The Phenomenology of the Social World: Husserl on Mitsein as Ineinandersein and Füreinandersein

Dermot Moran
Boston College & University College Dublin*
dermot.moran@ucd.ie

ABSTRACT. In this paper I discuss Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of the constitution of the social world, in relation to some phenomenological contributions to the constitution of sociality found in Husserl’s students and followers, including Heidegger, Gurwitsch, Walther, Otaka, and Schutz. Heidegger is often seen as being the first to highlight explicitly human existence as Mitsein and In-der-Welt-Sein, but it is now clear from the Husserliana publications that, in his private research manuscripts especially during his Freiburg years, Husserl employs many of the terms associated with Heidegger, e.g. Mitwelt, Weltlichkeit, Alltäglichkeit, Zeitlichkeit, and Geschichtlichkeit, and had detailed discussions of various forms of social constitution. It is clear that Husserl and Heidegger were exploring these themes in dialogue with one another, and that Husserl, in fact, has a rich phenomenology of sociality that is worth exploring in its own right. In this paper, I will outline some of the key aspects of Husserl’s contribution.

KEYWORDS. Phenomenological Movement; Social World; Husserl; Schutz; Heidegger; Patočka.

* Correspondence: Dermot Moran – Boston College, Department of Philosophy, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467. University College Dublin, School of Philosophy, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland.
1. Introduction: The Phenomenology of Sociality in Germany in the 1920s

In this paper I shall discuss Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of the constitution of the social world, as well as some phenomenological contributions to the constitution of sociality in Heidegger, Gurwitsch, Walther, Otaka, Schutz, and others. The phenomenology of social life began to occupy philosophers’ minds in

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Abbreviations of Husserl’s works (English pagination is followed by the Husserliana volume and page number):


Germany especially during the 1920s. Evidence of this can be seen in various publications in Husserl’s *Jahrbuch für phänomenologische Forschung* through the 1910s and mid-1920s. It begins with Adolf Reinach’s *Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes* (*Jahrbuch* volume 1 1913), and Max Scheler’s *Formalism in Ethics* (1913-1916), the first volume of which also appeared in Volume One of Husserl’s *Jahrbuch*, and his *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923). The key phenomenological contributions range from the identification of specifically ‘social acts’ in Husserl and Reinach, to discussions of collective intentionality, \(^2\) empathy, intersubjectivity, and ‘living-with-one-another’ (*Ineinanderleben*) in Scheler, Stein and Walther, as well as Heidegger’s characterization of *Mitsein* as a fundamental existentiale of Dasein. Indeed, in his private research manuscripts, Husserl employs many of the terms, e.g. *Mitwelt*, *Weltlichkeit*, and *Alltäglichkeit*, *Zeitlichkeit*, *Geschichtlichkeit*, normally associated with Heidegger. For instance, Husserl himself uses the term *Mitwelt* in the *Crisis of European Sciences*, \(^3\) which may have been inspired by Heidegger’s use of the terms *Mitsein* and *Mitdasein*, but it is more likely that the influence runs the other way – from Husserl to Heidegger. Husserl, however, tends to use the term *Mitsein* in a reasonably non-technical sense to mean simply ‘belonging with’ or ‘being alongside’ – as the manner in which being a side implies that there are other sides alongside: ‘a side has only got sense through the co-belonging of opposing sides’ (*eine Seite hat nur Sinn durch Mitsein von Gegenseiten* \(^4\)).

Throughout the nineteen twenties and thirties there was an explosion of interest in the phenomenology of social relations from different phenomenological perspectives, specifically to be found

\(^1\) The *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1970.


\(^2\) See Szanto 2016.

\(^3\) Hua VI, 482. In this passage, interestingly, Husserl is speaking of the human relation to animals.

\(^4\) Hua XV, 124.
among Husserl’s students and followers, e.g. Gerda Walther, Edith Stein, Tomoo Otaka, Alfred Schutz, Jan Patočka, and even Aron Gurwitsch’s *Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt* (posthumously published in 1977). The key questions is: How is this social world constituted in intentional life and how can the researcher come to reflect on that world and make it structures apparent? In this regard, Husserl took an explicitly *transcendental* approach that depended on the reduction. He claimed that the social world as such could be revealed in its essential features only by a transcendental approach that started from the suspension of the natural attitude. Alfred Schutz, on the other hand, maintained that one had to put aside Husserl’s transcendental reduction in order to do a phenomenology of the social world.

There is, then, in the phenomenological tradition, a broad range of approaches to the phenomenology of sociality – from the emphasis on ‘everydayness’ (*Alltäglichkeit*) and the, more or less, collective ‘they-self’ or ‘one-self’ (*Man-Selbst*) in Heidegger, to the discussion of ‘anonymity’ in Schutz, to the notion of specifically collective intentional ‘social acts’ in Husserl and in Adolf Reinach, who discussed them already in his *The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law* (1913) (acts such as commanding, requesting, warning, questioning and answering, and promising that institute particular social bonds that have objective reality in social institutions such as marriage). Indeed, the phenomenology of collective intentionality is now a major topic in contemporary social philosophy.

Max Scheler’s contribution is extremely important in this regard, and is replete with rich insights that deserve separate treatment and will not be discussed here. Scheler revived the Hegelian distinction between ‘community’ (*Gemeinschaft*) and ‘society’ (*Gesellschaft*) and distinguished different kinds of belonging that relate to different levels

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5 See GURWITSCH 1979. Gurwitsch wrote this text in the early 1930s and planned it as a Habilitation but left Germany due to the National Socialist rise to power and never published the text in his life-time.
6 See Hua XIV, 360.
of personal and interpersonal social life, ranging from belonging unreflectively to the ‘mass’, ‘tribe’ or ‘horde’, or to the ‘life-community’ to more sophisticated self-conscious forms of belonging that belong to personal life. For Scheler, moreover, these levels do not correspond to historical stages in the development of humanity but are present all at once in concrete social relations.

Gerda Walther’s Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften [On the Ontology of Social Communities] is an important and neglected contribution to the phenomenology of sociality, which was originally published in Husserl’s *Jahrbuch* (volume VI, 1923), followed soon after by Edith Stein’s brilliant but neglected *Eine Untersuchung über den Staat* [An Investigation of the State], published in *Jahrbuch* vol. VII (1925) which deals with various possible kinds of ‘living together’ (Zusammenleben) from families to the state. One should also include in the list of discussions of social ontology other key works not published in the *Jahrbuch*, but still associated with phenomenology, such as Karl Löwith’s *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen* [The Individual in the Role of Fellow Human Being] (1928), written as a Habilitation thesis under Heidegger. Löwith’s work extends the concept of *Mittwelt* found in Heidegger by offering an historical context (ranging over Hegel, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and others) but also criticises the role of reflection in destroying the authentic nature of ‘being together’. Hans-Georg Gadamer later reviewed Löwith’s work and, more recently, Axel Honneth has returned to it in his discussion of the relations between intersubjectivity and recognition. Löwith discusses the manner in which the world is encountered as the human world and in which being-together in the world is accomplished through language (*Miteinandersein als Miteinander-sprechen*). He discusses Scheler’s notion of the human being as person and as such independent of the natural world. Löwith highlights the way human beings occupy different social roles and that we encounter others often primarily through their roles or ‘personae’, e.g. as ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘neighbour’, and so on. Löwith explains how our encounters with others are often regulated in advance by the recognition of these roles.
One allows oneself to be determined by the other, as Löwith puts it. Aron Gurwitsch’s discussion in his *Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt [Human Encounters in the Social World]*, deeply influenced by Scheler, distinguishes between looser more external forms of social partnership and more integrated forms of social communal being-together that involve mutual belonging and ‘mutual understanding’ and genuine partnership. Gurwitsch takes issue with Karl Löwith for not differentiating between different kinds of social relationship. He writes:

> The sense in which a father ‘belongs’ to his children is different from the sense in which an officer ‘belongs’ to the military, and is different again from the manner in which ‘an old man does (not) belong young people’.  

