son welcomes them in her introduction—Middle English scholars owe her gratitude for the fruits of much labor.

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This book, originally a Ph.D. dissertation presented to the theology faculty of the University of Amsterdam, joins the growing number of recent studies of Eriugena’s philosophy that focus on his remarkable anthropology as expounded in his major dialogue, Periphyseon. Otten claims to offer a theological reading that takes Eriugena’s dialectical literary style into account. She deliberately avoids a historical or comparative approach. Her book is an attempt to argue both that Eriugena had traditional theological concerns and that his rationalistic anthropology is the key to understanding those concerns.

The book begins with a chapter examining Eriugena’s famous fourfold division of natura in terms of the overall dialectical pattern of division, definition, and return. Eriugena not only defined natura as including God and creation, and as having four divisions or species, but he also said that nature includes all that is and is not. He then went on to offer five different ways (modi) in which things can be said to be or not to be. Otten takes the first way as primary. According to this way, things graspable by the senses can be said to have being whereas those things that elude the senses belong to the realm of nonbeing. Otten sees this as defining being as relative to human nature, and she concludes that “human reason lies at the core of Eriugena’s view of natura” (p. 17).

Otten sees Eriugena as making use of an explicit principle of rationality in exploring the nature of God and the cosmos. The second chapter develops Eriugena’s conception of God and creation and again stresses the intermediary role of reason. Later chapters focus on the role of human nature as both a point of mediation between the parts of the cosmos and between the cosmos and God. She discusses Eriugena’s interpretation of Genesis in some detail. Otten emphasizes Eriugena’s account of human nature as emphasizing the rationality of the structure of the cosmos. She contends that patristic anthropology in general is concerned with the examination of the sinful state of human nature whereas Eriugena sought rather to explain why humans have not achieved their destiny to be imagines Dei. Human nature for Eriugena is not only the pinnacle of all created nature but the very medium, as it were, through which the exitus and reditus of universal nature (which includes the divine nature) is carried out. Very frequently in the book she puts forward the view that humanity is the rationality of the cosmos. But she never explicates precisely what is at stake in this notion of rationality. Otten says, “It is with God as the all embracing entity that the unfolding of natura began, and it is with God as the final goal to which all things are under way, that the development of natura must end. But it is through man as the instance conditioning Eriugena’s rational investigation that all movement must pass” (p. 200). Otten is trying to hold together two divergent claims: that Eriugena’s thought was focused on God and that Eriugena’s thought recognized the centrality of human nature (even for God’s self-manifestation). Otten’s language in this quotation as elsewhere is frustratingly unclear: what does it mean to call man “the instance conditioning Eriugena’s rational investigation”? Examples of such sloppy formulations abound in the book.

Otten claims to be interested in Eriugena’s central theological purpose and to be offering a corrective to Neoplatonic or idealist readings of Eriugena’s oeuvre (including my own). Her main point is that the divisions of nature are articulated with respect to the human mind’s modes of differentiation between being and nonbeing and that Eriu-
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genae has an intellectualist or rationalistic approach to being. Furthermore she rightly points to Eriugena's emphasis on the role of human rationality in effecting the return of nature (also found in Maximus, of course). Yet she denies Eriugena is an idealist. Did not Eriugena deny the existence of matter, claim that things are nothing other than their being known by the divine mind, and that human nature itself is nothing but an idea in the divine mind? How is this not idealism?

Otten glosses over many of the more explicitly idealistic passages in Eriugena. She in effect downplays his philosophical originality. She does not take seriously Eriugena’s unusual formulations of the cogito on the grounds that early-medieval philosophers were less concerned with proving the existence of the self than the existence of the cosmos (p. 208), but this is a strange claim to make. Myles Burnyeat has argued that philosophers before Descartes never doubted the existence of a real world; and though Richard Sorabji has provided forceful evidence to show this claim is not strictly accurate, one would need to give justification for holding that early-medieval philosophers really needed to prove the existence of a world. Eriugena never questioned the existence of the world, but he did (as Berkeley later did) absolutely deny the existence of matter external to the mind. One gets the impression that emphasizing Eriugena’s theological interests has led to a devaluation of his philosophical strengths.

