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Chapter 1
Husserl’s Layered Concept of the Human Person: Conscious and Unconscious

Dermot Moran

Abstract Husserl’s mature phenomenology offers a complex and multi-layered account of the constitution of the human person through a developmental analysis of different stages of constitution, from the constitution and integration of the lived body upward to the full, free, rational functioning of the mature human person. The mature human person is, for Husserl, in the fullest sense, a self-reflective Cartesian cogito, a self-conscious rational agent exercising conscious “position-takings”, judgings, desirings, and willings. At the same time, a person is an intersubjective social being, a member of a family, a group, a community, a nation, a participant in empathic interpersonal relations with others in the context of a social world, an environment, and a life-world, what Husserl calls socius. But, for Husserl, the self is also necessarily rooted in nature, and lives through its sensations, drives and tendencies, affections, feelings, emotions and motor capacities and especially through its voluntary movements and decisions (Husserl’s “I can”). The ego has moments of wakeful alertness but can also be sunk in sleep or dreaming. It has dispositions, habits, a hexis or habitus, which gives it a network of habitual actions, stances and motivations. Husserl’s account is an extraordinarily rich phenomenological account of the person that contains analyses comparable to psychoanalytic explorations of the unconscious, with which Husserl was barely familiar. In this paper I shall chart Husserl’s conception of the person and explore some tensions in it especially between its unconscious and conscious dimensions.

Keywords Husserl • Phenomenology • Consciousness • Freud • Unconsciousness • Memory • Passivity

I must lie down where all the ladders start
In the foul rag and bone shop of the heart.
William Butler Yeats, The Circus Animals Desertion

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Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) were almost exact contemporaries, both attended Franz Brentano’s lectures in Vienna,¹ and both were involved in the understanding of subjective life and its meaning. As a result, various efforts have been made over the years to explore the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis, between the descriptive phenomenological exploration of experienced, conscious life, in all its modalities (including memory, fantasy, emotion, habitual action), and the analytic uncovering of unconscious processes (repression, sublimation) and their effects.²

For many years, the standard view has been that Husserl’s phenomenology deals only with the conscious self-reflective ego (what Husserl calls, following Descartes, cogito) and its ‘lived experiences’ (Erlebnisse) that can be accessed in conscious reflection (or at best through some kind of reflective reconstruction), whereas Freudian psychoanalysis identifies unconscious processes, forces and energies, acts of repression and recurrences, that are not immediately (and may never become) available to the conscious subject, but rather must be identified through the mediation of the psychoanalytic engagement with an analyst working through hints, traces, slips, ruptures, resistances, and absences, that point to these underlying forces at work.³ For Freud, the psychology of the unconscious was a ‘depth psychology’ that entails a whole vision of human nature that portrayed humans as struggling to balance instinctual drives (the pleasure principle, the death instinct) as ways of coping with sex and aggression, albeit that Freud also had a generally Enlightenment view of humans as capable of rationality, freedom and love.⁴

¹Freud attended Brentano’s lectures in Vienna as a young student from 1874 to 1876, whereas Husserl attended Brentano’s lectures 10 years later from 1884 to 1886. See Philip Merlan, ‘Brentano and Freud’, Journal of the History of Ideas vol. 6, no. 3 (Jun., 1945), pp. 375–377. The lectures appeared to have no lasting impression on the founder of psychoanalysis, but see Raymond E. Fancher, ‘Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Freud’s Early Metapsychology’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, vol. 13 no. 3 (July 1977), pp. 207–227, who discusses some comparisons in their approaches.


In attempting to discuss the parallels between Husserl and Freud it is important to recall that Husserl had a particularly narrow and limited view of Freud’s contribution. Similarly, as I argue, Husserl’s thought is more complex than traditionally conceived (in part the blame lay in Husserl’s explicit espousal of Cartesianism); and so too is Freud’s but Freud – certainly in the early part of the twentieth century – was conceived more narrowly (primarily on the basis of The Interpretation of Dreams) and pessimistically than he is now viewed.\(^5\) Karl Jaspers, for instance, was perhaps the most explicit philosophical critic of psychoanalysis in the 1920 revision of his General Psychopathology.\(^6\) Ironically, both phenomenology and psychoanalysis were denounced by the National Socialists in Germany after 1933 as “Jewish” sciences. It was in fact, Eugen Fink who seemed to be particularly interested in the relations between phenomenology and various forms of ‘depth psychology’. The Frankfurt School, on the other hand, especially through the work of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse seemed to embrace Freud and psychoanalysis.\(^7\)

Husserl’s exhaustively detailed exploration of the intentional structures and syntheses of the flow of experiential consciousness (Bewusstseinsstrom, Erlebnisstrom), through disciplined methodological reflection, operating under the ‘bracketing’ (einklammern) and ‘suspension’ (epoché) of assumptions of actuality or ‘belief in being’ (Seinsglaube), and deliberately cast in the language of Cartesian solipsism (especially in Husserl’s Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations), seems at first glance to rule out the positing of an inaccessible, unconscious domain and to be in principle incapable of tracking unconscious states.

In addition, the mature Husserl’s explication of all ‘sense and being’ (Sinn und Sein) of the entire world of experience as the intentional ‘achievement’ (Leistung) of the transcendental ego seems, moreover, to bring all experience within the purview of the ego and be at least in principle, available for conscious inspection.

Furthermore, it is often pointed out that what Husserl occasionally alludes to as the ‘unconscious’ (das Unbewusste) is in fact what Freud would have called the ‘unconscious’ (das Unbewusste) is in fact what Freud would have called the


‘pre-conscious’, and, in reverse, standardly, phenomenologists tend to regard Husserl’s transcendental approach as incompatible with what they regarded as Freud’s mechanistic naturalism of the hidden ‘forces’ of the ‘id’ and their effects. Finally, Husserl’s interest in the syntheses performed by agent consciousness appears to contrast with Freud’s account of the primacy of repression as an unconscious process.