Gurwitsch goes on to articulate different kinds of being together which have their own implicit structures of knowledge and recognition. He writes:

> In common situations the partner listens deliberately. While each plays his role, he divines the purposes and tendencies of the other even when the other does not declare them— as is clear from the example of the chessplayer.  

One must also not ignore the impact of Martin Buber’s 1923 book, *Ich und Du [I and Thou]*. The more or less home-schooled, independent scholar Buber was an avid reader of Georg Simmel and Wilhelm Dilthey. This I-Thou relation is to be contrasted with what Buber terms the ‘I-It’ relation. Husserl, too, speaks often of the ‘I-Thou relation’ (*Ich-Du-Beziehung*).

In the background, of course, is the towering figure of Max Weber and the growing Marxist movement that emphasises the collective

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8 Gurwitsch 1979, 110.
9 Gurwitsch 1979, 113.
nature of human being – human being as ‘species-being’ as Karl Marx discussed it in his 1844 Manuscripts which also appeared for the first time in the 1920s. In his early *Early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844), first published in 1932, Marx defines ‘species being’ as follows:

To say that man is a species being, is, therefore, to say that man raises himself above his own subjective individuality, that he recognizes in himself the objective universal, and thereby transcends himself as a finite being. Put another way, he is individually the representative of mankind.¹⁰

Marx’s account of alienation in these manuscripts was taken up by many phenomenologists including Herbert Marcuse and Jean-Paul Sartre. Lucien Goldman has even claimed that György Lukacs’ account of reification in his *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), another important work on social philosophy from the 1920s, influenced Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.¹¹

**2. Heidegger on Mitsein and Mitdasein**

Heidegger’s ground-breaking *Being and Time* (1927),¹² of course, contributed a new and decisive chapter with its discussion of ‘being-in-the-world’ (*In-der-Welt-sein*) as involving *Mitsein* as an existential characteristic of Dasein. Dasein is *Mitsein*, and it is always essentially *Mitsein*, even if it is factually alone in the world, like the castaway Robinson Crusoe (SZ §26), a figure invoked by Husserl and Scheler among others and always indicative of how one is never completely alone. For Heidegger, Dasein is essentially being-towards-others,

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¹⁰ *MARX* 1975, 327.
¹¹ See *GOLDMAN* 2009 and *HEMMING* 2013.
¹² *HEIDEGGER* [1977] 1962. Hereafter SZ followed by the English pagination and then German pagination.
oriented to them in ‘solicitude’ (Fürsorge) and ‘care’ (Sorge). In *Being and Time* (Division One, Chapter Four), following his chapter on ‘Being-in-the-world’, Heidegger explores the existential structures of ‘being-with’ (Mitsein), ‘existing-with’ (Mitdasein), and ‘being with one another’ (Miteinandersein). Mitsein (literally ‘being-with’) in everyday German means ‘togetherness’ or ‘companionship’, but Heidegger gives the term the particular philosophical inflection it continues to have in the literature, namely, that character of Dasein whereby it is always already structurally related to other Daseins (even when one is alone and others are actually absent). Heidegger states in *Being and Time* §26:

«Being-with is an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world»

He goes on to say: «So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being».

In *Being and Time* (1927) Heidegger proposes a new way of thinking about human beings in terms of ‘being in the world’. He reinterprets human existence as Dasein whose fundamental structure is care. It is both absorbed in the world, thrown and falling, and also deciding for itself and its future, and in this sense taking care of itself. Heidegger’s account of Dasein treats it as a ‘dispersal’ (Zerstreuung) or ‘dissemination’ which is already stretched along through its life in time and is ‘made manifold’ in space and through its embodiment (Leiblichkeit). Heidegger speaks primarily of human Mitdasein and Mitsein. In encountering tools in their environment, human Dasein also encounters whom the tool is for, who used it, who owns it, and so on. The other Dasein (albeit primarily and mostly the unknown or anonymous other) is already encountered with the equipment that is handy for Dasein, and this ‘who’ is not added as an afterthought. Heidegger writes:

The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is

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13 SZ, 163/125: «Das Mitsein ist ein existenziales Konstituens des In-der-Welt-seins».
14 SZ, 165/128: «Sofern Dasein überhaupt ist, hat es die Seinsart des Miteinanderseins».
15 SZ, §26.
16 SZ, §26.
Being-with Others [Mitwelt mit Anderen]. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with.\textsuperscript{17}

The ‘who’ of this everyday social self is Heidegger’s focus. When one is absorbed in the ‘they-self’ (Man-selbst) one is constantly the same, but indefinite and empty:

When one is absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and the rapid succession of that with which one is concerned, the Self of the self-forgetful ‘I am concerned’ shows itself as something simple which is constantly self-same but indefinite and empty.\textsuperscript{18}

Heidegger is interested both in ‘care of the self’ and in ‘the constancy of self’ (Die Ständigkeit des Selbst)\textsuperscript{19} which is the authentic counterpart to the non-self-constancy of the everyday self. This notion of the ‘self-subsistence’ (Selbst-ständigkeit) of the ego or self is returned to again in SZ §66. The authentic self keeps silent. It keeps its head down. Resolute existence is reticent. The problem is that in one sense authentic selfhood is a kind of lone and lonely resolute figure – a Kierkegaard standing over and against the society and the they-self. Heidegger also speaks of a kind of abandonment to a world which one cannot master.\textsuperscript{20} Heidegger spends a great deal of time explicating a kind of being-with-others which is anonymous. This is the realm of ‘das Man’. In this situation, Heidegger puts it, «Everyone is the other; and no one is himself».\textsuperscript{21} For Heidegger, living as ‘the they’ or ‘the one’ (das Man) is inauthentic because it «deprives the individual Dasein of its answerability».\textsuperscript{22} This has led to the view that Heidegger, although

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[17] SZ §26, 155/118: «Die Welt des Daseins ist Mitwelt. Das In-Sein ist Mitsein mit Anderen. Das innerweltliche Ansichsein dieser ist Mitdasein».
\item[18] SZ, §64, 368/322.
\item[19] SZ, 369/322.
\item[20] SZ, §69a.
\item[21] SZ, 165/128.
\item[22] SZ, 165/127.
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he recognizes the fundamental being-with of Dasein, tends to see authentic Dasein as primarily located in individual self-responsibility that makes decisions independently of the masses. There remains a question as to how Dasein can authentically participate in community.\footnote{See McMullin 2013.}

### 3. Schutz and Patočka on the Social World

But the most important work by far, in terms of its impact on the developing science of sociology, was Alfred Schutz’s 1932 *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (translated *The Phenomenology of the Social World*). Just four years later, in 1936, the young Czech philosopher and student of Husserl, Jan Patočka, produced his important Habilitation thesis, *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem*.\footnote{Cfr. Patočka 2008.} Patočka published a second, enlarged edition in Czech in 1971. This work was translated into German and French, and Patočka himself contributed an *Afterword* or *Postscript* to the French Edition (1976).\footnote{Cfr. Patočka 1976, 168–81.} Patočka says the book is an attempt at systematic analysis of a pressing problem – the problem of the natural world or life-world. This natural world is an intersubjective world, a world of life (whose structures cannot be captured by the formal sciences). Patočka discusses the distinction between home and the unfamiliar. He stresses that home is not where one is but where one feels most familiar. He writes that home is not merely our individual home; it includes community as well. While Patočka embraces Heidegger’s conception of *Mitsein*, he thinks Husserl’s valuable notion of *Heimwelt* has been missed by Heidegger. He writes:

> Husserl’s idea that there is a zone of home, correlative and opposed to the alien (farther and farther removed in the
style of its structure), that there is a private sphere as opposed to what is more or less public, cannot be explained by Heidegger’s analyses.\textsuperscript{26}

For Patočka, Heidegger has no way of answering why it is the case that the space of home is not in the same space as the space of the workshop. Patočka later returns to this theme in his lecture \textit{I and the Other: Appresentation and Being-With} in a series of lectures on phenomenology that he gave in 1968 when his teaching was restored at the Charles University.\textsuperscript{27} Patočka follows Heidegger in criticizing Husserl for thinking our basic foundational experience is our perceptual interaction with things in nature, and agrees with Heidegger on the care-structure of human existence. As he writes in his Postscript to the French edition of \textit{The Natural World as Philosophical Problem} (1976): «We have to acknowledge that what lies at the ground of the natural world is not ‘internal time-consciousness,’ but rather care and temporality». But he criticizes Heidegger for his misunderstanding of the structures of \textit{Mitsein}. Patočka also says that Heidegger misses the «elementary protofact of harmony with the world which is the same for children as for animals».\textsuperscript{28} At this point Patočka invokes Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit to speak about the manner in which nature must already be spirit. As spirit we are in harmony with nature: «Our spirit is evidence that the world is not a mathematical world but rather a light; it shows that there is something in nature with which our spirit can be in harmony».\textsuperscript{29} Earlier in these lectures Patočka had distinguished different levels of the ‘I’.

