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Edited by Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew R. Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez,
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THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Edited by

GIOVANNI STANGHELLINI
MATTHEW R. BROOME
ANTHONY VINCENT FERNANDEZ
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OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Contributors

xv

1. Introduction 1
GIOVANNI STANGHELLINI, MATTHEW R. BROOME,
ANTHONY VINCENT FERNANDEZ, PAOLO FUSAR-POLI,
ANDREA RABALLO, AND RENÉ ROSFORT

SECTION ONE: HISTORY

SECTION EDITORS: ANTHONY VINCENT FERNANDEZ AND RENÉ ROSFORT

2. Edmund Husserl 11
ROBERTA DE MONTICELLI
3. The Role of Psychology According to Edith Stein 20
ANGELA ALES BELLO
4. Martin Heidegger 25
ANTHONY VINCENT FERNANDEZ
5. Jean-Paul Sartre 35
ANTHONY HATZIMOYSIS
6. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, and Psychopathology 42
MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE
7. Simone de Beauvoir 51
SHANNON M. MUSSETT
8. Max Scheler 57
JOHN CUTTING
9. Hans-Georg Gadamer 63
ANDRZEJ WIERCINSKI
10. Paul Ricoeur 72
RENÉ ROSFORT

11. Emmanuel Levinas RICHARD A. COHEN	80
12. Critiques and Integrations of Phenomenology: Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze FEDERICO LEONI	88
13. Karl Jaspers MATTHIAS BORMUTH	96
14. Eugène Minkowski ANNICK URFER-PARNAS	104
15. Ludwig Binswanger KLAUS HOFFMANN AND ROMAN KNORR	111
16. Medard Boss FRANZ MAYR	118
17. Erwin Straus THOMAS FUCHS	126
18. Ernst Kretschmer MARIO ROSSI MONTI	134
19. Hubertus Tellenbach STEFANO MICALI	141
20. Kimura Bin JAMES PHILLIPS	148
21. Wolfgang Blankenburg MARTIN HEINZE	157
22. Franco Basaglia JOHN FOOT	165
23. Frantz Fanon LEWIS R. GORDON	173
24. R. D. Laing ALLAN BEVERIDGE	182

SECTION TWO: FOUNDATIONS AND METHODS

SECTION EDITORS: ANTHONY VINCENT FERNANDEZ AND RENÉ ROSFORT	
25. On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology ANTHONY VINCENT FERNANDEZ AND ALLAN KØSTER	191
26. The Phenomenological Approach DERMOT MORAN	205
27. Clinical Phenomenology: Descriptive, Structural, and Transcendental Phenomenology DOROTHÉE LEGRAND	216
28. Genetic Phenomenology ANTHONY STEINBOCK	225
29. Phenomenology and Hermeneutics RENÉ ROSFORT	235
30. Introspection, Phenomenology, and Psychopathology LOUIS SASS AND ADAM FISHMAN	248
31. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences SHAUN GALLAGHER	262
32. Phenomenology, Naturalism, and the Neurosciences MASSIMILIANO ARAGONA	273
33. Normality SARA HEINÄMAA AND JOONA TAIPALE	284

SECTION THREE: KEY CONCEPTS

SECTION EDITORS: MATTHEW R. BROOME AND GIOVANNI STANGHELLINI	
34. Self DAN ZAHAVI	299
35. Emotion RENÉ ROSFORT	306

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CHAPTER 26

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL
APPROACH

DERMOT MORAN

INTRODUCTION: PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE
SCIENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY

PHENOMENOLOGY, broadly speaking, involves the careful, unprejudiced *description* of conscious, lived experiences (Husserl's *Erlebnisse*), precisely according to the manner that they are experienced, without the imposition of external explanatory frameworks, whether these be drawn from the natural or social sciences, from religion, or even from common sense or ordinary language use. In this sense, phenomenology seeks to remain true to what conscious experience—understood in the widest possible sense—reveals to the disciplined observer. Phenomenology, then, must be loyal to the way our experiences are actually given to us (we shall come back to the problem of the right kind of language for describing experiences). Phenomenology aims to recuperate our responses to experience and, in particular, to resist reductionist, scientific efforts to displace the richness of experience with a narrower, usually more naturalistic account of experience.

