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30.1 Intentionality as the Main Theme of Phenomenology

**Intentionality** (Intentionalität, Gerichtetsein), "directedness," or "aboutness," is central to the phenomenological tradition. Husserl calls it the "principal theme" (Hauptthema) of phenomenology (Husserl 2014: 161). Phenomenology treats intentionality not narrowly as a relation between a mental act and its object, and especially not as a kind of representation of the outer world in the inner mind (Stich and Warfield 1994; Drummond 2012). Rather, intentionality is a claim about the sensefulness of experience based on the irreducible interrelatedness between embodied consciousness and the surrounding world of significance. Intentionality, for phenomenology, involves both sense-giving—whereby consciousness confers sense on what it encounters—and sense-explication—whereby consciousness articulates preexisting objectual and worldly significance. Both are normally intertwined.

Sense, moreover, is broader than linguistic meaning. Husserl distinguished between "sense" (Sinn) (e.g., of non-linguistic perceptions) and "meaning" (Bedeutung), which requires linguistic expression. Perceptions, feelings, moods, and emotions already have "sense" prior to articulation.

Phenomenologists generally reject immanent, representationalist ("in the head"), causal, and naturalist accounts of intentionality and instead consider conscious states as having "sense" primarily through embodied "comportment" (Verhalten) and intersubjective "interaction" (Ineinandersein) in a pre-given world already charged with significance.
Intentionality was reintroduced into modern philosophy by Franz Brentano in 1874 (Brentano 1995), who himself drew on medieval thought (Black 2010).1 In his effort to define the domain of psychological science, Brentano proposed that intentionality was the defining characteristic of all and only mental phenomena. Edmund Husserl expanded this insight to make intentionality the meaning-endowing character of all lived experiences.

In the Brentanian tradition, largely developed within twentieth-century philosophy of mind following Roderick Chisholm, intentionality is construed quite narrowly as the “aboutness” or “directedness” of individual conscious episodes (Forrai 2005), but Husserl and his followers speak more expansively of the “consciousness-of” (Bewusstsein-von) of all “lived” experiences (Erelebnisse), including not just perceptual and cognitive but also emotional (Vendrell Ferran 2015), volitional, bodily, and habitual states, and emphasize intentionality as a fundamental openness to the sense and meaningfulness of the world. Iris Marion Young, building on Merleau-Ponty’s and Husserl’s discussion of the self’s sense of governing in its body—expressed as Husserl’s “I can” (Ich kann)—adds a new dimension by highlighting how gendered, bodily intentionality and, in particular, women’s “inhibited intentionality” (Young 2005), emerges in response to prevailing cultural norms.

Although intentionality is interpreted in radically different ways (Heidegger rejects the very term), nevertheless, there is, I argue, a clear continuity in the phenomenological tradition, such that Husserl’s account is radicalized by Heidegger and, furthermore, informs Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of embodied, habitual, and practical intentionality. My stress on this continuity challenges Hubert L. Dreyfus (2000; 1991) and others (Carman 2003), who interpret Heidegger’s emphasis on non-cognitive, practical engagement as antithetical to Husserl’s (and Searle’s) more Cartesian-style concern with the structures of pure consciousness.

Phenomenology, starting with Husserl’s Ideas I (Husserl 2014), furthermore, defends an explicitly transcendental approach towards intentionality that continues in the tradition. Since subjectivity must be presumed in all cognition, it cannot simply be treated as a natural fact. Both the suspension of the “natural attitude” and the phenomenological reduction aim to remove naïve prejudices in order to allow the essential structures of intentional consciousness to be exhibited. The “spell of the naturalistic attitude,” for Husserl, blocks the true understanding of consciousness (Moran 2008). Thus he explicitly opposes the “naturalization of consciousness” (Husserl 2002: 254; Zahavi 2004) as countersensical, since it presupposes norms and laws and other ideal entities that it cannot explain. Intentional, “sense-giving” subjectivity is involved in the very “constitution” (Konstitution) of the world; hence consciousness is not a residue item or “tag-end” (Husserl 1960: 24).

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1 The Latin term intentionalitas (from intendo, “I stretch toward,” “I aim at”) already appears in the debate about first and second intentions (Peirce 2004; 2001). Indeed, the concept can be traced to Aristotle (Chrzadzinski 2013; Caston 1998; Seraji 1991), the Arabic tradition of Avicenna and Averroes (Black 2010), and Aquinas (Bretton 1955), among others.
phenomena, including the contexts and horizons of objectual experiences, within the totality of temporally streaming conscious life.

It is a mistake, moreover, to think of intentionality primarily as a willed or active directing of attention or deliberate positing of sense driven by an ego. Phenomenology also explores intentionality as a non-willed openness and responsiveness to others (Waldenfels 2004) and to the world, often involving passive, but nonetheless constituted, pre-conscious syntheses, harmonies, and attunement. From the outset, moreover, phenomenology investigated not just individual but also collective or group intentionality (Salice and Schmid 2016; Szanto 2014; Schmid 2005; Chant et al. 2014), including anonymous public shared intentionality to the historical past and to one’s culture. A particularly original feature of phenomenology is its concern to show how the “always already” pre-given sense of a common, stable, enduring, shared world of objects and other subjects is established by subjects co-operating together.

30.2 Brentano: Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental

Franz Brentano (1838–1917) revived the notion of intentionality from late Scholasticism (Spiegelberg 1969), but did not elaborate it in a thematic way in his writings; what he discussed in a few pages has inspired a whole tradition of commentary. In his 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1995), he divided psychology into two domains: genetic psychology that studied the physiological underpinnings of psychic events, and descriptive psychology that documented the “fundamental classes” of mental phenomena through careful, a priori description (Brentano 1995: xxv). Descriptive psychology was later named “phenomenology” by Brentano (Brentano 1955a), thereby inspiring Husserl.