Paul Ricoeur was one of the first phenomenologically trained thinkers, in his 1965 ground-breaking and comprehensive hermeneutical study of the whole of Freud’s corpus, to explore in some detail the relations between Freud’s explorations of the terrain of the unconscious and Husserl’s phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty earlier also made some explorations in this regard). Ricoeur, in particular, links Husserl’s passive synthesis and his concept of association with the Freudian unconscious. He remarks that no other philosophy of reflection has come as close as Husserl did to Freud’s concept of the unconscious. Others, too, have seen the close proximity between Husserl’s and Freud’s investigations. Thus, the mathematician and logician Kurt Gödel once remarked that ‘both Husserl and Freud considered – in different ways – subconscious thinking’. Husserl does see the stream of consciousness as broadly divided into ‘waking’ and ‘sleeping’ states, and waking states as built around perception. Indeed, his most careful analyses focus on embodied perception as that which provides our most basic, primitive and enduring contact with others and with the world.

Typically, the best way to approach Husserl on the unconscious has been, following Ricoeur’s suggestion, to explore his analyses of passive synthesis. Another interesting way of approach, proposed by the phenomenologist and psychoanalyst Rudolf Bernet, is to examine the complex relations that Husserl finds between the experience of the living present and memory and fantasy. In a powerful and

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8 This was indeed the view of Elmar Holenstein in his Husserls Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passive Genesis bei Edmund Husserl (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972), see especially p. 322.
10 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 376. Ricoeur is particular is referring to Freud’s 1915 paper on ‘The Unconscious’.
illuminating discussion, Rudolf Bernet locates Husserl’s discussion of the unconscious primarily in his account of ‘presentification’ or ‘presentation’ (Vergegenwärtigung), a kind of representational or ‘making present’ consciousness found in different forms in memory, fantasy, looking at photographs and pictures, and also in empathic experiences of other people (present, past, real or fictional). Already in his early writings on perception, imagination and image consciousness from around 1905, Husserl produced very careful accounts of fantasy, dream, and other representational states, and indeed, had discussed how for instance real wishes (e.g. the desire to have a holiday) can emerge within flights of daydream fantasy or in a dream.¹⁴

A present consciousness such as a perception, Bernet says, can comport itself towards a non-present consciousness such as a fantasy.¹⁵ Indeed, perception and fantasy are usually found intertwined. Fantasy depends or is founded on perception, according to Husserl, but floats free in a specific way by not insisting on the present givenness of the fantasized object. Bernet criticizes Husserl for the limitations in his characterization of fantasy as such: Husserl always sees it as somehow grounded in or based on perceptions or memories and is surrounded by a consciousness of the world although not directly connected to it.¹⁶ Fantasy, for him, always amounts to a diminished quasi-perception. Husserl, according to Bernet, had to make fantasy-experiences dependent on the experience of a contrast with present experienced events. Bernet argues that the concept of the unconscious must be grounded in the notion of presentification as a non-positing experience (in contrast to memory) that may deal with events that may never have been actual.¹⁷ Fantasies in this sense can have their own objects and trajectory without being anchored to actuality. Fantasy, for Husserl, can enfold real feelings and wishes as well as fantasy feelings and wishes (e.g. I may identify with a film character’s desire to kill someone in a movie but do not exit the movie theatre with a real desire to murder in my heart).

Husserl himself only very rarely refers to psychoanalysis in his work. In Ideas II,¹⁸ Husserl discusses the domains of passivity, habituality and ‘sedimentation’,

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experiences where the ego simply finds itself and does not quite know how it got there. Thus, in *Ideas II* § 56 (b), he speaks about the domain of unnoticed or unacknowledged motivations that ‘psychoanalysis’ (*Psychoanalyse, Ideas II*, p. 235: Hua IV 222) might investigate further. Despite its focus on the unconscious, there are just two brief references to Freud and psychoanalysis in the recently published Husserliana volume of notes that the editors have entitled *Limit Problems of Phenomenology. Analyses of the Unconscious and of Instincts* (2014).¹⁹

In Walter Biemel’s critical Husserliana edition of Husserl’s *Crisis of the European Sciences* (1954),²⁰ there is a reference to ‘depth psychology’ (*Tiefenpsychologie, Crisis* p. 386; VI 473), by which presumably is meant Freudian psychoanalysis (although possibly including Freud and Adler). This reference occurs in an Appendix Husserl’s then assistant Eugen Fink, added to Husserl’s *Crisis* in 1936.²¹ This Appendix stresses that the exploration of the unconscious must begin from a thorough study of ‘being conscious’ (*Bewusstsein*). Furthermore, Fink acknowledges that one should not automatically assume that the ‘unconscious’ is equivalent to all sorts of obscure awareness, after-effects of conscious states that can subsequently be re-awakened, since the practitioners of depth psychology actually claim the reverse, namely, that all conscious life is founded on the unconscious which is prior. Fink claims that depth psychology itself takes unconscious phenomena as self-evident in their own way:

> For the unconscious, too, as well as for consciousness, there exists the illusion of everyday, given immediacy: we are all familiar, after all, with the phenomena of sleep, of fainting, of being overtaken by obscure driving forces, creative states, and the like. (*Crisis*, p. 387; VI 474)

Fink rejects as “naïve” and “dogmatic” certain theoretical constructions (he means Freud) that have been built on the recognition of the unconscious, e.g. those that invoke the ‘naturalistic mechanism of the “libido”’ (*Crisis*, p. 386; VI 474) or some kind of “dynamics” of instincts and drives. Fink claims that these discussions begin from the naïve assumption that conscious life is immediately given and, as it were, transparent, whereas in fact Husserlian intentional analysis has shown that conscious life is a very complex and multilayered structure. Only when ‘wakeful’ consciousness as such is clarified can a proper discussion of the unconscious as such be undertaken.²² Presumably Husserl and Fink discussed the problem of the Freudian


²¹Eugen Fink’s discussion of the unconscious was included by Walter Biemel as an Appendix in his edition of the *Crisis*, pp. 385–87; Hua VI 473–75.