The enduring appeal of phenomenology is that it respects the importance and centrality of the first-person point of view. Phenomenology is, as Husserl put it, a science of subjectivity, but it is also a science of subjectivity embodied, embedded, and involved in the intersubjective constitution of objectivity. Phenomenology continues to attract interest because of its strong defence of the ineliminability of subjectivity and its detailed analyses of the structures of conscious life and of the "life-world," the ordinary, everyday, pre-scientific world that we inhabit. Phenomenologists can begin from their own experience, but they are open to understanding other people's experiences, as they are experienced (examples can be found in real life, in literature, or, simply, through the process of imaginative variation, a procedure that Husserl himself practiced). In other words, close attention must be paid to the subject's own account of their experiences, emotions, and how they form their general sense of matters that affect them.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH: "BACK TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES"

Phenomenology as a movement is usually said to have begun with Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (Husserl 2001), although it has an earlier inauguration in the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano (Brentano 1995), who was Husserl's mentor for a period in Vienna. Through Husserl's students and followers, it developed into a major philosophical movement in Europe (especially Germany and France) and subsequently in the United States and internationally. The main figures (Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Schutz, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) developed phenomenology in different directions and did not necessarily agree on the central tenets of the approach (Moran 2000). Phenomenology, then, should be understood as a general *approach* rather than a strict *method*. Different phenomenologists, of course, have developed different approaches. Nevertheless, there are certain commonalities which can be observed as broadly characterizing the phenomenological approach. It is best to think of phenomenology not as a set of specific philosophical commitments but rather a disciplined approach that wishes to remain open to the role of subjectivity in the constitution of various forms of objectivity.

Husserl's original slogan was: "Back to the Things Themselves [*Zu den Sachen selbst*]" (Husserl 2001: 168). And this phrase soon became the catch-cry of the phenomenological movement. Husserl means that phenomenology should avoid metaphysical speculation or other forms of theorizing, and, making use of description rather than causal explanation, attempt to gain insight into the *essences* of all kinds of phenomena. Husserl's Freiburg colleague and former assistant, Martin Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, emphasized the specifically *methodological* dimension of phenomenology:

The expression "phenomenology" signifies primarily a *methodological conception*. This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the *how* of that research.

(Heidegger 1962: 50)

Heidegger wants to develop phenomenology as a way of making phenomena manifest. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines phenomenology as "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger 1962: 58). This formulation is close to that found in Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences*: "to take the conscious life, completely without prejudice, just as what it quite immediately gives itself, as itself, to be" (Husserl 1970: 233). In both Husserl and Heidegger, then, phenomenology aims at manifestation. At the same time, there is a strong injunction not to tamper with this disclosure or revelation but rather to allow it to manifest itself in its own peculiar way. Human subjects are, as Robert Sokolowski puts it, agents of disclosure, "agents of truth" (Sokolowski 2008).

There is an essential double-sidedness—often called "correlation" to phenomenological intuition. There is, on the one hand, *the object meant* or intended and, on the other hand, *the act of meaning or intending* it. Traditional philosophy has tended to emphasize one or the other side of this correlation (i.e. objectivist or subjectivist) and has rarely sought to give credit to the essential subject-object relation and the manner in which experience vacillates backwards and forwards between an object-focus and a subject-focus. Phenomenology

argues that the objective view—what Merleau-Ponty calls, in his 1945 *Phenomenology of Perception*, "the view from nowhere [*la vue de nulle part*]" (Merleau-Ponty 2012)—is achieved only by abstracting from the original first-person stance with which humans engage with the world.