Brentano proposed intentionality as the essential characteristic of “mental” (das Psychische) as opposed to “physical phenomena.” All and only mental phenomena can be said to be intentional; intentionality is the criterion for the mental.

Brentano’s descriptive psychology had undoubted metaphysical commitments. He thought we are primarily acquainted with our own presentations, thoughts, and emotions. The objects of perception are not directly apprehended, but only indirectly inferred (Brentano 1995: v). Brentano’s terminology—“relation” (Beziehung), “directedness” (Richtung), “object” (Objekt), “intentional inexistence” (intentionale Inexistenz), and “immanent objectivity” (immanente Gegenständlichkeit)—suggest that Brentano held an immanentist account of the intentional object (i.e., the Aristotelian sense in which knowledge is “in” the knower). In a footnote in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano explicates “inexistence” (in-esse), referring to Aristotle, Philo, Anselm, and Aquinas (Moran 2013a; Spruill 1994), as the “indwelling” (Einwohnen) of the intentional object in the act (Brentano 1995: 88). As a result Brentano was suspected of psychologism.

In a partial second edition (1911) of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano revised his earlier conception in a reist direction. Intentionality is now a “quasi-relation” (etwas Relativliches) within the subject; since there are not two relata but only one thinker. Only the thinker can be said to exist; the intentional object is a modification of the thinker. Brentano’s later view may be characterized as adverbial: to think of an object is for the subject to be modified in a specific manner (Kriegel 2016). Brentano bequeathed a portfolio of problems concerning intentional content, object, and relation, to his students, including Meinong, Twardowski (Betti 2013; Rollinger 1996; Albertazzi et al. 1996) and Husserl, and these problems entered analytic philosophy of mind through Roderick Chisholm (1955–6).

30.3 Edmund Husserl: From Object-Intentionality to Horizon-Intentionality

Husserl always credited Brentano for awakening him to intentionality; nevertheless, from the beginning, he was critical of almost every aspect of Brentano’s account and especially of his failure to defend the objectivity of ideal objects. In Logical Investigations (1900–1) Husserl already lists his “departures” (Abweichungen) from his master’s “convictions” and his technical
"vocabulary" (Varga 2015). In the Sixth Investigation, he separates "what is indubitably significant in Brentano's thought-motivation from what is erroneous in its elaboration" (Husserl 2001 II: 340). The mature Husserl claimed that Brentano was blind to his own discovery: "The proper problems of intentionality never dawned on him. He [Brentano] even failed to see that no given experience of consciousness can be described without a description of appertaining an 'intentional object as such' (for example, that this perception of the desk can only be described, when I describe this desk as what and just as it is perceived). Brentano had no inkling of intentional implication, of intentional modifications, of problems of constitution, etc...." (Husserl, letter to Marvin Farber, June 18, 1937; Cho 1990: 37). Husserl remarked in 1929 that Brentano's discovery of intentionality "never led to seeing in it a complex of performances, which are included as sedimented history in the currently constituted intentional unity and its current manners of givenness—a history that one can always uncover following a strict method" (Husserl 1969: 245).

Already in early essays, e.g., his 1894 review of Twardowski's On the Concept and Object of Presentations (Husserl 1994: 388–95) and his unfinished 1894–8 essay "Intentional Objects" (Husserl 1994: 345–87), Husserl offered a more complex account of the "being of the intentional object," specifically addressing the problem of so-called objectless presentations, i.e., presentations to which no existing object corresponds, e.g., "centaur," "round square," "the present King of France," originally discussed by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science), and subsequently taken up by Twardowski, Meinong, Russell, among others (Jacquette 2013). In 1894, the mathematician Gottlob Frege reviewed Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic and accused him, perhaps unfairly, of psychologism (Mohanty 1982). Husserl's response was his extended critique of psychologism in Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900), the first volume of his Logical Investigations, where he defends the "logical objectivism" of Bolzano, according to which mental judgments track objective "propositions in themselves" or "states of affairs" (Sachverhalte): Following Bolzano, for Husserl, logical and mathematical objects are ideal objects that stand apart from the minds contemplating them, and remain identical in repeated apprehensions of them, have "existence-in-themselves," and the states of affairs in which they are embedded can be said to "hold" (bestehen) or be "valid" (gelten). Husserl insists that psychological acts of perceiving and judging have contents, but that the intentional objects are distinct from these contents although apprehended through them.

In Logical Investigations Husserl states that the central feature of consciousness is intending (Vermeinen, intention, Husserl 2001 I: 384–5). But he offers a much more complex account than Brentano, distinguishing between the immanent real (reelle), psychological "content" of the act (a temporal slice of the act), the intentional object, and the ideal content tokened or instantiated in the act. Husserl distinguishes between the ideal intentional structure of the conscious experience and its "real" components, such as sensational content or temporal duration. In an act of speaking, the spoken sound has "real" components and other abstract parts that can be analyzed by "descriptive psychology" quite distinct from the physical sound elements, for instance the vibrations, parts of the ear, and so on. Besides both the physical and descriptive psychological elements, there is also the "ideal sense" consisting of what the word means and what it names (Husserl 2001 II: 112).

Husserl further distinguishes between the "act quality" and "matter" (Husserl 2001 II: 119). Acts of different quality (judging, willing, perceiving) may have the same matter, i.e., the state of affairs judged, willed, or perceived (e.g., *that it is raining*). The "matter"—not to be identified with the sensory content of the experience—is the content that gives the intention its reference to its specific object (Husserl 2001 II: 121).