²²Husserl sometimes comment on the fact that the wakeful ego is punctuated by periods of sleep and has to actively join itself to earlier states through acts of synthesis. Husserl leaves it an open question as to whether there is ever pure ‘unconsciousness’ in the sense of there being no flicker of
unconscious on one or more of their daily walks in the hills above Freiburg and it is undoubtedly the case that some of Husserl’s own students were interested in psychoanalysis. The mature Husserl regularly distinguishes between the ‘awake’ or ‘wakeful ego’ (*das wache Ich*) and the ego sunk in sleep or dream or other altered states (e.g. intoxication). In *Ideas II*, for instance, he speaks of the ‘sleeping ego’ (*das schlafende Ich*) as sunk in what he calls ‘ego-matter’ (*Ichmaterie, Ideas II § 58, p. 264 IV 253*) or *hyle*. In this state the ego is undifferentiated, it is ‘ego sunkenness’ (*Ichversunkenheit*). But Husserl was not clear on the best way of approaching these ‘dull’ (*dumpf*) conscious states (*Ideas II § 26*).

Aside from Eugen Fink’s remarks, it is accurate to state that Husserl’s phenomenology in Freiburg continued to develop more or less in parallel to Freudian psychoanalysis, without direct contact between the two disciplines (Freud himself never refers by name to Husserl and indeed there are only a couple of generic references to ‘psychological phenomenology’ in Freud’s works). In Husserl’s circle in Göttingen, Max Scheler, who came to deliver public lectures, had a deep interest in and critical understanding of Freud and discussed him in his *The Essence of Sympathy* and elsewhere. Generally, speaking Scheler is critical of Freud’s naturalism and his lack of appreciation that human beings can discriminate and choose between values. But Scheler does find that Freud’s (albeit mistaken) views must be discussed in any serious phenomenological exploration of the emotions, and especially the nature of sexual love and shame (where Scheler is critical of Freud’s postulations).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (especially in his unfinished *Working Notes* written in 1959 and 1960 and published posthumously in *The Visible and the Invisible*, 1964), does take Freudian psychoanalysis more seriously and indeed thinks that Freud’s suspicion towards the lived experience as it presents itself is pre-eminently ‘philosophical’ (VI, p. 181; 233). In fact, Merleau-Ponty is explicating a phenomenological conception of the unconscious that is, I believe, close to that which Husserl would have developed and which we can piece together from his scattered remarks.


Dreams and other phenomena must be scrutinized critically in their apparent given-ness, but, the late Merleau-Ponty thinks, the ambiguous existential structures and processes in which we live in the world are not somehow ‘behind’ the phenomena (as in Freud) but between them (VI, p. 232; 281). The flow of experiences that Husserl described does not unfold solely in the present but in a landscape that is a ‘field of being’ (champ d’être, VI, p. 240; 289). As Merleau-Ponty puts it: ‘The “associations” of psychoanalysis are in reality “rays” of time and of the world’ (VI, p. 240; 289). In his view the phenomenon of temporality – and the peculiar indefinite pastness of the time of the unconscious – needs to be revisited (VI, p. 243; 291–92).

Following Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenologist and psychiatrist Thomas Fuchs suggests that, if the unconscious is considered more as a horizon of conscious life rather than as a depth below it, then the concept of the unconscious can be successfully accommodated within Husserlian phenomenology. In fact, Fuchs speaks of the unconscious as a ‘horizontal dimension of the lived body, lived space and intercorporeality’.28 This seems to be consistent with Husserl’s own approach. In fact, Husserl considers his discovery of ‘horizon-intentionality’ to be one of his most original contributions to consciousness studies.

In contrast to the writings of Husserl, Martin Heidegger’s work did directly stimulate a vigorous encounter between hermeneutical phenomenology and psychoanalysis, both in terms of the existential phenomenological psychology as well as in terms of the Lacanian approach which is heavily dependent on Heidegger’s conception of language. Inspired by Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time in 1927, a new existential phenomenological analysis – Daseinsanalyse – was developed by LudwigBinswanger (a life-long friend of Freud),29 Medard Boss,30 and others, which emphasised human spatial and temporal locatedness, mood and attunement (Stimmung) as part of an overall structure of ‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-Sein). This form of analysis involved detailed exploration of phenomena such as dream, anxiety, depression (melancholia), trauma, and so on, but within the context of the person’s overall modality of existing in the world (including, crucially, the manner in which the person experienced temporality).31 Ironically, Heidegger himself, much later, in his Zollikon seminars with Boss, criticized this Daseinsanalyse

for focusing solely on being-in-the-world and ignoring the larger issue of the ‘understanding of Being’ (*Seinsverständnis*).\(^{32}\)

In these seminars, Heidegger maintained a distance from the Freudian concept of the unconscious and maintained that human concealment (the parallel of Freud’s repression) is actually a form of manifestation and dwelling in the ‘clearing’ (*die Lichtung*).\(^{33}\) In this regard, Heidegger’s position is not that different from Husserl’s (and Fink’s). Heidegger, for instance, points out that although a child and an old person may both live in the same present, their ‘presencing’ of that temporal present is not the same. The child is more forward-facing and futural, whereas the old person dwells in ‘having-been-ness’.\(^{34}\) These temporal differences are not immediately obvious but can be disclosed. As Merleau-Ponty had also pointed out, the designation of events in the unconscious as somehow in a ‘past’ that was never present is exceptionally problematic and needs careful reframing in terms of the ‘ecstatic’ character of human existence.

