Second World War shifted to the United States and now wrote in English rather than in German. French philosophy cut itself loose from German philosophy and flourished as a vigorous and extraordinarily diverse set of interests. The second half of the century saw a steady drift towards America (including the large number of British philosophers, e.g. Colin McGinn, who left the UK for US universities during the Thatcher years) and the recognition of a distinct voice emerging in the US. The accounts of the education of American philosophers such as Quine or Richard Rorty are striking in that their orientation was entirely towards Europe. Quine studied logic at Harvard with Whitehead but was disappointed by what he found there, and so, having good German, he travelled to Europe to study in Vienna (where he spent six weeks with Carnap), Prague and Warsaw (where he met Polish logicians including Tarski, Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz). Rorty was first taught by Carnap and others at Princeton, as was Putnam. Indeed, the influence of European philosophy in the US was such that Arthur Danto claims that a distinctive American academic philosophy only emerged in the 1960s.

The Emerging Division Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy

In particular, and most relevant to the rest of this paper, the dislocation of the war brought about a separation between Anglophone philosophy and philosophy on the European Continent, helping to cement the emerging distinction between analytic and continental philosophy. One of the most notable features of twentieth-century philosophy is the development of two dominant

⁷ Quoted in Giovanna Borradori, *The American Philosopher. Conversations with Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre and Kuhn*, trans. Rosanna Crocitto. (Chicago: University of Chicago Pr., 1994), p. 33.

intellectual traditions, named—at least in the Anglophone world—as the ‘analytic’ or ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘Continental’ or ‘European’ philosophical traditions.⁸ The labels are a stumbling block: European philosophers have never been comfortable with the label ‘Continental’, since they see themselves as doing philosophy in the traditional sense (and upholding the tradition of historical scholarship). They see ‘Continental’ as a label imposed on them from without, often from a rather narrow Euro-sceptical British or American perspective.⁹ Recently philosophers in this tradition have begun to express a preference for describing their tradition as ‘European philosophy’, a title that recognises the long and unbroken European tradition from the Greeks through to German Idealism, hermeneutics and Neo-Kantianism. The problem is that European philosophy includes LaPlace, Comte, Frege, Carnap, Schlick, Popper and Wittgenstein alongside Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, and Lacan and again seems to be mirroring the British Euro-Sceptics in excluding Hume, Mill, Russell and Ayer from the cast of acceptable Europeans. On the other hand, the term ‘European’ philosophy also seems to exclude all those in the USA who write about Heidegger, Derrida and others, excluding thereby Richard Rorty, John Sallis, Jack Caputo, or Charles Taylor. A recent meeting of SPBP (The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) struggled with this difficulty and tried to propose the title ‘Society for Continental Philosophy’ but the move was resisted by those who felt it was vague – which continent? Martinich and Sosa are in a similar predicament with regard to the term ‘analytic’ philosophy, which they believe most accurately characterises the work of Moore and Russell and other British philosophers up to the mid-century. They suggest the term ‘Anglo-German philosophy’ to recognise the important contribution of Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach and others. This division between ‘analytic’ and ‘Continental’, then, is most unhappy, as Simon Critchley has pointed out; however, at present we do not have a more suitable nomenclature and we shall continue to use these terms as they were used largely by followers of the traditions themselves.¹⁰ These traditions are widely held to have developed separately, with opposing aspirations and methodologies, and, indeed, to be fundamentally hostile

⁸ For reasons of space in this essay I shall leave aside two other extremely important twentieth-century movements, namely *pragmatism* and *Marxism*, both in effect reactions against German Idealism.

⁹ See Tom Baldwin's comments in his review essay ‘Two Approaches to Sartre,’ *European Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 4 No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 81-2.

¹⁰ Of course, the term ‘analysis’ was used by Russell and others in contrast with the ‘synthetic’ method of the Neo-Hegelians. Continental philosophers (certainly European ones) did not use that label, which emerged seemingly in the US in the sixties.

to one another. Certainly they have evolved their own distinctive ideologies. Crudely, analytic philosophy has been seen as interested not in the history of ideas but in ‘doing philosophy’. It was, initially at least, anti-metaphysical in that it thought of metaphysical speculation as the mind idling, unconstrained by logic. Certain forms of analysis had a strong sympathy for positivism.

More recently, the analytic tradition has largely embraced naturalism and what critics might call ‘scientism’, the view that philosophy itself is really a part of the exact sciences. Continental philosophy, on the other hand, is often seen as anti-scientific and humanistic in orientation. I believe, however, that more careful scrutiny will actually show that these traditions emerge from common sources in nineteenth-century philosophy and address many of the same problematics, albeit with differing emphases and conclusions. Both Continental and analytic philosophy, for instance, are interested in *naturalism*, diagnosed quite early in the twentieth century as a major threat to philosophy by Husserl in his essay *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* (1910/1911) but advocated by Quine with proposed the naturalisation of epistemology, and by philosophers who have extended the naturalisation project to ethics and philosophy of mind. However, analytic philosophy cannot be seen as exclusively committed to naturalism, given the powerful anti-naturalist arguments of John McDowell and others.

Both traditions are sensitive to language and meaning, aware of the problem of multiple and competing interpretations, sensitive to the challenge of science and technology, reacting to the challenges of scepticism and relativism, and so on. Both traditions began as committed to some form of foundationalism but now are radically shifting ground and abandoning their supposed ‘founding’ methodologies. For instance, descriptive phenomenology soon faced the challenge of hermeneutics, which emphasised the clash of interpretations. Similarly, structuralism gave way to deconstruction with its conception of the limitless deferral and dispersal of meanings. In analytic philosophy, the Carnapian project of securing an ideal language was gradually replaced by a robust philosophical confidence in ordinary language, which itself has been gradually eroded by the problems associated with radical translation, etc.