Husserl specifically rejects Brentano's immanentist understanding of "intentional inexistence." Already in the Fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl says that, in thinking of the God Jupiter, the god is not found inside the thought as a real component. Husserl also challenges Brentano's account of the intentional "relation": It is not a relation between two actual entities, a consciousness and a thing; nor is it a psycho-physical relation. Later, in Ideas I §36, Husserl reiterates that intentionality is neither a real relation with an existent object nor a "psychological" relation between consciousness and its internal "content," but rather that intentionality is inherently disclosive of objects that transcend consciousness. In fact, for Husserl, all objects of thought, including apparently immanent objects of fantasy and memory, are mind-transcendent. He states in Ideas (1913):

As a matter of absolutely unconditional universal necessity, a thing cannot be given in any possible perception, in any possible consciousness at all as immanent to it in a real (reelle) manner. (Husserl 2014: 73–4)

The intentional object is never a component piece of a lived experience; rather lived experiences are essentially self-transcending, i.e., pointing beyond themselves.

A major contribution to intentionality is Husserl's description of the specific intentional features of perceptions, memories, fancies, acts of willing (Husserl 2001, 2014; see also Pfänder 1967), and acts of judgment. He focuses on both the structure of the intending act and the peculiar "modes of givenness" (Gegebenheitsweise) of objects in various acts. Objects in perception are experienced as "bodily" (leibhaftig) present; objects in fantasy appear detached from the subject's spatiotemporal surroundings; memories are experienced as "no longer" bodily present; photographs have a double character: appearing as physical objects (shiny paper) but also displaying a "subject" (Sujet) or theme, that must be seen into them.

Husserl offers an interesting analysis of empty intentions, where objects are not grasped as present-in-the-flesh as in perception but are apprehended in a very general way (usually through signs). Most thinking involves empty intentions, only some of which are ever fulfilled in perceptual or categorial intuitions. Scientific thinking, e.g., in formal mathematics, is a primary example of such empty, sightive intending (the square root of minus 1 can never be intuited fully in a perceptual manner, but could have its own kind of evidential fulfillment, which may require following a proof).

A conscious act takes place in objective time and may have a specific sensuous character, but its intentional structure and object are not to be identified with its sensory, real
nature. The intentional object (e.g., "my dog") is intended through the "psychological" content in the occurrence experience (e.g., "I hear the dog’s bark"), but the mental reference is to the actual dog and not to the occurring sensory component or "content" (the barking sound). For Husserl, sensations belong to the "real" components of intentional acts experienced by the subject, but are not in themselves intended. As Husserl puts it: "Objects on the other hand appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced" (Husserl 2001 II: 105).

Husserl denied all conscious experiences were intentional; sensations such as pains are not in themselves intentional. As Husserl puts it: "Objects on the other hand appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced" (Husserl 2001 II: 105). Normal experience is world-directed.

Husserl also distinguishes between the object that is intended and the manner in which it is intended (a variation of Frege's distinction between sense and reference). One can think of the person Napoleon under different descriptions, e.g., the "victor of Jena," or "the vanquished at Waterloo." It is this feature of intentionality that leads to non-substitutivity in different contexts while preserving truth (as discussed by Chisholm), underpinning intentionality. Husserl, however, developed it into his account of the intentional object and noema, which we discuss later.

For Husserl, the objects of intention are multiple. For instance, one can perceive objects and their properties, but also processes, relations, and complexes that Husserl calls "states of affairs" (Sachverhalte, Husserl 2001 II: 155). It is important to distinguish between the direct perception of an object or event and the various linguistic expressions or mental judgments that may accompany the perception or, later, replace it. Even perceptual judgments are complex, multilayered acts—my actual perception can find and motivate linguistic utterances that pick out aspects of the overall perceived state of affairs (I can say that I see the blackbird, the blackbird flying, that the bird is startled, etc.).

In the Sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl expands intentionality with his account of "categorial intuition" (kategoriale Anschauung), a higher-order intuition of complexes founded on sensory intuition that apprehends states of affairs and other non-sensory features of objects. Categorial acts, such as "if . . . then," "and," "or," and so on, have no correlates in the perceived objects but are founded on sensual perceptions and are apprehended intuitively.

Perceptual intentionality, furthermore, always carries an "excess" or superfluity of sense that escapes full articulation in any pronouncement. Perception in that sense has a filled character that provides the intuitive basis for true judgments. Thus, crucially, for Husserl, the paradigm case of a successful intentional act is an act where the meaning is fulfilled by the presence in intuition of the intended object with full "bodily presence" (Leibhaftigkeit). Actual perception is the paradigm case of fulfilled intuition (albeit that the object always presents in profiles or shadings, Abschattungen). The perceived object is directly presented as a whole—even if it is really presented as possessing an indefinite number of further profiles that can be brought into view.

Perception is the primal or "originary" form of intuiting, whereas memory and imagination are reproductive modifications of perception. Memory is a form of "calling to mind" or "re-presenting" (Vergegenwärtigung) that no longer has the distinctive bodily presence that characterizes perception. Imagining is yet another form of presenting which posits an object somewhat detached from perceptual surroundings. Empty or "signitive" intentions, for Husserl, constitute the largest class of our conscious acts, and have a particular relevance in mathematics and scientific discourse where signs are manipulated in an empty way but ultimately, for Husserl, must be grounded in fulfilled intuitions. Some (Kelly 2002) interpret Husserl's empty intentions as non-sensory hypotheses or postulations, e.g., the perceiver theorizes about what the backside of the house looks like from seeing the front-side directly. But Husserl (and, following him, Merleau-Ponty) denies such empty intentions are cognitive projections. They are non-cognitive intuitions not filled with sensory content (Hopp 2015) but pregnant with determinable possibilities that are in part given through embodied potential for action and movement (drawing nearer, moving behind, etc.). Husserl conceives of the structure of intentionality as essentially a dynamic movement of empty intentions towards fulfillment. Furthermore, there are different degrees of fulfillment. Husserl also connects intentionality with the manner that objectivities have "self-givenness" (Selbstgegebenheit) in experience, a phenomenon he often calls "self-evidence" (Evidenz), and which he strongly distinguished from psychological feelings of certainty. Husserl sees intentionality and evidence as essentially correlated:

The concept of any intentionality whatever—any life-process of consciousness—of something or other—and the concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving of something—its (Selbstgebung) is essentially correlated. (FTL §60, p. 160)

Perfect evidence, for Husserl, involves the grasping of the object in full givenness and with the clarity and distinctness appropriate to it.

