DISSECTING MENTAL EXPERIENCES: HUSSERL’S
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE ERLEBNIS IN IDEAS*

DISECCIONANDO LAS EXPERIENCIAS MENTALES: LAS REFLEXIONES
FENOMENOLÓGICAS DE HUSSERL SOBRE ERLEBNIS EN IDEAS

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Abstract:
What interests us are not the facticities [Faktizitäten] of consciousness and instances of it elapsing [Abläufe], but rather the problems of its essence [Wesensprobleme], problems which would need to be formulated there. (Husserl, Ideas § 135, p. 269; Hua III/1 312)

In this paper I shall focus on the following matters: (a) what is new in Husserl’s Ideas (b) the need for a transcendental epoché or reduction in order to access the noesi-noema correlation (c) the complex structure of an intentional Erlebnis and some aspects of noesis and noema (d) the eidetic laws Husserl identifies, and, finally, (e) some remarks on the role of the ego in the stream of experiences (Erlebnisstrom).

Key Words: Erlebnis, Noesis, Noema, Consciousness, Eidetics, Ego.

Resumen:
No nos interesan las facticidades [Faktizitäten] de la conciencia y de sus cursos [Abläufe], pero sí los problemas esenciales [Wesensprobleme], que aquí habría que formular. (Husserl, Ideas §135, p. 412; Hua III/1 312)

En el presente artículo me centraré en las siguientes cuestiones: (a) que hay de nuevo en las Ideas de Husserl (b) la necesidad de una epoché trascendental o una reducción para acceder a la correlación noesis-noema (c) la estructura compleja de Erlebnis intencional y algunos aspectos de noesis y noema (d) las leyes eidéticas identificadas por Husserl y, finalmente, (e) algunas observaciones sobre el papel del ego en la corriente de las vivencias (Erlebnissstrom)

Palabras clave: Erlebnis, noesis, noema, conciencia, eidética, ego.

Just over one hundred years ago, on 2\textsuperscript{nd} April 1913, Edmund Husserl published the First Book of his planned three-volume Ideen zu einer reinen

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Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, hereafter ‘Ideas’) in Volume One of his newly founded Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research),¹ a yearbook that he jointly edited with his fellow phenomenologists Alexander Pfänder (1870-1941), Adolf Reinach (1883-1917), Moritz Geiger (1880-1937) and Max Scheler (1874-1928).

Husserl was already 54 years old when he published Ideas and he intended it as a programmatic book on the phenomenological method and on the overall scope of phenomenological philosophy (a new idea captured in the very title of the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research). The book stands at the ‘entrance gate to phenomenology’, offering a ‘purely introductory meditation’ (eine emporleitende Meditation, III/1 223). Husserl writes:

Here, in the context of our meditations that merely lead up to phenomenology, the task cannot be to expound its components systematically (Ideas § 96, p. 192; III/1 223)

There is no ‘royal road’ (Königsweg, III/1 223) to phenomenology; each set of problems has to be tackled on its own.

Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen, 1900/1901)² had already presented a detailed discussion of what Husserl, following Dilthey calls Erlebnisse, that is mental experiences, mental occurrences, or lived expe-


periences, in terms of their intentional character, objectivating structure, their 'parts and moments' and their relation to their intended object and its indwelling 'sense' (Sinn). Husserl revisited this analysis in his _Ideen_ (1913), extending it greatly, correcting some earlier formulations and indeed bringing his discussion to a whole new plane (that of transcendental philosophy which breaks with philosophy done in the 'natural attitude'). He has initially planned to revise the _Logical Investigations_ to bring it into line with his new flagship _Ideas_, but this project seemed too vast and he abandoned it, simply publishing a second edition with some revisions, notes and clarifications. As he writes in his Foreword to the Second Edition (1913) of the _Investigations_:

> I decided first of all to plan my _Ideas_. They were to give a universal yet contentful presentation of the new phenomenology, based throughout on actual executed work, a presentation of its method, of its systematic field of problems, of its function in making possible a strictly scientific philosophy, as well as a reduction to rational theory of empirical psychology. (LU, I p. 4; Hua XVIII 9)

One of the central new themes that emerges in _Ideas_, as we shall see, is the idea that phenomenology is a _transcendental_ eidetic science and bears no relation to empirical psychology, a claim that alienated many of his 'realist' followers such as the members of the Munich School. His Neo-Kantian critics, on the other hand, while approving of his new direction, did not think he had gone far enough in embracing Kant.

One key aim of _Ideas_ is to fix phenomenological language for scientific purposes. Husserl readily acknowledges the problems generated by ordinary language. Its meanings confuse and cover up the distinctions that the phenomenological scientist needs:

> Yet transferences among them have encumbered all these words with so many equivocations – and not least with the sort that stem from gliding over into these correlative layers, which science is supposed to keep rigorously and systemically separate – that the greatest precaution is in order in relation to them. (_Ideas_ § 95, p. 191; III/1 222)

Loose ambiguous everyday words distort genuine phenomenological findings. Husserl therefore introduces new terms, including _epoché_, reduction, _noesis_ and the _noema_ (the term 'noetic' has been in use earlier and the 'natural attitude' had been alluded to in his 1910/1911 _Logos_ essay 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science'), and later terms such as 'neutrality modification' as ways of specifying his intended meaning. The noetic-noematic 'correlation' is also pre-
sented in *Ideas* for the first time as a new and clearer way of thinking about the intentional composition of *Erlebnisse*. Husserl is convinced his new terms (including the replacement of the ‘a priori’ with the ‘eidetic’) makes his phenomenology more rigorous. He writes:

Our new terms [unsere neuen Termine] and the accompanying analyses of examples certainly serve us better for the generalities we are considering. (*Ideas* § 95, p. 192; III/1 222)

This does not seem to be completely distinct from the notion of an ideal language as developed in the Vienna Circle by Carnap and others. In fact, Husserl remains resolutely optimistic that phenomenological insights can be communicated in a suitably clarified language.