Inaugural Moments and Grand Narratives

In trying to write the history of twentieth century philosophy, one must be careful not to impose a 'grand' narrative nor to be deceived by many of the grand narratives which contemporary philosophers themselves espouse. Analytic philosophers no less than Continental philosophers have showed a suspicion of these grand narratives. Rorty speaks of 'downbeat' stories; other analytic philosophers want to offer 'deflationary' accounts of truth, meaning, and so on. But while one must be suspicious of the veracity of grand narratives, one must also be aware of the many grand narratives that were proposed. Freud and Husserl were themselves authors of such grand narratives, self-conscious founders of new disciplines – inscribing themselves into history as the founders of psychoanalysis and phenomenology. Husserl, of course, was always an ambiguous founder; he saw himself as radicalising the project of first philosophy (*proté philosophia*), but also reading the history of modern philosophy as the progressive discovery of the reduction in his 'critical history of ideas' (*kritische Ideengeschichte*). But there were many other 'inaugural moments', from the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle to Jacques Derrida's typically ambiguous proclamation of a new science of *grammatology*, the science of writing, (a call taken up by Kristeva) while at the same time explaining how the metaphysical closure of the epoch could prevent it being established as such:

By alluding to a science of writing refined in by metaphor, metaphysics and theology, this exergue must not only announce that the science of writing – grammatology – shows signs of liberation all over the world ... I would like to suggest above all that, however fecund and necessary the undertaking might be ... such a science of writing runs the risk of never being established as such and with that name ... For essential reasons: the unity of all that allows itself to be attempted today through the most diverse concepts of science and writing is in principle more or less covertly yet always, determined by an historico-metaphysical epoch of which we merely glimpse closure. I do not say the end.¹¹

In other words, and in rather typical manner, Derrida wants both to participate in the grand gesture of the founding of a new science and at the same time protect himself against the inevitable failure concealed in such vaulted ambition.

11 J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976), p. 4.

Martin Heidegger, too is a curious case, both a 'modern' and a 'postmodern' in many ways, and yet one who wants to speak of, and diagnose, 'epochs'. Heidegger not only developed a narrative that linked the practices of the ancient Greeks, an interest itself stimulated by nascent German neo-Thomism, with those of Husserl, but also married the hermeneutic tradition of Dilthey and Schleiermacher with the descriptive phenomenology of Husserl. Heidegger too has an idiosyncratic history of philosophy with its narrative of 'the history of Being', which, for instance, bizarrely characterises Nietzsche as a metaphysician, albeit one who diagnoses nihilism as the contemporary meaning of Being. Heidegger and Derrida want to see western philosophy in terms of an occlusion of the meaning of being, or the all-pervasive dominance of an understanding of being in terms of presence. In phenomenology, it is astonishing how so many French thinkers – Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, for instance – had the same totalised view of the history of philosophy. They were all formed in the same *École Normale Supérieure* and accepted its view of the history of philosophy, very much a 'totalised' package.

There are many examples of the grand gesture and indeed the Geneva philosopher Kevin Mulligan has characterised continental philosophy as 'melodramatic'.¹² How many philosophers in the twentieth century issued apocalyptic pronouncements, proclaiming the 'end of philosophy' or, with Foucault, the 'end of man'? Heidegger sees the end of philosophy as coming with Nietzsche who 'completed' metaphysics and gave 'planetary thinking' the form it will have for decades to come. Philosophy is ended because a certain form of philosophy has been incorporated into this planetary thinking:

With Nietzsche's metaphysics, philosophy is completed. That means: it has gone through the sphere of prefigured possibilities. Completed metaphysics, which is the ground for the planetary manner of thinking, gives the scaffolding for an order of the earth, which will supposedly last for a long time. The order no longer needs philosophy because philosophy is already its foundation. But with the end of philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transition to another beginning.¹³

The rhetoric of end is always associated with the rhetoric of beginning.

12 Kevin Mulligan, 'Post-Continental Philosophy: Nosological Notes,' *Stanford French Review* Vol. 17, 2-3 (1999).

13 M. Heidegger, 'Overcoming Metaphysics,' from *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Füllingen: Neske, 1954), trans. in *The End of Philosophy*, ed. J. Stambaugh (NY: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 95-96.

Analytic philosophy, too, at various times has proclaimed an end to philosophy as a discipline distinct from science. There is science and there is stamp-collecting. There is no such thing as 'philosophy'. It is at best a set of questions for which the proper scientific method for answering them has not yet been defined. Even where philosophy is still accepted as a separate discipline, there is also a more widespread rejection among analytic philosophers of philosophy as traditionally practiced through the critical study of classic texts. Just say 'no' to the history of philosophy, is a slogan in point. Philosophy as scientific analysis is supposed to be different in character to what is often disparagingly characterised as 'the history of ideas'. Yet, A. J. Ayer, for instance, in his autobiography, *A Part of My Life*, describes his Oxford training in philosophy as primarily being a kind of critical engagement with the history of philosophy, writing essays on Leibniz and others, a form of philosophy he practiced in his own books.

Carnap and Ayer proclaimed the elimination of metaphysics from philosophy. Metaphysical statements literally have no meaning, they are nonsensical, at best 'poetry', not subject to the criteria of truth or falsity. Metaphysicians have been 'duped by grammar' and philosophy must be distinguished from metaphysics, Ayer proclaims in *Language, Truth and Logic*. Ayer goes further and denies that metaphysical statements can be cherished alongside poetic statements as statements of nonsense that still have emotive value. While poetry is rarely literal nonsense, metaphysics always is and is of no scientific value. But Heidegger too has commented on the kind of 'nothingness' or lack of content of philosophical assertions. Although Carnap reacted violently against Heidegger's conception of philosophy, there are closer and more complex connections between their positions as Michael Friedman has shown.

