Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics

Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus

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Chapter 11

Husserl and Heidegger on the Transcendental “Homelessness” of Philosophy

Dermot Moran

For Karsten Harries

A philosophical problem has the form: “I don’t know my way about.”

L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations Par. 123.

Introduction: Breakthrough and Breakdown

Although Husserl and Heidegger became increasingly estranged from one another during the late 1920s resulting in a complete breakdown in their relationship, nevertheless their respective conceptions of philosophy and its unsettling nature remained surprisingly close and run along parallel paths during the 1930s in ways that are worth examining in depth. In this chapter I propose to look more closely at Husserl’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of the peculiar homelessness of philosophy in relation to the essentially displaced or transcendent character of human existence.¹

Both Husserl and Heidegger rejected the classical Enlightenment view of philosophy as a universal possession of humankind, one that emerges at the mature stage of every culture. Instead, both saw the emergence of philosophy as a distinctly fortuitous historical event, brought about as Husserl put it by a “few Greek eccentrics,” and attributed the “breakthrough” to (Durchbruch) or “break-into” (Einbruch, Hua VI, 273) philosophy and the transcendental attitude to a unique Greek “origin” or “primal instituting” (Urstitzung). Moreover, both maintained that understanding the meaning of philosophy requires that its “original” sense be retrieved and run through over again (although how this was to be done remained a matter of difference between them). Both believed that the fortuitous breakthrough to philosophy had world-shattering consequences—and deeply unsettling ones. Husserl, for instance, speaks of what is “inborn in philosophy from its primal establishment” (Husserl 1986, par. 56, 192; Hua VI, 195). Both believed that something profound about the Greek passing on of philosophy to the
West had been deeply misunderstood (Husserl: “subject to a falsification of sense”), overlooked, forgotten (Heidegger) or ignored.

The Greeks, moreover, at least according to Heidegger, did not understand the nature of their own breakthrough and indeed they bear responsibility for themselves essentially misconstruing it. The Western Christian adoption of philosophy simply confirmed and reified a distortion already present at the heart of classical Greek philosophy. For Husserl, on the other hand, it is less a matter of the classical Greek understanding of their own discovery of the purely theoretical attitude as the manner in which this attitude became distorted in modernity through its being deracinated and atrophied.

For both Husserl and Heidegger the urgency of understanding the Greek origination of philosophy is driven by the crisis of the present. Thus in the famous Galileo section of his Crisis of European Sciences, § 9 (I), Husserl speaks of the “task of self-reflection [Aufgabe der Selbstbesinnung] which grows out of the ‘breakdown’ situation of our time” (aus der “Zusammenbruchs”-Situation unserer Zeit, Husserl 1986, 58; Hua VI, 59). Since the end of World War I, in fact, Husserl had been increasingly preoccupied about what he calls in the Vienna Lecture the spiritual rebirth of Europe, which, for him, involves the “rebirth (Wiedergeburt) of Europe from the spirit of philosophy” (Husserl 1986, 299; Hua VI, 347). The parallels with Heidegger are unmistakable. In the 1930s Heidegger too recognized a crisis of spirit in Western civilization and also linked this with the question of the essence of science. Heidegger believes science cannot simply be allowed to run its course unquestioned. Rather the sciences’ origin in philosophy and the origin of philosophy itself have to be questioned. For instance, Heidegger proclaims in his Rektoratsrede of 1933:

Only if we place ourselves under the power of the beginning of our spiritual-historical existence. This beginning is the departure, the setting up of Greek philosophy. Here, for the first time, Western man rises up, from a base in a popular culture [Volkstum] and by means of his language, against the totality of what is, and questions and comprehends it as the being that it is. All science is philosophy, whether it knows it and wills it—or not. (Heidegger 1990, 6–7; 2000b, 108)

Leaving aside the question of origin, both Husserl and Heidegger believed that the practice of philosophy had an essentially disruptive and uprooting consequence. Both have their own parallel accounts of how philosophy essentially disrupts the fundamental mood of (inauthentic) self-secure everydayness and suspends the habits of the natural attitude
in order to gain some kind of privileged (authentic) stance (Husserl’s “non-participating spectator”) on naively lived worldly life. For Heidegger, especially in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1967a, 1993) § 40 and in his 1929 *Antrittsrede* “What is Metaphysics?” (1998; 1967b), it is the fundamental “state of mind” of anxiety (*Angst*) that somehow makes visible the essential transcendental “homelessness” of Dasein and reveals its status as revealing Being. For Husserl, on the other hand, the rigorous application of what he increasingly began to call the “universal *epoché*” achieves more or less the same result; overcoming the “natural” experience of life in order to achieve a new and not to be relinquished form of insight into existence.

Finally, in terms of the parallels we are exploring here, in their accounts of human existence or subjectivity Husserl and Heidegger emphasize that human existence is essentially “being in the world” (*In-der-Welt-sein*) and that we are, in Husserl’s word, “world-children” (*Weltkinder*), whose existence is necessarily temporal, fi

*Being and Time* strongly emphasizes that human existence (Dasein) is “factual” (*faktisch*), and also points out that the supposedly natural horizon from which our usual inquiries start actually contains hidden assumptions and masks deep riddles: “The ‘natural’ horizon for starting the existential analytic of Dasein is only seemingly self-evident” (1967a, § 71, 423; 1993, 371). Similarly, the essentially paradoxical manner in which the historically conditioned and fi
dental transformation of culture is one of the major preoccupations of Husserl’s *Crisis of European Sciences* (see especially par. 52–4).

