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Pollok's *Critical Commentary*, which is written in a clear and uncomplicated academic German, steers a middle course between textual analysis and criticism. The author accords each major division of the book (the Preface, Phoronomy, Dynamics, Mechanics, and Phenomenology) its own chapter, and then follows the argumentative lines of these closely. But Pollok's text does not mirror Kant's "mathematical" sub-division of the MFNS into axioms, theses, and scholia. These are often grouped together and commented on as a single argumentative whole, which is keyed with the title of the main sub-division. The body text of the commentary consists of textual exegesis, quotations, and references to historical sources, as well as to the larger context of Kant's philosophy. The lengthy footnotes address discussions and controversies in recent secondary literature, as well as Pollok's evaluation of these. He quotes both primary and secondary sources at length, thereby freeing the reader from the bother of tracking down quotations in order to grasp what is at issue. This aid is, however, counterbalanced by his legitimate decision to quote all sources in the original language, with the exception of those available to Kant only in translation.

Critical discussion is strictly confined to the conceptual context of Kant's time, in that the significance of Kant's arguments for later developments in the philosophy of science, and their status from the standpoint of such later developments are not addressed. But this decision still leaves open significant interpretative play: one can approach the MFNS either from the point of view of Kant's critical philosophy as a whole, or one can choose to regard it in its relation to its scientific antecedents in the Leibniz-Wolffian, or the Newtonian tradition. These are not exclusive approaches, but favoring one will lead to a different interpretation of Kant's intent. Pollok's reading is clearly undertaken from the point of view of transcendental idealism. This preference is most evident in his detailed analysis of the dynamics of the MFNS. While conscientiously documenting the relevant physical antecedents, he emphasizes the constitutive role of attractive and repulsive forces for the possibility of perception. They are necessary categorical determinations of the empirical concept of matter just because they are prerequisites for matter's being a possible percept. For this very reason, Pollok insists, the "fundamental forces" are not to be identified with the forces treated in the natural sciences. They are the fundamental determinations of matter that first enable properly scientific experience and cognition. On Pollok's reading, these fundamental forces are the metaphysical *Anfangsgründe* spoken of in the book's title.

Although this interpretation is carefully developed through the commentary as a whole, it is never pursued at the cost of a balanced consideration of the existing literature. Given the scope and detail of this work, it will doubtless count as a standard reference for those working on Kant's philosophy of science for some time to come.

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The stated aim of this collection of thirteen essays (mostly new—four are reprints) by philosophers resident in Australia is to offer selective perspectives on the phenomenological tradition, correcting misunderstandings and highlighting aspects overlooked in standard commentaries. Presumably, it also wants to exhibit contemporary Australian writing in the phenomenological tradition, and situate phenomenological claims in terms graspable by analytic philosophers.

Robin Small's introduction, taking Husserl's conception of eidetic intuition as fundamental, sketches the rise of phenomenology. The collection is then divided into three parts. Part One ("Approaching the Sources") focuses on the sources of phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger) and opens with a thoughtful essay by Max Deutscher, reprinted from the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (1980), which is replied to by Maurita Harney. Three further, not particularly distinguished, essays deal with the issues of realism, relativ-
ism, and the relation between Ryle and Husserl. Part Two ("Following the Tradition") deals with new themes arising in Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida, while Part Three ("Making Connections") explores the relation between phenomenology and other disciplines, chiefly sociology, anthropology, and literature. A final essay by Jocelyn Dunphy Bloomfield examines the relevance of phenomenology in the Australian context.

The collection is interesting but uneven. Some of the essays are out of date: Small's essay on Ryle and Husserl originally appeared in 1981 and Purushottama Bilimoria's paper, "Heidegger and the Japanese Connection," first published in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (1991), is in need of updating given the upsurge of interest in Husserl in Asia in recent years. Deutscher's "Bustett's Transcendental Subjectivity" is helpful in that it introduces Husserl's transcendental idealism through unusually prosaic analogies. He suggests that the transcendental attitude can be grasped in familiar experiences such as "keeping silence" during an awkward or embarrassing moment or adopting a detached or removed stance. An actor on stage can express anger without being angry. The transcendental attitude is such a detached spectator attitude; it is the capacity we have to judge and appraise ourselves. Moreover, it is in this attitude that we come to recognize our commitments to others. Deutscher resists the temptation to separate radically the ordinary living in the world from the detached contemplation of it. There never can be total but only intermittent detachment from the life-world; nevertheless the transcendental epoché is important in that it allows us the chance to gain self-awareness about our situation, about our "forms of life." While Deutscher does a terrific job demystifying one of Husserl's central and much misunderstood concepts, he is at risk of oversimplifying and worse of psychologizing Husserl's insights.

Richard Campbell's essay on Heidegger's conception of truth as *aletheia* is also particularly noteworthy in that it is a philosophically sophisticated attempt to cut through Heidegger's somewhat inflated jargon and expresses his central intuitions about truth. Campbell goes to some trouble to elucidate and disambiguate what Heidegger is saying. Furthermore, he believes Heidegger is wrong in his interpretation of Plato; Plato is doing precisely the opposite of what Heidegger says he is doing. Deutscher's essay on Sartre, informed by an analytic rigor and sensitivity to ambiguity, gives a very clear account and partial defence of the relations between positional consciousness of the object and non-positional self-consciousness. He is critical of Sartre's sweeping concept of the "in itself" and points out that in reality there are many diverse "in-themselves" with different real properties. Crittenden, too, has an interesting essay on Sartre's conception of "the look." Sartre understands the other as the one who looks at (and thereby seeks to objectify me) whereas for de Beauvoir, the other (in the particular case: woman) is the looked at and objectified.

The article on sociology and phenomenology attempts to show the relation between their methods: epoché is seen as equivalent to the sociologist's suspension of judgement concerning the so-called "normality" of the phenomenon under consideration.

Some of the articles are undistinguished and the reprinted papers are among the best in the collection. Furthermore, the collection betrays a sense of intellectual isolation with little reference to current debates on the nature of phenomenology, or to the *Husserliana* or Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* series. Small's introduction, for example, focuses solely on Husserl's published works. The effort to translate Husserl into a more acceptable and common philosophical language does lead to some exaggerations and simplifications. Is it really accurate to claim, as Small does, that "Husserl's pure psychology shows affinities with empiricist thinkers such as Locke" while "his later thought finds its model in the transcendental philosophy of Descartes" (xv)? Clearly, this overlooks both the non-Cartesian elements in the late philosophy of the life-world and the whole attempt to offer a description of embodied experience. Overall, however, this is a worthwhile attempt to show the value of phenomenological inquiry.

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