The mature Husserl, after Ideas I, expanded his account of intentionality to include the manner in which the object-intending involves contexts ("horizons") that manifest themselves in the temporal flow of a unified "nexus of consciousness" (Bewusstseinszusammenhang, Husserl 1969: 159). In Ideas I also, he introduced a novel language for intentionality, namely, the "fundamental correlation between noesis and noema" (Husserl 2014: 181). The terminology is Greek: noesis, "thought," and noema, "that which is thought." The "noesis" is "the concretely complete intentional experience, designated with the emphasis on its noetic components" (Husserl 2014: 192), e.g., perceiving, remembering, and so on; whereas noema means the object (a perceptual thing, quality, relation, or a state-of-affairs) of a conscious intention precisely as it is apprehended in the noetic act. Ideas I also introduces the notions of the "natural attitude" (die natürliche Einstellung), the
pheno

The noema obtained after "bracketing" (Abschattung) or "parenthesis" meant to bring noetic-noematic structures into view.

Not to be overlooked thereby is the phenomenological reduction (die phänomenologische Reduktion) that requires us "to bracket" ([einzuklammern]) [the actual process of] making the judgment, insofar as we want to obtain just the pure noema of the experience of judgment. (Husserl 2014: 187)

From Ideas Husserl's inquiry into intentionality is carried out in "the transcendental attitude" (Husserl 2014: 172), suspending the existential belief-component (Seinsglaube), to allow the constituting (noetic-noematic) structures to become visible undistorted by naturalistic assumptions. Lived experiences are to be considered solely in their "mode of givenness" (Gegebenheitsweise), i.e., the manner they are displayed to the experiencing subject, purified of everything transcendent or "worldly." "The real relation that actually obtains between perception and what is perceived is suspended" (Husserl 2014: 175), allowing Husserl to focus on the "objectivity meant as such; the objectivity in quotation marks" (Husserl 2014: 185). Husserl speaks of apprehending the "transcendental stream of experience in pure immanence" (Husserl 2014: 175), i.e., in its experiential character without imposition of mundane assumptions and presuppositions drawn from natural life, from science, and specifically from psychology.

Every conscious experience is a "real" psychic event, one that takes place primarily in worldly time, with its own specific "real" parts and temporal phases. On the other hand, after all reference to this natural and psychological world is suspended, there remains a structured, intentional experience that aims at or is about something, an intentional object that is not a real part of the intending act. I perceive this blooming apple tree, and not just the side-profile that it currently presents. The apple tree, moreover, has the "sense" of being an external or "transcendental" thing, an enduring spatiotemporal physical entity. The noema "tree" means the intentional object in the reduced experience, i.e., the tree as seen through the window. It is always possible, through a disciplined shift of focus, to move from the "really obtaining components" of the intentional experience (the current actual glimpse of the tree that presents itself) and it is also possible to shift focus in the other direction to the "intentional object"—the seen tree as such (Husserl 2014: 198). The intentional object is still distinct from the actual tree. When I remember the tree in the garden, the remembered tree is not identical to the physical tree. As Husserl puts it, the actual tree can burn up whereas the "remembered tree" cannot. Husserl uses the term "noema" to pick out the intentional object as it is intended, but he also acknowledges that there must be some noematic core (a "determinable X") that allows the remembered tree and the seen tree to be about the same tree.

Husserl recognized that all objects that occupy space are apprehended in "profiles" or "adumbrations" (Abschattungen), and their essence is never exhausted by these profiles. An object is always further determinable and portends ever-new contexts in which these prefigured experiences can be fulfilled. Physical objects present with an "excess" (Überschuss), whereby their determinate features are supplemented with a horizon of indeterminacy of features that can be explored in further perceptions (Hopp 2001). Husserl speaks of "modes of indeterminate suggestion and non-intuitive co-presence" (Husserl 2014: 183) that are wrapped up in the experience.

Husserl also maintained, following Brentano and the Cartesian tradition, that mental experiences themselves are presented not in profiles but as they are; their esse is percipi. On this account, experiences in themselves are incorrigible; one has first-person authority over them, although what is disclosed may contain hidden depth dimensions (such as the a priori temporal structures of the experiences) that require further phenomenological unpacking.