There is the I capable of being plural, the I appearing as a Thou, the I for others. The Thou is the second I as present, in reciprocity, in a mirroring, the process of exchange, in

\textsuperscript{26} Cfr. Patočka, forthcoming.
\textsuperscript{28} Cfr. Patočka 1998, 133.
\textsuperscript{29} Patočka 1998,134.
this double situation (I here— you there, etc.). Then there is
the I in absolute originality which only it itself can live,
incapable of plurality.\(^{30}\)

Patočka does not agree with Schutz that the self cannot be experienced
immediately in self-presence. Following Sartre and Merleau-Ponty,
Patočka believes in an immediate experience of the embodied self, not
necessarily apprehended cognitively.

Here Patočka accurately describes the original impersonal subject or
‘They-self’ \((\text{Man-Selbst})\) of \textit{Mitsein} with its distantiality, levelling down,
and its commonality. Patočka criticises Heidegger for reading
everything communal as ‘fallen’ and public. This is Heidegger’s own
insertion – not something that is in the things themselves.

There is, then, a continuous engagement with the constitution of the
social world in phenomenologists of the nineteen twenties and thirties,
a development which was disastrously disrupted by the arrival of
National Socialism in 1933. But let us turn to Husserl’s own account of
the phenomenology of sociality, which was at the heart of this
engagement with the constitution of social life.

4. Husserl’s Phenomenology of the ‘We-World’ \((\text{Wir-Welt})\)

For Husserl, the social world is the world shared primarily with other
human subjects (and with animals), what Husserl variously calls the
‘we-world’ \((\text{Wir-Welt})\), or the world of ‘those around me’ \textit{Mitwelt} \((\text{Hua VI: 482})\), or, in the \textit{Crisis of European Sciences}, ‘we-community’ \((\text{Wir-Gemeinschaft}, \text{Hua VI: 416; Hua XIV: 223})\). This is the world of ‘we-humans’ \((‘\text{Wir-Menschen’}, \text{Hua IX 339, 342}),\) the world of ‘co-subjectivity’ \textit{Mitsubjektivität} \((\text{Crisis, 255; Hua VI: 258})\), of co-existing
intentional subjects operating together in a shared ‘intersubjectivity’. As Husserl writes in the \textit{Crisis}:

\(^{30}\) \text{PATOČKA 1988, 60.}
But each soul also stands in community (Vergemeinschaftung) with others which are intentionally interrelated, that is, in a purely intentional, internally and essentially closed nexus (Zusammenhang), that of intersubjectivity.31

And he writes similarly in a manuscript from his middle period in the early 1920s:

I am, and everyone is, in the horizon of the we [im Horizont des Wir], and this horizon is at the same time the horizon for many communities and for all those to which I in particular belong and to which each person belongs in his or her own right. And over and above this, a further extension to inauthentic communities [von uneigentlichen Gemeinschaften] as common possession and of the remote effects of persons on persons, of community on community, etc. Effects extending out.32

There is much to comment on this concept of a ‘horizon of the we’. Husserl tries to describe the structural features of this horizon in various works. He distinguishes between those who are immediately present to me now, my contemporaries, those who are absent or dead, those who belong to the past, those who will be my successors, possible people, putative people, fictional and imagined people, and so on. Influenced by Husserl, Alfred Schutz, whom we shall discuss further below, categorizes these kinds of social world in his Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (1932; translated as The Phenomenology of the Social World),33 with his own concepts of Mitwelt, Vorwelt, Folgewelt, and so on.

31 Crisis §69, 238; Hua VI, 241.
32 Husserl Manuscript 1921/1922, Hua XIV 223, my translation.
33 Hereafter PSW followed by pagination of the English translation.
Husserl is aware not only that the social world is built upon tradition and incorporates the sedimented achievements of generations of anonymous others (everyday language is a repository of such sedimentations), he is also aware that even the everyday world is layered and structured in complex ways. Husserl introduces his notion of ‘life-world’ or ‘world of life’ (Lebenswelt) as his shorthand for all these complex interconnections. To be human is to be already en-worlded. Husserl writes in the Crisis:

Consciously we always live in the life-world; normally there is no reason to make it explicitly thematic for ourselves universally as world.\(^\text{34}\)

As Husserl’s assistant Ludwig Landgrebe puts it:

It is essentially impossible to find men in any “pre-worldly” state, because to be human, to be aware of oneself as a man and to exist as a human self, is precisely to live on the basis of a world [...].\(^\text{35}\)

Husserl distinguishes the life-world (Lebenswelt) into zones of familiarity and unfamiliarity, ‘home-world’ (Heimwelt) and ‘alien-world’ (Fremdwelt),\(^\text{36}\) neighbour and stranger, friend and foe, between what is accepted as normal and what is regarded as not falling under the normal and hence is “anormal” in some respect.\(^\text{37}\)

One of the most interesting aspects of the passage I have just quoted above\(^\text{38}\) is that Husserl here speaks – avant Heidegger – of ‘inauthentic’ (uneigentlich) ways of belonging to a community. One can belong simply as part of a group which is, more or less arbitrarily, thrown together. To use Alfred Schutz’s terminology, when I am travelling

\(^{34}\) Crisis, Appendix VII, 379; Hua VI, 459.

\(^{35}\) Cfr. LANDGREBE 1940, 38-58, esp. p. 53.

\(^{36}\) See STEINBOCK 1995.

\(^{37}\) See HEINAMAÄ 2013.

\(^{38}\) Hua XIV, 223.
together with other passengers on the same airplane, we are constituted as a group of ‘consocials’, and there is even a very particular dynamic that emerges in such a ‘thrown together’ group, e.g., if the flight has turbulence, then there is a general atmosphere of unease, or if there is a disturbance among the passengers, and various people bond together or oppose one another in various ways, and so on. Various forms of group behaviour emerge even among a group of relative strangers who are thrown together temporarily in a situation. But Husserl goes on to talk about human beings belonging always within more intimate structured groups: family, friends, club members, members of a specific language community, and so on. Husserl, as we have seen, even uses the term *Mitsein*, albeit rarely and only in his later works, which we now associate more properly with Heidegger.

Especially in the three Husserlian volumes comprising *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, edited by Iso Kern (Hua XIII, XIV, and XV), Husserl gives detailed accounts of the various kinds of collective intentional and social acts that humans carry out in order to enter into social relations that transcend the sphere of individual acts. In his key published works, on the other hand, Husserl’s usual approach is to begin from the Cartesian ego and to move outwards in terms of its constitution of others and of an intersubjective world. Thus Husserl speaks, both in *Cartesian Meditations* and in *Crisis*, of the problem of the ‘communalization (*Vergemeinschaftung*) of the ego’, raising the question of what has priority – the transcendental ego or the intersubjectively constituted community. Traditionally, Husserl has been interpreted as prioritizing the individual transcendental ego.