Otten’s attempt to distance Eriugena from Neoplatonism also seems forced. She claims that—despite Eriugena’s evident dependence on late Proclean Neoplatonism (in the form of the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius)—one need not suppose that Eriugena made use of an “apophatic ontology” (John Marenbon’s phrase) or a “meontology” (my phrase in The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena: A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages [Cambridge, Eng., 1989]). Eriugena spent much of Periphyseon 3 carefully explicating his concept of nothingness (nihilum) in order to be able to defend calling God “Nothing.” “Nothing” has at least two meanings—nihil per privationem and nihil per excellensim. It is not sufficient to claim—as Otten does—that Eriugena implied no existential commitment when he said, for example, that “God is not” is more true than the statement “God is.” On the contrary, Eriugena was explicitly challenging the view that God is a being among beings. The nonbeing of the One above being does imply that “existence” cannot be predicated of the One. To understand what this means one needs to study late-Neoplatonic distinctions between existence, subsistence, nonexistence, etc. (distinctions that Eriugena reproduced). It is scarcely explanatory to say, as Otten does, that “non esse turns out to retain its inverted affinity with being” (p. 44). What does “inverted affinity” mean? Clearly Otten does not take Eriugena’s apophaticism seriously, and this means she does not take his Dionysianism seriously. It is true that Eriugena’s thought presents severe challenges to the interpreter. We know little about his intellectual formation, and the surviving texts of ninth-century philosophy show little sophistication in comparison with his richly textured and extremely speculative philosophical approach. But we do know from internal evidence that his worldview was profoundly altered by his encounter with the writings of the Areopagite, and any study of his work should take that encounter into account.

The case Otten makes for seeing Eriugena’s anthropology as guiding his overall metaphysical scheme is compelling, but too often Otten’s interpretation of Eriugena is selective. She presents his anthropology as essentially a more rationalized version of Augustinian anthropology.

Overall, Otten’s book is a useful guide to Eriugena’s thought in the Periphyseon, and the emphasis on Eriugena’s guiding theological concerns is a healthy challenge to the Hegelian reading that sees him as a radical innovator and the father of idealism. However, her abjuration of a close historical comparison makes the theological reading somewhat less strong since an ahistorical notion of theology is used to measure Eriugena’s project. She does not discuss Eriugena’s relations to the main theological arguments of the ninth
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The Summa musice has been known to scholars of music since 1784, when it was first edited in Martin Gerbert's Scriptores de musica (3:190–248). For nearly two hundred years it was believed to be a work by Johannes de Muris (Jehan des Murs) from the early fourteenth century, but this attribution, offered tentatively in the work's explicit by a scribe around 1400, was disproved by Ulrich Michels in his 1972 edition of Jehan's Notitia artis musicae. The title, too, may be an invention of the copyist, who wrote, “Explicit summa magistri Johannis de muris ut credo” (“Here ends the summa of Magister Johannes de Muris, so I believe”). The sole surviving source is St. Paul im Lavanttal, Archiv des Benediktinerstifts, 264/4, a manuscript copied after 1394 that contains mostly musical treatises, including several by Jehan des Murs.

In this new edition Christopher Page's Latin text differs from Gerbert's in more than a thousand places (by Page's count) in the course of some twenty-seven hundred lines. Though Page is not confident that he has resolved every difficulty of a highly contracted and abbreviated source, his edition is a vast improvement upon that of Gerbert. The treatise is in the form of a prosimetrum, in that each of its twenty-five chapters is followed by a summary recapitulation in rhyming hexameter verse. For the sake of clarity the translation retains a prose format throughout. But in a regrettable decision by the press, text and translation are not aligned on facing pages; the translation precedes the Latin text, and much flipping of pages is required to compare one version with the other.

The work seems to be of south German provenance and is directed towards the writer's friends and pupils (young boys) "so that they should be able to sing properly constituted chant in a well-informed way" (pp. 45–46). Thereby avoided are the more speculative topics covered in many musical treatises, music as a liberal art and music as sounding number (i.e., the mathematics of musical intervals and acoustics). The treatise begins with the traditional topics of the invention and use of music, its place in the church, and its subdivisions. But after that, the remainder is completely focused towards practical matters of how to sing, read, and compose chant, including discussion of the neumes of chant, solmization and the hexachord system, the "Guidonian" hand, notation on the staff, intervals used in chant, and multifarious aspects of the ecclesiastical modal system. Although the treatise contains no musical examples, numerous chants are cited in illustration of various points. Two chapters (22 and 23) deal with the composition of chant, and chapter 24 is a brief discussion of polyphony (with several technical terms unique, insofar as I am aware, to this treatise). Chapter 25, which Page views as a somewhat later addition to the original treatise, pedagogically relates various aspects of music to numbers and to God and the church; for example, there are eight modes just as there are eight Beatitudes, and nine intervals in music just as there are nine orders of angels, etc.

Regarding authorship, this treatise has had a checkered career in the scholarly literature. After reposing for centuries under the name of Johannes de Muris, it next moved to Pseudo-Johannes, then to Anonymous; in Page's hands it acquires not one but two