


# The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy



Edited by Dermot Moran

# INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS AN ASSESSMENT OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

*Dermot Moran*

## The long twentieth century

What is the legacy of twentieth-century philosophy? Or, to adapt the question originally asked (in relation to Hegel) by the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866–1952):<sup>1</sup> What is living and what is dead in twentieth-century philosophy? The sheer range and diversity of the philosophical contribution is surely one of the century's most singular characteristics. As the century fades into memory, so many of the great philosophers associated with it have also passed away: Rudolf Carnap (d. 1970), Martin Heidegger (d. 1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (d. 1980), Simone de Beauvoir (d. 1986), A. J. Ayer (d. 1989), Emmanuel Levinas (d. 1995), Gilles Deleuze (d. 1995), Thomas Kuhn (d. 1996), W. V. O. Quine (d. 2000), Elizabeth Anscombe (d. 2001), David Lewis (d. 2001), Hans-Georg Gadamer (d. 2002), John Rawls (d. 2002), Robert Nozick (d. 2002), Donald Davidson (d. 2003), Bernard Williams (d. 2003), and more recently Jacques Derrida (d. 2004), Peter Strawson (d. 2006), Jean Baudrillard (d. 2007) and Richard Rorty (d. 2007). When one thinks of the names that were current at the beginning of that century – Croce, Bradley, McTaggart, Pritchard, Joachim, Collingwood, Whitehead, Duhem, Husserl, Natorp, Dilthey, James, Dewey, Cassirer, Josiah Royce, George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars, to name but a few<sup>2</sup> – one realizes just what a rich and varied legacy of philosophy the century has produced and how great is the span that separates those who opened the century from those who closed it.

How can we even begin to appreciate the philosophical heritage of that turbulent, terrifying, but enormously productive period? To review such a vast repertoire of philosophy is certainly challenging. Developing a critical assessment of twentieth-century philosophy, then, one that identifies accurately its main accomplishments (avoiding ideological distortion and clannishness) as well as the problems it bequeaths

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to current thinking, is a remarkably complex and demanding affair, but nonetheless it stands as an important, even urgent, task, one that calls for judgement and decision.<sup>3</sup>

Given that historians are apt to speak of "long" centuries, certainly the twentieth century must now seem one of the longest. This tumultuous period was characterized by world wars, the rise and fall of Communist, fascist, and totalitarian states, the invention of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, genocide, famine, anti-colonial struggles, globalization and technologization on an enormous scale. Rapid scientific and technological advances were coupled with political catastrophes and dramatic events of a scale hitherto unimagined. But we are still too close and the century in many ways – not least in terms of its intellectual legacy – remains an undigested mass for us, we who are still living so completely in its shadow.

Thinking specifically of philosophy, there probably has never been a time when there have been so many professional philosophers at work in universities across the world. Yet what has been their contribution? Perhaps, for most of the century, one could say that the nineteenth-century Karl Marx and his twentieth-century followers, including Lenin and Mao, were the most influential philosophers in terms of the scale of their practical impact stretching over almost half the globe (including the countries of the USSR, China, North Korea, Cuba, as well as in Central and South America). In terms of impact, one can also name the great public intellectuals in the West: Jean-Paul Sartre ( "the philosopher of the twentieth century,"<sup>4</sup> who turned down a Nobel Prize) and Bertrand Russell, united in their opposition to the Vietnam War; or, much earlier, John Dewey who campaigned for progressive education; or the displaced intellectual Hannah Arendt, reporting on the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem;<sup>5</sup> or the roles of Noam Chomsky (a prominent critic of US political engagements), Richard Rorty,<sup>6</sup> Bernard Henri-Lévy<sup>7</sup> or Slavoj Žižek today. There is undoubtedly a public appetite for philosophy in many countries; think of the public interest in the philosophical dissertations on happiness, such as that by Alain de Botton;<sup>8</sup> or perhaps an interest in philosophical *lives*, witness the popularity of Ray Monk's biography of Wittgenstein.<sup>9</sup> One cannot overestimate the extraordinary influence of A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*, especially the manner in which it was developed by those who wanted to argue that moral and religious statements were in fact literally meaningless. While, perhaps, Roger Scruton's defense of fox-hunting<sup>10</sup> in England is not momentous enough to be counted here, certainly Peter Singer's book *Animal Liberation* sparked enormous public debate about the ethical treatment of animals, for which he argued on utilitarian grounds on the basis of animal sentience.<sup>11</sup> Existentialism was perhaps the first great philosophical movement (since the ancient Greek movements such as Stoicism, Skepticism, or Epicureanism) to have had popular support among the masses and even to become a fashion for a time in the mid-century. There are philosophers who preached engagement and critique (for instance, Sartre, or the Frankfurt School), and those who recommended skeptical distance and irony (Rorty). On the other hand, many of the more exciting technical advances in philosophy have been produced by retiring figures working relatively unseen, absorbed in their research (one thinks of Wittgenstein, Kripke, Husserl, Levinas, or Rawls), who contributed little to public debate.

## Continuities, discontinuities, novelties

Philosophy does seem to have undergone enormous changes in the course of the century, but it also has diversified into many different and competing forms. New disciplines have emerged: from mathematical logic and meta-ethics to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of psychology; from philosophy of gender and embodiment to environmental philosophy (or "ecosophy" as founded by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess).<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, to date, there have been remarkably few academic studies of twentieth-century philosophy in its interconnections although there are some studies of specific traditions.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, it is noteworthy that even the ten-volume *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* contains no entry for "Twentieth-century philosophy,"<sup>14</sup> yet it is clear that the very meaning of philosophy changed in profound ways in that century, ways that are certainly not even documented, never mind fully understood. It is important, then, to document the commonalities and continuities; to identify the transformations, discontinuities, dead-ends and sheer novelties.

In terms of continuity, many aspects of philosophical *practice* in the twentieth century follow on directly from patterns set in the nineteenth century, e.g. the academic *professionalization* and *specialization* of the subject, begun in the nineteenth century, became all-pervasive during the twentieth, such that the independent, non-institutionally funded scholar contributing substantially to a discussion is now almost an extinct species (apart from some dissidents who emerged in the former USSR and elsewhere). Philosophy is now carried out, almost universally, in universities and higher research academies. Yet, a most important – and indeed novel – feature of the ongoing professionalization of philosophy has been the entrance of women into the philosophers' academy. Rosa Luxemburg emerged in Germany quite early in the century, and, partly because women were the majority of university students during the First World War in Germany, Edmund Husserl became one of the first major philosophers to attract a sizable number of women students and assistants in his Freiburg years. Hedwig Conrad Martius, Edith Stein, and Gerda Walther all studied with him, even if he was not always supportive of these women's desire to continue to professional careers in philosophy.<sup>15</sup> In fact, women philosophers in Germany were active in removing institutional constraints;<sup>16</sup> e.g. both Hannah Arendt and Edith Stein promoted equality of education between women and men. In England, Elizabeth Anscombe emerged as Wittgenstein's student at Cambridge in the 1940s, and acted as his editor, translator, and interpreter, before going on to develop her own path as an original and influential philosopher, especially in the area of philosophy of mind and action.<sup>17</sup> Anscombe also opposed the Second World War and was an active critic of the American President, Harry Truman, for his actions in relation to the dropping of atomic bombs on Japanese cities.

Following on from Simone de Beauvoir, a whole generation of women philosophers emerged in France, leading to a particular tradition which includes Julia Kristeva (born in Bulgaria but educated in a French school), H el ene Cixious, Luce Irigaray, Sarah Kofman, and Mich ele Le D œuff (see "Feminism in philosophy," Chapter 7). In

Britain, prominent women philosophers include: Philippa Foot, Onora O'Neill, Susan Stebbing, Sarah Waterlow Broadie; in the US: Ruth Barcan Marcus, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Christine Korsgaard, Martha Nussbaum, and Judith Jarvis Thomson; in Australia, Genevieve Lloyd.<sup>18</sup> Women not only entered the academy to work in traditional areas, but often transformed the debate in certain areas, introduced new topics, and made ground-breaking contributions (Ruth Marcus in logic; Judith Jarvis Thomson in the area of the ethics of abortion). Following on from the theme of feminism, new areas have emerged that include issues surrounding the philosophy of gender and lately "queer theory," which has overlapped the boundaries of philosophy and linked it more with disciplines of social criticism.

Thinking of technical breakthroughs, it is easy to point to the development of modern mathematical logic (with Frege, Russell, and Whitehead), modal logic (the logic of necessity and possibility, begun by Aristotle but formalized in the twentieth century by C. I. Lewis, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Saul Kripke, and others), temporal logic (A. N. Prior), the discovery of the incompleteness of formal systems (Gödel), and many more logical innovations. It is less easy to find solutions to perennial philosophical problems or revolutionary new approaches to ethical and political issues that have gained the status of scientific discoveries. As always, the human world is extremely complex and escapes the exact lawfulness found in the natural sciences, and there is no clearly identifiable progress in moral concepts. As the German Critical Theorist Theodor Adorno once put it, "No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the atom bomb."<sup>19</sup> In moral philosophy, for instance, the argument continues to rage about whether statements such as: "slavery is and always has been wrong," is an objectively true proposition.

With respect to direct continuities in philosophy across the centuries, it is remarkable how many of the issues that were discussed so vitally at the start of twentieth century, e.g. the nature of consciousness, perception, space and time, the meaning of naturalism, the nature of the a priori, the proper methodology of the human sciences, and so on, continue to be vigorously debated at the century's end. The descriptive phenomenology of inner time consciousness is as much an issue now as it was one hundred years ago when Husserl was giving his 1905 lectures on time-consciousness, at a time when Bergson and James were also focusing on the temporal nature of consciousness. Time-consciousness certainly has been a major focus of discussion among European philosophers such as Jacques Derrida;<sup>20</sup> whereas, in the UK and USA, McTaggart's discussions of temporal flux, with his A- and B-series continue to provoke discussion concerning the unreality of time, by A. N. Prior, Richard Swinburne, Hilary Putnam, Sidney Shoemaker, and others.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, William James's interest in the existence and nature of consciousness<sup>22</sup> is surely replicated in the work of David Chalmers and others writing about the "hard problem" of consciousness.<sup>23</sup> It is hard to believe that the metaphysics of internal relations that so preoccupied the British Idealists should again be a matter of discussion among contemporary analytic metaphysics (see "Metaphysics," Chapter 10).

In some cases, the continuities are of a different kind: where a subject seems to appear and disappear only to reappear again some time later. The issue of embodiment

is one such issue which gets a very full discussion by Husserl in his *Ideas II* (written between 1912 and 1918 but not published until 1952), is continued in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945) and is again a hot topic among philosophers, including analytic philosophers of mind.<sup>24</sup> Essentialism is also a theme that surfaces and disappears at regular intervals across the century (Husserl, Wittgenstein, Kripke, et al.). Other kinds of continuities are of a more persistent kind. Thus, in "Moral Philosophy" (Chapter 20), Rowland Stout even suggests, somewhat paradoxically, that the great philosophers of twentieth-century moral philosophy continued to be Aristotle, Hume, and Kant! Continuities of this kind are also evident in the manner in which both epistemology and analytic philosophy of religion have managed to continue to talk, in ever more refined ways, about traditional problems such as the nature of knowledge, skepticism, and the meaning of faith. Arguments concerning the existence of God or the compatibility of the divine attributes continue in the work of Anthony Kenny, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Nelson Pike, and others, refining and sharpening debates to be found in Anselm, Aquinas, or Descartes. One could say the same for aesthetics, whose central task, as suggested by Paul Guyer (Chapter 22), has been to respond to Plato's questioning of the arts as a form of lie (*pseudos*).