As Husserl announces in his Introduction, *Ideas* Volume One aimed to develop a method of ‘phenomenological reductions’ that make transcendentally purified consciousness and its eidetic essential visible and accessible to us (*Ideas*, p. 5; Hua III/1 7). A change of attitude is required from the natural to the transcendental, and nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the new analysis of intentionality in terms of noesis and noema.

Husserl’s chapter on the ‘Noesis and Noema’, therefore, exemplifies the phenomenological method in action. Numberous eidetic laws and conceptual distinctions are identified in the course of his analysis. The chapter’s focus is on the familiar phenomenological theme, namely, intentionality, understood as ‘consciousness of something’ (*Bewusstsein von Etwas*). Already in *Ideas* § 84 Husserl had indicated that intentionality is the ‘the principal theme [Hauptthema] of phenomenology’, that which characterizes consciousness ‘in the precise sense’ (*im prägnanten Sinne*, *Ideas* § 84, p. 161; III/1 187). Husserl, moreover, has moved beyond the descriptive psychology of his earlier writings. He is not interested in information about the ‘psychic act’ understood in a psychological sense or in the intentional object described in a transcendent sense as an entity in the actual world. He is interested rather, as he says, in “‘objectivity meant as such,” the objectivity in quotation marks (die "vermeinte Objektivität als solche", die Objektivität in Anführungszeichen, *Ideas* § 93 p. 185; III/1 215). Perhaps even more than in the case of perception, as he discusses later in the chapter, the case of judgment requires us to sharply distinguish between the psychological process of judging and judging considered in its essence:
Those of a psychologistic bent will take exception here throughout; they are already disinclined to distinguish between judging as an empirical experience and judgment as an "idea," as an essence. (Urteilen als empirischem Erlebnis und Urteil als "Idee", als Wesen, Ideas § 94, p. 187; Hua III/1 217)

Husserl even makes a personal biographical remark right at the outset in Ideas § 87:

In fact (if I may be allowed a judgment based on my own experience), it is a long and thorny path [ein langer und dorniger Weg] that leads from purely logical insights, from insights into the theory of meaning [bedeutungstheoretischen], from ontological and noetic insights [noetischen Einsichten], likewise from the usual normative and psychological epistemology to the apprehension of immanently-psychological and then phenomenological givennesses [immanent-psychologischen und dann phänomenologischen Gegebenheiten] in the genuine sense, and leads finally to all the essential connections [Wesenszusammenhängen] that render transcendental relations intelligible to us a priori. (Ideas § 87, pp. 172-73; Hua III/1 201)

Husserl is aiming to capture the a priori eidetic laws that govern the temporal flow of conscious experiences and account for their ability to intertwine and interweave with one another in the seamless flow. Each Erlebnis waxes and wanes and is in itself 'a flow of becoming' (Jedes Erlebnis ist in sich selbst ein Fluss des Werdens, Hua III/1 167) that itself is part of the larger stream of consciousness. Conscious life is, Husserl frequently says, a Heraclitean flux. He is at the same time interested in the constitution of enduring or ideal objectivity and of the manner in which objects, their properties and contexts (their 'horizons'), manifest themselves in the flow and maintain their stability across changing mental states and attitudes such that we can fix their senses and return again to contemplate them as the same. Husserl is clear that the various transformations that go on in consciousness are never contingent, but instead are essentially rule-governed (§ 93). We are in an interwoven matrix or nexus (Zusammenhang) this is tightly governed by a priori laws. Earlier, in § 75, Husserl had even spoken of Ideas as generating a 'mathesis of Erlebnisse' (Ideas § 75, p. 135; Hua III/1 158).

In this chapter on noesis and noema, as indeed throughout Ideas, Husserl identifies and articulates a number of these eidetic laws concerning lived experiences. Already in § 41 he had articulated the eidetic law that every conscious experience of a material spatial object unrolls in adumbrations or profiles (Abschattungen). At the same time, he proclaimed in § 42 that no Erlebnis as such, in itself, unfolds in profiles in our experiences of it. On the contrary, its
esse is *percepi*. Each chapter offers new eidetic discoveries, e.g. ‘every intentional experience is, thanks to its noetic moments, also noetic’ (*Ideas* § 88, p. 174; Hua III/1 202). It belongs to its essence ‘to have a sense’. Husserl thus articulates an eidetic law:

*There is no inherent noetic aspect without an inherent noematic aspect specifically pertaining to it* – so reads the essential law that is corroborated in every case. (*Ideas* § 93, p. 185; III/1 215)

And similarly:

Like perception, every intentional experience has its “intentional object,” i.e., its objective sense – that is precisely what makes up the fundamental component [*Grundstück*] of intentionality. (*Ideas* § 90, p. 177; III/1 206)

Husserl also maintains that each *Erlebnis* has a single albeit multilayered noema. It is unified through its sense and a single experience must have a single if multiform sense. There is, so to speak, always a single ‘state of affairs’ (*Sachverhalt*), perhaps a very complex one, intended by a single and perhaps very complex noesis. Furthermore, different kinds of acts have different correlated noemata. The noemata differ structurally with the acts. So a perceptual noema is essentially and necessarily structurally different from a memory noema, and so on. There is an essential typology of noemata to be uncovered and this is a central task of phenomenology —how does a perceived object differ essentially from an imagined or remembered object, for instance.

Husserl begins the chapter on ‘Noesis and Noema’ by invoking the distinctive peculiarity of intentional experience (*Die Eigentümlichkeit des intentionalen Erlebnisses, Ideas* Hua III/1 200) and says that he wants to work out ‘with great care the universal difference between noesis and noema’ and their universal correlation. Further on, he writes that ‘it is necessary to conduct phenomenological discriminations [*Ausscheidungen*] and clarifications [*Klärungen*], by means of which, too, the sense of the problems to be solved here can first be made intelligible’ (*Ideas* § 96, p. 193; III/1 223). As he puts it, at the beginning of § 92, he has identified ‘remarkable changes in consciousness (*Bewusstseinswandlungen*) that crisscross (*kreuzen*) with all other kinds of intentional occurrences, and thus make up a completely universal structure of consciousness (*eine ganz allgemeine Bewuβtseinsstruktur*), a structure with its own dimension’ (*Ideas* § 92, p. 182; III/1 211). Husserl is seeking to specify
the essential structure of each type of Erlebnis —perception, willing, emoting, valuing or judging— what they are, as Husserl says, ‘as Idea’ (als Idee), i.e. their pure conditions of possibility in terms of their act structure as well as their target object type.