The Origins of Analytic and Continental Philosophy

Let us consider a little more closely the origins of both analytic and continental philosophy. Both these prominent twentieth-century movements have their origins in the same set of interrelated concerns, including: the scientific status of logic (and its relation to mathematics); the nature and extent of the new science of psychology (which had been inaugurated in the final quarter of the nineteenth century by Wundt and Brentano and Titchener and others; and the challenge posed by reductive naturalism to the traditional philosophical enterprise. These problematics are interrelated: prominent philosophers in the nine-

teenth century (e.g. J. S. Mill) had explained logic in terms of psychology and the internal processes of the human mind (so called 'psychologism') and twentieth-century philosophy begins with Frege, Russell, Husserl and Wittgenstein, all rejecting this explanation in order to defend the ideality and independence of logical truths. A kind of Platonic realism about logical entities and a rejection of psychologism are hallmarks of the beginning of twentieth-century philosophy whether it be Moore or Russell or Frege or Husserl. Bertrand Russell once characterised the nineteenth century as the age of mathematics. It is interesting that the major developments in mathematics and logic were of central interest to philosophers – Husserl, Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein. Quine and Putnam were both fascinated by mathematical logic. Karl-Otto Apel has spoken of a similar fascination with formalisation in German philosophy in the sixties, a fascination still evident in the work of certain Scandinavian philosophers.

As Hilary Putnam has pointed out, in the early twentieth century philosophers read each other without any conscious sense that they belonged to alien traditions, or that one was philosophy while the other was not. Russell and Husserl were both deeply influenced by the crisis of foundations in mathematics and by Cantor's work on infinite numbers. Russell's early work was in the philosophy of mathematics and his famous paradox was not only known to Husserl but may even have been anticipated by him. Husserl carefully read works of Frege, which the author had sent to him. His copies, held in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, are heavily annotated, and, in particular, Husserl comments on Frege's context principle, which Michael Dummett sees as one of the inaugural moments of analytic philosophy.

In his book *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* Dummett locates the linguistic turn in Frege's 1884 *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* where he articulates the context principle that only in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning.¹⁴ Sentences express thought but the decomposition of thought into its components is achieved through the decomposition of sentences. Dummett sees it as crucial to the rise of analytic philosophy that thoughts were stripped of their subjective mental character, thought was 'extruded from the mind' as he puts it. Yet this is precisely true also, as Dummett recognises, of Husserl. The compo-

14 Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1993), p. 5.

nents of thoughts could be tracked through the composition of language once the 'disguised' logic of language had been unmasked.

In contrast to their views on meaning, Frege and Husserl, the founders of the analytic and continental traditions, parted company in their evaluation of the role of mathematical formalisation in logic. When Russell went to gaol in 1918, he took with him Husserl's *Logical Investigations* with the intention of reviewing it for *Mind*. Unfortunately, the review was never written, but the gulf between Husserl and the advocates of formal mathematical logic was by then fairly well established. Husserl regarded the development of symbolic logic as a calculus which did not penetrate the significant philosophical questions of meaning, whereas he himself was interested in transcendental logic, reviving the Kantian problem of how it is that logical acts achieve objectivity. This issue of the nature of transcendental logic has only recently reappeared in analytic philosophy, inspired by contemporary forms of Neo-Kantianism.

Of course, once a new tradition is inaugurated there will always be those who claim it had prior incarnations. Thus, the 'linguistic turn' in analytic philosophy (initiated by Frege but really developed by Russell and Wittgenstein) is also paralleled in Continental philosophy with the concern for language and interpretation of Heidegger, Gadamer and others. But, interestingly, efforts have been made to trace the linguistic turn in philosophy back to Herder, Hamann, and other figures in the German Enlightenment, and this is legitimate, but is possible only because of the particular shape that the linguistic turn took in analytic philosophy highlighted this kind of turn in earlier thinkers. Nevertheless, the forms of thinking involved are different. In analytic philosophy, for instance, the linguistic turn is given specifically scientific garb, whereas the turn to language in eighteenth-century thought is an attempt to achieve a universalisation of thinking, freeing thinking from the peculiarities of local inscription in language. But even among analytic philosophers, a pre-history to what Austin calls 'the way of words' is given, which recognises specifically analytic philosophy in the work of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Thus you get the emergence of another grand narrative – this time within analytic philosophy – according to which the best philosophy has always been analytic philosophy – whether it be the practice of definition in Plato's *Theaetetus* or Aristotle's different senses of the term *ousia*.

If the nineteenth-century saw philosophy becoming thoroughly professionalized and academicized, it also saw, with Hegel, philosophy coming to produce a philosophical reflection on its own genesis. An increasing self-awareness about the nature and limits of philosophical practice is evident in philosophy since Kant. But it was in Hegel's lectures, that for the first time the history of philosophy itself became philosophical. Hegel saw the need for that side of philosophy, which was to be 'its time comprehended in thought' (*ihre Zeit in Gedanken gefasst*). Incidentally, Rorty thinks this idea of philosophy freed it from the need to offer explanation and instead allowed philosophy to take the position of celebration. Rorty has recently written:

... I happily join with Charles Taylor in thinking that Hegel's importance lies chiefly in his historicism, and specifically in his redescription of philosophy as its time held in thought. One happy consequence of this redescription seems to me that it frees philosophers from the need to give explanations. It lets us relax and be frankly and openly celebratory (or in Heidegger's case, frankly and openly nostalgic).¹⁵

Whether philosophy is able to comprehend the times in which it emerged and of which it is supposedly the rational representation, is an open question, but it is at least true that the effort to comprehend our philosophical time is itself a philosophical (rather than sociological) challenge.

To think about the twentieth-century philosophical legacy, one has to be aware of the enormous and complicated hermeneutical tasks involved. In one sense, one must be resolutely Hegelian. We cannot take history to be either 'bunk' or 'one damn thing after another'. The historical development of philosophy through the century must itself have philosophical significance, but the recognition of that significance must not endanger the very understanding of radical contingency which underlies human action in history. Hegel himself recognised the tension between concept and contingency, between the rationality which philosophy demands and the chaos of what happens, and claimed that:

... the only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple idea of reason – the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process.¹⁶

15 Richard Rorty, 'Comment on Robert Pipplin's 'Naturalism and Mindedness: Hegel's Compatibilism'', *European Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 7 No. 2 (August 1999), p. 215.