Phenomenology, then, offers an important corrective, analyzing and describing the structure of consciousness, intentionality, and embodied being-in-the-world in a way which does not lose sight of the *first-person* perspective, that is, subjectivity both singular and plural (Husserl speaks of the "we-world [*Wir-Welt*]"). For phenomenology, human beings are embodied, intentional meaning-makers, acting and suffering in a surrounding world (the "life-world"), and their subjective slant on matters is not just an annoying inconvenience for the objectivist sciences. Rather, it has to be acknowledged as the very medium of human existence and as the necessary condition for objectivity to be possible. This means phenomenology essentially involves understanding intentionality, the fact that all our lived experiences are about something, have some kind of significance, which is linked to a whole nexus or web of motivations and other intentional implications.

PHENOMENOLOGY AS INTENTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF MEANINGFUL EXISTENCE

Phenomenology essentially *is* intentional description, that is, it aims to describe all kinds of objects in terms of their correlation with subjectivity. Furthermore, phenomenology maintains that intentionality is all-pervasive; all aspects of life involve a coming together of subjective attitude and objective meaning. Besides the intentionality of cognitive states (such as believing, knowing), the intentional structures of perceptions, feelings, moods and emotions, acts of willing and deciding, as well as all kinds of habitual practices, are primary topics of exploration for phenomenologists.

Phenomenology may be characterized initially, very broadly, as a practice of attending to matters that manifest themselves to us ("phenomena" in the widest sense of the word). For Husserl, this meant understanding precisely the essential nature of perception, memory, imagination, temporal consciousness, and other forms of "calling to mind [*Vergegenwärtigung*]," and how these different conscious modalities interweave seamlessly in the stream of consciousness. What is the nature of perception? How are objects experienced in perception? What is their "mode of givenness"? How does perception become altered into a memory or a fantasy? These are typical phenomenological questions. Traditionally, phenomenologists have attempted to describe the essential features of conscious cognitive life, with specific studies of perception (Merleau-Ponty 2012), memory, imagination (Sartre 1962), willing (Pfänder 1967), valuing (Scheler 1973), and judging, but phenomenologists have also sought to describe affective life, feelings, emotions (Sartre 1971; Vendrell Ferran 2015), moods, existential concerns, and various dimensions of lived embodiment (Husserl 1989), and, more generally, "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger's *In-der-Welt-Sein*, Heidegger 1962; and Merleau-Ponty's *être-au-monde*, Merleau-Ponty 2012).

Phenomenological insights (which Husserl called "intuitions [*Anschauungen*]") are understood to be insights into the essential natures of matters (what Husserl called "essential

seeing [*Wesensschau*]) that can be read off the phenomena by the trained observer. This intuitionist emphasis has been dismissed as a form of unreliable introspection by its critics (Searle 2000, 2005), but phenomenologists insist that the universal structural features of the experience can be uncovered by remaining attentive to the experience as it unfolds or as it is captured in unprejudiced reflection.

Phenomenology is a discipline, therefore, that tries to be extremely sensitive to the varieties of ways in which *meaning* presents itself to us as living, conscious, embodied subjects embedded in a shared environment, or “life-world [*Lebenswelt*]” (Husserl 1970). For phenomenology, this meaning is not necessarily tied to language and for this reason phenomenologists emphasize the intrinsic meaning involved in pre-linguistic embodied action and perception, in emotional states, moods, and in one’s overall embodiment (right down to one’s posture, see Straus 1966) and intersubjective relations with others, mediated through empathy (Husserl 1960).