Although Heidegger’s and Husserl’s conceptions of phenomenology in the lead-up to *Sein und Zeit* (1927) has been relatively extensively investigated (by Theodore Kisiel, Steven Crowell, Ronald Bruzina, among others), less attention has been paid to the parallels between their conceptions of philosophy (and phenomenology) during the 1930s (apart from the work of Luft and Bruzina, among others, involving the later Husserl and Fink’s conception of the “phenomenology of phenomenology”). Here, therefore, I propose to examine some of Husserl’s texts on the nature of transcendental phenomenology from the period leading up to the writing of the *Crisis* (i.e., c. 1931–1936) to explore the relation between Husserl’s conception of philosophy as a transcendental enterprise and Heidegger’s conception of philosophy as it developed in the same period. Both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of philosophy were undergoing radical revisions at that time. Husserl abandoned his plan for a system of transcendental philosophy and began to pay more attention to the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) whereas Heidegger felt that the transcendental phenomenological
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approach was too constraining for the kind of meditation he was trying to pursue.

Heidegger and “Homelessness”

Heidegger’s conception of radical philosophical questioning is well known and does not need to be summarized here. The whole of *Being and Time* is an exploration of a question—the question of the meaning of Being—and what it means to raise that question in a time of forgetfulness. What is interesting for our purposes is that Heidegger singles out Angst (anxiety, dread) as having a special status not just in *Being and Time* but especially in his controversial 1929 Inaugural Address in Freiburg. Heidegger stresses the manner in which anxiety (Angst) wrenches us out of our familiarity with the world and makes the “uncanniness” (*Unheimlichkeit*) of the world visible and hence brings home to us our own essential homelessness.

As Steven Crowell has pointed out in a penetrating study, Heidegger had already encountered the concept of “homelessness” in the work of Emil Lask (see Crowell 1992). Lask had commented that Kant had not properly addressed the status of logic and had not housed it in a third realm but had left it essentially homeless in his two-world metaphysics (Crowell 1992, 79). In *Being and Time* Heidegger applies the notion of “homelessness” to the experience of Being-in-the-world itself and indeed, as we shall see, makes it central to the understanding of Dasein’s transcendence.

In *Being and Time*, § 40, Heidegger talks about the manner in which Dasein as absorbed in “das Man” is in a kind of “flucht (eine Flucht des Daseins vor ihm selbst, Heidegger 1967a, § 40, 229; 1993, 184) as “an authentic possibility for being itself.” Humans turn away from themselves and their authentic possibilities and attach themselves to the “inertia of falling” (*Zug der Verfallens*, 1967a, 229; 1993, 184). In a rather complex passage Heidegger argues that in order for Dasein to flee from itself it must in fact already have come face to face with itself in a certain way. So the phenomenon of what Dasein authentically is is already disclosed even in its flucht kind of flucht of any entity within the world (Heidegger 1993, 186) rather “that in the face of which one has anxiety is Being in the World itself” (*Das Wovor der Angst ist das In-der-Welt-sein als solches*, 1967a, § 40, 230; 1993, 186). A little later Heidegger even abbreviates this claim to state baldly: “The world is that in the face of which one has anxiety” (*das Wovor der Angst ist die Welt als solche*, Heidegger 1967b, 231; 1993, 187).
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The “what of” (Wovor) of anxiety is Dasein’s peculiar and inexpressible transcendent status itself (i.e., transcendent above entities), since there is nothing “within-the-world” (innerweltlich, Heidegger 1993, 186), whether vorhanden or zuhanden, that is bringing about this threat. What threatens, for Heidegger, is something completely “indefinite” (völlig unbestimmt). It has precisely the character of “complete insignificance” (Charakter völliger Unbedeutsamkeit, 186) that Dasein is in the grip of. That in the face of which one has anxiety is precisely neither here nor there but “nowhere” (Nirgends). When anxiety has subsided we go back to saying “it was really nothing” but when we are in the grip of anxiety we are genuinely experiencing this “nowhere,” neither near nor far, this genuine lack of signifi-

thing. Anxiety reveals the essential nothingness at the heart of the human experience of enworldedness.

As with Husserl, Heidegger thinks the everyday attitude is concerned with the “ready-to hand” (zuhanden, Heidegger 1993, 187). The experience of the “nothingness” of this ready to hand is grounded in the world: “The nothingness of readiness to hand is grounded in the most primordial ‘something’—in the world” (Das Nichts von Zuhandenheit gründet im ursprünglichen “Etwas” in der Welt, Heidegger 1967a, 232; 1993, 187).

Heidegger goes on to speak of this experience as being “uncanny” (unheimlich) which he immediately glosses as “not-being-at-home” (das Nicht-zuhauser-sein, Heidegger 1967a, 233; 1993, 188): “But here ‘uncanniness’ also means ‘not-being-at-home’”(Unheimlichkeit meint aber dabei zugleich das Nicht-zuhauser-sein, Heidegger 1967a, § 40, 233; 1993, 188).