16 G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: CUP, 1975), p. 27.

But precisely this assumption of rationality is what is in question in contemporary philosophy. On the other hand, any scientific enterprise, any enterprise of understanding surely begins from the assumption of rationality, that there is an identifiable order even in apparent chaos. Heidegger for instance and I think Gadamer here follows him sees it as belonging to the meaning of philosophy to say something essential about the spirit of the age. Heidegger, Gadamer, Blumenberg, Cassirer and Arendt, all want to characterise the essence of *modernity* for instance. Foucault wants to diagnose contemporary civilisation using the mirror of the history of madness. His employment of the Nietzschean figures of genealogy and diagnosis confirm that he too believes that it is possible to penetrate to the essence of a time or a period. This is a kind of phenomenological essentialism, one that needs much fuller study.

In any event, to write a history of twentieth-century philosophy is not, as Hegel correctly recognises, merely to assemble a list of all the philosophical works and tendencies. It is also an attempt to seize the *rationale* at work in the processes. For example, Lyotard is doing just that in diagnosing the postmodern condition. In precisely this sense, I believe that the history of philosophy is relevant to philosophy, in contrast to the way in which the history of physics or medicine is not relevant to the current practice of these disciplines. Concepts and problems have histories, as I have argued elsewhere, and understanding those histories is important to understanding and contextualising the concepts themselves. I am glad to see that I am supported in this approach by an analytic philosopher interested in the history of analytic philosophy. Peter Hylton has written in his elegant *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*:

Philosophical problems, and the concepts in which they are formulated, and the assumptions on which they rest, have a history; and this history is surely a legitimate subject of study.¹⁷

Moreover, Hylton argues it is not just a subject of interest in historical terms but it is of philosophical interest too. That is, it challenges our conceptual frameworks.

The Meaning of Europe

Certainly for the first half of the century, western philosophy was quite specifically European philosophy. As in the later half of the nineteenth-century, the

¹⁷ Peter Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 13.

intellectual centres were in Germany, Austria, France, and Britain – in Marburg, Göttingen, Vienna, Prague, Paris (with Bergson), Cambridge (with Russell and Wittgenstein), Oxford (Ryle, Grice, Austin, Dummett) and London (A. J. Ayer). But, especially since 1945, the axis moved persistently westward, specifically towards the United States, and since the 1960s Australia has emerged with a distinctive kind of analytic philosophy of a materialist and realist variety (Armstrong, Smart, etc.).

But the Europe in question for the first half of the century is a very small Europe: mostly Germany, France, Austria, Poland and Britain, with some developments in Russia. What of philosophy in Greece, for instance, or Portugal? In the late nineteenth-century, formal logic flourished in the Lvov-Warsaw schools, but after 1945 academic philosophy in general forgot Poland (Taski for example remained in the US) and indeed the whole Eastern bloc, with the possible exception of a small number of thinkers (such as Kolakowski in Poland), or in Hungary (Lukacs), Prague (Patočka) and Belgrade with the Marxist school, some now discredited due to their extreme Serbian nationalism. In 1932, as we have seen, the American philosopher W. V. O. Quine thought it worthwhile to leave Harvard, where he had studied with C. I. Lewis and Whitehead, to visit Vienna, Prague and Warsaw, in order to learn about the latest developments in logic. Gilbert Ryle similarly recommended A. J. Ayer to study with Moritz Schlick in Vienna. Tarski¹⁸ on truth, for instance, is essential to understanding the work of Donald Davidson. But such thinkers as Tarski and Carnap became completely absorbed in the American context after the war, whereas post-1945 Poland together with its philosophers remained locked in a Soviet cul-de-sac from which it is only now beginning to emerge.

I must emphasise how small philosophical Europe is. In the first half of the twentieth century, it did not include Greece or for that matter Portugal or Scandinavia. If Wittgenstein went to Norway, it was because of his professed desire

¹⁸ Tarski was born in Warsaw in 1901 (The family name was changed in 1924.) Between 1918 and 1924 Tarski studied at the University of Warsaw where he received his doctorate in mathematics under the direction of S. Lesniewski. In 1926 he was appointed as a lecturer. In 1939 Tarski set out for a lecture tour of the USA and was prevented from returning to Poland by the outbreak of the Second World War. He then briefly held positions at Harvard University, the City College of New York and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. In 1942 he was appointed to the mathematics department of the University of California at Berkeley, where he remained until his retirement in 1968. (*Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0, London: Routledge).

for darkness, not philosophical company and the same is true of his sojourns in the West of Ireland, where I doubt he ever visited University College Galway. If academic philosophy continues to flourish in Athens, for instance, it was on the basis of German-led classical scholarship and traditional philosophical practice (probably including now a large dose of Anglo-American philosophy imported in). This is still the case, a glance at most European philosophical syllabi sees the enormous importance of Gadamer, for example, who probably does not appear at all on the syllabi of most English-speaking universities. So 'Europe' in philosophical terms still means, predominantly Germany, France and the UK, and if new university departments are being developed in Hungary, Slovenia, and elsewhere, it is largely due to support from British and Western European philosophers (as happened in East German universities after re-unification).

Tradition and Forgetfulness

In charting the history of twentieth-century philosophy, another hermeneutic scruple to bear in mind is the manner in which thinkers are inscribed into a tradition, either self-consciously by themselves or else by their followers. The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, writing in 1958 to commemorate the centenary of Husserl's birth, has an interesting reflection on the nature of tradition:

Establishing a tradition means forgetting its origins the aging Husserl used to say (*La tradition est oubliée des origines disait le dernier Husserl*). Precisely because we owe so much to tradition, we are in no position to see just what belongs to it. With regard to a philosopher whose venture has awakened so many echoes, and at such an apparent distance from the point where he himself stood, any commemoration is also a betrayal (*toute commémoration est aussi trahison*)...¹⁹

Indeed, it is a singular feature of the main traditions of twentieth-century philosophy that they saw themselves as new movements, which broke decisively with the past. Husserl, Freud and others saw themselves as founders of new disciplines. The rhetoric of the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle is similar. Nevertheless, as Merleau-Ponty points out, to establish something as new means self-consciously separating it from all that has gone before. Yet this separation can never be carried out completely. For instance, in order to succeed in France,

19 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p. 201, trans. R. McCleary, *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1964), p. 159.