Husserl's noema is a rich but somewhat ambiguous and underdeveloped notion. One popular position is that the noema is an abstract, ideal entity (similar to a Fregean sense) that acts to determine the reference of a thought whose only relation to the actuality is that the latter instantiates it (Falссesdal 1978: 190, followed by Dreyfus), what has been called an "ontological" characterization of the noema. While Husserl agrees that the ideal sense (Sinn) is one component of the full noema, viz. its "noematic core" (Kern), which guarantees sameness of reference across different thoughts of the same entity, this identical sense is not identical with the noema but is at best one "layer" (Schicht) of the noema (Drummond and Embree 1992). Husserl writes:

A noematic sense "inhabits" each of these experiences, and however much this sense may be related in the diverse experiences, indeed, however essentially alike it may be in terms of its core composition (Kernbestand), in experiences of different kinds it is a noematic sense of a different kind in each case. (Husserl 2014: 181)

There are further dimensions of the noema that make it not exactly equivalent to a Fregean sense. The noema is a particular "this," whereas a sense is universal. A noema includes essentially the various possible modes of apprehension of the object. On this basis, Aron Gurwitsch (in Drummond and Embree 1992) argued that the noema consists of the series of possible apprehensions or appearances of the intentional object (and Sartre follows Gurwitsch here). On this account, the noema simply is the object as understood in a certain way, and no new ontological entity is being postulated. Sokolowski (1984) and Drummond (1990) propose a more nuanced account according to which noema and its intentional object are a unity in a manifold.

From around 1908, Husserl develops an original transcendental idealism that asserts that all "sense and being" is the outcome of intentional constitution of transcendentally subjectivity (Husserl 1970: 204). Thus, in Cartesian Meditations, he claims that "phenomenology is eo ipso 'transcendental idealism,' though in a fundamentally and essentially new sense" (Husserl 1960: 86). He elaborates:

The proof of this idealism is therefore phenomenology itself. Only someone who misunderstands either the deepest sense of intentional method, or that of transcendental reduction, or perhaps both, can attempt to separate phenomenology from transcendental idealism. (Husserl 1960: 86)
The intentional method is transcendental. Husserl regularly portrays Descartes as the first original discoverer of intentionality “which makes up the essence of egological life” (Husserl 1970: 82), even though, Husserl maintains, Descartes in fact lost sight of the true significance of intentionality by retreating into metaphysical dogmatism. Nevertheless, Husserl adopts the Cartesian-style construction, *ego cogito cogitatum*, to express the structure of intentionality or “having something consciously” [*etwas bewussthaben*] (Husserl 1970: 82).

For Husserl, a physical object, apprehended phenomenologically, supports a potentially indefinite number of possible modes of access to it. Hence Husserl speaks of the intended object as “an idea in the Kantian sense” (Husserl 2014: 284). Intentional objects already contain the possible modes of approach to them as a series of lawfully related noema. The aspectual shapes or modes of approach to the object can be visualized as “windows” or avenues of approach to the object, set up in an essentially predetermined way. Thus, in the Amsterdam Lectures, Husserl describes the noema of a house in a house-perception as opening onto an infinite horizon of other possible profiles of the house.

The question immediately arises as to how come it is evident that this pointing-ahead belongs to the phenomenon-in-consciousness? How come this horizon-consciousness refers us in fact to further actually unexperienced traits of the same “phenomenon”? Certainly this is already an interpretation which goes beyond the moment of experiencing, which we have called the “horizon-consciousness,” which is, indeed, as is easily determined, completely non-intuitive and thus in and of itself empty. (Husserl 1997: 226–7)

In his mature works, Husserl expands his earlier analyses of the specific features of intentional objects to consider the non-objectual intentionality of horizons, fringes, and ultimately of the life-world (L Lebenswelt) that is “always already there” but can never be objectified. In *Ideas I* Husserl defines the “horizon” as “what is co-given’ but not genuinely” (Husserl 2014: 77) and, in *Experience and Judgment*, he speaks of “the horizon of typical pre-acquaintance in which every object in pregiven” (Husserl 1973: 150). Husserl believed he had made a genuine breakthrough with his concept of horizon-intentionality (*Horizont-Intentionalität*), originally inspired by William James. Husserl’s “horizon-intentionality” is later taken up by Gурwitsch and Merleau-Ponty (Walton 2003), to explicate the complex manners in which experiences are framed by temporal and other horizons that have their own vague but real significance.

In *Crisis of European Sciences* Husserl claimed his real philosophical breakthrough came in 1898 when he realized that there was a “universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness” (Husserl 1970: 166n). Every object must be understood not solely as it is “in itself” but in necessary relation to the subjective acts that disclose it. Anything that is—whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs—is “an index of a subjective system of correlations” (Husserl 1970: 165). This “correlationism” accounts for the whole manner of human being in the world (including the temporality of experience with its horizons of past and future): Intentionality covers the whole of conscious life; everything is an achievement or accomplishment of intentional consciousness: “nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual and potential performance of my own consciousness [Bewusstseinsleistung]” (Husserl 1969: 234). Life is intentional, “accomplishing” life with its potentially infinite horizons of intentional implication, uniting together into the collective experience known as spirit. As Husserl writes in the *Crisis*:

Conscious life is through and through an intentionally accomplishing life [intentional leistendes Leben] through which the life-world . . . in part attains anew and in part has already attained its meaning and validity. All real mundane objectivity is constituted accomplishment in this sense, including that of men and animals. (Husserl 1970: 204)

Moreover, sense-giving should not be understood as a solipsistic, individualist form of meaning-loading, carried out by isolated Cartesian egos that are not in communion with one another, but rather as an interactive, collective, social, historically embedded experience, an experience of interconnected subjects operating within the horizon of the life-world. Husserl speaks of the “interweaving” (Ineinanderseind) of human intentional existence, a conception subsequently taken up by Merleau-Ponty (Moran 2015). Subjectivity exists within a nexus of other intentional subjects:

But each soul also stands in community [Vergemeinschaftung] with others which are intentionally interrelated, that is, in a purely intentional, internally and essentially closed nexus [Zusammenhang], that of intersubjectivity. (Husserl 1970: 238)

There is, for Husserl, a network of interacting subjects or agents adding up to a “we-subjectivity” or “we-community” (Wir-Gemeinschaft, Husserl 1954: 418). Husserl speaks of an “intersubjective harmony [intersubjective Einstimigkeit] of validity” (Husserl 1970: 165). Indeed, as Husserl will insist, the very idea of objectivity as such, of a common objective world—including and perhaps most especially scientific objectivity—is not a given brute fact of experience but a unique and particular achievement of subjects cooperating together. Naive experience does not even raise the issue of objectivity. It simply lives in its experiences with an originary primal belief, an “acceptance character” (Urglaube). It is the task of transcendental phenomenology to uncover the hidden intentionalities at work in the constitution of normal experiential life.