This is in contrast to the tranquilized self-assurance of the “everyday publicity” of das Man at home with itself. Average everydayness provides the usual, normal home for Dasein. Anxiety operates to break with this “falling absorption” (verfallendes Aufgehen, 1993, 189) with the world. Anxiety highlights the manner of our being-in the world and the non-entity character of worldliness. Heidegger declares abruptly: “Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of ‘not-at-home.’ Nothing else is meant by our talk of ‘uncanniness’” (Das In-Sein kommt in den existenzialen “Modus” des Un-zuhause. Nichts anderes meint die Rede von der “Unheimlichkeit,” Heidegger 1967a, 233; 1993, 189).

As part of a fi

of it “being-alongside of” or “being familiar with” and in a note he refers back to Being and Time § 12 on the nature of “being-in” (In-sein, 1993, 53) and “in-hood” (Inheit, 1993, 53) as such. In that section, Heidegger explains “in-ness” not as spatial containedness but rather in terms of an etymologi-

cal reference drawn from Jakob Grimm (Kleinere Schriften, Vol. 7, 247) to “innan” as “dwelling,” sustaining oneself (wohnen, sich auf halten, Heidegger
1993, 54). He goes on to explain the “an” (of “innan”) as being accustomed to, being used to. Being-in is really “Sein bei,” a kind of Aufgehen in der Welt (54) which Macquarrie-Robinson translate as “being absorbed in the world” (Heidegger 1967a, 80).

So the basic constitutive character (its basic “Verfassung”—N.B. Heidegger replaced the word “Wesen” with “Verfassung” in subsequent editions of Sein und Zeit, see 1967a, note 2) of human existence is its “being in” the world understood as being absorbed (Aufgehen) in it, “getting into” it (but as we shall see, this getting-into or being absorbed in has also the essential character of not being at home in and hence can itself be disrupted or catch itself out, as it were). Traditionally, Heidegger believes, this “getting into” the world, being involved in the world, has been interpreted in terms of knowing the world (Heidegger 1993, 59), but Heidegger wants to emphasize that it should be more properly understood as a kind of being preoccupied with, caring for, being absorbed in it, even being “fascinated” by it. Heidegger is replacing the Cartesian paradigm of knowing with a more Pauline concern.

Clearly, given Heidegger’s own theological background, one cannot but recognize the Pauline and Augustinian echoes present here. Furthermore, Heidegger, under the influence of Augustine, cannot help thinking of such a stance of theoretical inspection as motivated by a kind of debased “curiosity” (Neugier, 1993, § 68, 346–7)—Augustine’s vana curiositas. When Heidegger comes back to talk about the temporal character of anxiety in Sein und Zeit, § 67 (b), he says that anxiety “brings Dasein face to face with its ownmost being-thrown and reveals the uncanniness of everyday familiar Being in the world” (1993, 342). In that experience of uncanniness, we lose the signifi Bedeutsamkeit of entities and their “involvement” or “appliance” (Bewandtnis, 1993, 343—on these related concepts, see also § 18: “Anxiety discloses the insignifi 343). Notably, Heidegger speaks of anxiety being concerned about “naked Dasein” (1993, 343) thrown into uncanniness.

Heidegger wants to recuperate a certain form of being drawn into the world and being preoccupied with it into a form of practicality that evinces the true nature of Dasein’s Sein-bei character. In fact, it is precisely our being able not to be drawn into the world that gives Dasein its true transcendence as well as its possibility of opening up its own space and making visible at the same time the space of the world. It is the “not at home” character of Dasein which must be grasped as more primordial than the everyday lostness in the familiar (see Heidegger 1993, § 40, 189). As Heidegger will say, the temporal character of anxiety refers to a “having been” and also keeps open the possibility of a possible resolution of the anxiety (1993, 344). Heidegger
paradoxically portrays anxiety as both uncovering our “naked uncanniness” (nackte Unheimlichkeit, 344) and captivating us with it. The peculiar temporal character of anxiety is both to make us experience not-at-homeness and at the same time to draw us into this not-at-homeness as our essential constitutive possibility. This is made clear in the discussion of uncanniness in § 58 where the kind of potentiality for being (Seinkönnen) that is revealed by the call of conscience is not something idealized and universal but rather individualized to a particular Dasein. Dasein experiences itself as already thrown and finds its possibilities within its thrown condition. But all this is possible because there is a “nullity” (eine Nichtigkeit, Heidegger 1967a, 331; 1993, 285) at the heart of Dasein, a nothingness which is at the very basis of the possibility of falling and hence of inauthenticity. Nothingness is the condition for the possibility of being inauthentic.

Heidegger’s Re-interpretation of Intentionality as Transcendence

We are at a very important stage in Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein. Heidegger objects to Husserl’s Cartesian elevation of human subjectivity and consciousness especially understood as intentional in a more narrowly cognitivist manner. While Husserl was on to something extremely important, Heidegger feels, he also missed out on what was essentially significant about intentionality. Intentionality cannot be thought in terms of a cognitive relation with the world of whatever kind. Rather, Heidegger insists, it is rooted in the transcendence of Dasein. The discussions of “being-in” and “uncanniness” are ways of approaching the character of Dasein’s transcendence. Indeed this becomes clearer in texts written by Heidegger immediately after Being and Time.