Husserl's phenomenology had to be absorbed into the French tradition in a particularly distinctive way. Sartre harnessed Husserlian phenomenology to Cartesianism whereas Levinas links him with Bergson. Indeed, Husserl himself deliberately sought to inscribe himself into the French tradition in philosophy by emphasising his affinity with Descartes during the lectures given on his visit to Paris in 1929. Similarly, Hegel – whom Husserl, following his mentor Brentano, regarded as ungrounded speculative system-builder and hence the opposite of a true phenomenologist – was grafted onto the phenomenological tradition by Merleau-Ponty, largely through the mediation of the reading of Hegel to be found in the lectures of Kojève also given in Paris. Sartre self-consciously developed existentialism, but later, in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, he deliberately inscribed it as a moment within a larger conception of dialectical materialism.

In the analytic tradition similar insertions and re-inscriptions into traditions occur but they are usually not explicitly trumpeted. David Pears began his book on Russell by arguing that he was responding to the challenge of scepticism. Indeed, both Pears and Ayer portray Russell as an empiricist philosopher following in the footsteps of Hume. But, in fact, as Peter Hylton has shown, and as we have seen earlier, Russell was more immediately influenced by the idealism of Bradley and McTaggart. He was a practicing metaphysician, frequently introducing abstract metaphysical entities into his explanations as no empiricist would have done. Indeed, Russell, influenced by Green and Bradley, regarded empiricism as false and as having been effectively refuted by idealism.²⁰ Thus he could write in his *History of Western Philosophy*:

David Hume ... developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and by making it self-consistent made it incredible.²¹

Russell then was no Humean. But philosophical misreadings of this kind can have creative consequences. When Ryle advised Ayer to study with Schlick it was because he thought the Vienna Circle were pursuing Wittgenstein's programme in philosophy. Wittgenstein himself was soon to distance himself from the Circle and show that his philosophical interests were quite different. And, as we have seen, Heidegger inscribed phenomenology into the older Greek

20 Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 22.

21 B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 634.

tradition of philosophy, even claiming that the meaning of phenomenology was better understood by Aristotle than by his mentor Husserl. Derrida extracted the deconstructive moment from Husserlian *Abbau* and Heideggerian *Destruktion* and Nietzschean *Zerstörung* to make it into a kind of permanent principle of interpretative change. It is interesting to see that deconstruction will probably be reabsorbed into the longer tradition of hermeneutics.

The Beginning of the Century

Let us try to get a sense of how things were at the beginning of the century. In intellectual terms, we may consider the dawn of that century as marked by three important events: the death of the isolated figure Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who would become in his own words a 'posthumous man', and the publication of two works that would transform European thought: Sigmund Freud's *Traumdeutung* (*Interpretation of Dreams*, 1899), which inaugurated psychoanalysis, and Edmund Husserl's *Prolegomena zu reinen Logik* (*Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, 1900), which broke decisively with the prevailing *psychologism* in the understanding of logic and mathematics and led to the development of phenomenology. One may be tempted to see Friedrich Nietzsche as the philosophical voice of the century – his writings seem to touch on all the central themes – the problem of *history* and the fragmentary nature of inheritance and tradition, the need to engage with creative destruction – philosophising with a hammer – in order to free up sedimented meanings, *naturalism* and the way of integrating the human with the rest of nature, especially after Darwin, the recognition of the need to have ears behind one's ears in the interpretation of others, the ironic probing of dreams of mastery, the recognition of the hidden ties between reason and force. Yet, even a sympathetic reader of Nietzsche such as Richard Rorty himself believes that Nietzsche was really only integrated into philosophy through Heidegger, and before that was a figure of mainly literary inspiration, influencing Shaw for example. Similarly, Freud had almost no impact on philosophy – certainly in European philosophy prior to Ricoeur in France and to some extent Adorno and the Frankfurt school most notably Marcuse. Sartre was seen as having dismissed Freudian analysis in *Being and Nothingness* (1943). It was not until the sixties (with Adorno and Marcuse, Wollheim, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and others) that Freud entered the philosophical scene.

So perhaps Nietzsche and Freud are not in fact the archetypal twentieth-century figures, certainly if one considers the nature of the their respective

influences on philosophy. The situation is quite different with Husserl, who, as Merleau-Ponty put it, casts a long shadow over the twentieth century.²² Almost every European philosopher in the first half of the century had some contact direct or indirect with Husserl. Of course, as we know Husserl himself was isolated and humiliated by the rising Nazi movement, a movement in which his successor Heidegger enthusiastically participated. Any history of twentieth-century philosophy must face that great betrayal by Heidegger – a betrayal which was interpreted as being a kind of Nietzschean philosophising with a hammer. Heidegger hated the ensconced academic practice in the university and saw Nazism as a chance for university renewal and at the same time as a vehicle for cultural renewal. *Erneuerung*, the very term of course of Husserl's project in the *Kaizo* lectures of the twenties.

Husserl's *Logical Investigations* as Breakthrough Work

The *Prolegomena* was the first volume of Husserl's massive and groundbreaking *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical Investigations*),²³ the second volume of which, appearing from the publisher Max Niemeyer in two parts in 1901, inaugurated phenomenology as the project of descriptively clarifying the 'experiences of thinking and knowing'. With this work, Husserl believed he had made a start in clarifying problems that were at the heart of contemporary science and philosophy, problems concerning the nature of the experience and determination of meaning in the broadest sense. In this work, he used the term 'phenomenology' to mean a kind of descriptive psychology (such as practiced by Brentano and Meinong), a way of describing what shows itself as it shows itself in its essential forms, seeking to avoid speculation and remaining true to the evidential situations, what Husserl called somewhat misleadingly 'the things themselves' (*die Sachen selbst*). Husserl's primary principle – a radical variant of empiricism – is to accept as evident only what shows itself to be so in intuition. Intuition is the keystone of his philosophy. Intuition refers to the primary grasp of the presence of entities.