In post-war France, furthermore, the existential phenomenological descriptions of human existence found in the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre\(^{35}\) brought phenomenology into dialogical confrontation with classical Freudian psychoanalysis Sartre rejected the Freudian conception of the ‘id’, the ‘censor’ and what he regarded as the mechanistic languages of hidden drives and affirmed human capacity for freedom. Sartre thought, however, that a new kind of existential psychoanalysis could be developed that was based not on early sexual experiences and traumas but on original choices (‘project’) made by individuals.\(^{36}\)

Soon after, Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) integrated phenomenological insights concerning the nature of language from the late Heidegger (and also Merleau-Ponty) into his revision of Freudian psychoanalysis (his *retour à Freud*) with his famous pronouncement that the unconscious is structured like a language.\(^{37}\) In these

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\(^{34}\) Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, op. cit., p. 183.


rich post-war explorations, the work of Edmund Husserl (apart from the scattered musings in the late Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished Notes de cours that we have already discussed), as opposed to Heidegger, was largely ignored.\(^3\)

Of course, in classical Freudian psychoanalysis, as Eugen Fink had recognized, the unconscious as such is not accessible in itself through conscious reflection, it is ‘latent’ in Freud’s term,\(^3\) and it is detected only as it manifests itself in its irruptions in consciousness, in dreams, obsessions, repetitive actions, fixed attitudes, associations, neuroses, and so on. This led Freud to focus on phenomena in conscious life, such as slips of the tongue, dreams, delusions, random associations, and regressive phenomena, that somehow are revelatory of deeply buried suppressed trauma and drives.\(^4\) It is true that the concept of anxiety (Angst) as explored in Heidegger’s phenomenology – and the developments by Binswanger, Boss, and others – are more usually associated with psychoanalytic explorations than with Husserlian phenomenology. But there is plenty of scope within Husserl also for exploring the region of the ‘unconscious’ (das Unbewusste) understood in part as encompassing the horizons around the waking, conscious ego, as we shall now explore.

Consistent with Freud, Husserl sees life as involving a more or less unconscious, instinctive ‘striving’ (Leben ist Streben is a familiar Husserlian refrain, cf. Hua XV 408)\(^1\) towards goals and the fulfilment of intentions. Both have a conception of human life as the harmonization or balancing of conflicting forces. In agreement with nineteenth-century biology, Husserl thinks that the most basic drive of consciousness is towards living itself: ‘being is self-preservation’ (Sein ist

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Selbsterhaltung, Hua XV 367). Moreover, although this striving is endless and coincides with life itself, the satisfaction of drives is necessarily temporal, transitory and limited. Hunger is satisfied in the short term but it returns. Furthermore, there are drives on many different levels, and on the higher levels new goals are identified. It is possible to satisfy drives either with actual fulfilment or with fantasy fulfilment.

Husserl too talks about ‘instincts’ (Instinkte), ‘drives’ (Trieb), ‘tendencies’ (Tendenzen), and of being in the grip of moods such as anger, grief, joy, and so on, and analyses what happens in fantasy, dreaming and states of ‘dark’ or confused consciousness. Husserl tends to identify drives and instincts. He thought of instincts as intentions that arise without the mediation of consciousness or deliberation and which form a network of habit (he even speaks of ‘drive habitualities’, Triebhabitualitäten, Hua XV 148). Husserl’s own use is very broad and it is clear that he is somewhat uncomfortable with the terminology itself as he often puts the word ‘drives’ (Trieb) in quotation marks.

Indeed, the topic of instinct was commonplace late nineteenth-century German psychology and could also be found in the discussions around the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin and other biologists, as well as in the psychology of Theodor Lipps, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, and others. The Munich philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps (whose work was influential on both Freud and Husserl), for instance, maintained that humans had a basic instinct to express themselves through their bodily actions and also to imitate others (this was the basis of empathy). There is a drive towards life-expression or the communication of inner processes through bodily processes and a drive to external imitation. Lipps thought these instincts could not be further clarified; he called them ‘the unclarifiable instincts (Die “unerklärlichen Instinkte”).’ Lipps gave an important lecture in August 1896 entitled “The Concept of the Unconscious in Psychology,” at the Third International Congress of Psychology where he presented the problem of the unconscious as the central problem of psychology, a position similar to that of Freud, although it is unclear if Freud and Lipps ever met, albeit Freud credited Lipps for his insights.

In his critique of Lipps, Husserl takes this postulation of instincts to be, as he puts it, a ‘refuge of phenomenological ignorance’ (Hua XIII 2). Husserl briskly declares: ‘I cannot work with unclarifiable instincts’ (Mit unerklärlichen Instinkten...)

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kann ich nicht operieren, Hua XIII 242). Husserl has a very broad concept of instinct, as is made clear in a newly published Husserliana volume,\textsuperscript{46} that gathers a great deal of new material on the unconscious.\textsuperscript{47} Rochus Sowa and Thomas Vongehr have written in their Editors’ Introduction to this Husserliana volume:

The word ‘instinct’, furthermore, is employed by Husserl, as he himself says, “in an unusually broad sense.” It signifies “every drive intention, which is not originally revealed in its sense. Instincts in the narrower, “in the ordinary sense” are those drives or drive intentions that refer ‘to distant, originally hidden objectives’ and serve the preservation of the species, or of the self-preservation of the individual. (Hua XLII xlviii)\textsuperscript{48}

Husserl speaks frequently of the ‘blindness’ of instincts. There are different kinds of hunger, e.g. hunger for nourishment, hunger for sex (Husserl does not make the libidinal drive to be most basic – for him the primary drive is a drive to existence, to life).\textsuperscript{49} But he also speaks of simple tendencies or directions of interest that are ‘given’ contingently – one is attracted to a particular color, taste or sound. The instincts are experienced as sensuously felt. The sensuous field is already pervaded with ‘instincts or tendencies’ (Hua IV 337). Husserl’s favourite example of a sensuous drive is the desire to smoke (Hua IV 338), which may affect one without coming to conscious awareness. Husserl writes:

But at best it is the Ego thought of as purely passive which is mere nature and belongs within the nexus of nature. But not the Ego of freedom.

However mere nature is the entirety of the “mechanical I-do” \textit{mechanische Ich-tue}. There arises some sensuous drive \textit{Trieb} for example the urge to smoke. I reach for a cigar and light it up, whereas my attention, my Ego-activities, indeed my being affected consciously, are entirely somewhere else: thoughts are stimulating me. I am following them up. … Here we have “unconscious” Ego-affections and reactions. (Ideas II, 349; Hua IV 338)

This is the level of unconscious affection and reaction for Husserl.