To gain insight into the essence, Husserl claims in Ideas for the first time in print, one must apply the epoché, and here Husserl departs from the realist phenomenologists. One must apply the procedures of ‘switching off’ (Ausschaltung) and ‘bracketing’ (Einklammerung), i.e. suspension of all belief commitments, in a particularly vigilant manner to unmask the flow of consciousness in its essential ideality. This bracketing, Husserl insists, is explicitly of ‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit), of everything in nature, space, time and causality (especially as construed in the natural sciences) and also of everything presumed to be psychological, indeed, of the ‘transcendent world’ (die transzendente Welt, Hua III/1 204). The phenomenological epoché, ‘bracketing’ or ‘parenthesis’ is given explicit treatment here also and recurs several times in Chapter Three of Part Three. Thus he speaks, in § 94, in relation to ‘judging’ (Urteilen) of the process of bracketing or parenthesizing —the very term is put in parenthesis to show that it is being introduced in a new way:

> Not to be overlooked thereby is the phenomenological reduction that requires us “to bracket” [einzuklammern] [the actual process of] making the judgment, insofar we just want to obtain the pure noema of the experience of judgment. (Ideas, p. 187; Hua III/1 217)

After the exclusion of actuality what is left is still the concrete Erlebnis that includes or embodies a noetic act (all acts are or embody noeses) that has its own noetic content to which there corresponds what Husserl calls ‘noematic content’ (der noematische Inhalt). The noetic part of the act includes what Husserl had called in the Logical Investigations the ‘act-quality’, (Husserl remarks on the need to revise Brentano’s conception of act quality and matter at §129), i.e. an act of perceiving, willing, hoping, fearing, remembering, comparing, liking, valuing, and so on. The noetic element also contains what Husserl calls (introducing another new term) the ‘hyletic moments’ of the experience —and in particular its sensuous character.

For Husserl, our sensory experiences belong not on the content side of the act but on the noetic side. Sensations are not actually objects that are apprehended (although they are subjectively apprehended and some are responsible
for displaying (darstellen) the objective sense properties of the intentional object). In Ideas, therefore, Husserl retains this notion of ‘sense data’, now retitled ‘hyletic data’. Hyletic data have a peculiar status. Although they convey information concerning objective spatial and temporal features of, for instance, a perceived material object in space, are not themselves spatial or temporal.

Husserl had already been using the term ‘noetic’ in his earlier writings—in the Logical Investigations for instance. But now he deliberately introduces a new terminology that he hopes can be restricted exclusively to the phenomenological sphere. For this reason, the noesis-noema correlation cannot be simply taken as equivalent to the act-object or psychic-physical distinction inherited from Brentano’s analysis of intentionality. We are now approaching Erlebnisse under the epoché and from the transcendental point of view.

In Ideas § 88, Husserl introduces the term ‘noema’ for the first time in his published works (it had occurred earlier in his lectures). He begins with a fundamental distinction between the ‘genuine components’ (eigentliche Komponenten) of the mental process and their ‘intentional correlates’ (ihren intentionalen Korrelaten), a distinction he says that he had already broached in § 41. This time he speaks of the ‘real’ (reelle) or ‘integral’ components as precisely those ‘parts and moments’ that the Erlebnis may be said to have (Erlebniskomponenten). In § 75 he speaks of the ‘real component part’ (reelles Bestandsstück) of the Erlebnis in contrast to its intentional correlate ‘intentionales Korrelat’ (Ideas § 75 p. 134; III/1 156), which he will later describe as ‘irreal’ or as ‘transcendent’ to the act. The intentional living experience somehow points beyond itself and invokes its transcendent intentional object that, nevertheless, still characterizes it essentially. For example in perception, the perceived thing is not a really inherent component (der reelle Bestand, see the title of § 41), rather it is ‘transcendent’ (§41). The real thing and the perception of it, while essentially interwoven or related to one another (aufeinander Bezogen), are not on the same level as parts of the experience. Walking around the table I have different perceptions and if I close my eyes no perception at all. But the perceived thing can exist without being perceived or even potentially intended. The color of the thing is not a real part of the consciousness of that color (§ 41, p. 72; Hua III/1 85) although we confusingly refer to them by the same name. The seen shape of a glass [which is actually circular] will be seen as circular even though with more exact scrutiny (as a
sketch artist would do) it is actually presenting as elliptical. In fact, if drawn by
the artist, it must be drawn as elliptical in order to be seen as circular. The at-
tention can shift from the shape attributed to the object and the actual ‘shape’
of the experience itself.

It is already an essential law introduced at this point that all experiential
consciousness of objects is given in adumbrations and each determination has
its own specific system of continuities and adumbrations. There is also an es-
sential passive synthesis that unites each memory with each perception as ex-
periences of the same thing. Each phase of the perception has its own determi-
nate content of adumbrations, its ‘data of sensation’ (Empfindungsdaten, III/1
85). Furthermore these data are ‘animated’ (beseelt) by ‘construings’
(Auffassungen) carried out by the intending subject. They have a ‘presentation-
al’ or ‘displaying’ (darstellende) character such that we speak of them as ‘ap-
ppearances of a certain color’, and so on. This distinction between the ‘really in-
herent’ or ‘integral’ (reelle) and the ‘intentional’ components is a reprise of a
distinction first made in the Fifth Logical Investigation. In the First Edition
(1901) of that work Husserl speaks of the ‘real (reell) or phenomenological con-
tent’ and ‘intentional content’, but in the Second Edition he renames this the
distinction between ‘real’ and intentional content (LU V § 16). Here he writes:

