

# Editors' Introduction: Resurrecting the Phenomenological Movement

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## *Overview*

In this special issue we are very pleased to highlight the significant, enduring—and currently somewhat under appreciated—philosophical contribution of the early phenomenologists. The term “early phenomenologists” is used here to encompass five main groups of philosophers who contributed to the early phase of the phenomenological movement in the first third of the twentieth century: the students of Theodor Lipps who formed the Munich Circle of phenomenologists; Husserl’s original students at Göttingen prior to 1907, the so-called *Urschüler*; the Göttingen Circle, who studied with Husserl, Reinach, and Scheler in Göttingen from 1907 to 1916; the students who studied with Husserl in Freiburg from 1916 until he was barred from the university in 1933; and a handful of students of Carl Stumpf in Berlin. Lipps, Husserl, and Stumpf all developed their own versions of phenomenology, and their students and followers altered, combined, and adapted these in novel ways that have not been fully documented or critically explored. The recent resurgence in interest in early phenomenology appears to be twofold. On the one hand, studying the phenomenological movement and the works of Husserl’s followers provides scholars with the contextual apparatus they need to interpret and understand Husserl’s work. On the other hand, because the events of history rather than rational argument led us to forget the vast majority of the early phenomenologists and their work, philosophers are now discovering a wealth of knowledge that had almost been lost.

The list of these philosophers is long, and continues to grow as new works are re-discovered and the names of once forgotten figures begin to resurface. A small sample—listed in alphabetical order—of the members of the early

phenomenological movement include: Maximilian Beck, Winthrop Bell, Karl Bühler, Theodor Celms, Theodor Conrad, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Waldemar Conrad, Johannes Daubert, Alois Fischer, August Gallinger, Moritz Geiger, Aron Gurwitsch, Nicolai Hartmann, Jean Hering, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Roman Ingarden, David Katz, Wolfgang Köhler, Alexandre Koyré, Herbert Leyendecker, Paul F. Linke, Hans Lipps, Karl Löwith, Dietrich Mahnke, Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach, Hermann Ritzel, Wilhelm Schapp, Max Scheler, Gustav Shpet, Kurt Stavenhagen, Edith Stein, Gerda Walther, and Hermann Weyl. The works of these thinkers deal with a wide array of topics, from issues in the foundations of logic, mathematics and mathematical physics, to the experience of religious and mystical phenomena, the emotions, volition, perception, aesthetics, ethics, collective intentionality, and ontology. What unites them all is not simply their engagement with Husserl's phenomenology, but their attempt to get *back to the things themselves*, whatever those may be, to describe and limn the essences of phenomena of all kinds. This rallying cry of early phenomenology from Husserl's *Logical Investigations* was also the call that caused the movement to fracture. Over a few short years, lines were drawn between the realist and the idealist phenomenologists, and between the *Gegenstands-* and *Aktphänomenologen*. Members of all factions attempted to identify and describe phenomena (all possible conscious states and their intentional objects) free from theoretical constructions and presuppositions, and to start with what is directly given in experience. Their goal was to grasp the essences of cognitive states and their objects through what Husserl had termed *Wesensschau*. There was also a general commitment to the Brentanian and Husserlian ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science (*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*) pursued through painstaking, exact description and the avoidance of theoretical speculation.

Much of what we know of the early phenomenological movement comes from the collected papers and correspondence of Husserl and his students. Husserl's extensive correspondence with his students, Edith Stein's memoirs, *Life in a Jewish Family*,<sup>1</sup> as well as Winthrop Bell's recently declassified papers, are invaluable primary resources.<sup>2</sup> Stein paints wonderful portraits of the philosophers of this period, including Husserl, Reinach, Ingarden, Hans Lipps, and others. The memoir of Gerda Walther, *Zum Anderen Ufer*, is also a wonderful portrait of the time and includes her gentle critique of Husserl's old-fashioned male chauvinism.<sup>3</sup> There are plenty of other "eye-witness" reports found in the correspondence of these figures preserved at the Husserl Archives in Leuven and the Bavarian State Library in Munich. These documents have informed the original, ground-breaking research of Karl Schuhmann, Herbert Spiegelberg,

<sup>1</sup> Stein 1965 (English translation: Stein 1986).

<sup>2</sup> Bell & Bonnemann 2011, Bell 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Walther 1960.

and Eberhard Avé-Lallemant in their attempts to reconstruct the story of the phenomenological movement. The history of this time is rich, and, given the turbulent times the philosophers lived through, deserving of serious consideration alongside the philosophical contributions of these thinkers.