The rise and rise of *naturalism* is surely one of the most important of the continuities to be acknowledged in philosophy over the course of the twentieth century. As Geert Keil has shown in "Naturalism" (Chapter 6), in 1922 Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) could confidently declare: "We are all naturalists now," and at the end of the century that claim would look quite accurate for large swathes of contemporary epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, where naturalisms of varying kinds have flourished (see Geert Keil's nuanced discussion). In keeping with this recognition of the growth of naturalism, Edmund Husserl, in his 1911 essay "Philosophy as a rigorous science," diagnosed it as the greatest threat to the possibility of a genuinely scientific philosophy. Yet despite the popularity of naturalism, there has also been a constant counter-movement, and especially since the 1970s there has been a strong resurgence of transcendental philosophy and persistent arguments advanced that the normative cannot be naturalized (see "Kant in the twentieth century," Chapter 4).<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, following on from early twentieth-century neo-Kantians such as Rickert and Natorp, Husserlian phenomenology also adopted a resolutely post-Kantian transcendental position against naturalism, arguing that objectivity can only ever be objectivity-correlated-with-subjectivity and denying even the meaningfulness of talking about things in themselves independent of the subjective knower. Indeed, the manner in which Kant and Hegel continue to haunt twentieth-century discussions is reflected in this volume by two chapters devoted respectively to Kant and to Hegel (see Chapters 4 and 3). So much for the continuities.

In terms of novelties, some philosophical disciplines certainly seem to be new. In "Philosophy of Language" (Chapter 9), Jason Stanley makes a strong case for philosophy of language as making a unique twentieth-century contribution, although the precise nature of the contribution has to be carefully nuanced. As Jason Stanley contends,

The Twentieth Century was the century of "linguistic philosophy," not because all or even most philosophical problems have been resolved or dissolved by appeal to language, but because areas of philosophy that involved meaning and content became immeasurably more sophisticated.

Contemporary discussions of meaning, content, and reference, are indeed far more sophisticated than anything to be found in Bolzano, Mill, or even Frege. So there is certainly progress in philosophy in terms of increasing discriminations and disambiguations of complex concepts. Of course, technical refinements are not confined to one tradition. As Nicholas Davey shows in "Twentieth-century hermeneutics" (Chapter 16), the linguistic turn in twentieth-century thought owes as much to Heidegger and Gadamer, in their opposition to the Cartesian "philosophy of consciousness", as it does to Frege and Wittgenstein, and furthermore, evidence of a linguistic turn in German philosophy can be traced back to the Enlightenment with Hamann and others.<sup>26</sup> In particular, this tradition points up the holistic nature of the linguistic enterprise and the fact that the subject (speaker and hearer) cannot be disengaged from the practice of linguistic communication and miscommunication.

Along with philosophy of language, one could also argue that philosophy of science emerges decisively in twentieth-century philosophy as a distinct discipline. Indeed, there has been an explosion of interest in the logic and philosophy of science from the 1930s onwards, as Stathis Psillos documents in "Philosophy of science" (Chapter 14), and, especially as developed by members of the Vienna Circle and others, who put science at the centre of philosophy's concerns.<sup>27</sup> But even here there are continuities, especially in the vigorous debate over the nature of the a priori, which continues in the work of Reichenbach (and following him Putnam and others) with the puzzling notion of the revisable a priori.

### The ongoing legacy of the nineteenth century

It is an obvious truism to assert that to understand the twentieth century one must begin in the nineteenth. Many different traditions in contemporary philosophy have a common origin in nineteenth-century problematics. For instance, in German philosophy during the latter half of the nineteenth century, there were serious efforts to resist the bewitchment of Hegel (who had dominated philosophy in the first half of the nineteenth century). The various schools of neo-Kantianism (Windelband, Cohen, et al.), with their war cry "back to Kant" (*zurück zu Kant*),<sup>28</sup> as well as those inspired by classic British empiricism (and its nineteenth-century representatives, e.g. J. S. Mill), sought to distance themselves from what they considered to be the excessive and ungrounded speculative nature of the Hegelian system.<sup>29</sup> Oddly, in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century, the situation was almost the reverse of that prevailing on the Continent, with neo-Hegelian Idealism in the ascendant with McTaggart at Cambridge; F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), T. H. Greene (1836–82), and Harold Henry Joachim (1868–1938) – all at Oxford, and Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), who translated Hegel's *Aesthetics*, and was for a time President of the Aristotelian Society,

in London. Hegel also continued to have influence in the USA in the late nineteenth century owing to the St Louis Hegelians led by William Torrey Harris (1835–1909) and Henry Conrad Brokmeyer (1828–1906),<sup>30</sup> and was represented by Josiah Royce (1855–1916) at Harvard. Of course, it was against this Hegelian and Bradleyian system that Russell reacted so strongly (albeit that Russell's interest was focused on the logic of relations and defending their reality against Bradley). Similarly, on the European mainland, Kierkegaard too may be seen as leading a defense of the individual and singular against the sweeping universalism of the Hegelian system.

Notwithstanding the onslaught on idealism found in Russell, G. E. Moore,<sup>31</sup> and others, a critique that was foundational for the new analytic movement, idealism in various kinds continued to be found across twentieth-century philosophy. One of Sartre's early teachers at the École Normale Supérieure was Léon Brunschvicg (1869–1944), a neo-Cartesian idealist. In the latter part of the twentieth century (in Germany, partly inspired by Heidegger and Gadamer) there was a huge resurgence of (primarily scholarly) interest in Hegel (e.g. in the Hegel-Archiv in Bochum), but there was also somewhat earlier a strong resurgence of interest in Hegel in France (with Jean Wahl, Jean Hyppolite as well as through the astonishing lectures of Alexandre Kojève<sup>32</sup>), and in the UK and USA with works by J. N. Findlay and Charles Taylor, both movements aiming to restore Hegel's shaken credibility and to show the relevance of his dialectic to current concerns.<sup>33</sup> The rehabilitation of Hegel is now complete (see "Hegelianism in the twentieth century," Chapter 3) in that Hegel has now entered the canon of analytic philosophy, having once been its *bête noire*, in the work of McDowell, Brandom, and others. Whereas Wilfrid Sellars had once claimed that with Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, analytic philosophy passed from its Humean to its Kantian phase, Rorty suggested that with Brandom, analytic philosophy has moved on to the Hegelian phase of analytic philosophy.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, certain central Hegelian concerns run through the work of the Frankfurt School especially in the writings of Marcuse, Adorno, and even Habermas himself, as Axel Honneth has shown in "Critical Theory" (Chapter 18).

Certain philosophical subject areas seem to have developed in direct continuity from the nineteenth century onwards: ethics and epistemology are obvious examples here. Epistemology in the twentieth century, as Matthias Steup argues in Chapter 11, to a large extent remains a response to problems posed by the modern philosophical tradition stemming from Descartes, particularly with regard to the problem of our knowledge of the external world (e.g. Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1914) and in defending the possibility of knowledge against skeptical arguments. The main developments of the twentieth century appear to be new problems (Gettier-type problems that challenge the conception of knowledge as justified true belief)<sup>35</sup> and new efforts at articulating non-foundationalist forms of epistemic justification, but much epistemology in the twentieth century is still based on forms of a priori reasoning familiar in traditional philosophy.

Scholarly interest in the history of philosophy and the production of critical editions of the great philosophers' works continues to develop in a steady stream from the nineteenth through the twentieth century. In terms of continuities, the



main philosophical journals that were important at the turn of the twentieth century, e.g. *Mind* (founded 1876), *The Monist* (founded 1888), *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (the Society was founded in 1880; the *Proceedings* began to be published from 1888), *Philosophical Review* (founded 1892), *Kant-Studien* (founded 1896), *Journal of Philosophy* (founded 1904), continue to flourish – and continue to remain significant – for the dissemination of peer-refereed professional philosophy research.

In the nineteenth century, the scholarly history of philosophy began to be practiced entirely for its own sake, independently of the ideological baggage of Hegelianism for instance, or, to give another example, neo-Thomism, whose advocates (e.g. Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, even Frederick Copleston), wanted to revive the realism found in medieval philosophy, while downplaying the nominalist or even Neoplatonic traditions. This history of philosophy is now flourishing as an independent discipline in its own right and there are serious journals devoted to it (e.g. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* and the *British Journal of the History of Philosophy*), as well as to many of the individual figures (Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and so on). The critical edition of Hegel's works is still being produced at the beginning of the twenty-first century, replacing earlier unsatisfactory editions. Similarly, the works of Plato and Aristotle continue to be edited, translated, and commented on; see the work of W. D. Ross (1877–1971), for instance; and new editions are being produced of classical philosophers and early medieval writers who were almost unknown in the nineteenth century. For example, the elegant nineteenth-century translations of Plato's dialogues by Benjamin Jowett (1817–1893),<sup>36</sup> or Aristotle's major works by W. D. Ross,<sup>37</sup> are gradually being replaced with more contemporary translations, but by no means have been made redundant and are still in common circulation among students. Similarly, the twentieth century has seen an extraordinary growth of knowledge of the later antique tradition, especially Plotinus, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and others, who were first "re-discovered" in the nineteenth century, primarily by students of German Idealism (e.g. F. A. Staudenmaier). The growth in interest in medieval theories of logic, semiotics, and semantics is another indication of a continuation and deepening of nineteenth-century scholarship.

In regard to the history of philosophy, it is important to recognize how recent are many of our historical discoveries; to realize, for example, that more has been learned about all aspects of medieval philosophy in the twentieth century (its figures, texts, sources, and influences) than in the whole period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. Similarly, thanks to the discovery of the 1844 manuscripts, a new version of Marx emerged in the twentieth century, that was highly influential on the thinking of the Frankfurt School (see "Critical Theory," Chapter 18).

### Philosophy at the dawn of the twentieth century

In intellectual terms, one might consider the dawn of the twentieth century to be marked by a number of important events: there was the death of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), and the publication of two works that would transform European thought in very different ways: Sigmund Freud's *Traumdeutung* (*Interpretation of Dreams*, 1899),

which inaugurated psychoanalysis, and Edmund Husserl's *Prolegomena zu reinen Logik* (*Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, 1900), which broke decisively with the prevailing *psychologism* in the understanding of logic and mathematics and led to the development of phenomenology. G. E. Moore's essay "The nature of judgment"<sup>38</sup> appeared in 1899 (for Moore on propositions, see also "The birth of analytic philosophy," Chapter 1) and is often seen as the first paper in analytic philosophy, because of its particular view of the nature of propositions as objective complex entities independent of minds and analyzable into component parts (which had a formative influence on Bertrand Russell).<sup>39</sup> The International Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris in 1900, was also an important event, and Russell later recorded that it represented a turning point in his life, because there he met Peano, whose precision impressed the young Englishman, and, as a result, Russell turned to mathematical logic as *the* methodology for his own philosophy.<sup>40</sup> He wrote a paper which he sent to Peano and even claimed: "Intellectually, the month of September 1900 was the highest point of my life,"<sup>41</sup> and this before any of his own major works had been published and while the *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) was being composed.