22 M. Merleau-Ponty, 'The Philosopher and his Shadow', *Signs*, op. cit., pp. 159-81.

23 Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, erster Band, *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, text der 1. und der 2. Auflage, hrsg. E. Heidegger, Husserliana XVIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), and *Logische Untersuchungen*, zweiter Band, *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, in zwei Bänden, hrsg. Ursula Panzer, Husserliana XIX (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984), p. 6, trans. J.N. Findlay, *Logical Investigations*, revised with New Introduction by Dermot Moran with a New Preface by Michael Dummett (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 2 volumes. Hereafter 'LU' followed by investigation number, section number, and volume and page number of English translation, followed by German pagination of Husserliana edition. Henceforth 'Hua' will be abbreviated to 'Hua' and volume number.

As Husserl put it in the Foreword to the Second Edition, and as he would subsequently stress, the *Investigations* was his 'breakthrough work' (*Werk des Durchbruchs*, LU I 3; Hua XVIII 8). It certainly made his reputation as a philosopher, being praised by the foremost philosophers of his day in Germany, including Paul Natorp,²⁴ Wilhelm Wundt, who welcomed its anti-psychologism, and Wilhelm Dilthey, who saw it as providing the method to investigate lived experiences in their concreteness. In personal terms, it also afforded Husserl the opportunity of moving from Halle to Göttingen. But, in terms of its philosophical significance the import of the *Investigations* is many faceted. On the one hand, it abjured psychologism and defended a broadly Platonist account of numbers, logical forms, and other ideal entities. They are what they are independent of their being thought or known. On the other hand, Husserl recognised that ideal entities and meanings are only reached by consciousness through a set of determinate acts whose essential natures and interconnections can be specified. There are acts of intending meanings, acts of recognising, judging, and so on. These acts can be understood as themselves making up a framework of idealities. Husserl's subsequent recognition that these idealities are themselves embedded in the transcendental ego moved his thought in a transcendental direction, renewing his links with the more dominant tradition of Neo-Kantianism.

Husserl moved to Göttingen in 1901 as the self-proclaimed founder of phenomenology, and, through the influence of the *Investigations* on a group of philosophers in Germany, a phenomenological 'movement' (*Bewegung*) began to emerge in the first decade of the century with Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger and others. Through the fascination which the *Logical Investigations* provoked, Husserl effectively revolutionised existing philosophy in Germany, changing the very way philosophy was practiced, shifting the focus from the history of ideas and from epistemology to an attempt to describe what he called 'the things themselves' (*die Sachen selbst*). Until Husserl himself came to have a significant influence, German philosophy had been dominated by Neo-Kantianism (divided into the so-called 'South German and 'Marburg' schools) which accepted the fact of science, and whose project was to specify the preconditions of objective scientific knowledge.

²⁴ Paul Natorp, 'Zur Frage der logischen Methode. Mit Bezug auf Edm. Husserls Prolegomena zur reinen Logik,' *Kantstudien* VI (1901), pp. 270-283.

Furthermore, united in opposition to Hegelian speculative idealism, various forms of positivism were on the rise in Germany, influenced by John Stuart Mill and the older British Empiricist tradition as well as by Comte. Husserl's teacher, Franz Brentano, for instance, was a strong advocate of this positivism and of the unity of exact philosophy and science. Husserl's phenomenology had a profound effect. Issues of knowledge had to be given a much deeper analysis. No longer could the study of the history of philosophy substitute for philosophy. So, perhaps unsurprisingly, I see the publication of the *Logical Investigations* as the most important moment, the inaugural moment for European philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century.

The Rise of Analytic Philosophy

It is only in the past decade that philosophers have begun to think of analytical philosophy as a historical movement and as a tradition, rather than as the method of philosophy. There is also increasing recognition that the nature of the analytic tradition has radically altered over the decades. Who are the founders of analytic philosophy? Although the older Empirical tradition of Hume and Mill is clearly in the background most commentators see Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) as inaugurating analytic philosophy with his recognition of the distinction between the *grammatical form* of a sentence expressing a categorical judgement (S is P) and the logical form which was best expressed by the notions adapted from mathematics of *function* and *argument*. Frege was able to break free of psychologism in one move by showing that logical reasoning could be more accurately expressed in mathematical terms putting all reference to the subjective nature of judging aside. He clearly distinguished between the act of judging and the judgement or proposition asserted. Similarly, Frege regarded it as the task of philosophy 'to break the power of the word over the human mind' as he puts it in his *Begriffsschrift* (1879). His distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* in his 1892 article was seen as a helpful disambiguation of two different senses and hence as an example of the kind of clear and illuminating analysis favoured by philosophers.

However, the archetypal text that inaugurated analytic philosophy is usually held to be Bertrand Russell's famous 1905 article, 'On Denoting', published in *Mind*,²⁵ which also enshrined the difference between logical and grammatical form, became a model of its kind and the paradigm of analytic philosophy. Russell's target is Meinong's object theory which allowed any grammatically

acceptable subject of a sentence to stand for or name an object. Russell, in contrast, shows the difference between a referring or denoting expression and one which has a different logical form and serves as a description. Russell sets out his method in a manner that makes clear that logic must solve paradoxes:

A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science. I shall therefore state three puzzles which a theory as to denoting ought to be able to solve; and I shall show later that my theory solves them.

Following on from the paradigm of Russell's analysis, the task of analytic philosophy was seen, in Fregean terms, as freeing logic from the enslavement of language. In part this would lead to the pressure to develop ideal languages, it also led to the recognition that many traditional philosophical problems were actually insoluble because their linguistic form was 'systematically misleading' as Ryle would put it. Analytic philosophy now came to recognise the need to distinguish between genuine and 'pseudo-problems' (*Scheinprobleme*) in philosophy.