Husserl talks tentatively about the first stream of experiences as including certain parts that stand out and which draw the attention of the ego through what Husserl calls \textit{Reiz}, ‘affective allure’, ‘stimulus’ (Ideas II, Hua IV 189) – a bright light, a sudden noise, a pattern of colour, something awakes the attention of the ego. I yield


\textsuperscript{48} Husserl: ‘Das Wort „Instinkt” wird also von Husserl, wie er selbst sagt, „in ungewöhnlich weitem Sinn” gebraucht; es bezeichnet „eine Triebintention, die ursprünglich noch nicht enthüllt ist in ihrem Sinn „Instinkte im engeren, „im gewöhnlichen Sinn“ sind jene Triebe oder Triebintentionen, die sich auf „auf ferne, ursprünglich verborgene Ziele „ziehen und der Erhaltung der Art bzw. der Selbsterhaltung des Individuums dienen”, in Husserl, \textit{Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte}, op. cit., p. xlviii.

\textsuperscript{49} For Husserl’s discussion of love, see Hua XIV 172–175.
to the allure of the object—there is a peculiar pull of an object on the ego. This works on the level of pleasure and displeasure. I am attracted to a song on the radio; I turn away from an unpleasant smell; I shiver from the cold, I bask in the sunshine. In this case, there is a great zone than is shared with similar kinds of animality.

The stream of experience, for Husserl, is given to conscious awareness as already self-organised, unified and ‘harmonious’. One sees (without conscious effort) the organised pattern on the carpet, the regularity of tiles on the wall, the patchwork of colour in the sky. One feels the continuous, on-going and pervasive warmth of the day. The ego, for Husserl, is ‘awakened’ to these stimuli or allures and responds to them (roughly in Brentanian terms) as either being attracted or repulsed. I find myself drawn to looking admiringly at the blue sky and can bask in this looking without further attitudinal stances supervening. Sensory experiences in themselves can be pleasant and be appreciated in and of themselves (scratching an itch) but they are also enfolded into more complex states with differing degrees of significance.

There is already at this basic level, for Husserl, – as every mother will recognise – already a high degree of idiosyncrasy in the make-up of the individual ego. One baby will like loud noises or like to be bounced up and down, another prefers to be held closely, and is timid in relation to sudden noises. These initial ‘tendencies’ (Tendenzen, Hua IV 189) or ‘originary instincts’ (Urtriebe, Urinstinkte) can develop and be embraced in later life. Adult sexual and other desires have their origin or at least their configuration and material contours already in this early life (Freud here talks primarily – as Scheler points out – of the manner in which these early drives get distorted). A baby will want to be cocooned, cuddled, or bounced, and each will have his or her own unique ‘peculiarity’ (Eigenart). These will be taken up, modified and transformed in adult social and sexual relations through various kinds of acculturation and sedimentation and not necessarily due to mechanisms of repression and sublimation.

It would be a fruitless exercise to try to find in Husserl analogues of all the key Freudian notions (both discuss ‘instincts’ and ‘drives’ and do not sharply distinguish between them – although instincts generally are seen to belong more to biological animal nature), and the matter is further complicated by Freud’s evolving conception of drives. For instance, Husserl does not have a specific concept of ‘repression’ as such, but he does have the concept of ‘sedimentation’ (Sedimentation, Sedimentierung), and of patterns of intentional behaviour that have ‘sunk down’, through habituation, so as to be unnoticed or ‘unremarked’ (unbewusst). Thus in

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50 See the entry “Instinct (or Drive),” in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-analysis (London: Karnac, 1988), pp. 214 ff.
Experience and Judgment. Husserl speaks of judgments as involving repetitions of other judgments although they do not have to be explicit ‘memorial sedimentations’ (Erinnerungsniederschläge, EU § 5, p. 23; 16). Husserl claims that sedimentations are not immediately accessible to consciousness. He writes of the necessity for a ‘retrogression to a hidden subjectivity’ (Rückgang auf eine verhüllte Subjektivität, EU § 11, p. 48; 47) through a specific kind of dismantling or ‘unbuilding’:

It is necessary to dismantle [Abbau] everything which already pre-exists in the sedimentations of sense [Sinnesniederschlägen] in the world of our present experience, to interrogate [Zurückfragen] these sedimentations relative to the subjective sources out of which they have developed and, consequently, relative to an effective subjectivity. (Husserl, EU § 11, p. 48; 47)

This method of uncovering sedimeted judgements through a backward questioning and dismantling of conscious complexes surely can be considered as something akin to the understanding of repression in Freud (without Freud’s mechanistic, causal language). In general, furthermore, Husserl has little to say of trauma and pathological states since he is primarily interested in the constitution of ‘normality’ (Normalität). The experience of death, however, is discussed by Husserl in terms of a constantly experienced threat of the disruption of future plans (Hua XXVII 69) against the backdrop of the continuous flow of experienced time.

The mature Husserl, then, did not believe all aspects of intentional life can be brought to the forefront of consciousness as if they were illuminated by a Cartesian ray of awareness and incorporated into the ego as part of its own intentional acts. Quite the reverse: For Husserl, generally speaking, consciousness of the present is surrounded by horizons of consciousness of the past that is no longer, the projected and imagined future, the possible, the wished for, the feared. The person is made up of a conscious ‘egoic centre’ and what can be envisaged as a widening set of overlapping horizons that include fantasized selves and modifications of selves (dream personae and so on).