Husserl insisted that phenomenology had to be “presuppositionless”: one should not presuppose the results of the sciences or even the judgments of common sense. A large part of Husserl’s concern is to emphasize the complexity of even simple acts of seeing. There is always, for instance, a combination of present and absent moments, to see the front side is at the same time to have an empty intending apprehension of the rear side of an object in the form of a determinable indeterminacy. It is important not to think that visual perception first and foremost involves “visual sensations,” “stimuli,” and so on (standard ways of describing experience found in philosophy and psychology since Locke). These descriptions are *not* faithful descriptions of experience, but rather they involve reference to putative theoretical entities (“sense data,” “qualia,” “stimuli,” and so on). First and foremost, one sees physical, spatial entities in the world already endowed with sense, a *flowering apple tree* in the garden (Husserl 2014: 180); one certainly does not *see* sense data, mere patches of green, or some other kind of postulated intermediate entity. Furthermore, as Heidegger emphasizes, what one sees is constrained by one’s background assumptions and by the overall context of the “environment [*Umwelt*]” and “life-world [*Lebenswelt*]”. A craftsperson can identify the appropriate tools for a particular task and immediately sees what needs to be done. The gardener identifies some plants as *flowers* and others as *weeds*, not based on botanical classification but based on their usefulness and appropriateness in the context of gardening (itself a cultural and historically inflected practice). This is what Heidegger means when he says we first encounter objects in a practical way as “ready-to-hand [*zuhanden*]” rather than merely as “present-at-hand [*vorhanden*]”, objects merely theoretically apprehended, shorn of their context of usefulness (Heidegger 1962; Dreyfus 1991).

Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is regarded as one of the most creative and original works of philosophy of the twentieth century. Central to Heidegger’s achievement in this work is his radical way of approaching human existence, which both makes the nature of human existence unfamiliar and startling (described in entirely novel terms) and at the same time recognizes the human being’s inescapable hunger for familiarity, its anchoring in the routines of the everyday, its self-recognition in terms of the quotidian. Part of Heidegger’s originality lies in the way that he emphasizes the “historicality” of human existence. It is not just that all humans live in history and have a history but that their orientation to existence is such as to be intrinsically historical. Being historical is an a priori condition of being human. Human existence then has to be understood in terms of its overall temporal dimensions

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION: BREAKING WITH THE NATURAL ATTITUDE

Many phenomenologists follow Husserl in insisting that phenomenological description can only be practiced within the performance of the phenomenological reduction. Following the straightforward descriptive psychology of the *Logical Investigations*, around 1905, Husserl realized that he needed to apply a methodological break (which he called *epoché*, borrowing from the Greek Skeptics) with the pre-philosophical “natural” attitude in order to contemplate how meanings and significance are constituted and come to assume the “natural” character that they present to us in ordinary experience. In his *Ideas I*, for instance, Husserl speaks of *epoché* as rigorous “exclusion [*Ausschaltung*]” and an “abstention [*Enthaltung*]” from employing the methods or propositions of the philosophical tradition (Husserl 2014: 52). The *epoché* and the associated “phenomenological reductions” are meant to allow the nature of the experiences to become manifest without distortion and to *lead back* (Latin: *reducere*) to the apprehension of the essential (“eidetic”) structures, contents, and objects and how they interconnect with other forms of consciousness. To filter out distortions produced by our everyday, straightforward assumptions and presuppositions (which need not be scientific assumptions, but could include religious beliefs, cultural values, and so on), Husserl proposes a process of suspension or bracketing (*epoché*) and a set of phenomenological and transcendental “reductions” as essential to the phenomenological method.

Heidegger, however, does not make explicit use of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, whereas Husserl thought it as essential to the point of claiming that anyone who misunderstood the importance of the reduction could not be doing phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty accepted a modified version of the phenomenological reduction. He famously said that the lesson of Husserl’s reduction was that it could not be carried out to completion because it ran up against the indissoluble life-world—this “rupture can teach us nothing but the unmotivated springing forth of the world” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: lxxvii).

THE NATURAL AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL ATTITUDES

One of phenomenology’s greatest and most useful discoveries is that of “the natural attitude [*die natürliche Einstellung*]”—a term Husserl uses from at least as early as 1906–07 but which emerges in print in *Ideas I* (Husserl 2014: 48). Because phenomenology focuses on the manner of experiencing, it necessarily involves interrupting natural, straightforward experiencing (as carried out in what Husserl calls “the natural attitude”). According to Husserl, in our everyday practices and routines, we are in a certain attitude (“the natural attitude”) toward things and toward the world, and somehow this is a state of self-forgetfulness. The world presents itself as simply there, given, available to us.