Indeed, already in Being and Time, in an extremely important remark, unfortunately but probably quite deliberately, relegated to a footnote in § 69 (Heidegger 1967a, 498 note xxiii; 1993, 363 note 1), which is a comment on Husserl’s characterization, invoking the Sixth Logical Investigation (§ 37), of sensory perception as “presencing” or “making present,” das Gegenwärtigen, Heidegger promises to address the grounding of intentionality in “the ecstatical temporality” of Dasein in the next Division, which, of course, was never published. In this footnote Heidegger proclaims:

The thesis that all cognition has “intuition” as its goal, has the temporal meaning that all cognizing is making present. Whether every science, or
even philosophical cognition, aims at a making present, need not be decided here.

Husserl uses the expression “make present” in characterizing sensory perception, cf. his *Logical Investigations*, fi and 620. This “temporal” way of describing this phenomenon must have been suggested by the analysis of perception and intuition in general in terms of the idea of intention. That the intentionality of “consciousness” is grounded in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein, and how this is the case, will be shown in the following Division. (1967a, 498, note xxiii)\(^6\)

Heidegger is here making the claim that intentionality is not originary until it is re-interpreted in terms of Dasein’s peculiar form of ecstatic temporality.

The importance of this footnote is underscored by Heidegger himself in his 1928 Marburg lecture series, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*) (Heidegger 1978, 215; 1992, 168). The *Being and Time* footnote is again mentioned quite explicitly in Heidegger’s 1929 *Vom Wesen des Grundes* text. In fact, in this 1929 text Heidegger is insistent that the published portion of *Being and Time* has as its task “nothing more than a concrete revealing sketch [project] of transcendence” (*als einen konkret-enthüllenden Entwurf der Transzendenz*) (Heidegger 1955; 1969, 96–7).\(^7\) Indeed, Heidegger claims this is what is at issue when, in *Being and Time*, he described the project as aiming at attaining “the transcendental horizon of the question about Being.”

That Heidegger was preoccupied with explicating his conception of transcendence relative to Husserl is already clear from his 1927 lecture course *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Heidegger 1989; *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 1982), which is Heidegger’s most extensive and explicit discussion of intentionality. Here, Heidegger again emphasizes that intentionality has been thought in the tradition (of Brentano, the Neo-Kantians and Husserl) in terms that were “inadequate” and “external,” and needs rather to be reconceived in terms of the transcendence of Dasein:

But what is originally transcendent, what does the transcending, is not things as over against Dasein; rather, it is the Dasein itself which is transcendent in the strict sense. Transcendence is a *fundamental determination of the ontological structure of Dasein*. It belongs to the existentiality of existence. Transcendence is an existential concept. It will turn out that intentionality is founded in the Dasein’s transcendence and is possible solely
for this reason—that transcendence cannot conversely be explained in
terms of intentionality. (Heidegger 1989, § 15(c), 162; 1982, 230)

While Husserl had made intentionality the essential character of consciousness, Heidegger makes transcendence the essential existentiale of Dasein. Heidegger’s next move is to displace the sense of transcendence from a spatial to its temporal image. The transcendence of Dasein is Dasein’s ecstatic temporal character. The analyses of the manner in which Dasein occupies past, present and future, is what makes Dasein so very peculiar and gives it its transcendence. Heidegger’s conception of authenticity through anxiety is a way of bringing the urgency of time to the foreground: “Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness” (Die Angst entspringt aus der Zukunft der Entschlossenheit, Heidegger 1967a, § 68, 395; 1993, 344).

Heidegger returns to the topic of the transcendence of Dasein in his 1929 Vom Wesen des Grundes (“The Essence of Reason”) which, significantly, he contributed to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Heidegger writes:

> If one characterizes every way of behaving [Verhalten] toward being as intentional, then intentionality is possible only on the basis of transcendence [auf dem Grunde der Transzendenz]. It is neither identical with transcendence nor that which makes transcendence possible. (Heidegger 1969, 28–9)

In a footnote Heidegger again refers explicitly to his remarks concerning intentionality and transcendence in Being and Time, § 69, and especially singling out his note (1993, 363 note). In his 1929 text, Heidegger goes on to explicate transcendence in terms of “surpassing” (Überstieg): “Transcendence means surpassing” (Transzendenz bedeutet Überstieg) (Heidegger 1969, 34–5), and states that it is not one characteristic of Dasein among others but rather it is a “basic constitutive feature” (Grundverfassung) of “human Dasein” (menschliches Dasein).

In this text (written in 1928) Heidegger is still very much tied to the language of Being and Time (note this use of Verfassung—“constitution”) and he explicates his claim in terms of more traditional Kantian and Husserlian reference to subjectivity:

> If we choose the term “subject” for the being which all of us are and which we understand as Dasein, then transcendence can be said to denote the essence of the subject or the basic structure of subjectivity. The subject never falls in the event [falls] objects are present at hand, goes on to transcend as well. Instead to be a
subject means to be a being in and as transcending [Subjektsein heist: in und als Transzendenz Seiendes sein]. (Heidegger 1969, 36–7)

Dasein *is* transcending; it attains its being in surpassing: “Transcendence constitutes selfhood” (*Transzendenz konstituiert die Selbstheit*) (Heidegger 1969, 38–9). If we connect this with what is said in *Being and Time*, we have a reiteration of Dasein as essentially transcendence and that made possible by an inherent nothingness in Dasein, which allows it to be a clearing and a lighting (see Heidegger 1967a, § 69, 401; 1993, 350). This surpassing happens as whole; it is not a matter of transcending this or that object, but everything in nature. Dasein transcends beings but what it transcends towards (its “Woraufhin”) is *world* but of course, as Heidegger immediately goes on to point out, *not* world understood as the totality of objects but rather as the “how of being” (*Wie des Seins*).