On his basis of his reading of the *Crisis*, however, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the Preface to his *Phenomenology of Perception*, interprets the later Husserl as prioritising intersubjectivity. As Merleau-Ponty puts it there, the *cogito* is always situated, and transcendental subjectivity is

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40 *Crisis*, 185-6; Hua VI: 189.
only possible as an intersubjectivity. But it is more correct to see Husserl as more or less having a continuous interest in the social or ‘spiritual world’ all through his mature work, especially from around 1910-1911, when he begins, especially in his lectures *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,*\(^4^2\) to discuss the experience of the other in empathy and the emergence of a natural world (inspired by Avenarius) which is not the same as the world explicated by the natural sciences. In *Ideas I,* Husserl already speaks of human beings as ‘being in the world’. Merleau-Ponty himself never stopped reflecting on the complex interrelation between transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity and also on the kind of reduction needed to make clear this interrelation. Thus he writes in his late *The Visible and the Invisible* (1964)\(^4^3\):

> The passage to intersubjectivity is contradictory only with regard to an insufficient reduction, Husserl was right to say. But a sufficient reduction leads beyond the alleged transcendental ‘immanence’, it leads to the absolute spirit understood as *Weltlichkeit,* to *Geist* as *Ineinander* of the spontaneities, itself founded on the aesthesiological *Ineinander* and on the sphere of life as sphere of *Einfühlung* and intercorporeity.\(^4^4\)

Merleau-Ponty is indeed correct to say that thinking properly about intersubjectivity requires examining closely human being-in-the-world, and the manner in which this is founded on bodily incarnation and being-with-one-another on the corporeal dimension, prior to speech and language. That is not to say that Husserl does not recognize the importance of language for communalization and the constitution of the social world, but that he sees it as founded on a

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\(^{42}\) Husserl 2006. The original German text is collected in Hua XIII.


\(^{44}\) VI,172; 223-4.
more shared, embodied sense of incorporation and agency.\textsuperscript{45}

In fact, Husserl tries to think through the process of constitution from different entry points. His usual ‘Cartesian way’ is to uncover what is essential and even apodictic about the individual transcendental ego, the source of all ‘sense and being’ (\textit{Sinn und Sein}), as he often puts it, and then to proceed outwards from the ego-subject, to the constitution of others in empathy and then to the constitution of the natural and spiritual worlds through various forms of intersubjective constitution. At other times, especially in the \textit{Crisis}, Husserl begins from the standpoint of the self already embedded in a social and historical culture (and in the case of the European West, it is also a scientific culture), and examines how this culture has come to find itself the way it currently is (e.g. the impact of Galilean science on modernity), and recognizes the interconnecting unity of what he calls, in \textit{Cartesian Meditations}, ‘the community of monads’ (\textit{Monadengemeinschaft}). In other words, Husserl is already dealing with issues concerning the nature of sociality and historicality long before his encounter with Martin Heidegger. Of course, Heidegger adds a new dimension with his meditations on the nature of \textit{Mitsein} as an existential characteristic of Dasein’s being-in-the-world,\textsuperscript{46} but already in \textit{Ideas} I (1913), Husserl is talking about human existence as ‘being in the world’. In the very beginning of \textit{Ideas} I § 1, he introduces the notions of horizon and world together. He writes:

Natural knowledge starts with experience and remains in experience. In the theoretical attitude that we call the natural attitude, the entire horizon [\textit{Gesamthorizont möglicher Forschungen}] of possible lines of research is accordingly designated by one word: the world [\textit{die Welt}]. Thus, the sciences of this original attitude are, one and all, sciences of the world, and, as long as this attitude dominates to the exclusion of others, the following concepts

\textsuperscript{45} See \textit{Depraz} 1995.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{SZ}, §§ 25-7.
coincide: ‘true being’, ‘actual being’, i.e., real being, and – since everything real merges into the unity of the world – ‘being in the world [Sein in der Welt]’.\footnote{Hua III/1, 9/17.}

It is worth noting that Husserl is here already employing a locution ‘being in the world’ (Sein in der Welt’) which will reappear in reversed and hyphenated form in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) as In-der-Welt-sein.

\section*{5. Intersubjectivity and the One World ‘For Us All’ (Welt für uns alle)}

The Australian philosopher William Ralph Boyce-Gibson, who visited Husserl in Freiburg, in his Diary from 1928, records Husserl as saying that in his Foreword and Afterword to the English Translation of Ideas, he was planning to advert to two new themes not treated in Ideen I, namely, intersubjectivity (empathy) and ‘the ego and habit’.\footnote{Cfr. Gibson 1971, 65.} Of course, we now know that Husserl was working, in the manuscripts now published as Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität (especially from 1911 to 1937), on more detailed investigations and had also been developing his analysis of the experiential world in dialogue with Richard Avenarius’ conception of the ‘pre-found’ world, das Vorgefundene, the world as encountered in everyday, naïve experience, the ‘human concept of the world’.\footnote{Cfr. Avenarius 2005.}

In his published writings Husserl had attempted to discuss ‘the transcendental problem of intersubjectivity’ in his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), especially §96, and in his Fifth Cartesian Meditation (delivered as a lecture in February 1929 and published in French in 1931), especially §58. In Formal and Transcendental Logic §96 in particular he talks about the experience of the ‘world for everyone’
(Welt für jedermann) in which I experience every other ego as having sense, validity, and acceptance from myself. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl explicates the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity as follows:

[The problem is] To understand how my transcendental ego, the primitive basis [Urgrund] for everything that I accept as existent, can constitute within himself another transcendental ego, and then too an open plurality of other egos [eine offene Vielheit solcher Egos] – “other” [fremder] egos absolutely inaccessible [absolut unzugänglich] to my ego in their original being, and yet cognizable [erkennbarer] (for me) as existing and as being thus and so [als seiendo und soseiendo].

Husserl believes that every ego not only grasps the essence of ego-hood, alongside recognizing its own undeniable factual existence, it also belongs, as we have seen, to an ‘open horizon’ of other egos. These egos can be selves that existed in the past, or other possible egos that one encounters in various ways.

The world manifests itself and is constituted as ‘there for everyone’ (für Jedermann daseiend) in an ‘intersubjective cognitive community’ (intersubjektive Erkenntnisgemeinschaft). Husserl never stops insisting that the phenomenon of the world presents itself as objectively there in itself and as accessible through inexhaustibly many viewpoints. The world is both public and inexhaustible. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl goes on to explicate the interrelation between intersubjectivity and objectivity:

> It follows that a sense of “everyone” [Jedermann] must already be constituted, relative to which an objective world

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50 FTL §96, 237; Hua XVII, 244.
51 FTL §96, 239-40; XVII, 246.
52 Hua XVII, 247.
can be objective. This implies that the sense of “everyone” (and therefore of “others” [von Anderen]) cannot be the usual, higher-level sense [gewöhnliche, höhigstufige Sinn], namely the sense “every human being” [jeder Mensch], which refers to something real in the objective world and therefore already presupposed the constitution of that world.\(^{53}\)

By ‘higher-level’ Husserl means that to arrive at the end product of actual human beings engaging concretely in social relations in the context of a historical world requires many layers of grounding – foundational layers laid at a deeper level. Husserl’s argument is complex. He is arguing that the sense in which the ‘I’ of my immediate experience can avail of the sense of ‘everyone’ cannot involve an appeal to actual existing entities – other human beings – in an already constituted world. He argues that we have to go back to the constitutionally lower level of my ‘sphere of primordial ownness’ (Sphäre primordialer Eigenheit),\(^{54}\) free from all contamination of ‘others’ and in which the first sense of otherness must be constituted. That is, at the very basis of my experience of my ego, there must be constituted the equally primordial experience of the ‘not I’ (Nicht-Ich).\(^{55}\) There is within the ego a deep splitting (Husserl speaks of ‘ego-splitting’, Ichspaltung) – a sense of a first otherness over and against which I define or delimit myself as ‘I’. Husserl goes on to point out the inevitable temptation of collapsing into transcendental solipsism. He asserts that we must emphasise both sides of the issue:

The world is continually there for us [für uns da]; but in the first place [zunächst] it is there for me [für mich da]. [...] The first thing, therefore, is to consult the world of experience [Erfahrungswelt], purely as experienced.\(^{56}\)

\(^{53}\) FTL §96 (a), 240; Hua XVII, 247.