In his mature works, Husserl articulates in some detail the meaning of mundane life in the “natural attitude,” which involves all aspects of human engagement with others and with

the world as a whole (Landgrebe 1940), the very experience of “being-in-the-world” that Heidegger later explicitly thematizes in *Being and Time*. Disrupting the natural attitude and undermining its hold on us will be central to Husserl’s practice of the phenomenological method. By applying a deliberate “exclusion,” “suspension,” or “bracketing” (*epoché*) of our straightforward commitments, phenomenology hopes to uncover the necessary structures that govern the essence of experiences as such, including the particular character they have in the natural mode of experiencing. This led Husserl in particular to adopt a transcendental stance, which sees consciousness as somehow antecedent to the world, and strongly to oppose all forms of naturalism.

SUBJECTIVITY AS EMBODIED, EMBEDDED, AND ENWORLDED

As Husserl’s phenomenology developed, he increasingly emphasized that we are *incarnate*, that is to say, embodied, *situated*, *finite* human beings, already in the world and for whom the world has a given, taken-for-granted, “natural” status. Husserl himself speaks of the “phenomenology of embodiment [*Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit*].” Similarly, he attended to the enworlded nature of our experience. Much of Husserl’s puzzlement came from trying to figure out how it is that the lived world comes to have this *taken-for-grantedness*, *self-giveness*, and *obviousness* in the natural attitude. Of course, this situatedness and locatedness went on to become the theme of “*In-der-Welt-sein*” in Heidegger or “*être-au-monde*” in Merleau-Ponty.

Phenomenology puts special focus on identifying the a priori frameworks involved in the stream of a coherent, unified conscious life (not just spatiality and temporality, as in the Kantian tradition, but also the a priori structures of human, embodied, social being-in-the-world). Initially phenomenologists, moreover, concentrated primarily on *individual* conscious life, but they (Husserl, Scheler, Stein) soon explored the apprehension of others (in empathy, Scheler 2008), and the constitution of communal, social, and cultural life, indeed the historical dimension of human existence. Classic phenomenology—primarily the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Alfred Schutz, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—proposed a very broad program of research that included essential analyses of all the central aspects of human existence: intentionality, consciousness, perception, embodiment, the “horizontal” nature of experiences, the dimensions of lived temporality, the experience of one’s self, the experience of others in “empathy [*Einfühlung*]” (Stein 1989), the experience of alterity, more generally, and intersubjectivity, as well as in the understanding of social relations (Stein 2000), intersubjectivity, historicity, sociality, and the whole vague but real experience of “worldhood” (i.e. belonging to an open-ended “life-world” as the ultimate horizon of all experience). Indeed, the classical phenomenological tradition is still a rich source of analyses of phenomena such as imagination, memory, emotions, moods, liminal experiences, the complex character of embodiment or incarnation (with its essential finitude), the experience of lived temporality and historicity, as well as humans’ experience of tools, artworks, and the transformation of life in the modern technological world (Heidegger 1977). More recently, phenomenologists have also attended to

issues of gender following the explorations of Simone de Beauvoir and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Young 2005; Butler 2007) and to the construction of social identity (including the sense of belonging to a “group” or larger collective whole).

Husserl, for instance, claims (and here he strongly influenced Merleau-Ponty) that perception is a multimodal achievement, an intertwining of various sense modalities (sight, touch) and of bodily proprioceptive movements (called “kinaestheses” in the psychological terminology of the time) such as eye movements, hand movements, movements of the body (to get nearer, get a better grip, look more closely), involving looking over the object, pointing, grasping, moving around the object, and so on. The body is in the world as the “heart is in the organism,” Merleau-Ponty declares (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 209). It is our embodied perception that brings the visible and tangible world alive and Merleau-Ponty in particular shows the entanglement or “chiasme” that is constantly at work between the separate senses (e.g. touch and sight), as well as between body and world (Merleau-Ponty 1968). Moreover, disorders of the embodied relation to the world involve a significant modification of the way the world appears. There is a very fine attunement between lived body and world and it is upset in pathological cases, like the case of the brain-damaged former soldier, Schneider, discussed by Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 105–140). Merleau-Ponty’s discussions have inspired a whole phenomenology of embodiment that recognizes the complex manner in which humans are inserted through their “lived,” animate bodies into the environing world.