Heidegger wants to emphasize the originality of his concept of Dasein’s essential relation to worldhood as expressed in the phrase “being-in-the-world.” In so doing, he invokes the “decisive origins of ancient philosophy” (*in den entscheidenden Anfängen der antiken Philosophie*) with its concept of *kosmos* (Heidegger 1969, 48–9). What is interesting in this historical excursus on the meaning of world is that Heidegger moves quickly from Heraclitus (Fr 89: the wakeful have one world common to all) to the concept of *kosmos* in St Paul and in the Gospel of John, where it is understood as the distinctly human world, the created order, the world of human (as opposed to divine) affairs, and so on (as further typifies goes on to trace this conception of the world, as the specific through Leibniz and Kant into recent Weltanschauungsphilosophie. As in earlier works, Heidegger’s unique contribution to the analysis of intentionality in its Husserlian setting lies especially in his detailed exploration of the web of relatings which he calls the “worldhood of the world,” the a priori backdrop to the encounter with things, and in his emphasis on its fundamental *temporal* structure. As Heidegger says in the 1927 *Grundprobleme* lectures: the “elucidation of the concept of world is one of the most central tasks of philosophy” (Heidegger 1982 § 15, 164; 1989, 234).

In his 1929 *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, Heidegger claims that a true understanding of transcendence does not reduce world to being a subjective production of Dasein but rather that Dasein somehow transcends itself into a thrown, projected world.

The happening of the projecting “throwing the world over being” [*Dieses Geschehen des entwerfenden Überwurfs*] in which the Being of Dasein arises,
we call Being-in-the-world. “Dasein transgresses” means: the essence of its being is such that it “forms the world” \([\text{weltbildend}]\), in the sense that it lets world happen and through the world provides itself with an original view (form) \([\text{Anblick (Bild)}]\) which does not grasp explicitly, yet serves as a model \([\text{als Vor-Bild}}]\) for, all of manifest being, Dasein included. (Heidegger 1969, 88–9)

This is a very dense analysis but basically Heidegger is emphasizing the projective character of Dasein and especially its freedom to throw itself into something as that which (enabled by time) gives it its fundamental possibility. Dasein is defined as \([\text{Entwurf}]\), its project or plan or sketch, or more specifically by its \([\text{entwerfender Überwurf}]\), its “projecting throw-over” (according to my German dictionary, \([\text{der Überwurf}]\) is a wrapper, a shawl, or what is often informally called a “throw”; the Cambridge translation gives “casting-over”). The idea is that Dasein throws itself out in a project and at the same time what is thrown out covers over and captures the area (like a net?).

In \([\text{Being and Time}]\), unlike the \([\text{Vom Wesen des Grundes}]\) text, there is a stress on anxiety as a state of mind that somehow lays bare the transcendence of Dasein. Anxiety breaks with this familiarity with the world and highlights its genuine uncanniness, its weirdness, as a result of which Dasein experiences itself as not being at home, its “untimeliness.” Heidegger returns to the specific \([\text{Sein und Zeit}}]\ § 69 and this is where he focuses in one \([\text{transcendence}]\) in particular. Interestingly, in \([\text{Vom Wesen des Grundes}]\), when Heidegger defends himself against the (unnamed but clearly Husserlian) accusation that his approach came from the “anthropocentric standpoint,” it is precisely to this § 69 (entitled “The Temporality of Being-in-the-world and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World”) that Heidegger points. It is only through a proper grasp of transcendence that the concept of “the human” \([\text{der Mensch}]\) comes into the center of the picture at all. The key to \([\text{Being and Time}]\) is the manner in which it thinks through \([\text{transcendence}]\).

The link between anxiety and transcendence is again underscored in Heidegger’s 1929 “What is Metaphysics?” address delivered in Freiburg University. Here he repeats, with different emphasis, the nature of anxiety as an experience of “nothing” and as pointing up that Dasein is already beyond beings: “Such being beyond beings we call \([\text{transcendence}]\)” (Heidegger 1998, 91). If in the ground of its essence Dasein was not transgressing, then it could adopt no stance at all. Dasein is a stance-taking being, as Husserl too would emphasize. Position taking, \([\text{Stellungnehmen}]\), is an essential characteristic of human subjectivity. But here Heidegger
emphasizes that normally we lose ourselves among beings (91). Anxiety brings this familiar lostness in things to an abrupt halt.

In *Being and Time* § 69 Heidegger very clearly identifies ecstatic temporality as the very condition of the possibility of Dasein. In later texts, Heidegger continues to stress the “untimely” character not just of Dasein but also of philosophy. In his 1935 *Introduction to Metaphysics* lectures, for instance, Heidegger speaks of the “untimeliness” of philosophy. Here he speaks about the manner in which philosophy breaks with the ordinary and becomes “extra-ordinary” (Heidegger 2000, 13; 1953, 10). In raising the question of being (in the form “why is there anything at all rather than nothing?”) humans, according to Heidegger, “leap away from all the previous safety of their Dasein, be it genuine or presumed”: “The asking of this question happens only in the leap [Sprung] and as the leap, and otherwise not at all” (Heidegger 2000a, 6; 1953, 4).