\(^{54}\) Hua XVII, 248.

\(^{55}\) Hua XVII, 248.

\(^{56}\) FTL §96 (b), 242; Hua XVII, 249, trans. modified.
Husserl goes on to say that «the naïve and purely apprehended world of experience [die naïve und rein-gefasste Erfahrungswelt] must be constitutionally clarified». In keeping with the particular focus of the Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl says that initially the theoretical world, the world as postulated by objective scientific cognition must be understood, and then, moving into the particular ‘regions’ of the world, the very notion of the world of ‘exact nature’ – the world as constituted by geometry – has to be interrogated. We have a foreshadowing here of the Crisis project.

Husserl here is sketching a version of the argument that he had originally developed in more detail already in the Fifth Logical Investigation (1901). In a footnote to his 1929 Formal and Transcendental Logic §96 (d) he states that he has already been working on this problem from his 1910/1911 lectures on the Basic Problems of Phenomenology and will offer a ‘brief presentation’ (eine kurze Darstellung) of them again in his forthcoming Cartesian Meditations. In his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl somewhat unhelpfully discusses the constitution of this ‘intersubjective nature’ in terms of communication between ‘monads’ (§55), a conception he has borrowed from Leibniz (possibly through the influence of his student Dietrich Mahnke). According to the steps laid out in Cartesian Meditations, the first form of sociality is the experience of the ‘community of nature’ (die Gemeinschaft der Natur). In this common nature, the other also appears as a psychophysical organism. Animals are presented as ‘abnormal “variants” of my humanness’. Human beings in particular are constituted as belonging to a common form of time with me.

57 FTL §96 (c), 243; Hua XVII, 249-50, translation altered from Cairns.
58 FTL §96 (c).
59 Dietrich Mahnke (1884–1939) studied mathematics, physics and philosophy in Göttingen from 1902-1906, particularly under Husserl. He was deeply interested in Leibniz and attempted to construct a new monadology bringing Leibniz into contact with Neo-Kantianism. He published his Eine neue Monadologie in 1917 and sent Husserl a copy. See also Cristin 1990.
60 CM §55, 120; Hua I, 149, trans. Altered.
61 CM §55, 126; Hua I, 154.
62 CM, 128; Hua I, 156.
are on the way to constituting an open community of others. Especially in *Cartesian Meditations* §58, Husserl goes further and speaks not just of the constitution of the transcendent, shared objective world and also the constitution of other subjects but of the higher level acts involved in the ‘constitution of humanity’ (*Konstitution des Menschentums*). Human beings have to arrive at a point where they have a universal conception of ‘humanity’ as an open-ended group to which they belong. Here he speaks of specifically ‘social acts’ (promises, commands, agreements, oaths, etc.), that bind persons together in distinctly personal ways. Husserl calls these ‘Ich-Du Akte’. It is in this section of the *Cartesian Meditations* also that Husserl uses the word ‘life-world’ (*Lebenswelt*) for the first time in print. He speaks of the specific character of the cultural world as having the character of ‘accessibility for everyone’ (*Zugänglichkeit für jedermann*, CM §58, 132; Hua I: 160). Husserl further distinguishes between the ‘unconditioned communality and accessibility’ (*unbedingte Zugänglichkeit*) of the world of nature (anyone can see a mountain or a tree), and the more conditioned communality of the cultural world (access requires understanding of the relevant local language, for example), whereby it is justified to speak of people as belonging to essentially ‘different cultural surrounding worlds’ (*verschiedene kulturelle Umwelten*). Here he speaks in the plural of different *Lebenswelten*, a theme to which he often returns if one considers many of the texts in Husserliana XXXIX. Just as space is given from an orientation with myself as the zero-point of orientation, so also in the cultural world, it is given in an oriented way, with myself and my living present at the centre: «Here I and my culture are primordial, over and against every alien culture». As if referring to Heidegger, although he did not truly read the text of *Being and Time* until later in 1929, Husserl goes on to say that it is self-evident that every predicate of the world «accrues from a temporal genesis, and indeed, one that is rooted [verwurzelt] in human

\[63\] Hua I, 159.
\[64\] Hua I, 160.
\[65\] CM §58, 134; Hua I, 161.
undergoing and doing». Of course, Husserl returns to face these issues concerning the constitution of the life-world directly in the *Crisis of European Sciences*. «Transcendental intersubjectivity must be made into a problem», he writes in the *Crisis*: intersubjectivity can only be treated as a transcendental problem through a radical self-questioning («durch ein Mich-selbst-befragen») through which I have myself, others, and humankind in general. Psychology in particular misconstrued this task because it based itself on the familiar ground of the «taken for granted, pregiven world of experience, the world of natural life». Here he is using language that is very close to *Cartesian Meditations* § 58. In fact, in *Crisis* § 59, he identifies the life-world with «the world for us all». Husserl writes:

In psychology, the natural, naïve attitude has the result that human self-objectifications (*Selbstobjektivationen*) of transcendental intersubjectivity, which belong with essential necessity to the makeup of the constituted world pregiven to me and to us, inevitably have a horizon of transcendently functioning intentionalities [Horizont von transzendenten fungierenden Intentionalitäten] which are not accessible to reflection, not even psychological-scientific reflection.

Husserl’s sense is that a newly uncovered and deeper ‘functioning intentionality’ is at work in the constitution of the common world, something later exploited by Merleau-Ponty. In a text from the early 1920s Husserl emphasizes that, besides my own original actions and *Urstiftungen*, I am a child of my times (he

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66 CM § 58, 135; Hua I, 162: «[…] im menschlichen Leiden und Tun».
67 Crisis, 202; Hua VI, 206.
68 Crisis § 58, 204; Hua VI, 208: «Auf dem Boden der selbstverständlich vorgegebenen Erfahrungswelt, der Welt des natürlichen Lebens».
69 Hua VI, 213: «Welt für uns alle».
70 Crisis, 208; Hua VI, 212.
sometimes uses the term ‘child of the world’, \textit{Weltkind}), and I am an inheritor of tradition and act within a community. He asks: «What is now my real, original own, how far am I really originally founding?».

Husserl is struggling with the idea of defining the genuine originality (and authenticity) of my own actions in the light of tradition, since in many ways my actions are already predetermined by the kind of tradition I am in. Husserl lays stress on the original freedom of my will which can ‘collide’ with the goals (\textit{Zwecke}) of others. Husserl also has his version of public life as a life of convention, of the normal, the usual. The title of one text is

\begin{quote}
A part of what we call culture has the form of conventionality, custom, speech. … the customary (social tradition, social habit) the social ought constituting itself with this customality).
\end{quote}

For Husserl, this all belongs to «life in pre judgement, life in tradition». Husserl also lays stress on this community as a ‘speech community’ (\textit{Sprachgemeinschaft}) which is at the same time a ‘communicative community’ (\textit{Mitteilungsgemeinschaft}). Speech, for Husserl, is key to the creation of shared idealities, common reference points.

Husserl uses the term ‘Mitsein’ in relation to the social experience of ‘being with others’ in Hua XIV: 308 in a text from 1923, No. 14, entitled \textit{Die intersubjektive Gültigkeit phänomenologischer Wahrheit} [The

\begin{itemize}
\item [71] Hua XIV, 223: «Was ist nun mein wirklich originales Eigene, wiefern bin ich wirklich urstiftend?».
\item [72] Hua XIV, 224.
\item [74] Hua XIV, 230: «Das Leben in Vorurteilen, das Leben in Tradition».
\end{itemize}
Intersubjective Validity of Phenomenological Truth]. Somewhat later, in a text from 1931, Husserl explicates Mitsein in terms of temporal co-presence with others (which is a point strongly emphasised by Husserl in his analysis of empathy):

Being with others [Mitsein von Anderen] is inseparable from me in my living self-presencing [in meinem lebendigen Sich-selbst-gegenwartigen], and this co-presence of others is foundational for the worldly present, which is in turn the presupposition for the sense of all world-temporality with worldly-co-existence (space) and temporal succession.