PHENOMENOLOGY AS INTERPRETIVE AND HERMENEUTICAL

Martin Heidegger, especially in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962), radicalized Husserl’s intentionality to offer a description of human existence (*Dasein*) as essentially *transcending itself* toward the world and developed the conception that human beings can live rather anonymously and “inauthentically” as “the one [*das Man*],” simply following the crowd and doing as others do. But humans can also, through the deep, highly individualizing, existential experience of anxiety (*Angst*), face up to their own intrinsic finitude and mortality and can come face to face with their authentic singularity and freedom to project themselves into a future that they deliberately choose.

Heidegger’s introduction of *hermeneutics* (i.e. the theory of interpretation) into phenomenology was a way of neutralizing or at least exposing the operation of prejudice in our understanding. Prejudices for him cannot be eliminated, but at least they can be made transparent, acknowledged, and our corresponding insights put in correlation with these pre-judgments so that our understanding progressed in a “circular” manner (the hermeneutic circle), going backwards and forwards between what is understood and the manner in which it is understood. Heidegger—inspired by Wilhelm Dilthey—combined hermeneutics, the art of interpretative understanding, with phenomenology. Heidegger argued—against Husserl—that pure, unprejudiced description is impossible, since all understanding takes place with the horizon of presuppositions that are essential for the understanding to take place. At best, unrecognized presuppositions or “pre-judgments [*Vorurteilen*]” can be made manifest but they

can never be entirely dispensed with. Furthermore, language is essential to understanding and communication, and language always has a particular slant or leaning. Both Heidegger and his student Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasize the centrality of the human capacity for “linguisticity [*Sprachlichkeit*].” As Gadamer asserts in his 1960 *Truth and Method*, “language is the medium of the hermeneutic experience,” that is, language is the medium in which understanding is realized (Gadamer 1989: 384). Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology focuses more on uncovering the essential “*existentiale*” framework governing what is pre-given and assumed in human existence’s (*Dasein*’s) practical engagement with the world of interests and “in-order-to’s.” For Heidegger, humans are already embedded (“*immer schon da*”) in a pre-formed, and largely intuitively apprehended, historical and cultural world. Moreover, they are oriented primarily to the future, and the past is always implicitly interpreted in terms of this future project.

Gadamer’s own hermeneutics is heavily indebted to phenomenology. He sees his hermeneutics as making manifest or displaying “the matters themselves [*die Sachen selbst*],” shedding light on the essence of these matters in what he calls an “illumination of essence [*Wesenserhellung*].” In fact, hermeneutics, for Gadamer, is the project of self-understanding and understanding others, and as such it can be said to develop a *phenomenology* of the very process of understanding (*Verstehen*).

EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology came to France in the 1930s, primarily through Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre (especially *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre 1995), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology now takes on an existential dimension and issues concerning human existence, the experience of freedom, of anxiety, of alienation, the expectation of one’s own death, and one’s concerned dealings with others, now come to the fore. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty emphasized human embodiment, facticity, being in a situation, the experience of freedom and the experience of being forced to choose in the absence of any objective norms governing the choice. Thus, for example, Sartre, in his 1938 novel *Nausea* (Sartre 1965) describes the experience of vertigo (e.g. standing on a cliff ledge) as precisely the sense of anxiety that overcomes one when one realizes that one’s freedom is entirely in one’s own hands. The vertigo is not the recognition of the possibility of falling but of the experienced freedom of taking responsibility for the decision *not to jump*.