The early phenomenologists were truly gifted and remarkably individual and independent. Without doubt they were the most brilliant and original philosophical minds of their generation in Germany. Unfortunately, their lives and work were tragically and profoundly disrupted by the two World Wars. During the First World War, many of Husserl's students served in the military or assisted in some other form. Some lost their lives, e.g., Adolf Reinach, Waldemar Conrad, Heinrich Rickert Jr., and Rudolf Clemens,<sup>4</sup> while others, such as Winthrop Bell and Alexandre Koyré, were imprisoned. Later, several of the members of the early phenomenological schools were involved in the events of the Second World War. In Soviet Russia, Gustav Shpet was executed in 1937 during the Great Purge. Following the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany in 1933, Edith Stein was arrested by the Gestapo and shipped to the concentration camp at Auschwitz. She was sent to the gas chamber, where she died with her sister on 9<sup>th</sup> August 1942.<sup>5</sup> By contrast, Hans Lipps, who had been a close friend of Stein, joined the SS in 1934. He was appointed a full professor in Frankfurt in 1936 but was killed on the battlefield in 1941. Many others, such as Moritz Geiger, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Siegfried Hamburger, fled to the United States for safety.

The flourishing of phenomenology also coincided with the conferring of doctorates to women in German universities, though they were not yet being admitted to the Habilitation and thus could not become professors (a demand for which Edith Stein agitated).<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the early phenomenological movement is particularly remarkable because of the number of women philosophers who participated. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein, and Gerda Walther are the better known of the group, but there were many others who followed Husserl's lectures in Göttingen and Freiburg, such as Erika Gothe, Betty Heymann,<sup>7</sup> Anna Hoffa, Helene Joseph,<sup>8</sup> Zagorka Mičić, and Margarete Ortmann. The Munich group also had numerous women, including Else

<sup>4</sup> Heinrich Rickert Jr. was the son of the famous South-West Neo-Kantian. Rudolf Clemens had prepared the index for the 1913 edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, and was engaged to be married to the daughter of Felix Klein.

<sup>5</sup> At a ceremony in Cologne on May 1, 1987, Pope John Paul II beatified Edith Stein, that is, he declared her worthy of public veneration as a genuinely holy, or blessed, person. In Rome on Oct. 11, 1998 the Pope canonized her.

<sup>6</sup> See Mazon 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Betty Heymann had been a student of Georg Simmel in Hamburg.

<sup>8</sup> Helene Joseph would later marry Hermann Weyl.

Voigtländer and Margarete Calinich.<sup>9</sup> Many of these female students had trained as teachers and were auditing courses in philosophy,<sup>10</sup> while others, such as Rosa Heine and Charlotte Malachowski,<sup>11</sup> were attracted to phenomenology by way of psychology.

The *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* served as the main publishing outlet for many of the early phenomenologists. This yearbook, which Husserl had been planning since 1907,<sup>12</sup> published its first volume in 1913 in collaboration with Reinach, Scheler, Geiger and Pfänder. From 1913 to 1930, eleven volumes of the *Jahrbuch* were produced, and included a number of the doctoral and habilitation theses written under Husserl's supervision. The *Jahrbuch* quickly became a repository of brilliant phenomenological studies, including Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (now Hua III/1, hereafter *Ideas I*), which appeared in the first issue alongside Max Scheler's *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*.<sup>13</sup>

### *Phenomenology and the School of Brentano*

The term “phenomenology” had long been in use in German philosophy since the time of Lambert and Kant in the eighteenth century, before making a significant appearance in the title of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), a text that was identified by subsequent phenomenologists including Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty as a genuine phenomenological contribution. Most historians of European philosophy, however, locate the origins of what later become known as “the phenomenological movement” (a term Husserl himself used) in the work of Franz Brentano and his students. The school of Franz Brentano, including Husserl, Stumpf, Alexius Meinong, Kasimierz Twardowski, Anton Marty, Thomas Masaryk, and Christian von Ehrenfels, all had an influence on the work of members of the early phenomenologists (see the contributions from George Heffernan, Hynek Janoušek, and Marek Pokropski in this volume). Brentano was already using the term “phenomenology” for his a priori descriptive psychology in the 1880s in his lectures in Vienna.<sup>14</sup> However, the founding text of the phenomenological movement is usually taken to be the *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical Inves-*

<sup>9</sup> Voigtländer studied with Lipps in Munich in 1905 and completed her PhD with Pfänder in 1909. (See Voigtländer 1910). Calinich finished her dissertation *Versuch einer Analyse des Stimmungswertes der Farbenerlebnisse* under the supervision of Lipps in 1910.

<sup>10</sup> See Lyne 2000: 26. See also Posselt 1952.

<sup>11</sup> Heine and Malachowski would later marry David Katz and Karl Bühler respectively.

<sup>12</sup> See Husserl's letter to Daubert 26 August 1907, Hua XXV: xv; Schuhmann 1990: 1–25.