Husserl also uses the term ‘everydayness’ (Alltäglichkeit) in the 1930s e.g. in Crisis 260; Hua VI: 264 and in Hua XV. The term ‘everydayness’ is a late term by Husserl – it does not occur in the two earlier Intersubjectivity volumes, Husserliana XIII and XIV. Indeed, one manuscript is entitled End of February or Beginning of March 1932. Action, the practical tradition, the usual, the everyday, the construction of normality. The groundedness of the already existing, the preceding instinct, wares. See also Hua XV: 170 (from 1930-1931) and Hua XV: 407ff, where in a text from November 1931 he speaks of the concept of ‘everydayness’, of ‘dwelling’ (Wohnen), and relates it to the concept of ‘home world’:

A tribe as a familial community in symbiosis has its (stable

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75 See also Hua XIV, 419 (from 1927) and Hua XIV, 454 (where he refers to corporeal being alongside other bodies); Hua XIV, 493.
76 See Hua XV: XLIX.
78 Hua XV: LX; A V 7, Bl. 48-52: «Ende Februar oder Anfang Marz 1932. Das Handeln, die praktische Tradition, das Gewohnheitsmässige, die Alltäglichkeit, der Aufbau der Normalitäten. Die Bodenständigkeit des schon Seienden, die Instinkte vorangehend, die Guter» (see Hua XV: LX, introduction by the Editor).
or unstable) home of a higher level, ‘village’, village territory. Common inner world for all family homes, both individually and in the village in general in a new way (dwelling, place of dwelling, but not merely applied to physical things). The village in turn has its ‘outer world’. *Heimat* in the strict sense, a communalized humanity in the strict sense and an environment, *Lebenswelt* (present, existing now for this humanity) in the strict sense. Accordingly, from what went before we must distinguish:

1. Inner environment (*Umwelt*), the “everyday” world in which everyday life plays itself out in its normal forms of everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*), to which belongs a circle of interest of everydayness.

2. The outer *Lebenswelt*, the sphere of the world, which is no longer everyday life-interests but still life-interests.

3. The outer horizon of the world.  

And see the note on the next page of this text Husserliana XV: 412:

We understand by ‘everydayness’ the actual living style of the present of human doing and undergoing, human striving, acting, creating with its actual horizon of interest, so we find a fundamental distinction in the structure of this everydayness through the distinction between private and


Husserl goes on to contrast private life with the life of the functionary (and the philosopher is one such functionary) who must have the public good also in mind.\(^{81}\)

In his comments in the margin of his copy of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, Husserl underscores the notion of ‘average everydayness’\(^{82}\) and writes:

> In my sense this is the way to an intentional psychology of the personality in the broadest sense, starting from personal life in the world: a founding personal type.

> I have placed, over against each other, natural apprehension of the world in natural worldly life (or, this worldly life itself) and philosophical, transcendental apprehension of the world – hence a life which is not a natural immersion in a naïvely pre-accepted world nor a matter of taking oneself-in-naïve-acceptance as a human being, but which is the idea of a philosophical life determined by philosophy.\(^{83}\)

Heidegger had claimed such a starting point of everydayness had been overlooked,\(^{84}\) but Husserl resents this and refers back to the note above.

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\(^{80}\) Hua XV, 412: «Verstehen wir unter Alltäglichkeit den aktuell lebendigen Gegenwartsstil menschlichen Tuns und Leidens, menschlichen Strebens, Wirkens, Schaffens mit dem aktuellen Interessenhorizont, so finden wir einen Grundunterschied in der Struktur dieser Alltäglichkeit durch die Unterscheidung des Privaten und des Staatlichen».

\(^{81}\) Hua XV, 413.

\(^{82}\) SZ, § 5, 38/16.

\(^{83}\) Cfr. HUSSERL 1997, 287.

\(^{84}\) SZ, 43.
6. The Worldhood of the World: Homeworld and Alien World

In relation to his employment of themes more usually associated with Heidegger, Husserl not only discusses ‘everydayness’ (Alltäglichkeit), but also Weltlichkeit, worldhood or worldliness. The concept of ‘world’ is introduced in print in *Ideas* I as the horizon of horizons. Here Husserl also talks about the world as experienced in the natural attitude. In later writings, from around 1917, he introduced his conception of the ‘life-world’ and begins to discuss different forms of ‘worldhood’. Thus, in Husserliana XIV: 409, he speaks of ‘worldhoods’ in the plural (‘Weltlichkeiten’) meaning by that objects that are to be found in the world, that are the product of functioning intentionality. This is an interesting text entitled *Ich und die Welt. Wir und die Welt. <Fungierende und realisierte Intersubjektivität. Konnex im Fungieren> (Wintersemester 1926/27)* [I and the world. We and the world. Functioning and realizing intersubjectivity. Connection in functioning’ (Winter semester 1926/27)]. Here Husserl writes:

The others as pre-found, as present-at-hand objects, as worldlinesses [Weltlichkeiten] – the others as functioning subjects [als fungierende Subjekte] and equally as being worldly. I myself in this duality of mode of being. I as functioning I, that is also as I, as subject-consciousness – in connection with other functioning egos. Connecting in functioning. I, in my intentionality, know the others as ‘I-with’ [als Mit-Ich], as experiencing with the other, living with him, suffering with him, acting with him (and against him, opposing as a mode of ‘with’).  

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Here the subject is seen as being already in a cooperative functioning subjectivity with others, even if one is opposing the other or resisting them. In Text 6 of Husserliana Volume XV, written 1929-1930, Husserl speaks of being in the ‘natural attitude of worldliness’ (die natürlichen Einstellung der Weltlichkeit), in which can be found already the distinction between myself and others. Husserl states that the usual abstraction of myself as different from all others and as alone in the world is not a radical abstraction and changes nothing regarding my being ‘experiencable for everyone’ (für-jedermann-erfahrbar) even if a universal plague were to leave me genuinely alone in the world. The transcendental reduction however uncovers a new form of transcendental aloneness and singularity – the ‘ego in its transcendental ownness’.\(^6\) In other words, human beings cannot ever stop being in the mode of being-with-others, even if one is the last person left alive on the planet.

Especially in his later period, during the nineteen thirties, Husserl often employs the term ‘homeworld’ (Heimwelt)\(^7\) to express the claims that the world is always presented within a familiar context (e.g. the world as ‘normal lifeworld’, normale Lebenswelt).\(^8\) Husserl also uses the term ‘near-world’, translated as ‘familiar world’ by David Carr (Nahwelt)\(^9\) as equivalent. He means the familiar world. Husserl also speaks of the ‘human environment’ (Umwelt) or the ‘generative

\(^{6}\) Hua XV, 6; «In der natürlichen Einstellung der Weltlichkeit finde ich unterschieden und in der Form des Gegenuber: mich und die Anderen. Abstrahiere ich von den Anderen in gewöhnlichem Sinn, so blei be ich „allein“ zurück. Aber solche Abstraktion ist nicht radikal, solches Alleinsein ändert noch nichts an dem natürlichen Weltsinn des Für-jedermann-erfahrbar, der auch dem natürlich verstandenen Ich anhaftet und nicht verloren ist, wenn eine universale Pest mich allein übrig gelassen hatte. In der transzendente len Einstellung und in eins der vorhin bezeichneten konstitutiven Abstraktion ist aber das ego in seiner transzendentalen Eigenheit nicht das auf ein blosses Korrelatphanomen reduzierte gewohnliche Menschen-Ich innerhalb des Gesamtphanomens der Welt».  

\(^{7}\) Hua XV, Hua XXXIX, Crisis Hua VI, 303.  

\(^{8}\) Hua XV, 210.  