By the real phenomenological content of an act we mean the sum total
[Gesamtinbegriff] of its concrete or abstract parts, in other words, the sum total or
experiences that really constitute it. (LU V § 16, II, p. 112; Hua XIX/1 411)

He has come to realize that phenomenology identifies more parts and
structures in the lived experience than the perceived elements that conscious
attention can bring to light. His example of a ‘phenomenological’ content is that
for example in hearing a speech, we hear the sounds and meanings as they can
be parsed semantically to the hearer—we do not hear sound vibrations or oth-
er elements. These are the ‘reell’ contents only apprehended through reflective
analysis. In contrast, the intentional dimension is presented as being trans-
cendent to the experience and as including ideal elements and distinctions such
as the difference between the object intended and the manner in which it is
intended. Husserl does try to get clearer about what he means by this later in
Ideas—specifically at § 99. He now speaks of the qualities as attributed to the
object and their modes of appearing in the experience itself and speaks of the
qualities of the object as somehow ‘ideally [ideall] inherent’ (§ 99, p. 201; III/1

233)—they are “Ideellen” in a very special sense. Husserl here makes up the word ‘ideell’ to correspond with ‘reell’.

The crucial nature of this distinction between real and intentional is brought home in Part Four of Ideas (Reason and Actuality) where the inherent nature of the components of the noesis are contrasted with the transcendent nature of the noema to develop an idea of two distinct but related ‘spheres of being’ (Seinsregionen, § 128). Noetic analysis and noematic analyses are now seen to run parallel but in a different register. The noematic is a realm of objectivity that does not really inhere in the conscious stream although it essentially characterizes it in a certain manner.

Husserl in the Logical Investigations pursued an ‘ego-less’ analysis of conscious experience, more or less in the spirit of Brentano, himself influenced by Hume. Although Husserl’s belated discovery of the pure ego (and his reconciliation with Natorp who had been criticized in the Logical Investigations First Edition) is a central part of Ideas, there is not a great deal in the chapter on ‘noesis and noema’ about the ego which somehow lives in and across the flow of Erlebnisse, as a kind of unity in the flow of change, but he does make some remarks concerning the direction of attention and the sending out of ego-rays which do have a bearing on his understanding of the ego. Husserl speaks of ‘egoic rays’ and it is not entirely clear what he means. Already in § 77 Husserl says that the ego lives through its experiences (Jedes Ich erlebt seine Erlebnisse, Ideas § 77, p. 139; III/1 162, see also § 92), furthermore, he emphasizes that the ego lives its experiences and does not simply regard them or have them in view (“im Blicke”, III/1 162). Each Erlebnis can however be viewed and be made an object of the ego. Husserl makes an interesting but undeveloped remark about the place of the ego in the act of attending in § 92. In attending there is a beaming or radiating out from the ego—this is not separate from the ego—the ego-ray is the ego itself radiating:

The radiating is not separated from the ego, but instead itself is and remains the ego radiating. (Der Strahl trennt sich nicht vom Ich, sondern ist selbst und bleibt Ichstrahl, Ideas § 92, p. 184; Hua III/1 214)

How does he attend to this? Is this also an eidetic truth? In Ideas, Husserl is still perhaps too much in the grip of Paul Natorp’s conception of the ego as a subjective source that cannot be objectified.

In Ideas Husserl claims that the epoché excludes the ego:
However, if I carry out the phenomenological epoché, if the “ego, the human being,” along with the entire world as it is naturally supposed, is suspended, then the unadulterated experience of the act with its own essence still remains. (*Ideas* § 80, p. 154; Hua III/1 179)

He goes on to remark that the pure ego that remains once the human psychological ego has been bracketed has no content:

*These distinctive kinds of interwovenness with all the “ego’s” experiences notwithstanding, the ego living through them is still nothing that could be taken for itself and made its own object of investigation. Apart from its “manners of relating” or “manners of behaving,” it is completely devoid of any essential components. It has no explicable content whatsoever, it is in and for itself indescribable: pure ego and nothing further. (*Ideas* § 80, p. 154; Hua III/1 179)*

This brings Husserl very close to Natorp who considered the ego to be a pure consciousness (*Bewusstheit*) that is simply lost when it is objectified. It is, for Natorp, a ‘unifying centre of relations’ (*einheitlicher Beziehungspunkt*) in our experiences and nothing more. Husserl announces his reconciliation with Natorp and rejects his earlier view:

*On the question of the pure ego, in the *Logical Investigations* I stood for a skepticism that, as my studies progressed, I could not maintain. (*Ideas* §57, p, 106n. 16; III/1 124 n. 1)*

This *mea culpa* is echoed in the Second Edition of the *Logical Investigations*:

*I have since managed to find it [the pure ego], i.e. have learnt not to be led astray from a pure grasp of the given through corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic cf. note to §6. (LU II, p. 353 n. 8; Hua XIX/1 374 n.*).

*Ideas*, then, although it acknowledges the pure ego, also more or less treats it as a pure pole of experience (*Ichpol*), a source of radiations out, and so on, but not having a content that can be further investigated. This will change in Husserl’s mature work. Indeed, by *Ideas* II, the ego has become something that has a history, acquires habits, abilities, dispositions, and so on. Thus in *Ideas* II, Husserl would write:

*It pertains in general to the essence of every cogito that a new (cogito of the kind called by us “Ego-reflection” is in principle possible, one that grasps, on the basis of the earlier cogito (which itself is thereby phenomenologically altered), the pure subject of that earlier cogito. It consequently pertains, as we can also say (since the same obviously applies to this reflective cogito as well) to the essence of the pure Ego that it*
be able to grasp itself as what it is and in the way it functions, and thus make itself into an object. Therefore it is in no way correct to assert that the pure Ego is a subject that can never become an Object ... (Ideas II § 23, p. 107; Hua IV 101)\(^3\)