### 30.4 Martin Heidegger: Intentionality Reconfigured as Care and Transcendence

In his lectures Martin Heidegger (1985; 1989) offered a sustained critique of the Cartesian metaphysical presuppositions he claimed underpinned Husserlian intentionality,
leading him, in *Being and Time*, to abandon the term "intentionality" in favor of talking of the "transcendence" of human existence (Dasein) and its caring manner of "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 1962). As Heidegger puts it, because of its uninterrogated metaphysical baggage, "intentionality" is the very last word that should be used as a phenomenological slogan. In *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962), Heidegger avoids key Husserlian formulations, e.g., intentionality, epoché, noesis-noema, consciousness, *ego-cogito-cogitatum*, and instead proposes a new way of describing human existence (Dasein) as "care" (Sorge), running-ahead of itself, and "transcendence."

In his 1927 *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* lectures, Heidegger sees the "enigmatic phenomenon of intentionality" (Heidegger 1982: 58) as designating a problem rather than a solution (see also Heidegger 1984: 134). Heidegger rejects as "Cartesian" the framing of the key question of intentionality as the problem of representation: "How can this ego with its intentional experiences get outside of its sphere of experience and assume a relation to an extant world?" (Heidegger 1982: 61). Heidegger implicates Husserl in this representationalist form of intentionality. Heidegger also claims, essentially repeating Husserl's critique of Brentano, that the nature of the intentional relation has been misconstrued either as a real relation between two extant things, or, as in Brentano, as an *immanent* relation between the mind and its private contents, replicating the inherent representationalism of modern philosophy since Descartes. Husserl, according to Heidegger, lacks an ontological characterization of conscious intentional life:

> It is not intentionality as such that is metaphysically dogmatic but what is built under its structure [Struktur], or is left at this level because of a traditional tendency not to question that of which it is presumably the structure, and what this sense of structure itself means. (Heidegger 1985: 46–7)

Heidegger claims that Husserl failed to interrogate the "being of the intentional" (*Sein des Intentionalen*, Heidegger 1982: 161). In his 1928 lectures, Heidegger proclaims: "The intentional relation must be founded on the 'being-with' or 'being-by' of Dasein" (*Sein-bei*, Heidegger 1984: 134). Intentionality is a form of "ontic" transcendence that can only be understood if Dasein's more basic "ontological" transcendence is understood (Heidegger 1984: 135); and in 1927: "Intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence. Transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality in its diverse modes" (Heidegger 1982: 65). Human existence is self-transcending: "Dasein is itself the passage across [Überschritt]" (Heidegger 1984: 165), and "transcendence means surpassing" (*Transzendenz bedeutet Überstieg*). Heidegger conceives that Husserl also conceived of intentionality in terms of transcendence but he rejects Husserl's subjectivist orientation. Heidegger recasts the problem of intentionality as: How does Dasein encounter entities within its world? (Heidegger 1962: 417–18). This leads Heidegger to a fundamental interrogation of Dasein's "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 1982: 164). As Heidegger writes in "On the Essence of Ground":

> We name word that towards which Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1998: 109)

Heidegger rejects the model of detached knowing as the primary mode of human engagement with the world. He claims that Husserl prioritized the disinterested, perceptual, or theoretical inspection of a thing as the primary mode of being-in-the-world, whereas Heidegger contends that priority must be given to the pragmatic, interested, goal-oriented engagement with things. Things manifest themselves as tools or equipment to accomplish specific goals in a set of "in-order-to's." The hammer's essence is exhibited in utilizing it correctly—not by sitting back and looking at it. Detached "theoretical" inspection is secondary and derivative to the original, concerned involvement. This pragmatic account of concerned involvement—combined with a reading of Merleau-Ponty's motor intentionality—inspired Hubert L. Dreyfus's concept of "skillful coping" (Dreyfus 1991), although Dreyfus somewhat unfairly contrasts Heideggerian copying with Husserl's representationalism and cognitivism. Dreyfus downplays Husserl's own account of habitual, pragmatic, "operative" intentionality in *Ideas II*, Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see, more accurately incorporated Husserl's account of practical lived engagement with the world in his account of embodied, habitual, motor intentionality.

### 30.5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Motor Intentionality and the "Intentional Arc"

French phenomenology—Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—continued to affirm intentionality as central to human existence. Sartre stressed that Husserl's doctrine of intentionality, in opposition to Kantian epistemology, restores consciousness's direct contact with the world: "Husserl has restored to things their horror and their charm" (Sartre 1970). Sartre rejects a representationalist, immanentist account of intentionality; intentionality is precisely transcendence toward the world, even in imagining what is imagined transcends consciousness: "Consciousness has no inside" (Sartre 1970: 5); it is a "nothingness" that is always oriented to what-it-is-not.