One might at first be tempted to see that self-proclaimed "posthumous" man, Friedrich Nietzsche, as the principal philosophical voice of the century. His writings seem to resonate with themes that became vital for the century – the nature of truth, the nature of power relations, the problem of the writing of *history*, the fragmentary nature of inheritance and tradition, the threat of relativism, the naturalization of values, the need for radical and creative critique and destruction – philosophizing with a hammer – in order to free up sedimented meanings, the integration of the human with the rest of nature (especially after Darwin), the exercise of hermeneutic suspicion, with "ears behind one's ears" in the interpretation of others, the ironic probing of dreams of mastery, the recognition of the hidden ties between reason and force. Michel Foucault is clearly one of Nietzsche's direct successors, but Bernard Williams, too, for instance, sees Nietzsche's repudiation of traditional conceptions of truth as crucial for defining contemporary thought. Yet, even Richard Rorty himself, a sympathetic reader of Nietzsche, believed that Nietzsche was really integrated into philosophy only through Heidegger, and before that was a figure of mainly literary inspiration, influencing George Bernard Shaw and others.

In similar fashion, initially Sigmund Freud had little impact on academic philosophy, particularly on the European mainland, in the first half of the twentieth century, apart from the work of Horkheimer and Adorno<sup>42</sup> and Herbert Marcuse<sup>43</sup> (see "Critical Theory," Chapter 18). Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, was seen as having dismissed Freudian analysis in *Being and Nothingness* (1943) with his demolition of the concept of an unconscious that is always unconscious to itself. The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur was important for reinscribing Freud into French philosophy in the latter half of the century.<sup>44</sup> It was not until the 1960s, however, that Freud fully entered the philosophical scene in Europe, with Jacques Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, and Chittari,<sup>45</sup> Kristeva, and others, and even later in the 1970s and 1980s in the UK, with Richard Wollheim, Juliet Mitchell, and others.<sup>46</sup> One reason that delayed the acceptance of psychoanalysis by philosophers was the extremely hostile approach

taken by Karl Popper to the claims of psychoanalysis to be a genuine science (on the grounds of its supposed lack of falsifiability).<sup>47</sup> Indeed, Freud is still left somewhat in the background in academic philosophical discussion; philosophers who are interested in analyzing the emotions, for instance, may advert to his writings, but will quickly go on to develop their independent analyses that pay little more than lip service to the Master.

So, despite their inaugural moments at the turn of the century, perhaps Nietzsche and Freud are not in fact the most representative or archetypal philosophical figures for the twentieth century, certainly if one considers the nature of their respective influences on philosophy. In fact, the pair of names most often advanced (in the work of Richard Rorty among many others) as best representing twentieth-century philosophy are: Heidegger and Wittgenstein, especially after both had made the "linguistic turn" subsequent to their own early publications.<sup>48</sup> The influence of these two philosophers probably outweighs all other philosophers in the twentieth century.

Here, however, I would like to make a case for Edmund Husserl as one of the most influential European philosophers of the twentieth century, who, as Merleau-Ponty put it, casts a long shadow over his times.<sup>49</sup> Almost every European philosopher in the first half of the century had some contact direct or indirect with Husserl (e.g. Heidegger himself, but also Schutz, Levinas, Horkheimer, Adorno, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida).

#### Husserl's "ground-breaking" work

Phenomenology was inaugurated with Husserl's ground-breaking *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical Investigations*, 1900/1901),<sup>50</sup> the second volume of which, appearing from the publisher Max Niemeyer in two parts in 1901, characterized phenomenology as the project of descriptively clarifying the "experiences of thinking and knowing." With this work, Husserl believed he had made a start in clarifying problems that were at the heart of contemporary science and philosophy, problems concerning the nature of the experience and determination of meaning in the broadest sense. In the First Edition, he used the term "phenomenology" to mean a kind of descriptive psychology (such as had been practiced by the school of Brentano, Stumpf, and Meinong). For Husserl, phenomenology was to be a way of describing what shows itself *as it shows itself* in its essential forms. It had to avoid speculation and remain true to the evidential situations, which Husserl somewhat misleadingly called "the things themselves" (*die Sachen selbst*) or "the matters themselves." Husserl's primary principle – a radical variant of empiricism – is to accept as evident only what shows itself to be so in intuition. Intuition is the keystone of his philosophy. Intuition refers to the primary grasp of the presence of entities.

As Husserl put it in the Foreword to the Second Edition, and as he would subsequently stress, the *Investigations* was his "breakthrough work" (*Werk des Durchbruchs*, LU I 3; Hua XVIII 8). It certainly made his reputation as a philosopher, being praised by the foremost philosophers of his day in Germany, including Paul Natorp,<sup>51</sup> Wilhelm Wundt, who welcomed its anti-psychologism, and Wilhelm Dilthey, who saw it as providing the method to investigate lived experiences in their concreteness. In terms

of its philosophical significance, the import of the *Investigations* is many-faceted. On the one hand, it abjured psychologism and defended a broadly Platonist account of numbers, logical forms, and other ideal entities. They are what they are independently of their being thought or known. On the other hand, Husserl recognized that ideal entities and meanings are only reached by consciousness through a set of determinate acts whose essential natures and interconnections can be specified. There are acts of intending meanings, acts of recognizing, judging, and so on. These acts can be understood as themselves making up a framework of idealities. Husserl's subsequent recognition that these idealities are themselves embedded in the transcendental ego moved his thought in a transcendental direction, renewing his links with the more dominant tradition of neo-Kantianism.

Husserl moved to Göttingen in 1901 and, through the influence of the *Investigations* on a group of philosophers in Germany, a phenomenological "movement" (*Bewegung*) began to emerge in the first decade of the century with Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, and subsequently, Max Scheler. Through the fascination which the *Logical Investigations* provoked, Husserl effectively revolutionized existing philosophy in Germany, changing the very way philosophy was practiced, shifting the focus from the history of ideas and from epistemology to an attempt to describe what he called "the things themselves" (*die Sachen selbst*). Until Husserl himself came to have a significant influence, German philosophy had been dominated by neo-Kantianism (divided into the so-called "South German" and "Marburg" schools), which accepted the fact of science and whose project was to specify the preconditions of objective scientific knowledge. Furthermore, united in opposition to Hegelian speculative idealism, various forms of positivism were on the rise in Germany, influenced by John Stuart Mill and the older British empiricist tradition, as well as by Comte. Husserl's teacher, Franz Brentano, for instance, was a strong advocate of this positivism and of the unity of exact philosophy and science. Husserl's phenomenology had a profound effect. Issues of knowledge had to be given a much deeper analysis. No longer could the study of the history of philosophy substitute for philosophy.

The next major transformation of phenomenology took place with the publication of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*) in 1927. Clearly, *Being and Time* had an extraordinary influence on a whole generation, as Hannah Arendt later reported.<sup>52</sup> Heidegger made thinking come alive again! As his student, Hans-Georg Gadamer also wrote with deliberate irony,

Just as might have been the case in fifth-century Athens when the young, under the banners of the new sophistic and Socratic dialectic, vanquished all conventional forms of authority, law, and custom with radical new questions, so too the radicalism of Heidegger's inquiry produced in the German universities an intoxicating effect that left all moderation behind.<sup>53</sup>

As we know, Husserl himself was isolated and humiliated by the rising Nazi movement, a movement in which his successor Heidegger enthusiastically participated.

Any history of twentieth-century philosophy must face that great betrayal of Husserl and of the academy by Heidegger – a betrayal which might be interpreted as being a kind of Nietzschean philosophizing with a hammer. Heidegger hated the ensconced academic practice in the university and saw in Nazism a chance for university renewal and at the same time a vehicle for cultural renewal, or *Erneuerung*, the very term of Husserl's project in the Kaizo lectures of the 1920s.<sup>54</sup> Husserl had claimed that the First World War had exposed the "internal untruthfulness and senselessness" of contemporary culture. In response he sought intellectual renewal through radically self-critical reflection. Heidegger, on the other hand, in his Rectoral Address of 1933, demanded that the university dedicate itself to following the will of the Führer.<sup>55</sup> It would later fall to other German philosophers, notably Jaspers, Habermas, and Adorno, to seek to break Heidegger's spell and to show up his feet of clay. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that Heidegger continues to have enormous influence today, especially in the discussion concerning the meaning of art, poetry, and technology.

#### The revolutionary importance of Gottlob Frege

Just as one could advance the thesis that Husserl is more influential than Heidegger, one could also argue that Frege has been more radical and wide-reaching in his influence than Wittgenstein. Gottlob Frege's importance is undeniable, as many of the chapters in the present volume attest. Like Nietzsche, he too is something of a posthumous figure. Regarded primarily as a mathematician, he had little impact among philosophers in the nineteenth century, apart from on Edmund Husserl who discussed him in the first volume of his *Logical Investigations* (1900). Frege was enormously influential not just on Russell and Wittgenstein but subsequently on discussions in the philosophy of language (his context principle is important for the linguistic turn, as Michael Dummett has argued<sup>56</sup>) (see also "The development of analytic philosophy: Wittgenstein and after," Chapter 2), for philosophy of science (problems raised by the notion of analyticity), philosophy of mind (the meaning of logical, conceptual, and mental "content"), even metaphysics. As Jason Stanley points out, Frege had a particularly modern way of approaching the notion of content (see "The philosophy of language," Chapter 9). Furthermore, as Stanley argues, Frege's account of quantifiers had a lasting impact on the semantics of natural languages. And Frege's views have an important bearing on metaphysics, although he himself paid scant regard to that subject. As E. J. Lowe writes in "Metaphysics" (Chapter 10), first-order quantificational logic in its modern form, as developed by Frege, Russell, and Whitehead, has embedded within it certain important metaphysical assumptions of an ontological character, specifically, the notions of an *atomic proposition* and *quantification*. Frege operated with a rather restricted ontology of individuals and relations, but he set the stage for subsequent discussions in analytic metaphysics. Of course Frege cannot be said to have had universal influence on all areas of philosophy (he had little interest in epistemology or ethics, for instance) but nonetheless he has to be credited with giving twentieth-century analytic philosophy its particular sharpness and distinct style. Like Heidegger, Frege had a dark side. Frege's political beliefs were somewhat naive, to say

the least. He allied himself with Bruno Bauch's right-wing Deutsche Philosophische Gesellschaft (German Philosophical Society), a group that supported Hitler's rise to power. Furthermore, Frege's diary contains anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic sentiments, including the view that Jews should be expelled from Germany.<sup>57</sup>

### Two main traditions: analytic and Continental philosophy

Discussing the relative significance of Husserl or Frege, Heidegger or Wittgenstein, leads naturally to a consideration of a philosophical divide that became prominent from the 1930s onwards. It is generally recognized that one of the most notable features of twentieth-century philosophy is that there developed two dominant intellectual traditions, traditions that in that century began to be named as the "analytic" or "Anglo-American" or "Anglo-Saxon" on the one hand, and "Continental" or "European" on the other. These traditions are widely held to have developed separately, with opposing aspirations and methodologies, and, indeed, to be fundamentally hostile to one another.<sup>58</sup> More careful scrutiny actually shows that these traditions emerge from common sources in nineteenth-century philosophy and address many of the same problematics, albeit with differing emphases and conclusions (both, for instance, are sensitive to language and meaning, aware of the problem of multiple and competing interpretations, sensitive to the challenges of science and technology, and also to the challenges of skepticism and relativism, interested in the nature of intentionality, and so on).<sup>59</sup> Early twentieth-century philosophy in most of its forms was united in its hostility to German Idealism, and its broad suspicion of speculative systems and of ungrounded metaphysics. This suspicion can be found not only among empiricists (such as Mill and Brentano) and positivists (Comte), but also among the German neo-Kantians (who looked to philosophy to provide a kind of logic of science), as well as in Russell and Moore, after they had come to reject the late-flowering British and American neo-Hegelian idealism current in their philosophical youth.