As Husserl will write in \textit{Cartesian Meditations}: ‘The ego constitutes itself for itself in, so to speak, the unity of a history’ (\textit{Cartesian Meditations}, p. 75; Hua I 109).\(^4\)

Returning to the analysis of the intentional relation, Husserl does acknowledge that there is what he calls in Ideas § 88 a ‘real relation’ (\textit{das reale Verhältnis}, III/1 204) —presumably a causal relation between the seeing and the object seen, between the ‘perceiving’ (\textit{die Wahrnehmung}) and ‘the perceived as such’ (\textit{das Wahrgenommene als Solche}, III/1 203) but in the phenomenological attitude there is no interest in this real relation. Interest in it is suspended: ‘the real relation that actually obtains between perception and what is perceived is suspended’ (Ideas, p. 175; III/1 204, gestört). We are now supposed to be attending to ‘the phenomenologically reduced experiences of perception and enjoyment, just as they fit in the transcendental stream of experience’ (§ 88, pp. 175-76). A new concept has been introduced here —the ‘transcendental’ stream of experience (\textit{der transzendentale Erlebnisstrom}) which has to be grasped ‘in pure immanence’ (in “reiner Immanenz”, Hua III/1 204). It is within this plane that Husserl’s analyses now operate. The ‘natural attitude’ (\textit{die natürliche Einstellung}) encountered earlier in the book (§ 27) is now invoked only in order to be suspended. The natural attitude, Husserl reminds us, has a certain view not only of its objects but also of subjective experiences themselves. They are considered as parts of nature with at least temporal if not spatial location. The \textit{Erlebnisse} as natural events are essentially temporal events, they belong to the stream of experience. So, when Husserl says ‘Let us pass over now to the phenomenological attitude’, he is now exclusively interested in ‘the phenomenologically reduced experience’ and the radical modification of sense that has been brought about in thinking both of the act and its object, to use the older language of the \textit{Logical Investigations}. As Husserl says,

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he wants to investigate what “lies” (liegt .. ein) in an evident way in the completely reduced phenomenon (§ 90). The focus is still on the individual concrete Erlebnis but stripped of its natural, human, psychological characteristics. It is now an ‘eidetic singularity’ (§ 75). With meticulous carefulness the phenomenological observer must pay attention to ensure that nothing is placed in the experience other than what is actually contained in it, and “lay it in” [einlegen] just exactly as it “lies” [liegt] therein (p. 221).

The phenomenologically reduced Erlebnis now carries as an extra marker, as it were, a kind of disruption of the natural direction (Richtung) of attention. The Erlebnis is seen bifocally, as it were. It is noteworthy that Husserl’s remarks on ‘attention’ (Aufmerksamkeit) appear in this chapter. In the natural attitude, our focus is normally outwards towards the transcendent. Using Husserl’s own example, we attend to the blooming apple tree and are not primarily attending to our perceiving with pleasure, although we bask in the pleasurable viewing. Husserl explicitly says this. But it seems to be the case that we can, already in ordinary natural attitude reflection, shift out attention to the felt qualitative character of the perceiving. I can say that I am looking dreamily or wistfully or admiringly out the window at the apple tree, apprehending the character of my perceiving. So it is not just the object as it were that dwells in the natural attitude but also the perceiving and normally we do not separate them although our natural attitude can focus back and forward across the experience – which as we see from § 97 is meant to be conceived of as an extended temporal process that includes bodily movement (walking to the window, shifting one’s head and eyes and so on).

Husserl now notes that this Erlebnis is suffused with a natural credence or belief-in-being, Seinsglaube, although that term does not appear anywhere in Ideas.⁵ He does speak of the Glaubenscharakter of every act and its component element of ‘taking as actual’ (Für-wirklich-Haltung), that is, a component of every intention in the natural attitude. This might be regarded as another eidetic law:

Every Erlebnis is suffused with Seinsglaube (cf. Doxa ist Meinung, Hua XI 364).

This ‘Seinsglaube’ moreover does not disappear in the activity of switching to the phenomenological attitude. It remains what it is but it now gets ‘modified’ or ‘placed in brackets’ and ‘put out of work’, and this can happen in many different ways (in phantasy, in the neutrality modification, in reading fiction, and so on). This basic belief still belongs to the Erlebnis as an integral structural feature, but now our conscious noesis does not go down the line of living in acceptance, as Husserl puts it: ‘This thetic actuality is, indeed, not there for us in the way of a judgment’ (Die thetische Wirklichkeit ist ja urteilsmässig für uns nicht da, Ideas § 88, p. 176; III/1 204). In other words, we now deliberately and as a matter of conscious decision, take a stance within the very Erlebnis itself. The phenomenological meditator does not externally sit in judgment on the Erlebnis, or decide that the perception is in fact a hallucination or whatever. Somehow one shifts focus within the Erlebnis itself and take it as a token of an essence. After the reduction, we find in the remembering the remembered as such, in expecting the expected as such, in the fictionalizing fantasy the fantasized as such. The key term here is ‘as such’ (als Solches). We are moving to the sphere of essence and the a priori rather than the sphere of fact.

The conscious and deliberate application of the epoché is in fact a new psychic occurrence in the stream, a new Erlebnis that acts to modify the original Erlebnis on which it is operating. It is a kind of filtered reflection so there is a kind of triple layer going on. Husserl explicitly says that the kind of reflection which brings the Erlebnis to light in itself is itself a ‘new modification’ (§78). One has a consciousness of the original perception and a consciousness of one’s original living in it, but that living in is also consciously suspended. These experiences and their conscious modifications sit on top of one another like the ingredients of a triple-decker sandwich. Obviously, the application of the epoché is itself a new kind of Erlebnis that superimposes itself and alters or modifies the existing Erlebnis. A phenomenological epoché, furthermore, involves an act of deliberate willing and that willing may not have been part — and certainly is not a part of the original perception. In fact, for Husserl as for Descartes, it is a feature of perception that what is given is not deliberately willed (unlike the case of fantasy).