Merleau-Ponty criticized any intellectualism that "treats the experience of the world as a pure act of constituting consciousness" (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 253), but he claims Husserl has a different account:

> Husserl's originality lies beyond the notion of intentionality; rather, it is found in the elaboration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath the intentionality of representations, of a more profound intentionality, which others have called existence. (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 530 n. 57)
In *Phenomenology of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty 2012), Merleau-Ponty develops his notion of "operative intentionality" (l'intentionnalité opérante), based on Husserl's "functioning intentionality" (fungierende Intentionalität) (Husserl 1969, 234; and Husserl 1973: 48), where Husserl talks of a hidden intentionality buried in "sedimentations." Merleau-Ponty develops the non-objectifying, lived-body intentionality expressed in Husserl's "I can" or "I do." Merleau-Ponty says that "consciousness is originally not an 'I think that' but rather an 'I can'" (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 139), taking up Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* §98, where he speaks of an "accomplishing" (leistende) subjectivity that is more than the purely actual; it also consists of "abilities" (Vermögen)—"I can" (ich kann) and "I do" (ich tue, Husserl 1969: 246).

Merleau-Ponty correctly identified Husserl's advance beyond objectifying intentionality in the discovery of "operative intentionality" (Husserl's fungierende Intentionalität), characterized by anonymity and passivity. Operative intentionality is a pre-conscious intentionality that presents the world in which we find ourselves as something already there (Husserl's *Geradehineinleben*). Merleau-Ponty dubs this unreflective, habitual, bodily intentionality "motor intentionality" (intentionnalité motrice, Merleau-Ponty 2012: 133). Motor intentionality is a pervasive structure of life, achieved by the functioning, active body in its capacity for self-movements (kinaesthesis).

The *locus classicus* for Merleau-Ponty's concept of pre-conscious motor intentionality is his famous analysis of the case of Schneider, where he critiques the Gestalt psychologists Gelb and Goldstein's interpretation of their patient (see Mooney 2011; Jensen 2009; Kelly 2000). Schneider's case illustrates how pathological conditions indicate breakdown in the circuit of operative intentionality. Gelb and Goldstein thought Schneider could carry out *habitual* but not spontaneous actions and concluded that habitual movements enjoy a privileged position in the schema of possible bodily movements. Merleau-Ponty argues, in contrast, that Schneider's capacity for habitual activity was *as impaired as his capacity for spontaneous activity because his entire being-in-the-world is disrupted.*

Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between the intentionality of *pointing* and that of *grasping.* Schneider cannot accomplish pointing but can scratch where a mosquito bites him. Grasping is already *with* the object, Merleau-Ponty says, whereas pointing requires separation between hand and object. Pointing is a kind of prefiguration of more cognitive intentionality, which intends an absent object; grasping is embodied practical engagement with the lived environment. This skillful unreflective bodily intentionality is what Dreyfus calls "copying"—"situation-specific skillful copying" (Dreyfus 2007: 352), "everyday skillful copying" (Dreyfus 1991: 67). As Dreyfus elucidates: "Merleau-Ponty understands motor-intentionality as *the way the body tends* toward an optimal grip of its object" (Dreyfus 2007: 65).

Merleau-Ponty rejects a purely active or intellectualist account of intentionality and argues that not all intentional activity can be construed as "constitution": "The world is not an object whose law of constitution I have in my possession" (Merleau-Ponty 2012: lxxiv). The body knows the world better than I do, he claims.

In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty employs the phrase "intentional arc," borrowed from the German psychologist Franz Fischer who, in analyzing the experience of space and time among schizophrenic patients (Fischer 1930), speaks of an "intentional arc" (intentionaler Bogen) binding them to the world. For Merleau-Ponty, the life of consciousness is "underpinned by an 'intentional arc' [arc intentionnel] that projects around us our past, our future, our human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation and our moral situation, or rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships" (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 137). This "intentional arc" is an overarching framework that connects the subject to the world and unifies its life, holding everything together in a coherent, meaningful way. Dreyfus links the "intentional arc" to J. J. Gibson's ideas of the "solicitations" and "affordances" in the environment (Gibson 1979). Dreyfus says Merleau-Ponty's "intentional arc" names the "tight connection between the agent and the world... as the agent acquires skills, these skills are 'stored', not as representations in the mind but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world" (Dreyfus 2007: 367). Dreyfus writes:

> The idea of an intentional arc is meant to capture the idea that all past experience is projected back into the world. The best representation of the world is thus the world itself. (Dreyfus 2007: 373)

Drawing on Husserl's *Ideas II*, for Merleau-Ponty, bodily movement ("motricity") is an integral aspect of all perception and there is an inextricable intertwining between bodily perception and the sensuous way the world appears:

> My mobile body makes a difference in the visible world, being a part of it; that is why I can steer it through the visible. Conversely it is just as true that vision is attached to movement. We see only what we look at. What would vision be without eye movement? (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 162)

Merleau-Ponty's account of embodied perception has provided a paradigm for cognitive scientists wishing to move away from predominantly cognitivist accounts towards enactive accounts of perception. Merleau-Ponty has also inspired the "naturalized phenomenology" of Francesco Varela (Petitot, Varela et al. 1999; Zahavi 2010) and Evan Thompson (2007).