I don't propose here to spend too much time discussing the merits of the labels "analytic" and "Continental," as there is now an enormous literature documenting this divide.<sup>60</sup> In short, Continental philosophers have never been comfortable with the label "Continental," since they see themselves as doing philosophy in the traditional sense – upholding the tradition of historical scholarship, for instance. They see "Continental" as a label imposed on them from without, often from a rather narrow – even Euro-skeptical – British perspective.<sup>61</sup> Philosophers in this tradition have begun to express a preference for describing their tradition as "European philosophy," a title that recognizes the long and unbroken European tradition from the Greeks through to German Idealism, hermeneutics and neo-Kantianism. The problem is that European philosophy includes, alongside Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, and Lacan, such names as LaPlace, Comte, Frege, Carnap, Schlick, Popper, and Wittgenstein. Further it seems to be ceding too much to British Euro-skeptics to exclude such figures as Hume, Mill, Russell, and Ayer from the cast of acceptable "Europeans." On the other hand, the term "European" philosophy also seems unhelpful since it excludes all those in the USA who write about Heidegger, Derrida, and others (e.g. Richard Rorty, John

Sallis, Jack Caputo) in a "Continental" manner. A. P. Martinich and David Sosa are in a similar predicament with regard to the term "analytic" philosophy, which they believe most accurately characterizes the work of Moore and Russell and other British philosophers up to the mid-century.<sup>62</sup> To capture the subsequent development of this philosophy, they suggest the term "Anglo-German philosophy," to recognize the important contribution that Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach, and others made after they emigrated to the United States.

The difficulty in handling the labels of these traditions is mirrored in a difficulty in distinguishing their respective methods. Both attempt to be rigorous, scientific, and to be sensitive to language. There have been suggestions that analytic philosophy is more problem-centered whereas Continental philosophy is more focused on *explication de texte*.<sup>63</sup> Often, however, both traditions circle around the same kinds of problematic. For instance, both traditions have had to grapple with *skepticism* and *relativism*. Relativism, the view that truth or rationality is relative to a particular group of people (a view as old as Protagoras) is a particularly strong tendency to be found across a range of twentieth-century thinkers<sup>64</sup> from John Dewey, Thomas Kuhn,<sup>65</sup> and Wittgenstein to Quine<sup>66</sup> and Putnam; from Nietzsche to Michel Foucault, Derrida and Richard Rorty; even Martin Heidegger has been accused of relativism.<sup>67</sup> Early in the century, Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy of worldviews appeared to Husserl to be leading inevitably to relativism, whereas late in the century Hilary Putnam's espousal of conceptual relativity has also been interpreted as a kind of relativism, since "what there is" is considered to be relative to a particular conceptual scheme. Both traditions show radical shifting of ground and abandonment of their supposed "founding" or "foundationalist" methodologies. In the Continental tradition, Husserl's descriptive phenomenology soon gave rise to Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology and ultimately (partly in reaction to structuralism which itself was reacting to existentialism) to French deconstruction. Deconstruction challenged the notion of fixed, ideal meanings and espoused *différance* and *dissémination*, concepts that suggest the dispersal of significance and the impossibility of final closure in issue of meaning. In analytic philosophy, philosophical confidence in ordinary language was gradually eroded by the problems associated with radical translation (Quine), the recognition of the open plurality of conceptual schemes (Putnam), and the plurality and incommensurability of language-games (later Wittgenstein).

These two most prominent twentieth-century movements, namely, analytic philosophy and phenomenology (I shall leave aside for the time being two other extremely important movements, namely pragmatism and Marxism, which both are in effect reactions against German Idealism), both have their origins in a set of interrelated concerns, namely: the scientific status of logic (and its relation to mathematics); the nature and extent of the new science of psychology, which had been inaugurated in the final quarter of the nineteenth century by Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), his English student E. B. Titchener (1867–1927), and Franz Brentano (1838–1917), among others; and the challenge posed by reductive naturalism to the traditional philosophical enterprise. These problematics are interrelated: prominent philosophers in the nineteenth century (e.g. J. S. Mill) had explained logic in terms of psychology

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and the internal processes of the human mind (so-called "psychologism"), and twentieth-century philosophy begins with Frege, Russell, Husserl, and Wittgenstein all rejecting this explanation in order to defend the ideality and independence of logical truths. A kind of Platonic realism about logical entities (objects, propositions, states of affairs) and a rejection of psychologism are hallmarks of the beginning of twentieth-century philosophy, whether it be that of Moore or Russell or Frege or Husserl.

Bertrand Russell once characterized the nineteenth century as the age of mathematics. It is interesting that the major developments in mathematics and logic were of central interest to philosophers in the twentieth century also including: Husserl, Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein. Quine and Putnam were both fascinated by mathematical logic. Russell and Husserl were both deeply influenced by the crisis of foundations in mathematics and by Cantor's work on infinite numbers. Russell's early work was in the philosophy of mathematics and his famous paradox was not only known to Husserl but may even have been anticipated by him. In the Husserl Archives at Leuven we have the works of Frege, which the author had sent to Husserl, heavily annotated by Husserl, and Husserl in particular makes comments on Frege's context principle, which Michael Dummett sees as one of the inaugural moments of analytic philosophy. In his book *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* Dummett locates the linguistic turn in Frege's 1884 *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, where he articulates the context principle that only in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning.<sup>68</sup> Sentences express thought but the decomposition of thought into its components is achieved through the decomposition of sentences. Dummett sees it as crucial to the rise of analytic philosophy that thoughts were stripped of their subjective mental character, thought was "extruded from the mind" as he puts it. Yet this is precisely true also, as Dummett recognizes, of Husserl. The components of thoughts could be tracked through the composition of language once the "disguised" logic of language had been unmasked.

One way to distinguish the traditions is to look at the role played by logic in the analysis of philosophical concepts. Frege and Husserl – the founders of the analytic and Continental traditions – parted company in their evaluation of the role of mathematical formalization in logic. In 1918, when Russell was sent to jail, he took with him Husserl's *Logical Investigations* with the intention of reviewing it for *Mind*. But the review was never written. The failure to continue the development of symbolic logic was in part due to a deliberate decision by Husserl, who regarded it as a mere formal calculus of no philosophical importance. Husserl was interested in transcendental logic, reviving the Kantian problem of how it is that logical acts achieve objectivity. This issue of the nature of transcendental logic has only in the late twentieth century reappeared in analytic philosophy, inspired by contemporary forms of neo-Kantianism.

It may very well be that the distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy may in the end not prove to be a very useful tool for explicating the meaning of philosophy in the twentieth century. There is ample evidence that philosophers in the USA were unhappy with the distinction, especially as it appeared to be



used primarily for political purposes to assert the validity of some particular approach to philosophy to the exclusion of all others. The sheer diversity of twentieth-century philosophy and its increasing internationalization need other ways of being described. But it is worth looking a little more in detail at the manner in which analytic philosophy evolved over the century.

### The evolution of the tradition of analytic philosophy

Originally, analytic philosophy was presented simply as a method or indeed as *the* method of philosophy. It was primarily understood – by Russell and others – as a method of decompositional analysis. In his “Analytic realism,” for instance, Russell wrote: “the philosophy I espouse is analytic, because it claims that one must discover the simple elements of which complexes are composed, and that complexes presuppose simples, whereas simples do not presuppose complexes.” Morris Weitz, in his *Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition*,<sup>69</sup> lists a number of characteristics of analytic philosophy, including: the refutation of idealism (Russell, Moore), the defence of realism and common sense (Moore), logical analysis (Russell, Ryle), logical positivism (Carnap, Ayer), and a more generic kind of conceptual elucidation. Carnap offers a definition of logical analysis in his *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (1935):

The function of logical analysis is to analyse all knowledge, all assertions of science and of everyday life, in order to make clear the sense of each such assertion and the connections between them. One of the principal tasks of the logical analysis of a given statement is to find out the method of verification for that statement.<sup>70</sup>

Examples of the kind of logical analysis that developed in the tradition actually are of a much broader kind. Consider, for instance, Russell’s theory of descriptions, and, building on that, Ryle’s discussion of systematically misleading expressions.<sup>71</sup> Analytic philosophy was seen as offering a tool-kit for the identification, diagnosis and eventual solution of philosophical problems.

Only gradually was it recognized that analytic philosophy was in fact a historical movement or even a tradition, an idea that gained currency in the last decade of the twentieth century.<sup>72</sup> Certainly, there is a recognition that the nature of the analytic tradition has radically altered over the decades, even if the official ideology, as it were, has resolutely claimed that there has been no change. Indeed, it is now more or less a truism to state that analytic philosophy is a historical tradition which more or less spans the twentieth century itself (certainly from 1905). There is now even talk of “post-analytical philosophy”<sup>73</sup> (see also “The development of analytic philosophy: Wittgenstein and after,” Chapter 2).

Although the older empirical tradition of Hume and Mill is clearly in the background (in the work of Bertrand Russell especially), Gottlob Frege, as we have seen, is usually regarded as the first analytic philosopher insofar as he developed a precise way of talking about logical form (in terms of *function* and *argument*) and

managed to distinguish it from the *grammatical form* of a sentence. As Frege wrote, "Instead of following grammar blindly, the logician ought rather to see his task as that of freeing us from the fetters of language" (quoted in "Philosophical logic," Chapter 8). This allowed Frege to break free of psychologism (and the "psychological" conception of a judgment as the uniting of subject and predicate). Similarly, his distinction between "sense" (*Sinn*) and "reference" or "meaning" (*Bedeutung*) was seen as assisting the kind of clear analysis that would subsequently be favored by philosophers. As Michael Potter comments:

there is nothing deep, of course, in the distinction between a sign and the thing it signifies, nor in the distinction between both of these and the ideas I attach to a sign when I use it. What goes deeper is the claim that if we are to have a satisfying account of language's ability to communicate thoughts from speaker to listener we must appeal to yet a fourth element – what Frege calls sense. (in "The birth of analytic philosophy," Chapter 1)

As early as 1905, Russell's article "On denoting,"<sup>74</sup> which also enshrined the difference between logical and grammatical form, became a model of its kind and the paradigm of analytic philosophy.<sup>75</sup> The task was to free logic of the enslavement in language. In part this would lead to the pressure to develop ideal languages; it also led to the recognition that many traditional philosophical problems were actually insoluble because their linguistic form was "systematically misleading" as Ryle would put it. Analytic philosophy – beginning with Carnap – now recognized the category of the "pseudo-problem" (*Scheinproblem*).

Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore must also be given enormous credit for establishing the manner of analytic writing in philosophy that soon became current: writing crisply, identifying a thesis, addressing its merits, entirely independently of its historical context or location in the scheme of a philosopher's thinking. Thus, for example, idealism could be reduced to a single issue: the nature and possibility of internal relations.<sup>76</sup> Leibniz's philosophy could be reduced to a set of principles and the question was whether they were consistent with one another.<sup>77</sup> The form of writing became the lucid essay. But the will-to-system is also evident, from early on, in analytic philosophy. Russell himself was by nature a system builder, trying in his books to give clarification to the central scientific and metaphysical concepts of space, time, matter, causation, the nature of relations, classes, and so on. The most notable case of systematization in point here is Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (see further in "The birth of analytic philosophy," Chapter 1). According to this book, the object of philosophy is the "logical clarification of thoughts" (*Tractatus* 4.112) and the *Tractatus* is surely an extraordinary edifice, a purely modernist construction. The *Tractatus* encouraged the early Vienna Circle members who were intent on promoting a "scientific conception of the world" (their phrase). Moritz Schlick, for instance, had studied physics and was struggling to find an appropriate philosophical vehicle to accommodate the insights of Einstein's Theory of Relativity and the new physics in general. The Vienna Circle was the most hardnosed set of analytic philosophers and, given their influence, and

perhaps a residual institutional memory of their European roots, often Continental philosophers assume there is no other kind of analytic philosophy and dismiss it all as logic-chopping "positivism." Certainly the members of the Vienna Circle were hardnosed in their rejection of metaphysics and gave epistemic predominance to science and that too in a particularly stringent form. There is science and there is stamp collecting, as Quine would later put it, paraphrasing Ernest Rutherford. The human and cultural sciences were often passed over by the analytic tradition, a move that the Continental tradition regarded as disastrous for the very conception of what science is. Rorty saw this tension between a focus on the hard sciences and a softer focus on the humanities as encapsulating a traditional battle between poetry and philosophy (construed as a kind of superscience).<sup>78</sup>

Side by side with the hard, formalistic, systematic side of analytic philosophy, however, there was also a softer edge first typified by G. E. Moore and soon afterwards by Whitehead. Moore's "In defence of common sense" lists propositions which he claims he knows (that he has a body, that he once was younger than he is now, and so on), but many of these knowledge claims embody assumptions that belong to the background of what Husserl would call the life-world.<sup>79</sup>

Analytic philosophy as a tradition continued to be practiced even after many of its central theses were rejected. For example, Peter Strawson (1919–2006) was recognizably an analytic philosopher yet he rejected the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. The central notion of analytic philosophy seems to be the clarification of concepts through the clarification of the linguistic forms in which those concepts appear. As Michael Dummett has written,

What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained.<sup>80</sup>

Central then to Dummett's characterization of analytical philosophy is the linguistic turn.

What is difficult to understand is how logical analysis and specifically the disambiguation of the logical from the grammatical form of sentences should end being coupled with a strong defense of ordinary language. This is precisely what happened in the emergence of Oxford ordinary language philosophy in the 1950s, with Austin and Ryle and, incidentally subsequently in the USA, with their two American followers, John Searle (1932– ) and Daniel Dennett (1942– ). Dennett, for example, applies Ryle's analysis of systematically misleading expressions to deny that there exist "sakes" (as in "I did it for John's sake") and to determine which if any of our nouns denoting mental items are in fact referential.<sup>81</sup>

It would be wrong to think that analytic philosophers are wedded to a fixed set of presuppositions which they do not critically analyze. Perhaps the next most paradigmatic revisionary article for analytic philosophy is W. V. O. Quine's 1951 paper, "Two dogmas of empiricism,"<sup>82</sup> which attacked the very basis of the analytic/synthetic

distinction so beloved of neo-Kantians and Carnapians alike. This was a challenge to the very meaning of analysis, and an undermining of the theoretical assumptions that had given rise to analytic philosophy in the first place. Quine is not saying that the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is badly drawn or vague or useless, rather that it is illusory. It is for Quine “an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.”

Quine’s article also included an explicit attack on the verificationist principle of meaning which had become, as Quine calls it, a “catchword” of twentieth-century empiricism. Against the “reductionist” claim that meaningful statements can be traced back to a statement about immediate experience, Quine wants to propose that our “statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.”<sup>83</sup> What Quine wants to propose in that paper is an “empiricism without dogmas” and one that is holistic in that it sees the web of knowledge as a “man-made fabric which impinges on experience only at the edges.”<sup>84</sup> Every statement is revisable, whether it be a statement about experience or the formulation of a logical law. Moreover, the positing of abstract entities such as classes is on a par with the positing of Homeric gods or physical objects. This positing is a matter of convenience, or as Quine puts it, “swelling ontology to simplify theory.”<sup>85</sup>

The next step in this overhaul of the very meaning of classical empiricism and indeed classical analytic philosophy (as represented by Carnap or Ayer) is the attack on the scheme/content distinction in Davidson’s famous “On the very idea of a conceptual scheme” (1974).<sup>86</sup> Indeed, this step is already prefigured in Quine’s “Two dogmas” article. In that article, Quine already recognizes that some sentences look more like statements about our conceptual schemes (whether we admit classes or not) while others look more like statements about brute fact (“there are brick houses on Elm Street”). Quine wants to deny that there is a difference in kind between these two types of statement. They are on a continuum and the decision which to accept is “pragmatic” according to Quine. Davidson begins his article by recognizing that many philosophers speak of conceptual schemes and contrast them with experience and specifically “the data of sensation.” Even those who think there is only one conceptual scheme still cling to the idea of there being such a “scheme.” But in particular Davidson is interested in the idea (current in modern anthropology and elsewhere – he cites Whorf’s work on the Hopi languages and their untranslatability, as well as Thomas Kuhn’s work in the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* on revolutions in science leading to different paradigms or “mindsets”) that what makes one conceptual scheme different from another is that one is not translatable into the other. Davidson is explicit that he is seeking to build on Quine’s exposure of two dogmas by himself exposing the third dogma of empiricism – that between scheme and content. As Davidson recognizes, to give up the third dogma is to abandon a principle that is at the very heart of empiricism:

I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible

and defensible. It is itself a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma. The third, and perhaps the last, for if we give it up it is not clear that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism.<sup>87</sup>

These are paradigmatic moments in analytic philosophy, and there is evidence of a clear sense of tradition. Quine is utilizing but criticizing the approach of Carnap, and Davidson is moving to reject a new dualism that emerges after the analytic/synthetic dualism has been jettisoned. Davidson quotes closely from Quine's article, deliberately invoking phrases like "the tribunal of experience" and it is clear that the conception of a "conceptual scheme" he has in mind comes directly from Quine.

It is interesting that, despite the commitment to naturalism in analytic philosophy, there has been a progressive move *away* from empiricism through the century. Interestingly, as we have seen, both the early Russell and Moore began from the point of view (inherited from German Idealism and its British counterpart) that empiricism had been refuted. Nevertheless, for a long time, analytic philosophy was supposedly linked with empiricism. The essays of Quine and Davidson, then, may be seen as a corrective of the distorting empiricist interpretations of the Vienna School of the central tradition of analytic philosophy. The sheer multiplicity of forms of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century makes it difficult to provide a single account of its history and evolution through the century (but see "The birth of analytic philosophy," Chapter 1, "The development of analytic philosophy," Chapter 2, "Philosophy of language," Chapter 9, and "Philosophy of science," Chapter 14).

#### A suspicion of grand narratives

In trying to write the history of twentieth-century philosophy, then, one must be careful not to impose a "grand narrative," and indeed, one must resist being deceived by accepting one of the grand narratives which contemporary philosophers themselves espouse and tell. Analytic philosophers no less than Continental philosophers purport to have a suspicion of these grand narratives (whether they offer, to use Rorty's favorite terms, "upbeat" or "downbeat" stories about the development of philosophy). But while one must be wary of the veracity of grand narratives, one must also be aware of the many grand narratives that have been proposed even during the suspicious twentieth century (from Nietzsche and Freud, to Husserl and Heidegger, and even Rorty who had his own grand narrative of the clash between systematic and "edifying" philosophies).

As we have seen, Freud and Husserl both self-consciously sought to inscribe themselves into history as the founders of radically new disciplines: psychoanalysis and phenomenology respectively. But there were many other inaugural moments during the century, not just programmatic announcements such as the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle,<sup>88</sup> but also, for instance, Derrida's proclamation of the new science of grammatology. In typically ambiguous manner, in his *Of Grammatology*, Derrida announces a new science of grammatology (a call taken up by Julia Kristeva) while at the same time explaining how the metaphysical closure of the epoch would prevent

this science from ever being established as such. In his *Of Grammatology* Derrida proclaims:

By alluding to a science of writing reined in by metaphor, metaphysics and theology, this exergue must not only announce that the science of writing – *grammatology* – shows signs of liberation all over the world . . . I would like to suggest above all that, however fecund and necessary the undertaking might be . . . such a science of writing runs the risk of never being established as such and with that name. . . . For essential reasons: the unity of all that allows itself to be attempted today through the most diverse concepts of science and writing is, in principle, more or less covertly yet always, determined by an historico-metaphysical epoch of which we merely glimpse closure. I do not say the end.<sup>89</sup>

In other words, Derrida wants to participate in the grand gesture of the founding of a new science of writing (“grammatology”) and at the same time to protect himself against the inevitable failure of such vaulted ambition. Manifestos are indeed a recurrent feature of contemporary philosophy, as they have been through the centuries (think of the 1848 *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels).<sup>90</sup>

In terms of inaugural proclamations, Heidegger, too, is a curious case, both a “modern” and a “postmodern” in many ways, in that he wants both to advance and at the same time deconstruct grand narratives. He wants to speak of and diagnose the history of philosophy, indeed the “history of being” in terms of “epochs.” Heidegger and Derrida want to see western philosophy in terms of an occlusion of the meaning of being, or the all-pervasive dominance of an understanding of being in terms of presence. In his narrative of “the history of Being,” Heidegger claims apparently to be able to stand above time and history in order to diagnose essential tendencies (see also “German philosophy,” Chapter 17). Thus he can, somewhat idiosyncratically, characterize Nietzsche as a metaphysician, albeit one who diagnoses nihilism as the contemporary meaning of Being.

There are many examples of the grand gesture in Heidegger: Consider his claims concerning the “end of philosophy.” Heidegger sees the end of philosophy as coming with Nietzsche who “completed” metaphysics and gave “planetary thinking” the form it would have for decades to come. Philosophy has come to an end because a certain form of philosophy has been incorporated into this planetary thinking, Heidegger proclaims:

With Nietzsche’s metaphysics, philosophy is completed. That means: it has gone through the sphere of prefigured possibilities. Completed metaphysics, which is the ground for the planetary manner of thinking, gives the scaffolding for an order of the earth which will supposedly last for a long time. The order no longer needs philosophy because philosophy is already its foundation. But with the end of philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transition to another beginning.<sup>91</sup>

The rhetoric of end is always correlated with the rhetoric of beginning. We have Michel Foucault claiming both that the concept of "man" is a philosophical, or cultural, invention of modernity and also that it will have an "end." As he writes in *The Order of Things*,

One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge... As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.<sup>92</sup>

Analytic philosophy too at various times has proclaimed an end to philosophy as traditionally practiced and there has been considerable discussion about the transformation of philosophy in this tradition also.<sup>93</sup> Philosophy was supposed to be different in character from the history of philosophy. Carnap and Ayer and the Logical Positivists announced the elimination of metaphysics from philosophy.<sup>94</sup> Metaphysical statements have no literal meaning or "sense"; they are not subject to the criteria of truth or falsity, since they are incapable of verification. As Ayer proclaims in *Language, Truth and Logic*,

We may accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical.<sup>95</sup>

Metaphysicians have been "duped by grammar" and philosophy must be distinguished from metaphysics, for Ayer. Ayer went further and denied that metaphysical statements can be cherished alongside poetic statements as statements of nonsense that still have emotive value. No, while poetry is rarely literal nonsense, metaphysics always is and is of no scientific value. Yet, in his autobiography, *A Part of My Life*, Ayer described his Oxford training in philosophy as primarily being a kind of critical engagement with the history of philosophy, including much traditional metaphysics, and the writing of essays on Aristotle, Leibniz, and others.<sup>96</sup> It is clear in his own work that he too practiced philosophy in a very traditional manner. Indeed he recommended the historical approach as the best way of introducing students to philosophy.