Husserl here seems to be thinking not of an Erlebnis as a kind of temporally instant act but rather as one that takes place over a period of time, and in the concentrating that may or may not be part of the original act we can become
aware of different aspects of our own awareness and start to consciously check them. In § 92, Husserl makes clear that the ‘fixing of attention’ (Aufmerksamkeit) is inherent in the Erlebnis (§ 92). A new eidetic law will therefore be proposed:

There simply are diverse modes specifically appropriate to attentiveness as such. (Es gibt eben verschiedene speziell zur Aufmerksamkeit als solcher gehörige Modi, Ideas §92, p. 183; III/1 213)

While I am looking at something, I can bring my attentiveness to bear on the manner of my looking and this allows the carrying through of the act of attention in a new way. Something like this is what the phenomenological epoché is supposed to provide. It is like the manner in which Zen meditation proposes to attend to the experience but not engage with it, simply notice it, note it and pass on. For Husserl, and this was never fully accepted by his students, disengaging the Seinsglaube component is essential in order to bring the the transcendental structures in play. This new kind of modified attention —one which is alert to its own ‘attentional variations’ (die attentionalen Wandlungen) as well as to the ‘parts and components’ of the experience is what yields phenomenological insights.

With the application of the epoché to the Erlebnis, one now is in the conscious presence of a modified conscious stratum in the noesis which Husserl has indicated has to be construed as the whole concrete Erlebnis (according to a note added in the 1923 copy D). This modification in the noesis is meant to bring both the nature of the noesis and its accompanying noema to light. We are not just seeing-in-credence, seeing is believing, as it were, but attending with varying degrees of attentional focus to our seeing (not now in natural reflection) but in transcendental reflection, which involves a kind of disciplined and very specific hyper vigilance. The application of the bracketing (the formal procedure of the epoché) is a new act but it effects a change inside the existing lived experience that is its target and it alters or modifies one component of that act, namely its Seinsglaube character, its ‘credential’ character. Elsewhere, Husserl likens this epoché to the kind of suspension of belief that one performs in reading a fictional novel, where one puts the question of actuality out of play and go along with the pretence.
Moreover, this new modified attending is supposed to highlight the ‘correlation’. The term ‘noesis’ is chosen by Husserl precisely so we do not necessarily identify various noeses with linguistic terms such as ‘seeing’, ‘believing’, ‘hoping’ and so on. It is precisely for the same reason that the ‘neutrality modification’ is introduced as a more general term than any skeptical doubting, putting into suspension, disbelieving, negating and so on, in § 109. There are a myriad of noeses—distinguishing the various shadings of the ‘act’ part of the experiences—that can sit on top of one another, run parallel with one another, conflict with one another or modify each other in various ways. There are as he says here in Chapter Three memories that are accessed within memories (§ 92). We can be remembering through to an earlier memory which itself is founded on a perception. Husserl says I can recall how yesterday I remembered a childhood memory (§ 101). Indeed, even in his discussion of the famous example of seeing the apple tree in the garden, although the discussion is primarily about perception, Husserl is also discussing seeing the apple tree in an appreciative way, basking in the vision of the apple tree, as it were. He speaks of ‘looking with enjoyment’ (wir blicken mit Wohlgefallen) and of the ‘perception and the accompanying enjoyment’ (die Wahrnehmung und das begleitende Wohlgefallen, § 88, Hua III/1 203). Even straightforward perceiving has levels and degrees of accompanying appreciation. In § 92, he says that he is concentrating on the intentional layer of perception ‘for simplicity’ but recognizes that noeses have much more complex forms.

How does one discover the laws according to how these noeses intertwine and join in synthetic unities? Husserl’s example here in this chapter—as usual—is concerned not to allow a kind of fantasy representation to be admitted to the perceptual process. Perception cannot be confused in essence with any other kind of representation—otherwise it is representations all the way down—repeats argument from Logical Investigations and even from earlier unpublished text, ‘Intentional Objects’ (written between 1894 and 1898).6 If a perceiving was composed of both a filled intuition of the presented side of the object along with an ‘empty intending’ (Leermeinen) of the co-meant but sen-

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suously empty or unfilled other sides of the object, and if this latter Leermeinen were interpreted as a fantasy, then we would never be able to grasp the essence of perceiving as such. Fantasy can, of course, become involved but this involves a new imposition onto the original perception, enabled by that perception and founded on it. Because fantasy in turn is considered as a modification of a perceiving, we cannot then explain perceiving as essentially involving a fantasy-component. So the only upshot is that we have to recognize within the act of perception, different entangled noeses—one that presents in sensuous fullness the front-side adumbration of the object, and another ‘presentation’ (Vergegenwärtigung) or calling to mind, that is explicitly not a fantasy, imagining or picturing (which would have its own fantasy colors, etc). Husserl speaks here explicitly of ‘modes of indeterminate suggestion and non-intuitive co-presence’ (Modi unbestimmter Andeutung und unanschaulicher Mitgegenwärtigung, Ideas § 92, p. 183; III/1 212) that are wrapped up in the experience.

Let us now turn to the object pole of the intentional Erlebnis. There is the experience of a shared object across different perceivings, imaginings, etc., of the same thing. But the ‘noematic correlates are still essentially different for perception, phantasy, pictorial envisaging, remembering, and so forth’ (§ 91, p. 181; III/1 210). There is a unique and specific sense belonging to them: ‘sense of a perception, the sense of a fantasy, the sense of a memory—and that we find as necessarily pertaining to them in correlation to the relevant kinds of noetic experiences’ (§ 91, p. 181; III/1 210). Husserl speaks here for the first time of a ‘correlation’ (§ 90), a term that will become crucial for phenomenological analysis (as Quentin Meillassoux has noted). In fact, the concept of the essential correlation between noesis and noema is introduced only tentatively in § 91—it is something whose complete validity still needs to be ascertained, Husserl says. Furthermore, although he begins from the analysis of perception and imagination (fantasy), he moves on to the noesis-noema structure in judgment and willing, extending his analysis has he puts it to the ‘widest spheres of intentionality (§ 91).