<sup>13</sup> Scheler 1954 (English translation: Scheler 1973).

<sup>14</sup> Brentano 1982 (English translation: Brentano 1995).

tigations, 1900/1901) of Edmund Husserl.<sup>15</sup> This work had a revolutionary impact on the philosophical scene in Germany, particularly on the students of Theodor Lipps in Munich, who were simultaneously developing their own method of phenomenological descriptive psychology.<sup>16</sup>

The early phenomenologists continued the work of Brentanian descriptive psychology in attempting to define the nature of psychic states in their full range and complexity. For instance, many sought to clarify the relations between bodily and sensuous feelings, sentiments and emotions, including the apprehension of values from the lowest to the highest. Some feelings were seen as located in a body or related to the body in some ways, whereas other “sentiments” (*Gesinnungen*), such as love, hatred, or benevolence were characterized by their being directed towards the essence of a person. These “sentiments” were further distinguished from the class of the “emotions” (see the essay by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran in this volume).<sup>17</sup> Following the lead of Brentano, they maintained that emotions were grounded in and dependent on cognitive experiences. For them, emotions and affectivity in general constitute a distinct dimension of human experience which cannot be reduced to perception and belief and which possess its own kind of evidence: it makes us accessible the specific realm of reality. As Scheler insisted, emotions are intentional—they grasp “values.”

#### *The Munich Circle (Akademischer Verein für Psychologie)*

In 1900, the same year that Husserl published his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*, the Munich philosopher Alexander Pfänder published his *Phenomenology of the Will (Phänomenologie des Wollens: eine psychologische analyse)*.<sup>18</sup> Pfänder was a practitioner of the phenomenological method, though his phenomenology had developed independently of Brentano, Stumpf, and Husserl.<sup>19</sup> Pfänder himself had been trained in the descriptive psychology of the Munich philosopher Theodor Lipps. Around 1895, Lipps established an Academic Association for Psychology (*Akademischer Verein für Psychologie*) at the University in Munich. Members of

<sup>15</sup> Husserl 1900–1901. Four editions appeared in Husserl’s life: a revised Second Edition of the *Prolegomena* and first five *Investigations* in 1913, a revised Edition of the Sixth *Investigation* in 1921, and a Third Edition with minor changes in 1922 and a Fourth Edition in 1928. A critical edition, which includes Husserl’s written emendations and additions to his own copies (*Handexemplar*), has appeared in the Husserliana series in two volumes: Hua XVIII and Hua XIX. The only English translation is Husserl 2001.

<sup>16</sup> An elegant expression of this outlook can be found in Reinach 1951 (English translation: Reinach 2002).

<sup>17</sup> See Vendrell Ferran 2008.

<sup>18</sup> Pfänder 1900 (partial English translation: Pfänder 1967).

<sup>19</sup> Pfänder eventually became full professor in Munich in 1929, having failed to get appointed as Husserl’s successor in Freiburg.

this association included Pfänder, Daubert, Geiger, Th. Conrad, Hildebrand, Beck, Ernst von Aster, and Max Ettliger. Lipps and his students discussed the nature of consciousness, the unconscious, the nature of motivation, willing, the nature of empathy (see the paper by Joonas Taipale herein), aesthetic experience, and so on, from a descriptive psychological viewpoint. There was a strong feeling of the need for accurate description of psychological states and their interconnection.

When Lipps' students read Husserl's *Logical Investigations* they felt that his approach offered a new way of giving exact description of mental acts, and were swayed by his anti-psychologistic and anti-subjectivist arguments. Johannes Daubert was the first of Lipps' students to leave Munich, travelling to Göttingen to study with Husserl. As a result of this visit, Husserl was invited to give a lecture in Munich in 1904. Inspired by Daubert, in 1905 more of Lipps' students—Adolf Reinach, Alfred Schwenninger, and Fritz Weinmann—went to Göttingen to study with Husserl. These students invaded Husserl's seminars. Theodor Conrad (a nephew of Lipps) followed shortly after, and in 1907 founded, with Alfred von Sybel, the Göttingen Philosophical Society (*Göttingen Philosophische Gesellschaft*). Lipps' students came to Göttingen (then a renowned center for mathematics and psychology) because they thought that Husserl's phenomenology brought a new level of scientific rigor and objectivity to the study of conscious life.