Both the early and the later Wittgenstein may be said to have contributed to the end of philosophy debate. The Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* is already advocating silence on certain kinds of questions and the later "therapeutic" approach of the *Philosophical Investigations* may also be seen as a way of diffusing philosophical claims such that philosophical worries may be overcome. At the end of the *Tractatus* (1921), Wittgenstein claims (in a manner that would subsequently inspire the Vienna Circle),

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science – i.e.

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something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.<sup>97</sup>

Later in the *Philosophical Investigations*<sup>98</sup> he will continue to maintain that philosophical problems arise because of misunderstandings of language (see "The development of analytic philosophy: Wittgenstein and after," Chapter 2) ), but the resolution to the problem is to identify the right language-game to be playing:

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which brings *itself* in question. – ... Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a *single* problem.

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (*Philosophical Investigations*, §133)

Evident in both Wittgenstein and Heidegger is a certain frustration with the manner in which philosophy has been traditionally practiced and an attempt to begin anew. Both the *Tractatus* and *Being and Time* (1927) are modernist documents, as Rorty recognized, in that there is an attempt to break new ground, to use an innovative style, to present a *form* of thinking. Heidegger is explicit about conducting an *Abbau* or *Destruktion* (deconstruction, destruction) which argues that even the history of philosophy, the way the tradition of philosophy itself appears to us, needs to be broken down, unpackaged, and thought again. There is a strong sense in Heidegger of the kind of dilemma that Samuel Beckett's characters find themselves in: "I can't go on; I must go on."

Heidegger's ambitious destructive attack on the possibility of philosophy was countered, however, by his own student Gadamer's more conservative interpretation of hermeneutics. As Karl-Otto Apel writes in Chapter 17,

Instead Gadamer endeavors, in his founding of a "hermeneutical philosophy" (which appeared in a time of reconstruction after the German catastrophe), to utilize the structures of Heidegger's thought, presupposed in his approach, for what is on the whole a culturally conservative task of reintegrating contemporary philosophy into the European tradition. The classical Greek thinkers (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle), who were, already for Heidegger, the founders of "metaphysics," thereby play a thoroughly positive role that Gadamer explicitly defends *against* Heidegger's "destruction."

Heideggerian revolution gives way to Gadamerian conservation of the tradition.

Of course, once a new tradition is inaugurated, there will always be those who claim it had prior incarnations and who will write the prehistory of that tradition. Thus, the "linguistic turn" in analytic philosophy (initiated by Frege but really developed by Russell and Wittgenstein) is also paralleled in Continental philosophy with the



concern for language and interpretation of Heidegger, Gadamer, and others. There are differences, of course. In analytic philosophy, for instance, the linguistic turn is given specifically scientific garb, whereas the turn to language in eighteenth-century thought is an attempt to achieve universalization of thinking, freeing thinking from the peculiarities of local inscription in language. But even among analytic philosophers, a prehistory to what Austin calls "the way of words" is given, which recognizes specifically analytic philosophy in the work of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Thus we get the emergence of another grand narrative – this time within analytic philosophy – according to which the best philosophy has always been analytic philosophy, whether in Plato's *Theaetetus* or Aristotle's analyses of the different senses of the term *ousia* in his *Metaphysics*. Once a new tradition is identified, it is easy for it to find its forbears.

### Philosophical self-reflection

If the nineteenth century saw philosophy becoming thoroughly professionalized and academicized, it also saw, with Hegel, philosophy coming to produce a philosophical reflection on its own genesis. An increasing self-awareness about the nature – and limits – of philosophical practice (grown acute in Wittgenstein and Heidegger) is already evident in philosophy since the time of Immanuel Kant and his conception of *Kritik*. But it was in Hegel's lectures that, for the first time, the history of philosophy itself became self-consciously philosophical. Hegel saw the need for that side of philosophy which was to be "its time comprehended in thought" (*ihre Zeit in Gedanken gefasst*), as he put it. Incidentally, Richard Rorty interprets this Hegelian idea of philosophy (as the self-comprehension of an era) as freeing philosophy from the need to offer explanation and instead allowing it to take the form of celebration:

I happily join with Charles Taylor in thinking that Hegel's importance lies chiefly in his historicism, and specifically in his redescription of philosophy as its time held in thought. One happy consequence of this redescription seems to me that it frees philosophers from the need to give explanations. It lets us relax and be frankly and openly celebratory (or in Heidegger's case, frankly and openly nostalgic).<sup>99</sup>

Indeed, not only Husserl and Heidegger but also Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as description. Thus we have Wittgenstein say:

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. (*Philosophical Investigations*, § 126)

Whether philosophy is able to comprehend the times in which it emerged and of which it is supposedly the rational representation, is an open question, but it is at least true that the effort to comprehend our philosophical time is itself a philosophical (rather than merely a sociological) challenge.

To think about the twentieth-century philosophical legacy, one has to be aware of the many hermeneutical challenges involved. Yet, in one sense, one must be resolutely Hegelian in that one has to see a certain sense in history and not just one damn thing after another. The historical developments of philosophy through the century must themselves have philosophical significance, but the recognition of that significance must not endanger the very understanding of the radical contingency and facticity which underlie human achievement. Hegel himself recognized the tension between concept and contingency, between the rationality which philosophy demands and the chaos of what happens, and claimed that "the only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple idea of reason – the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process."<sup>100</sup>

But precisely this assumption of reality is what is in question in contemporary philosophy. On the other hand, any scientific enterprise, any enterprise of understanding surely begins from the assumption of rationality, that there is an identifiable order even in apparent chaos. Heidegger, for instance – and Gadamer here follows him – sees it as belonging to the meaning of philosophy to say something essential about "the spirit of the age"<sup>101</sup> (for further discussion of Gadamer see "Twentieth-century hermeneutics," Chapter 16). Heidegger, Gadamer, Blumenberg, Cassirer, and Arendt all want to characterize the essence of *modernity*, for instance. Foucault wants to diagnose contemporary civilization using the mirror of the history of madness. His employment of the Nietzschean figures of genealogy and diagnosis confirms that he too believes that it is possible to penetrate to the essence of a time or a period. This is a kind of phenomenological essentialism, one which needs much fuller study.

In any event, to write a history of twentieth-century philosophy is not, as Hegel correctly recognizes, merely to assemble a list of all the philosophical works and tendencies. It is also an attempt to seize *the rationale* at work in the processes. For example, Jean-François Lyotard is doing just that in diagnosing what he has termed the "postmodern condition." He writes: "Our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the post-industrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age."<sup>102</sup> Lyotard goes on to attempt (while disputing grand narratives) to diagnose the age in terms of a set of key characteristics. In precisely this sense, I believe that the history of philosophy is relevant to philosophy, in contrast to the way in which the history of physics or medicine is not relevant to the current practice of these disciplines. Concepts and problems have histories, and understanding those histories is important to understanding and contextualizing the concepts themselves. As Peter Hylton has written in his elegant *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* (1990), "Philosophical problems, and the concepts in which they are formulated, and the assumptions on which they rest, have a history; and this history is surely a legitimate subject of study."<sup>103</sup> Moreover, Hylton argues it is not just a subject of interest in historical terms but it is of philosophical interest too. That is, it challenges our conceptual frameworks.

### Twentieth-century philosophy and the meaning of Europe

One important hermeneutic scruple that has to be invoked in any writing of the history of twentieth-century philosophy concerns the meaning of the very terms in play in the description and categorization of that thought. As with the strictly philosophical concepts involved so too the supposedly cultural – or even geographical – terms are fraught with ambiguity. For instance, even if, in philosophy, the latter half of the twentieth century became very much the “American” century, no philosophical account of the first half of the century can ignore the vital contribution of Europe.<sup>104</sup> But immediately we have to ask: What do we mean by Europe?

The very notion of “Europe” itself has not remained static in the period in question, but has been the subject of intense analysis from Husserl and Jan Patočka to Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas. Edmund Husserl in his *Crisis of the European Sciences* (1936) sought to overcome the dangerous slide of European culture into irrationalism by tracing the roots of modernity in the mathematicization of nature successfully begun by Galileo.<sup>105</sup> Modern science had literally split the world in two (into objective measurable properties and “subjective-relative” properties) and had separated fact from value to a degree that twentieth-century scientifically informed culture was left without means to analyze the incipient loss of meaning and value that threatened its very existence. Husserl actually proposes self-reflective meditative philosophy (*Besinnung*) as a cure for this malaise. But Husserl’s concept of Europe was not without controversy. Critics point especially to Husserl’s *Vienna Lecture* (1935) where he explicitly excluded nomadic gypsies from the concept of “Europe” as the center of scientific rationality.<sup>106</sup>

Jan Patočka also wrote urgently and incisively on the meaning of Europe and about the “problems of a post-European humanity,” for which he developed the term “post-Europe” (*Nach-Europa*).<sup>107</sup> Like Husserl, he turns to the ancient Greeks, but he draws inspiration from the desire for justice which emerged there and in the idea of the need for “care of the soul.” In one of his last articles, Jacques Derrida also wrote on the nature of Europe, speaking of a “Europe of hope,” which would not be “Eurocentric” but a guardian of irreplaceable values, many of which stem from the Enlightenment:

Caught between US hegemony and the rising power of China and Arab/Muslim theocracy, Europe has a unique responsibility. I am hardly thought of as a Eurocentric intellectual; these past 40 years, I have more often been accused of the opposite. But I do believe, without the slightest sense of European nationalism or much confidence in the European Union as we currently know it, that we must fight for what the word Europe means today. This includes our Enlightenment heritage, and also an awareness and regretful acceptance of the totalitarian, genocidal and colonialist crimes of the past. Europe’s heritage is irreplaceable and vital for the future of the world. We must fight to hold on to it. We should not allow Europe to be reduced to the status of a common market, or a common currency, or a neo-nationalist conglomerate, or a military power.<sup>108</sup>

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The German Critical Theorist Jürgen Habermas, too, recognized the importance of the European contribution to world culture when he wrote:

The main religion in Europe, Christianity, obeyed its missionary imperative and expanded all over the world. The global spread of modern science and technology, of Roman law and the Napoleonic Code, of human rights, democracy and the nation-state started from Europe as well.<sup>109</sup>

Habermas sees the critique of Eurocentrism emerging at the heart of Europe’s own efforts to face up to its own history of struggles and disasters. He sees the possibility of encounter taking place as concepts of identity transcend the arbitrary boundaries of the old nation states.<sup>110</sup> The meaning of Europe, therefore, continues to demand philosophical discussion and critique.

For the first half of the century, Europe was at the center of western academic philosophy, especially if we include Britain as part of Europe. As in the later half of the nineteenth century, the most active centers of European philosophy continued to be found in Germany, Austria, France, and Britain. Philosophically significant cities included: Berlin (Dilthey, Simmel), Vienna (Wittgenstein), Marburg (Cassirer), Göttingen (Husserl), Freiburg (Rickert, Heidegger), Frankfurt (Adorno), Prague (Patočka), Paris (Bergson, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), Cambridge (Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein), Oxford (Ryle, Grice, Austin, Dummett) and London (A. J. Ayer). But, especially since 1945, the axis has been moving persistently westward, specifically to the United States. Later, especially from the 1960s on, Australia too emerged with a distinctive kind of analytic philosophy of a materialist and realist variety (one thinks of Armstrong and Smart, among others).