Merleau-Ponty considered Husserl’s emphasis on the *epoché* and phenomenological reduction to be both crucial but problematic. As we saw earlier, Merleau-Ponty denies the possibility of a complete reduction. One can never completely detach oneself from the life-world in which we are embodied and embedded. For Merleau-Ponty, the practice of phenomenological seeing is meant to disrupt the everyday. In his *Phenomenology of Perception*, he writes: “true philosophy entails learning to see the world anew” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: lxxxv). Philosophy will shed light on the “birth of being” for us. Phenomenology aims at “disclosure of the world [*révélation du monde*]” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: lxxvii); its task is to reveal the mystery of the world.

Phenomenological description and taking seriously the obvious experiential evidence that people’s emotions, feelings, and moods are intentional (i.e. are about something and are obviously meaningful in some manner) was a very important insight for psychologists and

psychiatrists especially in the 1920s. The early phenomenologists, especially Max Scheler and Edith Stein, discussed feelings and emotions. Right at the heart of this approach is that people’s moods and traumas are modalities of being-in-the-world. These experiences are lived deeply in the body, in a person’s self-experience and in their experience with others. In this regard, Heidegger has made significant contributions with his analyses of “fundamental moods [*Grundstimmungen*],” “disposition/state of mind/attunement [*Befindlichkeit*],” and the experience of “thrownness [*Geworfenheit*],” finding oneself always thrown into a situation. Heidegger is famous for locating authentic self-understanding in a deep anxiety which comes over each human existence at some point. Anxiety is not like fear, a relationship to something in particular, but has as its object one’s whole being-in-the-world. One’s whole being is experienced as groundless and unsupported. Sartre develops this with his account of vertigo—where one experiences one’s own absolute freedom. Vertigo is not so much the fear of falling as the fear of jumping. One’s inner freedom is limitless and in this sense truly terrifying, opening up before one like a yawning chasm.

THE APPLICATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

It is not difficult to see the benefits of phenomenological description for medical diagnoses, for example, the correct recognition of symptoms, and so on. One can also see that literature is a vast repository of such proto-phenomenological description and disambiguation, for example, consider the explorations of jealousy, possessiveness, envy, and so on, in Shakespeare. Of course, the ability to make fine discriminations (as in the case of the professional wine-taster) has to be matched with an equal ability to translate these discriminations into appropriately fine-grained linguistic communication. Literary description has the phenomenological character of being a description from the subjective point of view but of course it has not been methodologically refined and distilled through the techniques of disengagement and bracketing that phenomenology brings to bear. Presumably, literary descriptions do aim at a universality and hence have the claim to eidetic character that phenomenology also seeks. Husserl himself recognized this problem but did not address it centrally, at least until some of his later writings, for instance his essay “On the Origin of Geometry” (Husserl 1970) where he accords to written language an enormously important role in fixing the meanings of ideal objectivities such as occur in mathematics so that they can be accessed as the same over and over again. For Heidegger, however, the issue of language became inescapable and marked a major turning in his conception of phenomenology and its possibilities. Subsequent phenomenology has had to grapple with the complexity of the relationship between language and experience in ways that have frequently challenged many of Husserl’s assumptions. This is the case with Jacques Derrida, for instance, insofar as his work is motivated by phenomenology and continues to work within the phenomenological *epoché*, as he himself has attested (Derrida 2011).

Initially, when it originally emerged in Husserl and Scheler, interest in phenomenology was more or less confined to academic philosophy. But it was soon taken up and adapted by other disciplines in the social and human sciences, for example, psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, sociology, literary theory, art criticism, cultural studies, religious studies, and more recently, film theory, gender and identity studies, and studies concerned with human

embodiment and intersubjectivity. Both as a strict method and, more generally, as a theoretical approach, phenomenology is now well established not only within theoretical philosophy, but also in various forms of sociology (Schutz 1967; Schutz and Luckmann 1973, 1983), psychology (Gurwitsch 1964), psychiatry and psychotherapy (Binswanger 1963; Straus 1964, 1966; Giorgi 1970, 2009; Gendlin 1981; Heidegger 2001), and, more recently, as a method of qualitative analysis in the social and health sciences (Smith, Flowers, and Larkin 2009). Phenomenology continues to provide a rich resource of procedures and perspectives for illuminating human experiences.

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