\(^{9}\) Crisis, Hua VI, 303.
homeworld’ (*generative Heimwelt*). The world is neither the totality of objects in a physical sense nor the whole of all our subjective activities. Rather, *my* present world (full of meanings, spiritual and cultural values and objects) is inevitably enrooted in traditions and customs. Homeworld is in this manner the peculiar unity between present horizon and meanings. The notion of ‘homeworld’ highlights the manner in which the world is shared with others and, especially, with those who live in close proximity with us. Homeworld is contrasted with ‘alien-world’ (*Fremdwelt*). It is not easy to define the boundaries that separate the homeworld from alien worlds. Husserl regards the distinction between homeworld and alienworld as transcendental.

Every world is constituted according to the conditions of normality and abnormality. That is, the world unfolds necessarily within relations of proximity and remoteness. If the world is, as Husserl states, a meaningful horizon that emerge continually in the unity of our history, it is inevitably lived through different perspectives and distances. In this continuous movement, we can distinguish between familiar and strange elements, customs and people. Furthermore, different worlds can be interwoven. We can share, for example, the same place or town with other people whose habits or approaches to the world are radically different to ours. In this way we would not consider them our ‘home-comrades’. The unfolding of the world in terms of home and alien world is related to the problem of history: the world is always meaningful within a historical and intersubjective horizon. *Our* world is not only linked to our own experiences and remembrances, but it bears in its core the stamp of the others (aliens and home-comrades).

What is the relation between Husserl’s discussion of the constitution of the sense of the world as *für Jedermann* and Heidegger’s

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90 Hua XXXIX, 335.
91 Hua XXXIX, Beilage XLIII.
92 Hua XXXIX, Nr. 58.
93 *Crisis*, Beilage V; Hua IX, Beilage XXVII.
94 Hua XXXIX, nr. 48.
95 Hua XXXIX, nr. 17.
understanding of the public *das Man* character of the availability of entities in the world? This is a question that needs more work. It is addressed by Theunissen in his *The Other* which already identifies Husserl’s everyone with Heidegger’s *das Man*. But Husserl – and indeed phenomenologists such as Gurwitsch – allow for many more authentic forms of public being with others. Entrance into public arrangements is not necessarily alienating. Husserl always returns to discussing familial relations, relations with one’s neighbours. He puts an emphasis on commerce, trade, linguistic sharing, all kinds of social being that complete human beings rather than alienate them.

Let us now turn to Alfred Schutz’ 1932 work which was published at a time when Husserl was drafting the writings that became the *Crisis*, having abandoned his efforts (in 1931) to write a systematic philosophy based on revised German text of the *Cartesian Meditations*.

### 7. Alfred Schutz’s Phenomenology of the Social World (1932)

Schutz was not directly a student of Husserl. He was deeply influenced by Max Weber (who had lectured in Vienna in 1918 and was a friend of von Mises), particularly Weber’s ‘interpretative sociology’ (*verstehende Sociologie*) and the latter’s insistence that the social sciences offered ‘description’ and abstention from value judgements, but he also thought that Weber’s conception of method was quite superficial. Weber began from the recognition of social action and from the identification of different ways of grouping or associating in society. Schutz begins from Weber’s distinction between subjective and objective meanings – subjective meaning for Weber resides in the ‘intentions of individuals’. Weber assumes this as a

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96 Theunissen 1984.
97 *PSW*, 5.
98 *PSW*, 6.
primitive, whereas for Schutz it is a complex and ramified act.\textsuperscript{99} Objective meanings are objectively knowable. Schutz criticises Weber for not distinguishing between an ‘action’ (\textit{Handeln}) in process and one that is completed.\textsuperscript{100} Schutz recognises that sociology must use ‘common-sense concepts’ but that sociological science cannot admit these common-sense concepts in an unclarified way.\textsuperscript{101}

Schutz was also strongly influenced by Scheler, especially his writing on empathy. In the twenties, especially from 1925 to 1927, moreover, Schutz became particularly interested in Henri Bergson,\textsuperscript{102} especially his unified approach to consciousness and temporal experience in a series of manuscripts subsequently published as \textit{Lebensform und Sinnstruktur} (\textit{Life Forms and Meaning Structure}).\textsuperscript{103} Influenced by the phenomenologist Felix Kaufmann (who attended meetings of the Vienna Circle), Schutz began to read Husserl, especially his just published phenomenology of the consciousness of inner time, edited by Martin Heidegger (1928). For Schutz, ‘the problem of meaning is a problem of time’.\textsuperscript{104} Schutz approaches social constitution from the standpoint of temporal constitution.

In 1932, Schutz produced his major work, \textit{The Phenomenology of the Social World} (\textit{Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt}).\textsuperscript{105} The publication was subsidised by Husserl’s Japanese student, the legal and political theorist Tomoo Otaka (1899-1956) who had spent a year in Vienna studying with Kelsen and a year with Husserl in Freiburg, and had published his own book in defence of democratic values in the same year, \textit{Grundlegende der Lehre vom Sozialen Verband},\textsuperscript{106} which Schutz read and on which he wrote a lengthy critical review. For Otaka, social bonds were ideal spiritual forms (\textit{ideale Geistesgebilde}) and at the same actually existent entities in the historical world. Moreover, social

\textsuperscript{99} PSW, 7.
\textsuperscript{100} PSW, 8.
\textsuperscript{101} PSW, 9.
\textsuperscript{102} See LANGSDORF 1985.
\textsuperscript{103} Cfr. SCHUTZ 1982, 31-117.
\textsuperscript{104} See BARBER 2012, 28.
\textsuperscript{105} SCHUTZ, 1967.
\textsuperscript{106} Cfr. OTAKA 1932. See UEMURA & YAEGASHI 2016.
entities such as states are not to be identified solely with their legal structures (as Kelsen maintained).

Schutz sent a copy of his own book to Husserl who invited him to become his assistant. Schutz’s book earned Husserl’s praise. Husserl called him ‘an earnest and profound phenomenologist’. Schutz visited Husserl first in June 1932\textsuperscript{107} and borrowed copies of sections of Husserl’s draft German text of the \textit{Cartesian Meditations}.\textsuperscript{108} They subsequently met frequently and they corresponded, but he could not afford to leave his banking job. Husserl described him as a banker by day and a phenomenologist by night. Schutz subsequently attended Husserl’s Prague lectures in November 1935, which deeply impressed him. His last visit to Husserl was at Christmas 1937 when Husserl was already quite ill. Schutz later recorded his debt to Husserl in his article \textit{Husserl and His Influence on Me}.

Schutz approaches the phenomenology of the social also – here deeply influenced by Husserl – from the perspective of the ego and especially its experience of temporality. Schutz argues that the examination of social relations in the social world do not need the transcendental reduction – he is able to pursue eidetic structures precisely as they are experienced in the life-world. His aim in PSW is ‘to analyse the phenomenon of meaning in ordinary (\textit{mundanen}) social life’ (PSW, p. 44). The social world is immediately given and experienced as meaningful and actual; we do not need to employ an ‘epoche’:

\begin{quote}
The concept of the world in general must be based on the concept of ‘everyone’ and therefore also of the ‘other’.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

And again:

\begin{quote}
The object we shall be studying therefore is the human
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107} \textsc{schuhmann} 1977, 410.  
\textsuperscript{108} \textsc{schuhmann} 1977, 415–6.  
\textsuperscript{109} \textsc{schutz} 1977, 41-4. See also \textsc{wagner} 1984, 179–200.  
\textsuperscript{110} PSW, 97.
being who is looking at the world from within the natural attitude.\textsuperscript{111}

We perceive, grasp, or notice the other person’s meanings and intentions as genuine transcendent realities in the world. I ‘interpret’ the other’s ‘course of action’.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, I interpret the other not just in relation to his or her action in the context of a whole social world:

What is given both to the acting self and the interpreting observer is not only the single meaningful act and the context or configuration of meaning to which it belongs but the whole social world in fully differentiated perspectives.\textsuperscript{113}

The social world is not homogeneous but is given ‘in a complex system of perspectives’\textsuperscript{114} and observers take these perspectival meanings into account when establishing the meaning of a situation (e.g. the intimate shared knowledge of a husband and wife in a larger social setting). The social world is experienced in everyday life as already meaningful.