Heidegger goes on to talk about “origin” (*Ursprung*) being the original leap. According to Heidegger, only certain people ask this primal or originary question and make the leap. This seems to require a certain orientation towards their “human historical Dasein” (Heidegger 2000a, 7; 1953, 5). As Heidegger says: “Philosophy is one of the few autonomous creative possibilities, and occasional necessities, of human-historical Dasein” (Heidegger 2000a, 10; 1953, 7).

This remark echoes similar statements in his *Rektoratsrede*.

According to Heidegger in his *Introduction to Metaphysics* lectures, here being more explicit in his rejection of the mode of approach involving faith, people who accept the Bible as the revealed Word of God have not made this leap since they do not operate within the question. They have the answer to the question already beforehand. In this sense, faith offers a kind of safety. If it is not open to the possibility of unfaith, it is not really faith. If it is simply loyalty to the tradition that has been handed down then it is a form of convenience amounting to indifference (Heidegger 2000a, 8; 1953, 5). Against this form of security, philosophy will appear to be a foolishness. Real questioning, commitment to question is a form of “venturing.”

This seems to be developing further the idea that philosophy as such involves a risk, a breaking with the conventional, a “project” (*Entwurf*) that involves some kind of leap. As a result Heidegger claims that “all essential questioning in philosophy necessarily remains untimely” (Heidegger 2000a, 9; 1953, 6). Philosophy not only does not become timely, rather it itself imposes its measure on the time. The aim of philosophy is to provide grounds for humans but it cannot be expected to do for all humans at all times; it is not a foundation for every culture as such (2000a, 11; 1953, 8).
Instead, philosophy can offer a kind of thinking that brings order and measure to the efforts of a particular historical people to fulfill concepts were already present in *Being and Time* but are given renewed historical specificity and even a sense of urgency during Heidegger’s writings from 1927 to 1935 (just to remain within this timeframe).

Let us now turn to Husserl’s engagement with the same issues. Unfortunately, here I can only tentatively sketch some of Husserl’s responses to similar concerns regarding the transformative nature of philosophy and the revelation of the essential nature of human existence.

Husserl’s Mature Concept of Philosophy

In his earlier published works, Husserl does not often meditate on the nature of philosophy as such, although his occasional remarks in *Logical Investigations*, *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*, and so on, often mirror Heidegger’s disrespect for traditional historical approaches to philosophical problems and his rejection of philosophical jargon (Husserl’s “philosophemes”) and so on. During the 1920s, however, Husserl became more and more preoccupied with thinking out the relation between phenomenology and the history of philosophy, especially in his *Erste Philosophie* lectures of 1923/4 (Hua VII) where he engages in a critical “history of ideas” (*Ideengeschichte*), in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) which sketches a history of transcendental philosophy, and this engagement with the history of philosophy comes to its apex in the *Crisis* writings.

For Husserl—as for Heidegger—philosophy is essentially Greek. Furthermore, the discovery of philosophy involved the “breakthrough” (*Durchbruch*) or “break-into” (*Einbruch*) into the transcendental attitude of the detached spectator. It was the Greek attitude, for instance, that turned the art of land-measurement into geometry. The Greeks brought a new openness and universality and indeed a sense of open horizons. As Husserl claims in the Vienna Lecture, “spiritual Europe has a birthplace” (Husserl 1986, 276; Hua VI, 321), when a new sort of attitude arises. This is the “outbreak [*Einbruch*] of theoretical attitude” (Husserl 1986, 285; Hua VI, 331) among a “few Greek eccentrics” (1986, 289; Hua VI, 336):

Sharply distinguished from this universal but mythical-practical attitude is the “theoretical” attitude, which is not practical in any sense used so far, the attitude of *thaumazein*, to which the great figures of the flourishing period of Greek philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, traced the origin of
philosophy. Man becomes gripped by the passion of a world-view [Weltbetrachtung] and world-knowledge that turns away from all practical interests and, within the closed sphere of its cognitive activity, in the times devoted to it, strives for and achieves nothing but pure théoria. In other words, man becomes a non-participating spectator, surveyor of the world; he becomes a philosopher . . . (Husserl 1986, 285; Hua VI, 331)

Husserl sees philosophy as emerging at a particular time in Greek cultural development, just as Heidegger in his 1930s essays sees it as a particular development of the Greek Volk. The emergence of philosophy in Greece is an accidental, contingent, historical fact. Nevertheless, Husserl says, it has “something essential about it” (Husserl 1986, 285; Hua VI, 332).

A particularly important theme of Husserl’s 1935 Vienna Lecture is that, while other cultures have produced “types” of humanness, only European culture has produced the idea of a universal humanity set on infinitely tasks. “Extrascientific ausserwissenschaftliche) culture, culture not yet touched by science” knows only finite tasks (Husserl 1986, 279; Hua VI, 324). In this connection, Husserl speaks of “natural man” in the “prephilosophical period” (Husserl 1986, 292; Hua VI 339) whose outlook might be characterized as the natural primordial attitude, an attitude that has lasted for millennia in different cultures:

We speak in this connection of the natural primordial attitude [von der natürlichen, urwüchsigen Einstellung], of the attitude of original natural life, of the finite lower, whether developed uninhibitedly or stagnating. All other attitudes are accordingly related back to this natural attitude as reorientations [of it]. (Husserl 1986, 281; Hua VI, 326–7)

The natural attitude is as old as human history. As Husserl writes in his 1924 lecture “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy” lecture: “The natural attitude is the form in which the total life of humanity is realized in running its natural, practical course. It was the only form from millennium to millennium, until out of science and philosophy there developed unique motivations for a revolution” (Hua VII, 244; Husserl 1974, 20). Breaking with the natural attitude requires a revolution and this revolution was carried out by the Greeks.

