This massive, well-researched, handsomely produced tome consists of a total of 166 articles, averaging 3,000 words each, providing essential guidance for both neophytes and the initiated on the nature and broad sweep of phenomenology in the twentieth century. The central themes and concepts of phenomenology (intentionality, constitutive phenomenology, existential phenomenology, naturalism, lifeworld, eidetic method, epoché, reduction, Dasein, noema) are of course covered, but there are also entries on individual philosophers (Arendt, Bergson, Brentano, Cassirer, Stein, etc.), broader survey articles on the development of phenomenology (e.g. perception after Husserl) and its different stages (e.g. realistic phenomenology, constitutive phenomenology, etc.), and articles on phenomenology in diverse geographical regions (including, somewhat unusually, Australia, India, Korea, Russia, South Africa), as well as entries on related themes (action, body, time, truth, possible worlds) and related fields – artificial intelligence (Hubert Dreyfus), cognitive science (Osborne Wiggins and Manfred Spitzer), structuralism (Richard Langan), mathematics (Richard Tieszen), etc. Furthermore, although the focus of the majority of entries is philosophical, phenomenology’s impact on other disciplines is also treated, including, as might be expected, in the areas of psychology, sociology, feminism, anthropology, and law. There are even entries on phenomenology’s relation to disciplines as diverse as theatre, dance, and deep ecology. Masako Odagawa has, for instance, contributed an interesting article on the parallels and differences between certain phenomenological themes and aspects of Buddhism (on the nature of consciousness, the self-givenness of things, the nature of appearance, and so on).

The contributor list is distinguished: it includes phenomenologists not just from the US (e.g. Carr, Casey, Dreyfus, Drummond, Hart, Kersten, Kisiel, Kockelmans, McKenna, Soffer, Steinbock, Welton) and Europe (Germany, Czech Republic, Yugoslavia, Italy, Scandanavia), but also from Japan, South America (e.g. Roberto Walton), Australia, and South Africa, amounting to a deliberate effort on the part of the editors to represent the world-wide diffusion of phenomenology.

Phenomenology may be characterized in a broad sense as a practice of seeing, aiming at an unprejudiced, descriptive account of whatever appears to consciousness, precisely in the manner in which it so appears without the imposition of theorizing or assumptions drawn from one’s background, religious assumptions, scientific education, or whatever. The phenomenologist wants to get to ‘the things themselves’. One of its earliest realizations was that traditional empiricism (with its talk of ‘sense data’) was in fact far from being purely descriptive and was heavily burdened with theory. A major initial task of the phenomenological method, then, involves stripping away whatever gets in the way of pure seeing. As the Introduction by L. Embree and J. N. Mohanty points out, phenomenology, although anticipated in some of the ideas of Bergson, James, and Dilthey, really began with the work of Czech mathematician and philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) in the mid 1890s as he was pursuing fundamental inquiries into logic and the theory of knowledge which led ultimately to his Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations, 1900–1), the Urtexte of the phenomenological movement. Husserl developed his new approach built upon an insight of the Austrian philosopher and descriptive psychol-
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ogist Franz Brentano (1838–1917). The central insight Husserl took from Brentano is that our experiential life consists of relations between conscious episodes or ‘acts’ (taken in the broadest sense to mean an isolable part of a conscious process) and ‘objects’. Every conscious experience is object-intending. The point of phenomenology is to overcome the naïve objectivism of the sciences by a guided, methodological reflection on the essential correlation between the experiencing subject’s performances and the objects as disclosed. There is no worldless subject and no subjectless world. The gain of this approach is that all objectivity is understood as constituted by subjective performance, and all subjectivity has to be grasped in its relation to what is outside itself, namely objectivity. In this sense phenomenology cuts across the usual contrast between internalist and externalist approaches to consciousness and the mind. The ‘mind’ is the embodied site of disclosure of the world. The world is what is ‘given’. Phenomenologists seek to justify claims by relating them to evidence understood as ‘awareness of a matter as disclosed in the most clear, distinct and adequate way possible’. The phenomenological approach can be applied not only to traditional philosophical problematics but also more widely to issues concerned with all aspects of human life and culture, from the mathematical to the mystical. This Encyclopedia attempts both to convey the central achievement of phenomenology in the twentieth century and also give some hints as to its effect on non-philosophical fields of meaning from anthropology and dance to mathematics.

In the Introduction, Lester Embree and J. N. Mohanty sketch four stages or tendencies that can be discerned in the evolution of phenomenology: (1) so-called ‘realistic phenomenology’, which was stimulated by Husserl’s ‘ground-breaking’ Logische Untersuchungen and continued through the 1920s, especially in the so-called ‘Munich school’; (2) so-called ‘constitutive phenomenology’, which emerged with Husserl’s second major publication, Ideen I (Ideas I, 1913), and influenced the tradition everywhere else thereafter with its account of the reduction away from the natural attitude to the noetic-noematic structures of transcendental experience; (3) so-called ‘existential phenomenology’, which began with Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Being and Time, 1927), and was subsequently developed in France by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; and (4) so-called ‘hermeneutical phenomenology’, which also emerged in Germany with Heidegger and was developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer, and in France, during the 1960s, by Paul Ricoeur.