Schutz believes that in recollection the ego can only encounter its past states and not its present nature. On the other hand, the experience of the other takes place \textit{in the present}\textsuperscript{115}, the other’s and my streams of experiences are ‘simultaneous’. Other-experience therefore has a certain primacy over self-experience. Schutz thinks there is not just one mode of self-experience but there are ‘different modes or tenses of givenness for one’s past, present and future (i.e. intended) behaviour’.\textsuperscript{116}

Schutz interprets the life-world primarily as the social world with its

\textsuperscript{111} PSW, 98.
\textsuperscript{112} PSW, 101.
\textsuperscript{113} PSW, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{114} PSW, 8.
\textsuperscript{115} PSW, 102.
\textsuperscript{116} PSW, 41.
presupposed context of shared meanings that lay the basis for social action and interaction, what Husserl and Schutz call the ‘we-world’ (Wir-Welt) or ‘with-world’ of one’s ‘contemporaries’ (Mitwelt): ‘Living in the world, we live with others and for others, orienting our lives to them’.\textsuperscript{117} We immediately experience this social world as meaningful. Human ‘behaviour’ (Verhalten – Schutz translates it as ‘conduct’, Heidegger: ‘comportment’) is already meaningful in the everyday world.\textsuperscript{118}

Schutz correctly saw Husserl’s intentional description of ‘social acts’ (soziale Akte) as having enormous importance for the social sciences.\textsuperscript{119} For Schutz, Husserl has clearly articulated that the focus of the social sciences is on the everyday social world. In this regard, Schutz opposed the attempt by philosophers of science such as Ernst Nagel and Carl Hempel who wanted to model the methodology of the social sciences on the natural sciences. Schutz writes in 1953:

\begin{quote}
It seems to me that Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological school have demonstrated more clearly than any other philosophy of which I know that even our logic is rooted in this world of everyday life, which he calls the Lebenswelt, and that “nature” in the sense of the natural sciences is nothing else but a layer of this common life-world of all of us, a product of a systematic process of abstraction, generalization, and idealization in which man with his subjectivity is not included.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

Schutz differentiates between the many different kinds of ways we interact with others – we have our immediate neighbours with whom we have perceptual contact, but we also have wider circles of ‘consociates’ (PSW, 109; Schutz uses the English terms ‘associate’ and ‘consociate’ as a translation of Mitmenschen) – we share a common

\begin{footnotes}
\item[117] PSW, 9.
\item[118] PSW, 10.
\item[119] See Schutz 1959.
\item[120] Schutz 1997, 123-49, esp. p. 133.
\end{footnotes}
social space and time with me, a here and now. Schutz contrasts consociates (with whom I have general dealings) and a wider group of ‘contemporaries’ who are more anonymous.\textsuperscript{121} My contemporaries belong to the \textit{Mitwelt} but I don’t necessarily know them. Besides the world of my contemporaries (\textit{Mitwelt}), there is the ‘world of my predecessors’ (\textit{Vorwelt}), and the ‘world of my successors’ (\textit{Folgewelt}). Someone made these roads, built my house. Someone opens the park gates in the morning. Someone will inherit this house.

In an important subsequent article \textit{The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl} (originally delivered at the Husserl Colloquium in Royaumont in 1957),\textsuperscript{122} Schutz sketches the emergence of intersubjectivity as a theme in Husserl’s writing from \textit{Ideas I} to the \textit{Cartesian Meditations}. He enumerates deep theoretical problems in Husserl’s account of the recognition of the other subject precisely as another subject rather than as a modification of myself. Specifically, Schutz asks how Husserl is able to exclude all reference to others in performing what Husserl calls the ‘second’ \textit{epochē} to reduce all experience to the sphere of ownness and then go on to discuss social predicates. Is there not a primordial experience of the ‘we’ already constituted within the self?\textsuperscript{123} Furthermore, Schutz believes Husserl’s apperception of the other’s body as analogue of my own is faulty, as we do not at all perceive or experience the other’s body in the inner manner in which I experience my own (as Schutz says, Scheler, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty had also pointed out).\textsuperscript{124}

But, interestingly, Schutz also goes on to discuss Husserl’s \textit{Crisis}, especially section §54, where Husserl attempts to describe the constitution of the other person and also the group of persons from the individual ego. Schutz’s queries how Husserl ever arrives at the ‘transcendental we’ which for him is the ‘primal ground of all communities’. Schutz is particularly critical of Husserl’s proposed

\textsuperscript{121} PSW, 109. Schutz’s account of the anonymity of public life is developed in Natanson 1986.

\textsuperscript{122} SCHUTZ 1966, 51-91.

\textsuperscript{123} SCHUTZ 1966, 59.

\textsuperscript{124} SCHUTZ 1966, 63.
solution to the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity, and is also deeply unhappy with Husserl’s invocation of the ‘primal ego’ in Crisis §54. Schutz sees Husserl as believing that every personal ego’s experience of itself also includes an experience of itself as a member of a community, as part of a ‘we’ and as also recognizing another as a ‘thou’. Yet at the same time Husserl insists that the epochē creates a unique kind of philosophical solitude where I cannot co-validate the presence or experiences of others. The problem Schutz identifies in Husserl is that there is no guarantee that the community that I constitute from within myself coincides with the community that the other constitutes for herself or himself. This is an important criticism, to which, I believe, Husserl has no response. In general, in Husserl’s intersubjective monadology, it is not clear how these transcendental subjects communicate. Schutz refers to Crisis §71 where Husserl suggests an answer to this problem. Husserl writes:

But this means at the same time that within the vitally flowing intentionality in which the life of an ego-subject consists, every other ego is already intentionally implied in advance by way of empathy and the empathy-horizon. Within the universal epochē which actually understands itself, it becomes evident that there is no separation of mutual externality [Aussereinander] at all for souls in their own essential nature. What is a mutual externality for the natural-mundane attitude of world-life prior to the epochē, because of the localization of souls in living bodies, is transformed in the epochē into a pure, intentional, mutual internality [Ineinander].

Husserl speaks of the manner in which every ego ‘implicates’ other egos – but what is the meaning of this intentional ‘implication’? Husserl’s claim is that transcendental egos overcome the ‘mutual externality’ (Aussereinandersein) produced by being localized in

125 Crisis § 71, 255; Hua VI, 259.
physical bodies and gain a new kind of intersubjective community where all belong as internal members in ‘internality’ or literally ‘within-one-another-ness’ (Ineinandersein). But what evidence does Husserl offer for this transformation of mutually exclusive externality into shared internality? Schutz comments:

    It is completely unclear how an intentional in-one-another could account for the reciprocal implication of streams of life belonging to single subjects, and even to all psyches.¹²⁶

In this important paper Schutz also draws attention to Eugen Fink’s remark in his 1933 paper on Husserl in Kant-Studien that one cannot simply transfer the relation between individual and plural humans to the transcendental sphere and that Husserl’s use of the term ‘monad’ is simply an index of a larger problematic and not a solution to the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity. It is certainly true that Husserl’s embrace of the Leibnizian language of monads has not been seen as illuminating in term of the relations holding within transcendental intersubjectivity.

**8. Conclusion**

What I have tried to do here is to open up some themes and lines of communication with which to explore further the rich connections between Husserl, Heidegger, Gurwitsch, Schutz, and Patočka, among others, on the nature of the social world, and specifically on the nature of public existence in the world. There are many commonalities to be explored further – the relation between the individual and the communal, the nature of authenticity and inauthenticity, the constitution of the *Mitwelt*, and the nature of the anonymous subject in the public realm. Husserl’s deep reflections on empathy, intersubjectivity, socialisation, and communalisation offer an

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¹²⁶ Schutz 1996, 78.
important and relatively neglected contribution to the phenomenology of sociality that deserves much closer attention and scrutiny.

References


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