In the Vienna Lecture, and in associated writings from the period (see, for instance, the late 1934 piece “Different Forms of Historicity,” Hua XXIX, 37–46) Husserl is interested in the manner in which a “mythical-religious”
outlook provides a way of thinking about the world of that society and its relation to the whole. Natural life knows religious-mythic motifs (Husserl 1986, 283; Hua VI, 330). This mythical-religious attitude is “universal” in that it does make the world as a totality become visible in a unified manner. It is also a practical attitude not a theoretical one. The theoretical attitude has to be sharply distinguished from the religious-practical attitudes of ancient China, India, etc. This is because the Greek “mood” of \textit{thaumazein}, wonder, has quite a specific character. Through the activities of “isolated personalities like Thales” (Husserl 1986, 286; Hua VI, 332), a new “humanity” (\textit{Menschentum}) arises.

During the 1930s especially, Husserl’s reflections about “spiritual” Europe that arose from the Greek experience leads him to reflect on “primitive.” Husserl’s thought is that there are different forms of humanity, different societies or social groupings (“socialities,” \textit{Sozialitäten}) that are living in a more or less isolated, or “self-enclosed” or “self-encapsulated” (\textit{abgeschlossen}) manner (\textit{in Abgeschlossenheit lebende Menschheiten}). Self-enclosed cultures are future, on the other hand, has an openness and an intrinsic universality not found in other societies (see Moran 2008).

There is an essential paradox in Husserl’s claim about the Greeks: how can a particular moment in the history of an individual people become something “universal”? But this is the essence of what Europe is. Translating this into the language of our theme, in one sense philosophy has a \textit{home}, namely ancient Greece, but its essence is to be “homeless” or, in Husserl’s sense, \textit{universal}, \textit{infinite} in its open horizon of tasks, and self-critically vigilant in the way in which it constantly interrogates its origin, procedures, and justifications.

Husserl’s discussion of the history of philosophy especially in \textit{Erste Philosophie} reads it as providing a set of themes that recur in various forms in later incarnations. Thus in \textit{Erste Philosophie} (Hua VII) Husserl speaks of the “immortality of skepticism” (\textit{Unsterblichkeit des Skeptizismus}, Hua VII, 57) as a permanent possibility of philosophy, which emerges with Gorgias but reappears in Descartes and subsequently as the claim of the essential impossibility of a self-justifying science. Husserl speaks of skepticism as a Hydra growing ever new heads (Hua VII, 57). The essence of all skepticism is “subjectivism” (Hua VII, 58), a detachment of being in itself from all appearance. Being in itself becomes unexperienceable or unthinkable (Hua VII, 58). This is a kind of \textit{Urstiftung} of skepticism. Interestingly, Heidegger offers some contrasting thoughts on the
nature of Greek skepticism in his musings on Protagoras in the Appendices to his essay “The Age of the World Picture,” where he denies that Greek sophism can be a “subjectivism” in the modern sense since such a sense is possible only after Descartes (See Heidegger 2002, especially 77–80): “Every subjectivism is impossible within Greek Sophism since man can never, here, become subjectum. This cannot happen because, in Sophism, being is presencing and truth is unconcealment (Heidegger 2002, 80).

Interestingly, Husserl sees transcendental philosophy also arising in nuce at this early stage of Greek philosophy in that the Pre-Socratic skeptics made the “naïve pregivenness of the world” problematic (Hua VII, 59). The world as a whole, in its whole possibility, is now seen to be problematic, it is seen in a “transcendental perspective” (Hua VII, 60), in that it is considered from the perspective of a possible knowledge. Even subjectivity is now understood from a transcendental perspective in that it is considered in terms of its transcendental function. This is the “transcendental impulse” of skepticism (Hua VII, 60). This could not be carried further in antiquity because the objective dogmatic sciences were too strong. Descartes’ originality is that he again takes up the skeptical challenge. Heidegger, on the other hand, sees the transcendental breakthrough as essentially connected to the modern turn to epistemology (Heidegger 1973, 88).