It is clear that Husserl became more interested in the ‘unconscious’ (in his broad sense) in the early 1930s when he began to group a number of problems under the

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54 Sometimes, Heidegger’s account of finitude and authentic being towards one’s own death is contrasted with Husserl’s account that claims that the transcendental ego is immortal and that it is impossible to experience any ‘final’ moment in time. But the issue is more complex and Husserl acknowledges the humans can experience the possibility of death as a disruption. See Sara Heinämaa, ‘Threat, Limit, Culture: Phenomenological Insights into Human Death’, in Mortality and Death: From Individual to Communal Perspective, ed. Outi Hakola, Sara Heinämaa, and Sami Pihlström, Collegium Studies Across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences (Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2015).
title of what he called ‘limit problems’ (*Limesprobleme*) or ‘marginal problems’ (*Randprobleme*), among them are the challenges of understanding birth, death and the afterlife. In a text from 1930 (Hua XV 608) Husserl writes:

> The unconscious, the sedimented unground of consciousness, dreamless sleep, the form of birth of subjectivity, respectively, the problematic being of birth, death and ‘life after death’.  

These are all phenomena that bound or border personal, ‘egoic’ conscious life.

The mature Husserlian phenomenology has an overall project of understanding how the unified flow of ‘conscious life’ (*Bewusstseinsleben*) hangs together and integrates into a seamless yet temporally streaming unity, and interweaves with other conscious ‘egoic’ (first-personal) streams to create intersubjective cultural life, what Husserl, following Dilthey and German Idealism, calls ‘the life of spirit’. Husserl is often mistakenly characterized – largely because of his own deliberate starting point – as a Cartesian who seeks to establish all reality and other minds on the basis of the ego’s own constituting activities. But Husserl also sees that the constituting ego actually functions in an open-ended plurality of other egos – past, present, future, possible – that he calls, borrowing from Leibniz, ‘the community of monads’ (*Monadengemeinschaft*). The ego is constituted or constitutes itself as a social entity, as what Husserl calls a ‘*Socius*’, a member of a social and cultural *Mitwelt*, which is constituted through the complex interweaving and coinciding of individual and collective intentionalities, in what Husserl calls *Ineinandersein*. As Husserl elaborates:

> Just as each ego, each monad, is concretely named substance, but only in relative concreteness, it is what it is only as a citizen of a sociality, as a ‘member of a community’ in a total community.

When Husserl speaks of the ‘person’ (as he does primarily in *Ideas* II, in the *Kaizo* articles and in his lectures on ethics) he is primarily thinking of the mature, adult, rational self – the self that acts and is motivated by reasons and is involved with

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55 ‘Das Unbewusste, der sedimentierte Untergrund des Bewusstseins, der traumlose Schlaf, die Geburtsgestalt der Subjektivität bzw. Das problematische Sein vor der Geburt, der Tod und das „nach dem Tode“, Hua XV 608.


58 Husserl: Ebenso ist jedes *ego*, jede Monade konkret genommener Substanz, aber nur relative Konkretion, sie ist, was sie ist, nur als *socius* einer Sozialität, als „Gemeinschaftsglied“ in einer Totalgemeinschaft, Hua XV 193.

others in cooperative social and cultural activity in a shared life-world. Husserl begins from the mature adult in normal social relations, a social agent who belongs to a speech- and ‘communications-community’ (Mitteilungsgemeinschaft – Husserl’s word later adapted by Jürgen Habermas).

Overall, the mature Husserl has a very complex and nuanced account of the concrete human person. The person is first and foremost a unity; and Husserl speaks of the ‘unity of personhood’ (Einheit der Persönlichkeit, Hua XIII 244). Already in 1905 Husserl writes in notes collected in the Intersubjectivity volume (Husserliana XIII):

Naturally personhood – just like the substance of a thing – is not a phenomenologically pre-given datum; it is rather a “unity in the manifold”, a unity of validity, not a phenomenological moment [distinguishable part]. (Hua XIII 2).

Furthermore, the person has properties in a completely different sense than a physical thing. The self has ‘acts’ which no physical thing has in the same sense (Hua XIII 244); it establishes itself through its specifically egoic acts – its decisions, its judgments, its stances. Husserl typically conceives of the human person in traditional Cartesian, and more specifically, in Kantian terms as a free, rational agent, defined primarily by its explicit position-takings, i.e. its judgments, decisions, willings, desires, convictions, value-takings, and other acts, which it defines as specifically personal or ‘egoic’ (ichlich) rather than merely occurring in the self as ‘ego-belonging’ (ich-zuhörig).

At the same time, there is of course an extremely important aspect of the human self that is located in nature, is embodied, subject to natural forces and has an entire psycho-physical constitution. In 1910 Husserl is clear that what he calls here the ‘empirical human subject’, the ‘human-I’ (Menschen-Ich) belongs to nature and his or her actions, thoughts, etc., are part of the nature. He writes

The ego is the human ego in the nexus of nature [im Naturzusammenhang]. The acts are real natural events belonging to humans and psychophysically to the human lived body, real states of the human being, etc. Objective world-nature-research. Real causal networks.


61 I prefer to translate Husserl’s Persönlichkeit as ‘person’ rather than ‘personality’, which is misleading in this context given the connotations from social and behavioural psychology. See Dermot Moran, ‘Defending the Transcendental Attitude: Husserl’s Concept of the Person and the Challenges of Naturalism’, Phenomenology and Mind (2014), pp. 37–55.

62 Husserl, ‘Natürlich ist die Persönlichkeit, so wie die Substanz der Dinge, kein phänomenologisch vorfindliches Datum, es ist ja „Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit“, Geltungseinheit, nicht phänomenologisches Moment’ (Hua XIII 2).