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In § 85, Husserl remarks on the need for terminology and introduces the term ‘noesis’ (German: Noese) and ‘noeses’ in the plural to replace words such as ‘moments of consciousness’, ‘awarenesses’ (Bewussheiten) (Ideas, § 85, p. 167; Hua III/1 194). He writes:

> These noeses make up the specific character of "nous" in the widest sense of the word; leading us back, in terms of all its currently actualized forms of life, to cogitations, and then to intentional experiences in general. Hence it encompasses everything that is (and essentially only what is) an eidetic presupposition of the idea of a norm. At the same time, it is not unwelcome that the word "nous" calls to mind one of its preeminent meanings, namely, "sense," although the "affordance of sense" [Sinngebung] that is achieved in the inherent noetic aspects encompasses many sorts of things, and only as foundation is it an "affordance of sense" that is connected to the precise concept of sense. (Ideas, p. 167; Hua III/1 194)

This is in many ways peculiar —Husserl is claiming that the Greek nous (νοûς) has a connection with ‘sense’ (Sinn) whereas it is more usually understood as ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’ and ‘noein’ as ‘understanding’. There is an ancient tradition —found in Homer— where nous is largely connected with sensing. In fact, ‘nous’ or the ‘noetic’ is now put forward as a more accurate way of identifying the processes which Brentano somewhat misleadingly called the ‘psychic’ (das Psychische). Husserl concludes by saying that ‘the stream of phenomenological being [Der Strom der psychologischen Seins] has a material layer and a noetic layer [Schicht]’ (Ideas, § 85, p. 168; Hua III/1 196). He also acknowledges that he had earlier failed to distinguish these two strata clearly.

The noetic is returned to in Ideas Part III Chapter 3 § 88 where Husserl says that ‘owing to its noetic moments, every intuitive process is precisely noetic; it is of its essence to include in itself something such as a “sense”... (Ideas, § 88, p. 174; Hua III/1 202). Something noetic is something oriented towards sense (in some meaning of sense —including the sensuous). Husserl is still retaining the language of ‘noetic moments’ and he is suggesting they are best understood as ‘rays of regard of the ego’. What is somewhat unfortunate is that the notion of ‘noetic moments’ is not analyzed in detail at this point.

These nooses occur in strata at lower and higher levels (as discussed in the fourth Chapter). In fact, there is very little further about ‘noesis’ in this Chapter Three. Husserl is more interested in the components that can be found in the full concrete Erlebnis. Sometimes, however, he is interested in the purely noetic components and especially in the ‘ray of regard’ [Blickstrahl] of the ego is singled out (III/1 211). Husserl is not very happy with this being called ‘attention’.
He writes: ‘We tend to compare attention to a light that illuminates things’ (*mit einem erhellende Lichte*, *Ideas* § 92, p. 183; III/1 213), but his own account does not depart much from this spotlight metaphor. What he does is to make attention into a fundamental *sui generis* form of intentionality. It is not a component within the act but an act of a new kind. Furthermore, it does not just focus on the subjective contents of the act of perceiving but can be enacted across all aspects of the original act. There are different modes belonging specifically to attention; there are different modifications possible in terms of the amount of attention being paid, right to the limit case of inattention where the perceived/remembered/attended to object is barely present —present in a dead kind of way that does not awaken anything. Husserl is also aware that in the varying aspects of perceiving as my eyes linger on the object different aspects come into focus and others recede into the background although they do not disappear altogether (§ 92). These aspects come into view if we concentrate on the noematic side of the correlation. There are modes of ‘actualisation’ (*Aktualitätmodi*) and corresponding modes of ‘inactualisation’ (*Modus der Inaktualität*) in a kind of ‘dead consciousness’.

Husserl speaks of a ‘phenomenology of attention’ (*Phänomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit*, § 92) and notes that is one of the chief themes of modern psychology. He even has an interesting but too short footnote on it (Hua III/1 205n.1) which claims that psychology has misunderstood it and not seen it as a ‘fundamental form of intentional modification’. Husserl says that attention did receive a preliminary treatment in the Second Logical Investigation, §22 entitled ‘Fundamental deficiencies in the phenomenological analysis of attention’, and in the Fifth Investigation, § 19. Indeed the Fifth Investigation § 19 does discuss attention in a rather subtle manner. Here he repudiates the claim that attention is an act that picks out only the ‘content’ of the subjective act rather than being focused or absorbed in the object of the act. Husserl thinks in fact a new character of act has been brought about when we focus on contents. He gives the example of listening to a spoken expression (returning to the discussion in the First Logical Investigation). He says we say the words and attend to the meanings and we can of course attend to the sounds specifically in themselves but then the meaning is lost. This is not a component act of the original listening but a new intentional act with a new object. ‘Attention is an emphatic function that belongs among acts’ he says in LU V § 19. More or less the same
view is articulated in Chapter Three here —attention is a sui generis form of intentionality.

Earlier in the Second Logical Investigation Husserl distinguished attention from abstraction. He criticized traditional empiricist accounts of abstraction as a selective focusing on part of the individual content of an Erlebnis. He criticized the ‘Lockean prejudice’ that attention only picks out the mental contents of the experience.

Unthinkingly one credits to contents everything which acts, in their straightforward reference, place in the object; its attributes, its colours, forms etc., are forthwith called ‘contents’ [Inhalte] and actually interpreted as contents in the psychological sense, e.g. as sensations [Empfindungen]. (LU II § 22, I, p. 273; Hua XIX/1 165)

Husserl goes on:

Led astray by the seemingly obvious, one takes experienced contents to be the normal objects to which one pays attention. The concrete phenomenal thing is treated as a complex of contents, i.e. of attributes grown together in a single intuitive image. And it is then said of these attributes, taken as experienced mental contents, that their non-independence precludes their separation from the concretely complete image: they can only be noticed in the latter. How could such a theory of abstraction intelligibly account for the formation of abstract ideas of that class of attributive determinations which are indeed perceived, but which by their nature never are adequately perceived, which cannot be given in the form of a mental content? (LU II § 22 I, p. 273; Hua XIX/1 165-66)

This is an important point; attention (and a mistaken understanding of psychological reflection) has assumed that the intentional object is actually a collection of psychic contents each of which can be focused on. This precisely misconstrues the intentional structure of the Erlebnis and the role of the hyletic stuff in portraying on conveying the sensuous properties of the object.