Besides his actual logical analysis, Russell must be given enormous credit for establishing the style and manner of analytic writing in philosophy. The form of philosophical writing became the lucid essay, as exemplified in the writings of G. E. Moore, preferably published in one of the newly founded journals such as *Mind* (e.g. his 'The Nature of Judgement,' *Mind* 1899). Whole systems of thought were condensed in a series of propositions. In Russell's view, for instance, idealism could be reduced to a single issue: the nature and possibility of internal relations. Similarly, Leibniz's philosophy could be reduced to a set of axioms and the question was whether they were consistent with one another. But, of course, as in many other areas of twentieth-century thought, this reduction of the complex to the simple can also be found prefigured in Kant. It was Kant for instance who made the whole extraordinarily complex issue of the meaning and scientific status of metaphysics depend on the single question of whether a priori synthetic propositions were possible. Nevertheless, the Russellian style of analytic philosophy was not universally admired. In his correspondence with Russell in early 1914, Wittgenstein states that he hopes that, in his

25 B. Russell, 'On Denoting,' *Mind* (October 1905), pp 479-93.

forthcoming lectures in Harvard, Russell will reveal something of his thinking and not just present 'cut and dried results'.²⁶ Certainly, Wittgenstein had put his finger on something in the manner of Russell's way of writing. Russell favoured the scientific manner of reporting results. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, recognised that the *process* of philosophising is the important thing, the *showing*, the revealing that is done in the very acts of questioning and probing. Here in fact, Wittgenstein is probably closer to Heidegger than to Russell.

The will-to-system is also evident early on in analytic philosophy. Russell was by nature a system builder trying in his books to give clarification to the central scientific and metaphysical concepts of space, time, matter, causation, the nature of relations, classes and so on. The most notable case of systematisation in point here is Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (1921).²⁷ According to this book, the object of philosophy is the 'logical clarification of thoughts' and the *Tractatus* is surely an extraordinary edifice, a purely modernist construction. Wittgenstein announces that he believes he has found 'on all essential points, the final solution of the problems'.²⁸ But it also has unmistakable Kantian echoes, e.g. 'the aim of the book is to set a limit to thought'.²⁹

The *Tractatus* encouraged the early Vienna Circle members who were intent on promoting a 'scientific conception of the world' (their phrase). Moritz Schlick, for example, had studied physics and was struggling to find an appropriate philosophical vehicle to accommodate the insights of Einstein's Theory of Relativity and the new physics in general. Certainly the Vienna Circle gave predominance to science and dismissed the pseudo-propositions of 'metaphysics'. In the English-speaking world, A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936),³⁰ had extraordinary influence, especially on those who wanted to argue that moral and religious statements were in fact literally meaningless. Side by side with the hard, formalistic, systematic side of analytic philosophy was a softer style of analysis, first typified by G. E. Moore and soon afterwards by Whitehead. For instance, Moore's 'In Defence of Common Sense' lists propositions which he claims he knows, but many of these knowledge claims embody

26 Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell. The Spirit of Solitude*, op. cit., p. 340.

27 L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. P. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961)

28 Wittgenstein, 'Author's Preface,' *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., p. 5.

29 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., p. 3.

30 A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936)

assumptions that belong to the background of what Husserl would call the life world.³¹

Morris Weitz³² lists a number of characteristics of analytic philosophy, including the refutation of idealism, the defence of realism and common sense (Moore), logical analysis (Russell, Ryle), logical positivism, and conceptual elucidation. Examples of logical analysis are Russell's theory of descriptions, and, building on that, Ryle's discussion of systematically misleading expressions. But the central notion of analytic philosophy appears to be elucidation or the clarification of concepts through the clarification of the linguistic forms in which those concepts appear. As Michael Dummett has written:

What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained.³³

Central then to Dummett's characterisation of analytical philosophy is the linguistic turn.

What is difficult to understand is how logical analysis and specifically the disambiguation of logical from the grammatical form of sentences should end up being coupled with a strong defence of ordinary language. This is precisely what happened with the emergence of Oxford ordinary language philosophy in the fifties, inspired by the approach to language found in Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. Austin and Ryle were the main exponents of this approach in Britain but their approach was continued subsequently in America by Searle (a student of Austin) and Dennett (a student of Ryle). Ryle's analysis of systematically misleading expressions is employed by Dennett in his first book *Content and Consciousness* to deny that there exist 'sakes' (as in 'I did it for John's sake') and to determine which if any of our nouns denoting mental items are in fact referential.³⁴

³¹ See Stanley Rosen, 'Moore on Common Sense,' in *The Blustiness of the Ordinary. Studies in the Possibility of Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale U. P., 2002), p. 174.

³² M. Weitz, ed., *Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1966).

³³ M. Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1993), p. 4.

³⁴ D. Dennett, *Content and Consciousness* (London: RKP, 1969; reprinted Routledge, 1993), pp. 6-18.

It would be wrong to think that analytic philosophers are wedded to a fixed set of presuppositions, which they do not critically analyse. In fact, analytic philosophy shows a tradition of critique that gradually pared away what were thought to be foundational concepts of analysis. After Russell's analysis of descriptions, perhaps the next most paradigmatic article for analytic philosophy is Quine's 1951 paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'³⁵ which attacked the very basis of the analytic/synthetic distinction so beloved of Neo-Kantians and Carnapians alike. This was a challenge to the very meaning of analysis, and an undermining of the theoretical assumptions that had given rise to analytic philosophy in the first place. As Grice and Strawson point out, Quine is not saying that the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is badly drawn or vague or useless, rather that it is illusory. It is for Quine 'an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith'.

Quine's article also included an explicit attack on the verificationist principle of meaning, which had become, as he calls it, a 'catchword' of twentieth-century empiricism. Against the 'reductionist' claim that meaningful statements can be traced back to a statement about immediate experience, Quine wants to propose that our 'statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.'³⁶ What he wants to propose in that paper is an 'empiricism without dogmas' and one that is holistic in that it sees the web of knowledge as a "man-made fabric which impinges on experience only at the edges".³⁷ Every statement is revisable, whether it be a statement about experience or the formulation of a logical law. Moreover, the positing of abstract entities such as classes is on a par with the positing of Homeric gods or physical objects. This positing is a matter of convenience, or as Quine puts it, 'swelling ontology to simplify theory'.³⁸

The next step in this overhaul of the very meaning of classical empiricism and indeed classical analytic philosophy (as represented by Carnap or Ayer) is the attack on the scheme/content distinction in Davidson's famous 'On the Very

³⁵ *Philosophical Review* 60 (1951), reprinted in A. P. Martinich, and David Sosa, eds, *Analytic Philosophy. An Anthology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 450-462.