This physico-psychic dimension of the human self is shared with other animals. It is our distinctive animality, responses to heat and cold, nervousness, alertness in the face of danger, so called ‘fight or flight’ responses, experiences of hunger, thirst, fear, and so on. But, for Husserl, in human beings, higher self-conscious states can always reach down and modify or take a stance towards these lower ‘animal’ states. For Husserl, the ego is that which ‘governs’ or ‘holds sway’ (waltet) over our other responses. Thus the experience of hunger can be sensually or meaningfully intentionally configured in conscious experience as a desire to eat something specific such as Italian pasta or a Chinese stir-fry. Cultural predicates take up, overlay, and sublate the ‘natural’ tendencies so that, in the end, all experiences are culturally constituted. As we have seen, Husserl thinks of instincts as natural feelings such as hunger, desire for sex, fear (Die instinktive Furcht, Hua XXXIX 316), avoidance of pain, pleasure seeking, and so on. But he is insistent on the difference between an undifferentiated instinct, a desire for food, for satiety, and a more determinate ‘humanised’ longing that might be a longing for a particular food, for not just any drink buy a coffee, and so on. Husserl also acknowledges that humans are autonomous reasoners, motivated not just by nature but by spiritual values that motivate them:

In original genesis, the personal Ego is constituted not only as a person determined by drives [Triebe], from the very outset and incessantly driven by original “instincts” and passively submitting to them, but also as a higher autonomous, freely acting Ego, In particular one guided by rational motives, and not one that is merely dragged along and unfree. (Ideas II §59, p. 267; IV 255)

Husserl’s placing of the term ‘instincts’ in inverted commas suggests that he is simply invoking the then current concept of instincts and not necessarily endorsing either the Freudian or the Darwinian accounts.

Furthermore, at this level, the ego identifies what is egoic and what belongs to what Husserl calls ‘the non-ego’ (das Nicht-Ich). Experiences are experienced as intimate or less intimate, as ‘near’ or ‘far’ from the ego:

In many cases we speak of near-the-I [Ichnähe] and distant-from-the-I [Ichferne], or the I may be encountered in the deepest depths or it can be encountered superficially, it has inner interest or only more external and the like. In each case this points to phenomenological distinctions: is the I, is the pure ego overall something identical and are the characteristics of this ego denoted in the cogito?64

The domain of the ego is to be contrasted with its always accompanying domain of the ‘not-I’ (Ideas II § 54; see Hua XIII 244).

For the mature Husserl, the pure ego is more than an ‘I-pole’ (Ichpol), a purely formal principle of unity of the flow of experiences. He came to recognize that the ego has a history, and evolves: “The Ego always lives in the medium of its “history””

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64 Husserl, ‘In manchen Fällen sprechen wir von Ichnähe und Ichferne, oder das Ich sei in der tiefsten Tiefe betroffen oder es werde nur oberflächlich betroffen, es habe inneren Anteil oder nur mehr äusserlichen und dgl. In jedem Fall weist dergleichen auf phänomenologische Unterschiede hin: Ist das Ich, ist ein reines Ich überall ein identisches, und <sind> Eigentümlichkeiten dieses Ich im cogito damit bezeichnet?’, (Hua XIII 248).
(Ideas II, p. 350; Hua IV 338). It accrues abiding characteristics and a ‘habitus’ (Habitus, Hexis).\textsuperscript{65}

The I as the I of personal convictions, intentions, decisions, actions, and these things as a kind of identical objectivities. Convictions that remain, etc. The personal I as its subject. Hexis and Having (Hua XIII 400).\textsuperscript{66}

Husserl recognizes that these habits, convictions and permanent characteristics determine the ego – not in a causal sense – but in terms of giving it a style and an openness to certain kinds of motivations but not to others. The area of response to motivation is very complex and multifaceted but motivations have their own intrinsic ‘sense’.

On the other hand, Husserl always insists that the ‘spiritual ego’ (geistiges Ich), as he calls it, has a priority, and a certain distance both from the physical world and from the body. In his overall mature phenomenology it is clear that Husserl really begins from the full concrete person as a mature self-conscious rational being who is a member of a community and who understands him or herself and others in what Husserl calls ‘the personalistic attitude’ which is foregrounded in Ideas II but which earlier appears as ‘the subjective attitude’ (die subjective Einstellung, Hua XIII 91). But, persons do not act in isolation from their context. They have certain ‘intellectual and moral dispositions’ (Dispositionen, XIII 119). Persons also have their individual ‘peculiarities’ on many levels:

I do have my peculiarities [meine Eigenart], my way of moving, of doing things, my individual evaluations. My own way of preferring, my temptations, and my power of conquering certain kinds of temptations against which I am invulnerable. The next person is different, he has different pet motives [Lieblingsmotive], other temptations are dangerous for him, he has other spheres in which he exercises his individual powers of action, etc., but within the bounds of the normal [innerhalb der Normalität], specifically within what is normal for youth, for age. etc. Within this typicality there are of course idiosyncratic developments: conscious self-education, inner conversion [inner Umkehr], transformation through the setting of ethical goals, through exercise, etc. (Ideas II § 59, p. 226; IV 254)

This allows for conscious life to be shaped and motivated at all levels by one’s individual drives, desires, willings, education, and so on. Thus, Husserl, in Ideas II § 61, claims that the personal ego has two ‘layers’ – a higher, spiritual ego which Husserl calls an intellectus agens, which is free and lives in its acts, and a lower self that he characterizes as ‘unfree’ ands ‘dragged down by the sensual’:

The specifically spiritual Ego, the subject of spiritual acts, the person, finds itself dependent on an obscure underlying basis of traits of character, original and latent dispositions [von einem dunklen Untergrunde von Charakteranlagen, ursprünglichen und verborgenen Dispositionen], and thereby dependent on nature. (Ideas II § 61, p. 289; Hua IV 276)


The relation between the free and unfree aspects of the self is mediated by its embodiment. As Husserl writes, ‘every free act has its comets tail of nature’ (*jeder freie Akt hat seinen Kometenschweif Natur, Ideas II, p. 350; IV 338*).