For Husserl, Socrates and Plato make the breakthrough to science through the discovery of eidetic knowledge (Ideen-Erkenntnis, Hua VII, 31) yet failed to identify “achieving subjectivity” (leistende Subjektivität) as a necessary theme of inquiry. A “genuinely rational essential science of knowledge from the subjective point of view” was lacking (Hua VII, 33). For Husserl, even mathematics did not get properly thought about in terms of its ideality until Plato and Euclid especially was a Platonist in this regard (Hua VII, 34). Husserl speaks of “the subjective dimension of knowing” (das Erkenntnis-Subjektive, Hua VII, 45) and is interested only in the genesis of the science of “subjective knowing” (Wissenschaft vom Erkenntnis-Subjektiven, Hua VII, 44), which for him, includes logic. Husserl elaborates. All sciences are sciences of objects (real or possible) but all sciences too relate to objects through real or possible subjects:

A universal science of these modes of consciousness and of subjectivity in general, which constitutes and in so far as it forms any kind of “what is objective,” objective sense and objective truth of every kind, in the life of consciousness, thus embraces thematically every possible subjective [element] of knowing [alles mögliche Subjektive des Erkennens] in all the sciences in ways similar to the manner a logic embraces thematically in
Similarly, in *Erste Philosophie* Husserl comments on the meaning of logic and its relation to the Greek concept of *logos*. Also Aristotle is credited with attempting to found this first science of subjectivity as psychology (Hua VII, 52). In a way the manner in which psychology was introduced was a “permanent calamity” (*ein beständiges Kreuz*) for the idea of philosophy (VII 53).

What allowed for the adoption of the theoretical attitude was some kind of application of the *epoché*. According to Husserl, the purpose of the *epoché* is essentially to disrupt the fundamental (inauthentic) mood of everydayness and the natural attitude in order to gain some kind of privileged (authentic) stance (Husserl’s “non-participating spectator”) on naïvely lived worldly life. Although it would take us too far from our theme to demonstrate it here, I want to suggest that Heidegger’s “everydayness” with its “falling” is best understood as the counterpart of Husserl’s conception of life lived in the *natural attitude*. What Heidegger foregrounds in this discussion are the temporal modalities of everydayness which tend to round down our experience of time so that it has a kind of indef or “normality.” Life creeps in its petty pace from day to day, as Shakespeare put it. It also involves a certain placing of the present under the shadow of the past; this, for Heidegger, is inauthentic passive awaiting of time rather than authentic seizing of the day and decisively projecting into a specifically chosen future. Clearly, Husserl does not describe the experience of time with the same sense of existential involvement as Heidegger does, but there undoubtedly is in Husserl a complex approach to the experience of temporality and also of history, as is made clear in the refl the history of philosophy in some of the *Crisis* appendices (including the “Origin of Geometry” fragment). Husserl can thus write: “The historical refl *Existenz*] as philosophers and, correlative, the existence of philosophy. Which, for its part, *is* through our philosophical existence” (Husserl 1986, 392; Hua VI 510).

In the *Crisis* Husserl makes his most sustained effort to develop a phenomenological approach to issues concerning temporality, historicity, fi tude and cultural and generational development (so called “generativity,” Husserl 1986, 188). The *Crisis* itself is presented as a “teleological historical refl “backwards questioning” of the history of western culture (and philoso-phy) in order to produce an “eidetic history” and identify its hidden goal (*telos*) and “motivation” (Husserl 1986, 11). For Husserl, there is a dynamic
element to reason, it is seeing to realize itself, come to self-actualization and also self-clarity (as Husserl writes in § 73 which Walter Biemel placed as the concluding section of the Crisis):

Thus philosophy is nothing other than [rationalism] through and through, but it is rationalism differentiated within itself according to the different stages of the movement of intention and fulfillment; it is ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation [Selbsterhellung] begun with the first breakthrough [Einbruch] of philosophy into mankind, whose innate reason was previously in a state of concealment [Verschlossenheit], of nocturnal obscurity. (Husserl 1986, § 73, 338; Hua VI 273)

Husserl speaks of the correlative “discovery” (Entdeckung)—turning in a subjective direction—of “long-familiar man” (des altbekannten Menschen) as the “subject of the world” (Husserl 1986, 339; Hua VI 273). Husserl even wants to give human beings a “new rootedness” (eine neue Bodenständigkeit, Hua VI 200), a genuine one as opposed to the false one offered by modern science, by transforming their culture to one based on universal reason. But he also acknowledges this requires reflex of the philosophical tradition which was meant to achieve this end (see Husserl 1986, § 59). In part, the answer is expected, human beings can bear very little reality: “The complete inversion [Umkehrung] of the natural attitude, thus into an ‘unnatural’ one, places the greatest conceivable demands upon philosophical resolve and consistency” (Husserl 1986, § 57, 200; Hua VI 204).

From the standpoint of the natural attitude, philosophy will always appear as “foolishness” (VI 204). Humans can never feel at home in the transcendental attitude and indeed this attitude requires a permanent wakefulness and vigilance which is the opposite of the rootedness and “athomeness” of life lived in the natural attitude.

Heidegger is making a stronger issue of the historicality of Dasein. But at the same time he is severely critical of those who want to make out that the Greeks were somehow “primitives” or that an anthropology can determine their world view.

Notes

1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Husserl Circle, Marquette University, in June 2008. I am particularly grateful to Pol Vandevelde, Steven Galt Crowell, Burt Hopkins and Sebastian Luft for their helpful comments.
And have been noticed by commentators, especially Jacques Derrida (Derrida 1987).

For a discussion of this point, see Harries 2009, 39–44.

John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translate the seventh German edition.

For further discussion of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl and Brentano on intentionality, see Moran 2000b.

The original Macquarrie-Robinson translation erroneously has “ecstational unity” in place of “ecstactical temporality.”

The text itself was written in 1928 as Heidegger records but published for the first time in 1929.

Interestingly, in his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger is severely critical of those who want to make out that the Greeks were somehow “primitives” or that an anthropology can determine their world view. The Greek breakthrough completely distanced them from the world of the primitive.