³⁶ *Analytic Philosophy. An Anthology*, op. cit., p. 459.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 460.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' (1974).³⁹ Indeed, this step is already prefigured in Quine's 'Two Dogmas' article. In that article, Quine already recognises that some sentences look more like statements about our conceptual schemes (whether we admit classes or not) while others look more like statements about brute fact ('there are brick houses on Elm St). Quine wants to deny that there is a difference in kind between these two types of statement. They are on a continuum and the decisions which to accept is 'pragmatic' according to Quine. Davidson begins his article by recognising many philosophers speak of conceptual schemes and contrast them with experience and specifically 'the data of sensation'. Even those who think there is only one conceptual scheme still cling to the idea of there being such a 'scheme'. But in particular Davidson is interested in the idea (current in modern anthropology and elsewhere – he cites Benjamin Whorf's work on the Hopi languages and their untranslatability, as well as Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* on revolutions in science leading to different paradigms or 'mindsets') that what makes one conceptual scheme different from another is that it is not translatable into it. Davidson is explicit that he is seeking to build on Quine's exposure of two dogmas by himself exposing the third dogma of empiricism – that between scheme and content. As Davidson recognises to give up the third dogma is to abandon anything there is to empiricism:

I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible. It is itself a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma. The third, and perhaps the last, for if we give it up it is not clear that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism.⁴⁰

These are paradigmatic moments in analytic philosophy, and there is evidence of a clear sense of tradition. Quine is utilising but criticising the approach of Carnap and Davidson is moving to reject a new dualism that emerges after the analytic/synthetic dualism has been jettisoned. Davidson quotes closely from Quine's article, deliberately invoking phrases like 'the tribunal of experience' and it is clear that the conception of a 'conceptual scheme' that he has in mind comes directly from Quine.

³⁹ Reprinted in D. Davidson, *Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: OUP, 1984), pp. 184-198.

⁴⁰ 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, op. cit., p. 189.

It is interesting that there is a progressive move away from empiricism. However, as we have seen, the early Russell and Moore began from the point of view (inherited from German idealism and its British counterpart) that empiricism had been refuted. The essays of Quine and Davidson then may be seen as a corrective of the distorting empiricist interpretations of the Vienna school of the central tradition of analytic philosophy.

The changes in Wittgenstein's thought are suggestive of the kind of radical swings in the nature of philosophy that occur through the century. Wittgenstein is not alone in this progression. Heidegger too is famous for *die Kehre*, and it is evident that he moved from a commitment to pursuing fundamental ontology through the phenomenological method (in *Being and Time*) to a kind of 'other thinking' (*Anderes Denken*) in his later works. Evident in both Wittgenstein and Heidegger is a certain frustration with the manner in which philosophy has been practiced and an attempt to begin anew. Heidegger is explicit about conducting an *Abbau* or *Destruktion*, which argues that even the history of philosophy, the way the tradition of philosophy itself appears to us needs to be broken down, unpackaged and thought again. There is a strong sense in Heidegger of the kind of dilemma that Samuel Beckett's characters find themselves in: 'I can't go on; I must go on'. Indeed, as Rorty has recognised, it is important to understand that *Being and Time* and the *Tractatus* are modernist works in a very specific sense, there is an attempt to break new ground, to use an innovative style, to present a *form* of thinking.

In this essay, I have tried to explore some of the complexities involved in attempting to gain a historical perspective on western philosophy in the twentieth century, focusing in particular on the legacy of European philosophy and on the two major traditions it generated, namely analytic and Continental philosophy. In particular, I have tried to identify some of the hermeneutic scruples that must be brought to bear in order to gain a sense of the nature of the competing traditions at work. I shall end by quoting Merleau-Ponty's conception of the philosopher as a hint towards understanding the common threads that run through both traditions. He emphasises the philosopher's desire for truth, but goes on to say:

The philosopher is marked by the distinguishing trait that he possesses *inseparably* the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity.

Certainly, a philosopher such as Wittgenstein too, despite his fearsome logical intellect, also had a 'feeling for ambiguity'. In attempting to write the history of twentieth-century philosophy, one needs not just – to employ Nietzsche's phrase – 'ears behind one's ears', but also an acute sense of ambiguity as well as a talent for disambiguation.

Transformation of the Concept of People

Ove Korsgaard

Introduction

When I went to school many years ago I learned in history that the transformation from absolute monarchy to democracy in Denmark was a very successful process. Only one peaceful demonstration in Copenhagen 21st of March 1848 – and we got democracy. While it was peaceful in Denmark it was quite the opposite in other European countries. Down south it was massacre. Of course, I also learned about a war which started in 1848 in the southern part of Denmark, but I got the impression that it was a war between the 'good' Danes and the 'bad' Germans. It was not only me but generation after generation who was told that story in school. And it continues. In the 1990'es my children learned more or less the same story about the successful implementation of Democracy in Denmark. However, some years ago I realized as a big surprise that what I have learned in school is only a limit part of the whole story. What we did not learn was that the concepts of *people* and *nation* changed, which on the one hand gave the possibility for democracy and on the other threatened the old state-form. We did not learn about the dilemma between political system and state-form.

The History of Concepts and Ideas

A comparison between the dictionary for the older Danish language and Modern Danish dictionary shows that the notion *folk* [people] has undergone a radical shift in meaning from *household* to *nation*. The old definition was expressed in words like war-folk, court-folk, boat-folk, country-folk harvest-folk and people's hold, people's payment, people's room, people's kitchen and people's table.