At the higher spiritual level, the self is not restrained by its body. Husserl writes in 1910–1911:

The I about which I judge is therefore not the lived body and it is not the I as such as it is bound to the lived body, it is not that consciousness that exists in a psychophysical connection with nature. Rather the I is this absolutely given complex [*Zusammenhang*] of perceptions, presentations of any kind, feelings, desires, and volitions, exactly as the complex is found in the direct viewing of reflection, of the perceiving reflection, as well as in the reflection in remembering and in other forms of consciousness as well (and not only this complex, but also what is given as taking shape in it, namely the I, the person). It is about this complex, this unified and in this sense “immanent” connection and stream of consciousness, that I want to judge alone and ascertain what can be said in regard to it.⁶⁷

Husserl gives primacy to the notion of the person as a *sum cogitans* (*Ideas* II § 22) which does not primarily apprehend itself as a body – but rather thinks of itself as a free-acting ego which makes decisions, forms independent judgements, moves at will, and so on. As Husserl defines the notion of a spiritual person he sees it as

… the Ego that has its place precisely not in a Corporeality [*Leiblichkeit*]; e.g. I “think” (*cogito*), i.e. I perceive, I represent in whatever mode, I judge, I feel, I will, etc., and I find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived experiences, as “subject” of the acts and states. (*Ideas* II § 22, p. 104; IV 97)

This is, as it were, the apex of the human being and when this ego enters into relations with others (or has always already been in relation with other ego-subjects), it fulfils itself as a spirit or a spiritual being. The spiritual self (the spiritual sphere, *Ideas* II, p. 344; Hua IV 332) and its associated spiritual intentionality are defined by activity – grasping, explicating, predicating, considering the individual under the universal, evaluating:

All personal “intentionality” refers to activity and has its origin in activities. (*Ideas* II, Supplement XII, p. 344; Hua IV 333)

The spiritual self is a member of a family, a community, a society, a generation. In the wider context the person is embedded in a culture and has a specific historicity. It has its own time – its “generation” which it shares with others and which help to form its identity.

Husserl insists that everything conscious is clustered around an ego, and it is egoic or first-personal all the way down to the first stirrings of conscious life. The infant in the womb has, from a certain point, a stream of felt experiences and bodily movements. These are experienced as a unified stream linked by laws of association. The child’s first experience of the other is the voice of its mother – already heard in the womb. For Husserl the mother-child relation is the first social relation and takes place at a very early stage although he does not specify exactly when. The infant ego already

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has the experience of I and “not-I” and this is determining for it. This structure of I and ‘not-I’ (nicht-Ich) is all pervasive and is constitutive of the very core of the ego.

Furthermore, Husserl thinks that the ego constitutes itself just as it constitutes everything else. The ego is constituted in time consciousness which is the ultimate form of constitution—something must be designated as now and in so doing a ‘before’ and ‘after’ is at the same time constituted. In this regard he talks about ‘self-temporalisation’ (Zeitigung) of the ego. The self constitutes itself first by some kind of primitive association and gluing together of time experiences. Association, for Husserl, belongs to the very essence of sensibility:

Association and reproduction (memory, synthesis, phantasy) belong to sensibility as well. … Primal sensibility, sensation, etc., does not arise out of immanent grounds, out of psychic tendencies; it is simply there, it emerges. (Ideas II, p. 346; Hua IV 335)

The ego itself receives primary impressions in the form of its own flow of experiences, Husserl writes in Ideas II § 29 that every act is an impression, a being in inner time and is part of the constitution of inner time itself (Ideas II, p. 125; IV 118).

Husserl emphasizes—as Freud does—how humans saturate situations with meaning including imagined intonations and implications. I am bored—what I am doing no longer excites me, I have a feeling of just carrying on, not necessarily developing or advancing or going deeper, perhaps just going through the motions, doing the routines. Husserl emphasises the role of ego in investing these states with meaning and value and being motivated by them in one way or another. There is, undoubtedly, a certain passivity in which I find myself, a psychic energy that is different in each one of us (Edith Stein speaks of this as ‘life-power, Lebenskraft, in part building on Lipps’ notion of “psychic force”, psychische Kraft). There are feelings and movements of the psyche over which I do not have much control. As Husserl says, quite passively without intervention from the ego, one memory can trigger another (although Husserl, unlike Freud, never considers free association to have methodological import). I am more or less involuntarily drawn to relive the shocking moment—trauma means we cannot break free from this—I reactivate the emotion each time it reappears—and perhaps it can have increasing force rather than decreasing force.

In Husserl’s very interesting example, if I bear a grudge against someone then when the grudge reappears I have to be aware that it is the same grudge rather than a new feeling of resentment (which may also be there). I have to re-identify the grudge, acknowledge it as the “[same] grudge coming again to givenness” (Ideas II, p. 120; IV 113). Another grudge might appear with the same content but it might be a different grudge. Each grudge and sorrow has its own peculiar time span. There is a sense of an ending—our love is over; my anger with you is gone. These grudges become lasting properties of the ego. A conviction or opinion has its ‘founding’ or ‘instauration’ (Stiftung, Ideas II, p. 120; Hua IV 113). A conviction can also weaken, or break down. But perhaps I restore it and it is now the old-conviction that had

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Motives can arise to cancel something or amend it or renew it. A conviction can be reinforced; we can find new motives for believing it. Convictions have their “duration” (Hua IV 117). Husserl’s account here is multi-faceted. Drives can be owned more or less by the subject; they can be embraced or resisted. I defend my drive to smoke; I assert it as belonging to my person. I can also struggle against it, deny it as essential to my person and seek to cancel or strike it out. For Husserl, the ego is involved with its drives in ways that are more complex that the standard Freudian model suggests.

In conclusion, Husserl’s phenomenology of experiential, conscious life recognises its extremely complex textured unity. Even perceptions of objects can be interwoven with dreams, memories, fantasies, recalled fantasies and fantasized memories. These memories/fantasies wrap around the present object and the present act of experiencing. Someone looking at her lover does not see just the bare person in front of her – but the person as disclosed in emotion, love, memory, expectation, fantasy, hope. For Husserl, objective sense-making is correlated to the kinds of syntheses, motivations, harmonizations, and (subjective and intersubjective) horizontal contexts that make up the intentional of the subject. Husserl’s account is an extraordinarily rich phenomenological account of the person that contains analyses comparable to psychoanalytic explorations of the unconscious but it is articulated in its own technical language and will need to be reconstituted carefully for a full dialogue between Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis to be carried out.