Another point that has to be taken into consideration is that noetic modifications also affect the noema. The concrete noemata change correlatively with changes in the noeses. As well as a ‘noematic core’ (Kern, § 92) (that guarantees that is the same object that is being experienced under different noeses). The ‘ray of regard’ (Blickstrahl) can go through several strata of noetic acts e.g. remembering an earlier act of remembering. We can go to an object through a perceptual noesis or through a remembering noesis and sometimes we will shift suddenly from one to the other.

The notion of what belongs precisely to the noetic there is somewhat complex in Husserl’s account. It is clear that the hyletic moments belong to the no-
etic act rather than to the noema (which of course also contains intended seneuous properties) —and in fact that is consistent with what Brentano says, albeit confusingly, in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, when he speaks of ‘seeing a colour’ as belonging to the ‘psychic act’ rather than being one of the ‘physical phenomena’. In the following Chapter Four Husserl will more clearly locate the hyletic moments (the ‘stuff’ moments, the sensed colours) in the noetic side of the experience, whereas the colour attributed to the object is located in the noema’;

[...] everything hyletic belongs in the concrete experience as a really obtaining, integral part of it, while, what “displays” [Darstellende] and “profiles” [Abschattende] itself in it as a manifold belongs, by contrast, to the noema. (*Ideas* § 97, p. 196; III/1 227)

But even these ‘stuffs’ (to employ Husserl’s wonderfully technical term!) are animated with noetic moments even while the ego is not turned to them but to the objects. These ‘animating construals’ belong to the really immanent aspect of the noesis. On the other hand the profiles (Abschattungen) belong to the object side or the noema. They are, as it were, ‘noema moments’.

It is clear that as Husserl writes *Ideas* his thought is evolving. In the Foreword to the Second Edition of the *Logical Investigations* (Hua XVIII xiv), written around the same time as *Ideas*, Husserl thinks that the *Logical Investigations* did not sufficiently treat of the concept of noesis and noema. Later he will say that there was not sufficient awareness of ‘horizon consciousness’. He writes:

> As a further defect of this Investigation [he is referring to the First Investigation], only understood and corrected at the end of the volume, we must note that it has no regard to the distinction and parallelism between the ‘noetic’ and the ‘noematic’: the fundamental role of this distinction in all fields of consciousness is first fully laid bare in the *Ideas*, but comes through in many individual arguments in the last Investigation of the old work. For this reason, the essential ambiguity of ‘meaning’ [Bedeutung] as an Idea is not emphasized. The noetic concept of meaning is one-sidedly stressed, though in many important passages the noematic concept is principally dealt with. (LU, vol I, p. 7; Hua XVIII xiv).

Husserl is here claiming that the notions of noesis and noema actually were first treated (though not under those names) in the Sixth Logical Investigation. Furthermore, he believes that most of the attention there went on the noetic side. It is important to clarify how the notion of noema differs from the notion of ‘meaning as an idea’. Husserl echoes this passage in *Ideas* § 94 where he
refers back to the Fifth Logical Investigation § 21 where the difference between ‘intentional’ and ‘epistemic’ essence is distinguished.

That everything somehow has a kind of sense, that ‘makes sense’ to the mind, is the fundamental intentional starting-point. Everything that is manifest in consciousness has some kind of coherent sense. Each phase of the experience also has a sense and here we have to think of sense in some sort of component feature, perhaps like phonemes in the constitution of languages. There is, moreover, a number of threads of unity running across the experiences. The object is experienced first and foremost as the same object given through different profiles and also apprehended in different noeses. They are all experiences of the apple tree blooming in the garden. At the same time the noeses themselves are coordinated in a rigorous manner and ‘crisscross’ each other in very specific and determinately ordered ways. There are a number of noetic elements that come together and are united around a ‘noetic core’. This is equally important as the ‘noematic core’ that guarantees the sameness of the object. The hyletic moments belong to this noetic core but are different from the noetic moments in that ‘core’.

Husserl is aware that the object has an identity in and through these manifestations in different phases of the lived experience. The hyletic data, furthermore, do not determine or anchor the identity of the object across the experiences. For example, I can talk to John on the phone [aural data] and see John on the street (without hearing him) —visual data. The visual and aural data are entirely different clusters of data —yet they are both appearings of John. Furthermore, John is not some ideal limit at the end of an infinite series of such experiences but present in each of them yet not in a static manner. The hyletic data —although they do, for Husserl, anchor the intentional function, as Husserl says— at the same time underdetermine the intentional object. There can be no perception as a perception without hyletic sensory experiencings. That is what makes perception perception.

Without going further into the complexities of the noema, I hope I have made clear in this essay how Husserl develops his newer more complicated phenomenological analysis of intentional Erlebnisse in Ideas. He remains more or less atomistic in his focus on individual acts, such as perceiving an apple tree, and, as we have seen, is reluctant to pursue a close analysis of the manner in which the pure ego resides in each experience. But he greatly compli-
cates the manner in which what he previously called descriptive psychology uncovers the various inherent component parts in the experience. Each lived experience, each Erlebnis, now becomes, under the operation of the epoché, a vast field of levels of content, apprehension, profiles, horizons, attentional variations, temporal distentions, and so on. Husserl has put the intentional experience under the microscope of his transcendental phenomenology and an entirely new world has been disclosed. This is the radical originality and contribution of Husserl’s *Ideas*, it not only seeks to lay out the phenomenological method in some kind of formal way but it also offers a rich and powerful of phenomenological analysis at work.