The philosophical Europe in question for the first half of the century is a very small Europe; it does not contain Greece, Portugal, or Spain (apart from Unamuno at Salamanca and Ortega Y Gasset in Madrid; Santayana, for instance, was educated in the USA and wrote in English). If Wittgenstein went to Norway in 1913, it was because of his desire for darkness and to escape from life at Cambridge. He did not go there for its universities and the same is true of his sojourns in rural Ireland during the late 1940s. Europe continued to attract visiting international philosophers until the outbreak of the Second World War. Thus, in 1932 W. V. O. Quine thought it worthwhile to leave Harvard, where he had studied with C. I. Lewis and Whitehead, to visit Vienna, Prague (where he met Carnap), and Warsaw, to learn more about logic. Gilbert Ryle, who himself lectured in Oxford on Austrian philosophers (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl), could recommended the young A. J. Ayer to study with Moritz Schlick in Vienna.<sup>111</sup> During the nineteenth century there had been significant developments in logic in Austria and Prague (Bolzano) and later in Poland, in the Lvov-Warsaw schools,<sup>112</sup> but by the mid-twentieth century, especially after 1945, western academic philosophy in general had forgotten Poland (Tarski, for example, was in the US) and indeed the whole Eastern bloc, with the possible exception of a small number of thinkers (such as Leszek Kolakowski who later emigrated to the UK), Georg Lukács in Hungary, Jan Patočka in Prague, and the Praxis group of Marxists in

Belgrade (Mihailo Marković) and Zagreb (Gajo Petrović) in the former Yugoslavia, some now discredited owing to their support for Serbian extremist nationalism during the Kosovo disputes.<sup>113</sup> This is not to say that the discoveries of Tarski, for example, were ignored. Indeed, the work of Tarski on truth is essential to understanding the work of Davidson and contemporary philosophy of logic and of language (see "Philosophical logic," Chapter 8, "Philosophy of language," Chapter 9). It is rather that Tarski became completely absorbed in the American context, whereas post-1945 Poland together with its philosophers remained locked in a Soviet cul-de-sac.<sup>114</sup>

Another hermeneutic scruple concerns the manner in which thinkers are either inscribed or inscribe themselves into a specific tradition in terms of the language and culture of a particular group. Often a tradition metamorphized when translated into another country. Thus, for instance, Sartre very quickly harnessed Husserlian phenomenology to the native tradition of Cartesianism in France, clearly spurred on by Husserl's own efforts to communicate with French philosophy in his Paris Lectures of 1929.<sup>115</sup> Similarly, in his essay on Husserl, Emmanuel Levinas links him with the native intuitionist tradition of Henri Bergson.<sup>116</sup> In like manner, Hegel – whom Husserl regarded as ungrounded speculative system-builder and hence the opposite of a true phenomenologist – was grafted onto the phenomenological tradition by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others, who had all heard the lectures of Alexandre Kojève.<sup>117</sup> Sartre self-consciously developed existentialism but in the 1950s he deliberately reinscribed it as a moment within a larger conception of dialectical materialism, in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960).

Here again, it is important to bear in mind that each country – and certainly each language – has its own conversation going on and its own conception of tradition. Heidegger's *Being and Time* was not translated into English until 1962<sup>118</sup> and thus discussion of Heidegger in the Anglophone world really did not begin until the 1960s, whereas it had been continuing in Germany since 1927 and in France since the 1930s. Similarly, A. J. Ayer reminds us that although Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* had been published in 1922 and that he had been teaching at Cambridge since 1929, Wittgenstein's ideas had hardly penetrated Oxford (which was at that time deeply resistant to the mathematical logical approach being promoted at Cambridge) until introduced by Gilbert Ryle.<sup>119</sup> The Frankfurt School began in Germany; its members were forced to emigrate during the Nazi years and returned to Frankfurt after the war. Analytic philosophy of language, which emerged from the work of Wittgenstein and others, began to re-enter German philosophy only in the late 1950s, as Karl-Otto Apel relates, and it took him some time to understand it in relation to the existing tradition of hermeneutics practiced in Germany at that time by Heidegger, Gadamer, and others.<sup>120</sup>

In the analytic tradition similar insertions and reinscriptions into traditions occur but they are usually not explicitly trumpeted. David Pears, in his book on Russell,<sup>121</sup> argued that Russell was responding to the challenge of skepticism, and both Pears and A. J. Ayer paint Russell as an empiricist philosopher following in the footsteps of Hume. In fact, however, as Peter Hylton has shown, Russell was primarily influenced by the idealisms of Bradley and McTaggart, and was a practicing metaphysician, frequently introducing

abstract metaphysical entities into his explanations as no empiricist would have done. Russell and Moore, influenced by Green and Bradley, both regarded empiricism as false and as having been effectively refuted by idealism.<sup>122</sup> Thus Russell could write in his *History of Western Philosophy*: "David Hume ... developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and by making it self-consistent made it incredible."<sup>123</sup>

Mistaken inclusions of a philosopher into a particular tradition occur frequently and often with creative consequences. When Ryle advised Ayer to study with Schlick, it was because he thought the Vienna Circle were pursuing Wittgenstein's program in philosophy. Wittgenstein himself was soon to distance himself from the Circle and show that his philosophical interests were quite different. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger inscribed phenomenology into the older Greek tradition of philosophy, even claiming that the meaning of phenomenology was better understood by Aristotle than by his mentor Husserl! Derrida extracted the deconstructive moment from Husserlian *Abbau* and Heideggerian *Destruktion* and Nietzschean *Zerstörung* to make it into a kind of permanent principle of interpretative change. It is interesting to see that deconstruction will probably be reabsorbed into the longer tradition of hermeneutics.

### The World Wars: fragmentation and dislocation

The single most important historical and sociological factor that had an impact on the meaning and practice of academic philosophy was the Second World War. The First World War was catastrophic in its human and political consequences, breaking up the old order and separating Russell and Wittgenstein, it did not threaten the very existence of philosophy as such. In fact, the First World War was seen by Gadamer and others (e.g. Hannah Arendt) as having loosened the grip of neo-Kantianism and other nineteenth-century traditions, and as providing an opportunity for students hungry for meaning and relevance to explore the new more "concrete" philosophies, such as phenomenology (Husserl), *Lebensphilosophie* (Simmel, Dilthey), existentialism (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), and mysticism (inspired by the publication of Meister Eckhart's work as well as by the anti-materialist poetry of Stefan George). The First World War had similar important consequences for the nascent analytic philosophical tradition. It woke Bertrand Russell up from his detached mathematical and metaphysical concerns. Russell was horrified by the war fever gripping Britain in 1914 and argued against it, writing a number of articles on the ethics of war which, though they might not measure up to the politically correct standards of our day in that they defend the war of a more advanced civilization on a lesser, nevertheless demand serious reasons for war and were considered so shocking at the time that journals such as the *New Statesman* refused to publish them.<sup>124</sup> In effect, his opposition to the war and to conscription destroyed his academic career and led to his being jailed in 1918. In 1916 Russell was dismissed from Trinity College for publishing a pamphlet defending a conscientious objector. He was prevented from taking up a job in Harvard because Britain would not issue him a passport. Particularly shocking for Russell was that his friend and protégé Wittgenstein had enlisted in the

Austrian army and was effectively fighting for the other side. Russell wrote to his friend Ottoline Morrell, "It seems strange that of all the people in the war the one I care for much the most should be Wittgenstein, who is an 'enemy'."<sup>125</sup>

The First World War gave Russell a taste for activism (and Wittgenstein too served heroically on the opposing side), but otherwise it was more or less welcomed by other academics. In Germany, Max Scheler, who had lost his academic post because of various personal indiscretions, made a living writing patriotic pamphlets enthusing on the nature of war.<sup>126</sup> The classicist and socialist Paul Natorp also wrote some pamphlets related to the German war effort and later reflected on the meaning of war for the spirit of Germany.<sup>127</sup> Edmund Husserl was broadly supportive of Germany's claims, even though he lost a son and his second son was seriously injured, and he delivered some lectures on the political situation with reference to Fichte.<sup>128</sup> Heidegger was serving on the western front with the meteorological division.

The rise of European fascism (not just in Germany but in Italy and Spain) and the Second World War had a much more decisive impact on the academy. According to Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, the war divided his life in two.<sup>129</sup> He went from bourgeois idealist to committed existential Marxist over the course of the 1940s and later became an apologist for the Russian Communist regime of Stalin (until the Soviet repression in Hungary in 1956).<sup>130</sup> Heidegger tied his academic career to the rise of the Nazis and, as a result, his teaching career lay in ruins along with the collapse of Germany in 1945, as a result of his being denounced to the occupying administration by another German philosopher and his former friend, Karl Jaspers. Jaspers regarded Heidegger's attempt to curry favor with the National Socialists as naive but its effect was to destroy German philosophy.<sup>131</sup>

The rise of the Nazis in Germany with their specific anti-Jewish policies led to the mass migration of intellectuals, with most members of the Vienna Circle and Frankfurt School being forced to leave Germany. The Vienna Circle members (including Carnap and Feigl) went primarily to the United States;<sup>132</sup> but Neurath went to England, as did Adorno initially. Later, Adorno also went to the United States, where he was joined by Horkheimer and Arendt. Others too, such as Reichenbach and Hempel, had to leave Germany. The war, and more specifically Nazism, cost the lives of philosophers such as Walter Benjamin, who died in 1940 on the border between France and Spain, while fleeing from the Nazis, and Edith Stein, who died in Auschwitz concentration camp in 1942. In France, the philosopher of mathematics Jean Cavallès, a member of the French Resistance, was shot by the Gestapo in 1944. Many French philosophers, including Albert Camus, were members of the French Resistance. Others, such as Sartre and de Beauvoir, had more complicated relations with the Vichy regime (Sartre was not exactly the Resistance hero he later claimed to have been; and de Beauvoir made broadcasts on a radio station blacked by the Resistance), but there is no doubt that the war radically changed all their lives. The young W. V. O. Quine, who had studied in Vienna, was so horrified by the prospect of the rise of the Nazis that he enlisted in the navy and fought in Italy. He later wrote, "I felt that Western culture was on the verge of collapse and all I was doing was philosophy of logic."<sup>133</sup>

After the Second World War, as Adorno too has recognized in a different context, everything had changed. The second half of the century has seen a steady drift towards America and the recognition of a distinct voice emerging in the US, especially in the form of pragmatism. Arthur Danto, however, recognizes that a distinctive American academic philosophy emerged only in the 1960s (see "American philosophy in the twentieth century," Chapter 5). In reading accounts of the education of typical American philosophers such as Quine and Rorty one is struck by the fact that their orientation was entirely towards Europe. Quine had gone to Harvard to study logic with Whitehead but was disappointed and felt the need to move in a different direction. He spoke good German and traveled to Europe to study logic and became a member of the Vienna Circle. Richard Rorty was taught by Carnap at the University of Chicago; Hilary Putnam wrote his doctoral dissertation under Reichenbach at UCLA; Thomas Kuhn taught with Hempel at Princeton; Henry Allison studied with Gurwitsch at the New School for Social Research. The influence of European philosophy was dominant in American academe through the 1960s.