It is impossible to summarize the achievements of this volume in the confines of a short review. The Encyclopedia contains fascinating articles on a broad sweep of themes. On phenomenology’s sometimes fraught relationship with the analytic tradition there are excellent articles by David Woodruff Smith (analytic philosophy), Barry Smith and Dallas Willard (British moral theory), Richard Murphy (British empiricism), Lee Hardy (logical positivism), and J. N. Mohanty (Gottlob Frege; possible worlds). From the more Continental perspective there are articles by John D. Caputo (Dasein), J. Claude Evans and Leonard Lawlor (Derrida), and Ed Casey (memory). There are excellent articles from scholars from different regions reporting on the development of phenomenology in their own countries, e.g. Jean-François Courtine (France), Ernst Wolfgang Orth and Thomas Seebom (Germany), Wolfe Mays, Joanna Hodge, and Ulrich Haase (Great Britain), as well as Josef Moural (Czechoslovakia), Hiroshi Kojima, and Kah-Kyung Cho and Nam-In Lee (Korea). There are articles on non-philosophical areas where phenomenology has had something new and original to offer, e.g. law (William Hamrick), film (Vivian Sobchack), ecology (Ulrich Melle), music (Lawrence Ferrara and Elizabeth Behnke), even nursing (John R. Scudder and Anne Bishop) and dance (Elizabeth Behnke and Maureen Connolly). Articles that stand out for their clarity and insightfulness include: James Mensch on the ego, Iso Kern on intersubjectivity, J. N.
Mohanty on Frege and on meaning, Tom Nenon on Heidegger, David Carr on history, Ed Casey on memory, John Drummond on the noema, John Brough on time, Theodore Kisiel on Husserl and Heidegger, William McKenna on perception in Husserl, Gail Soffer on relativism, Kathleen Haney on Edith Stein, Dieter Lohmar on truth, and Donn Welton on world.

Given the wide range of authors, concepts, and topics, it is inevitable that there will be unevenness, overlaps, and omissions. Omissions include specific articles on some crucial concepts of phenomenology that do call out for explanation, e.g. ‘the natural attitude’, ‘the a priori’, ‘the transcendental’, ‘constitution’, and ‘horizon’. Some authors mentioned in the course of entries deserve individual treatments in their own right, for instance: Hedwig Conrad Martius, Adolf Reimach, and Theodor Lipps. It is hard to see why they are not given individual entries given that Ingarden, Stein, Felix, and Fritz Kaufmann are. There are some odd choices: ‘Ethics in Sartre’ receives a separate entry from ‘Sartre’, and ‘Language in Husserl’ is a separate entry from ‘Language after Husserl’, although both are by the one author, Arion Kelkel. But these quibbles aside, this is an important reference work, rich in philosophical insight and historical detail, an indispensable research tool for the student, professional philosopher, or educated reader seeking clarification on the concepts, themes, and persons in phenomenology, a century-old tradition that is central to the development of philosophy in the West and indeed, as Mohanty and others show clearly, has also had impact on the East in the twentieth century.

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*Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity*  
By Michael Tye  

Michael Tye’s book *Consciousness and Persons* is a very readable work in which he has sought to avoid creating a dense, laborious philosophy book. I believe that he has succeeded in keeping the book clear and comprehensible, certainly in structure and, to a large extent, in content. However, as he points out in his preface, the issues dealt with in his book – the unity of consciousness and what constitutes a person – are far from clear cut or simple but are rather ‘slippery and confusing’. To his credit, Tye has managed to present very lucidly a seemingly straightforward account of phenomenal unity that is also in keeping with our intuitions on the subject. His notion of what constitutes a person is developed on this basis in the last chapter, and because of this lesser degree of elaboration is perhaps less convincing than the former theory, though it is nonetheless an appealing theory of personal identity.

In his preface Tye explains that the book is the result of an ‘epiphany’ which he experienced a few years ago. While sitting having a drink in his garden one day and undergoing a bombardment of all his five senses from the colours, sounds, scents, etc., of his environment, he suddenly became intensely aware of the unity of his experience, how all these things were presented together as a whole. He also realized that this unity of experience was something he had not really noticed before – as he suggests, it is so fundamental that it is easy to miss.

So it is this notion of phenomenal unity that Tye sets about explaining and defending in the first four chapters of his book. Initially he looks at the unity of perceptual experience and proposes a theory of synchronic, perceptual, phenomenal unity. He