### 30.6 The Feminist Critique: Iris Marion Young on Inhibited Intentionality

Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Schneider, and especially of his supposedly damaged relationship to his sexuality (e.g., he no longer is aroused by pornography or experiences
kisses as sexual), has been criticized by Judith Butler (1989), who commends Merleau-Ponty for situating sexuality centrally as a “current of existence” that pervades life and is intentional “in the sense that it modalises a relationship between an embodied subject and a concrete situation” (Butler 1989), but criticizes his “tacit normative assumption about the heterosexual character of sexuality” and especially the characterization of male sexuality as a disembodied gaze towards a decontextualized female body. Iris Marion Young develops this relationship between intentionality and gender in her classic 1979 paper “Throwing Like a Girl” (Young 2005), influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s and Simone de Beauvoir’s discussions of situated embodiment. Young writes:

There is no situation, however, without embodied location and interaction. Conversely, the body as lived is always layered with social and historical meaning and is not some primitive matter prior to or underlying economic and political relations or cultural meanings. (Young 2005: 7)

Young starts from a critical reading of Erwin Straus’ “The Upright Posture” (Straus 1966). She claims—against Straus, who assumes women and men exhibit innately different bodily styles—that women’s “inhibited” bodily intentionality has been constituted through cultural norms. Applying Husserl’s conception of the lived body as experienced in a series of “I can’ts,” Young claims that there is a parallel series of “I can’ts” that have culturally been imposed on women:

For any lived body, the world appears as the system of possibilities that are correlative to its intentions. For any lived body, moreover, the world also appears to be populated with opacities and resistances correlative to its own limits and frustrations. For any bodily existence, that is, an “I cannot” may appear to set limits to the “I can.” To the extent that feminine bodily existence is an inhibited intentionality, however, the same set of possibilities that appears to be correlative to its intentions also appears to be a system of frustrations correlative to its hesitancies. (Young 2005: 37)

Young maintains that women’s “inhibited intentionality” is based on the cultural norms of a particular society. As a result, woman, she claims, retains “a distance from her body as transcending movement and from engagement in the world’s possibilities” (Young 2005: 39). Young’s account of the intentional constitution of gender and bodily style is an interesting development of the phenomenological approach to intentionality that has led to phenomenological explorations of gender, race, and vulnerability.

30.7 Conclusion

Phenomenology’s discussions of intentionality begin within the Brentanian framework, featuring problems concerning the intentional relation, the intentional object, and the overall scope of intentionality as the supposed “mark of the mental.” Husserl elevated intentionality to a central position in all conscious life and made breakthrough contributions with his essential descriptions of perception, memory, imagining, time-consciousness, as well as the functioning intentionality of practical embodied capacities. Heidegger emphasized the ecstatic, transcendentals and the being-in-theworld, with a powerful account of moods as essentially world-disclosing. Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty all characterize human intentional existence as transcendence towards the world, presenting subjectivity as essentially running beyond itself, world-disclosing, and sense-giving. Finally, the manner of embodied being-in-the-world raises issues about the experiences of sex and gender as they are constituted socially and historically, issues that analytic philosophers are now beginning to explore.

The analytic philosophical tradition has tended to develop intentionality largely from Brentano rather than Husserl. Roderick M. Chisholm (1967; 1989), interpreting Brentano, recast intentionality in a primarily linguistic formulation (“sentences about believing,” Chisholm 1955–6). For Chisholm, intentionality is a set of specific logical and semantic features (failure of substitutivity; existential generalization, intentionalness) of sentences containing “psychological” verbs designating mental acts. For Chisholm, the resistance of these logical features to a purely extensionalist treatment demonstrated the ineliminability of intentionality. This led to the distinction between intentionality (as a mental phenomenon) and intentionality-with-an-s, a logical or semantic feature referring to the non-substitutability of a term across contexts (Guttenplan 1994; Jacob 2013a).

Chisholm’s linguistic version of intentionality influenced Willard van Orman Quine (1960), Daniel C. Dennett (1987), with his heuristic notion of the “intentional stance,” as a user interface for predicting behavior, ultimately eliminable in favor of a physicalist account, and John Searle (1983) who argues that intentionality is an ineliminable “groundfloor” property of the mind (Morgan 2013a). Dennett’s and Searle’s accounts of intentionality reproduce many features found in Husserlian phenomenology, e.g., intentionality as an attitude, the recognition of “aspectual shape,” and the “background” of skills and capacities—although both deny any direct influence (Searle 2005). Searle’s distinction between “background” (bodily capacities) and “network” (framework of beliefs) roughly reproduces Husserl’s own distinctions between bodily habitual functioning intentionality and horizon-intentionality, although Searle considers background to be non-intentional whereas for Husserl it is a preperceptual intentionality.

A decisive difference remains, however. Whereas Searle and Dennett want to naturalize intentionality, phenomenological approaches to intentionality offer compelling alternatives to theories of intentionality wedded to representationism and naturalism. Representation, for phenomenology, is simply one or several ways in which objects are intended. Imagining something, depicting it, and so on, are distinct modes of representing. Not all intentionality reduces to representation. Embodied habitual intentional actions, for instance, are primarily non-representational, and touch is a good example of non-representational, intentional sensuous perception. The focus on embodied and embedded “being-in-the-world” is a particular feature of the
phenomenological tradition, although it is now reemerging in the activistic approach to cognition (Evans Thompson 2007; Noè 2005). Entirely original in phenomenology is the focus on non-objectifying forms of intentionality, e.g., on the phenomenology of "horizons" and "saturated" phenomena such as laughter or love which are meaning-laden without being object-directed in a narrow sense (Marion 2002). Phenomenology has a unique interest in the experience of "world" that is encountered as "always already" "pre-given" in a harmonious manner and as outrunning all possible intentional objectification. Phenomenology considers intentionality to be essential for understanding the philosophical issues clustered around conscious subjectivity, lived embodiment (Husserl 1969), the experience of "otherness" or "alterity" (Fremderführung), and the apprehension of other human subjects in empathy (Einfühlung), leading to wider meditations on intersubjectivity, sociality, historicality, and worldhood. As Husserl boldly proclaims: "Intentionality is the title which stands for the only actual and genuine way of explaining, making intelligible. To go back to the intentional origins and unities of the formation of meaning is to proceed toward a comprehension which, once achieved (which is, of course, an ideal case), would leave no meaningful question unanswered" (Husserl 1970: 168).

References


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