Given the political turmoil and cataclysms of the century, it seems rather strange that political philosophy did not really develop as a subject until the latter part of the century. Clearly the Russian Revolution appeared to justify the philosophy of Lenin and its interpretation of Marx, so thenceforth Communist countries embraced Marxist-Leninism. The so-called "western Marxism" of Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School represented a different, less doctrinaire approach to Marxism, as did the work of Gramsci and other Italian Marxists. Hannah Arendt made a significant contribution to political philosophy with her *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and *The Human Condition* (1958), as did Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin, both writing in the 1950s,<sup>134</sup> but the theoretical situation was transformed by the work of John Rawls, especially his *Theory of Justice* which circulated in manuscript during the 1960s before it was finally published in 1971 (see "Twentieth-century political philosophy," Chapter 21). In Europe, a new beginning in political philosophy was made by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre with their journal *Temps Modernes* (begun 1945), which published interesting and engaged critiques of colonialism and imperialism. Sartre was active in criticizing the French adventure in Algeria and Merleau-Ponty wrote a stinging attack on the Russian system in his *Humanism and Terror*<sup>135</sup> and fell out with Sartre who at that time sought to maintain solidarity between the French working class and the Russian Communist Party.<sup>136</sup> Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*,<sup>137</sup> to which Jean-Paul Sartre wrote an important Preface, was an important contribution to the critique of colonialism and for its analysis of the French use of torture against Algerians. In the late 1960s the student and worker protests in France gave Sartre new prominence, whereas in the USA in the same period the work of Herbert Marcuse, with his analysis of a kind of "repressive-tolerance" that characterized advanced industrial society, also was popular among the student left.<sup>138</sup> Subsequently in Europe, political thought has continued to be predominantly leftist, whether it be in the form of the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser or his follower Alain Badiou, or the attempt to pursue the emancipation of society as advocated by Jürgen Habermas (see "Critical Theory," Chapter 18), or in the analysis of forms of hegemony in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.



### Philosophy in the twenty-first century

How should the legacy of twentieth-century philosophy be characterized for the present day? Perhaps it will emerge that, just as Kant and Hegel emerged as the dominant figures in nineteenth-century philosophy, Heidegger and Wittgenstein will continue to be seen as the leading figures of the twentieth. But if that is so then there will need to be much more effort made to connect these two authors. After all, both Kant and Hegel were from the same intellectual stable, as it were, and Hegel's work addresses many issues initially raised by Kant. Wittgenstein and Heidegger, however, cannot easily be put in such close relation or in the same kind of terms. The century has many different philosophical voices and profound differences in style and content in doing philosophy. To paraphrase Mao, a hundred schools of thought contend. To illustrate the different styles and contents at work in contemporary philosophy, let us playfully indulge in a little thought-experiment. Imagine two books written by prominent philosophers. Both have the title "Identity and Discrimination." One is a European philosopher who is interested in the issue of shared identity, in terms of one's belonging to a family, a gender, a class, a culture, and so on. Her worry is how do we preserve and celebrate diversity. She is against discrimination in all forms and indeed regards all forms of monism as hegemonous. The other book is a careful study of the meaning of identity as expressed in Leibniz's law. Can one discriminate between identicals? What does logical identity mean and what are the epistemological criteria involved in any act of discrimination? One philosopher sees identity as follows:

Anything whatsoever has the relation of identity to itself, and to nothing else. Things are identical if they are one thing, not two. We can refute the claim that they are identical if we can find a property of one that is not simultaneously a property of the other. The concept of identity is fundamental to logic. Without it, counting would be impossible, for we could not distinguish in principle between counting one thing twice and counting two different things. When we have acquired the concept, it can still be difficult to make this distinction in practice. Misjudgements of identity are possible because one thing can be presented in many guises. Identity judgments often involve assumptions about the nature of things. The identity of the present mature tree with the past sapling implies persistence through change. The non-identity of the actual child of one couple with the hypothetical child of a different couple is implied by the claim that ancestry is an essential property. Knowledge of what directions are involves knowledge that parallel lines have identical directions. Many controversies over identity concern the nature of the things in question. Others concern challenges to the orthodox conception just sketched of identity itself.<sup>139</sup>

On the other hand, our European philosopher is suspicious of the notion of identity, and is concerned to show that all claims of identity involve the suppression of some alterity and difference. As Peter Fenves has written:

the Cartesian attempt to secure the legitimacy of knowledge finds its principal point of reference in the identity of the self-conscious subject. This subject can serve as the source of legitimation to the extent that it can immediately identify itself and can treat its act of self-identification as knowledge. Postmodern theories of identity and alterity are concerned for the most part with the nature of self-identity and with the relation between the self and whatever presents itself as other than the self ... If modern philosophy rests on the principle of self-consciousness, then one criterion for a postmodern philosophy would be its contesting of this principle.<sup>140</sup>

One philosopher is suspicious of the hegemony of identity and against discrimination, the other considers identity to be of absolutely paramount importance and that discrimination is the act of any mind that wants to understand anything. Not to be able to discriminate between elms and oak trees is a failure of knowledge. Clearly, there is a sense in which these contrasting accounts of identity could be integrated with one another. Indeed, there is an interesting collection of essays, *Identity*, edited by Henry Harris,<sup>141</sup> which consists of six essays addressing different aspects of the concept of identity, including numerical identity (what are the criteria for saying that two phenomena observed at different times are the *same* thing?), personal identity, sexual identity, national identity, and even fictional identity. The authors include Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit and draw on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre among others. The point, I think, is that analytic philosophy has, perhaps unknown to itself, expanded to become more inclusive of different standpoints and radically different metaphysical views and approaches. There is increasing recognition that concepts such as "identity" are fluid and many-sided. Besides Habermas, Ricoeur, and Apel, few Continental philosophers have been quite so expansive and accommodating in attempting to fuse their accounts with versions of problems imported from the analytic tradition. The hope of twenty-first-century philosophy is that there will be a true appreciation of the many-sidedness of philosophical problematics and of the multiplicity of modes of approach to them.

Philosophy will undoubtedly develop in unpredictable ways and it would be impossible to try to set out hard and fast tasks for the philosopher or to attempt to indicate where its future lies. As Merleau-Ponty, one of the philosophers most appreciated by all sides of contemporary philosophy, put it so perceptively in his *Éloge de la philosophie*, "The philosophical absolute does not have any permanent seat." In that same essay, he gives us an interesting portrait of the philosopher: "The philosopher is marked by the distinguishing trait that he possesses *inseparably* the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity."<sup>142</sup> Certainly, Wittgenstein too, despite his logical focus, or perhaps indeed because of it, also had a "feeling for ambiguity." In his correspondence with Russell in early 1914, Wittgenstein at one point states that he hopes that Russell, in his forthcoming lectures in Harvard, will reveal something of his thinking and not just

present "cut and dried results."<sup>143</sup> Wittgenstein had put his finger on something in the manner of Russell's way of writing; Russell favored the scientific manner of reporting results and discoveries. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, recognized that the process of philosophizing is the important thing, the showing, the revealing that is done in the very acts of questioning and probing. Both aspects of philosophy – the discovery of "results" and the unveiling of the very processes of philosophical thinking – will surely continue into the twenty-first century.

### Notes

- 1 B. Croce, *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, trans. D. Ainslie (London: Macmillan, 1915).
- 2 For a full list of twentieth-century philosophers, see Stuart Brown, Diane Collinson, and Robert Wilkinson (eds.) *The Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Philosophers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
- 3 An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a plenary address to the Society for European Philosophy conference, "European Philosophy and the Human Condition," held at University College Cork on September 14, 2002. See also Dermot Moran, "What is historical in the history of philosophy? Towards an assessment of twentieth-century European philosophy," in Peter Kemp (ed.) *History in Education, Proceedings from the conference "History in Education" held at the Danish University of Education March 24–5, 2004* (Copenhagen: Danish University of Education Press, 2005), pp. 53–82.
- 4 Bernard Henri-Lévy, *Sartre: The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century*, trans. Andrew Brown (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).
- 5 Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, 2nd rev. edn. (New York: Penguin, 1964).
- 6 See Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
- 7 Bernard-Henri Lévy, *War, Evil and End of History* (London: Duckworth, 2004).
- 8 See Alain de Botton, *The Consolation of Philosophy* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2000).
- 9 Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Free Press, 1990).
- 10 Roger Scruton, *On Hunting: A Short Polemic* (London: Yellow Jersey Press, 1998).
- 11 See Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals* (New York: Random House, 1975).
- 12 Naess defines ecosophy as follows: "By an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy as a kind of *sofia* or wisdom is openly normative, it contains both norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and prediction. The details of an ecosophy will show many variations due to significant differences concerning not only the 'facts' of pollution, resources, population, etc. but also value priorities." Quoted in Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue (eds.) *The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Publishers, 1995), p. 8. Arne Naess more or less invented "deep ecology" in a ground-breaking article, "The shallow and the deep, long-range Ecology Movement: a summary," published in *Inquiry* 16 (1973), pp. 95–100.
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14 Routledge has devoted three volumes in its History of Philosophy series to the twentieth century. Two volumes deal with analytic philosophy (seen as the dominant tradition, including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, ethics, philosophy of science); see S. G. Shanker (ed.) *Philosophy of the English-Speaking World in the Twentieth Century 1: Science, Logic and Mathematics*, Routledge History of Philosophy vol. IX (London: Routledge, 1996) and John Canfield (ed.) *Philosophy of the English-Speaking World in the Twentieth Century 2: Meaning, Knowledge and Value*, Routledge History of Philosophy vol. X (London: Routledge, 1996); whereas one volume deals with Continental European philosophy: R. Kearney (ed.) *Continental Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, Routledge History of Philosophy vol. VIII (London: Routledge, 1994).

15 See Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 34.

16 See Edith Glaser, "Emancipation or marginalisation: new research on women students in the German-speaking world," *Oxford Review of Education* 23/2: *Writing University History* (June, 1997), pp. 169-84.

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22 See William James, "Does 'consciousness' exist?," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* 1 (1904), pp. 477-91.

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24 See R. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch, *The Embodied Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

25 See, for instance, Robert Stern (ed.) *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Mark Sacks, *Objectivity and Insight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

26 See also Cristina Lafont, *The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

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- 34 On Robert Brandom's appreciation of Hegel see his, "Holism and idealism in Hegel's phenomenology," in *Hegel Studien*, Band 36 (2001), pp. 57–92. Rorty made his remark regarding the Hegelian phase of analytic philosophy in his Introduction to Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1997). Brandom endorsed Rorty's remark in his paper to the colloquium "Relation between Analytic and Continental Philosophy," which took place at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy held in Boston in 1998. For a discussion of Brandom's relation to Hegel, see Tom Rockmore, "Brandom, Hegel and inferentialism," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10/4 (November 2002), pp. 429–47.
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- 40 See Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1872–1914* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1951), pp. 217–18.
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- 42 See M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
- 43 See H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1974).
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- 45 G. Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London and New York: Continuum, 2004).
- 46 See R. Wollheim (ed.) *Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974) and his *Freud*, 2nd edn. (London: Fontana, 1991) and Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of Freudian Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).
- 47 See Karl Popper, "Philosophy of science: a personal report" (1957), reprinted in Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; 2nd edn. 1965), pp. 33–65. See also Frank Cioffi, *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience* (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1998).
- 48 See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) and his *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- 49 See M. Merleau-Ponty, "The philosopher and his shadow," in *Signs*, trans. Richard McCleary (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964).
- 50 Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1: *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, text of the 1st and 2nd edns., ed. E. Holenstein, *Husserliana XVIII* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), and *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 2: *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, in 2 vols., ed. Ursula Panzer, *Husserliana XIX* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984), trans. by J. N. Findlay as *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols., revised with new introduction by Dermot Moran and new preface by Michael Dummett (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
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- 58 See Dermot Moran, "The analytic and Continental divide: teaching philosophy in an age of pluralism," in D. Evans and I. Kuçuradi (eds.) *Teaching Philosophy on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (Ankara: International Federation of Philosophical Societies, 1998), pp. 119–54.
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- 85 *Ibid.*, p. 461.
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