Perhaps the most prominent Munich phenomenologist was the idiosyncratic and colorful Max Scheler, who became Lipps' assistant in 1906. Scheler, however, who had earlier been forced to leave Jena because of scandal, also encountered personal difficulties at the University of Munich and, having attempted to take a legal case against the university, was forced to resign in 1910 and had his teaching license withdrawn. With the help of his friend Dietrich von Hildebrand—who contributed pioneering work in phenomenological axiology (see the essay by Alessandro Salice in this volume)—Scheler arranged to give informal lectures at Göttingen. His lectures could only be held informally in cafes and private rooms, and public notices could not be issued so information about his visits was by word of mouth. Nevertheless, he was an extremely popular lecturer and his criticisms of Husserl were persuasive among the Göttingen students. Indeed he was a major influence on the young Martin Heidegger, who grieved his passing in 1928.

### *The Original Students (Husserl's Urschüler)*

In his history of the phenomenological movement, Herbert Spiegelberg refers to the earliest group of students to work with Husserl in Göttingen—from 1901–1907—as the *Urschüler*.<sup>20</sup> These were the students whose courses

<sup>20</sup> Spiegelberg 1971: 169.

at the University of Göttingen were invaded by the students of Theodor Lipps from Munich in 1905. Very few of these early students remained when the Göttingen Circle was founded in 1907 and as a result, Husserl's *Urschüler* tend to linger in the shadows of the history of phenomenology.

Perhaps the most recognizable of the *Urschüler* is Wilhelm Schapp (see the essays dealing with Schapp's work by Kristjan Laasik and Timothy Martell herein). Schapp was a late addition to the group, arriving in Göttingen in 1905 just ahead of the so-called Munich Invasion. When he came to Göttingen Husserl had a small group of dedicated followers consisting of Heinrich Hofmann, David Katz, Karl Neuhaus, Alexander Rosenblum, Alfred von Sybel, and Dietrich Mahnke.<sup>21</sup> Prior to Schapp's arrival, Husserl's lectures had been followed by Erhardt Schmidt, William Ernest Hocking, Theodor Lessing, Waldemar Conrad, and others. Over the next few semesters the group grew to include Erich Heinrich, Kurt Peters, Erich Jaensch, and finally the students of Theodor Lipps from Munich. Exactly who can properly be included under the title of Husserl's *Urschüler* is debatable, since a number of Husserl's early students were shared with either the renowned Göttingen experimental psychologist Georg Elias Müller (who personally did not like Husserl) or the mathematician David Hilbert. Nevertheless, the influence of Husserl can be gleaned from their correspondence with their former teacher, as well as their publications, even those in psychology and mathematics.

William Ernest Hocking, a student of Josiah Royce at Harvard, studied with Husserl in Göttingen from 1902–1903 before returning to Harvard to complete his PhD. He went on to write about idealism, and philosophy of religion. David Katz was perhaps the most innovative psychologist of color and touch of the twentieth century, who explored in great empirical detail the parallels and differences between the senses of sight and touch during the nineteen twenties and on whom Merleau-Ponty relies heavily especially in his earlier discussion of spatial perception in his *Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945). He attended Husserl's lectures and seminars and Husserl was one of the examiners for his doctoral thesis in 1907. Dietrich Mahnke studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy in Göttingen from 1902 to 1906, particularly under Husserl.<sup>22</sup> His *Eine neue Monadologie* (1917) was an attempt to translate Leibniz's monadology into the philosophical frameworks of Hermann Lotze and Husserl.<sup>23</sup> In 1922 he completed his doctorate in Freiburg with a thesis on Leibniz, directed by Husserl and published in the *Jahrbuch* (volume VII) in 1925. Very little research has been done on this group of students and their contributions to phenomenology.

<sup>21</sup> Schapp 1976: 18–20.

<sup>22</sup> See Schuhmann 1977: 70.

<sup>23</sup> Mahnke 1917.

*The Göttingen Circle* (Göttingen Philosophische Gesellschaft)

In 1907, the *Göttingen Philosophische Gesellschaft*, known colloquially as the Göttingen Circle, was born. Consisting of a handful of Husserl's earlier students, the invaders from Munich, and a number of newcomers, the establishment of the Göttingen Circle marks the beginning of the phenomenological movement proper. The members of Göttingen and Munich Circles—most notably, Winthrop Bell, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Jean Hering, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Roman Ingarden, Fritz Kaufmann, Alexandre Koyré, Hans Lipps, and Edith Stein—along with their teachers—the editors of the *Jahrbuch*—become the core of early phenomenology. Central among them was Adolf Reinach.

In 1909 Reinach had received a *Privatdozent* appointment in Göttingen and immediately became active in the philosophical society. Reinach was considered by many to be a much clearer exponent of phenomenology than Husserl himself, and became a mentor to many of Husserl's young students along with those who continued to come from Munich to spend a few semesters studying with Husserl on the advice of Pfänder and Geiger. Reinach wrote his *Habilitation* on the theory of judgement with Husserl in Göttingen in 1909 and his 1911 paper "On the Theory of Negative Judgment" was hugely influential.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps his most important work was his *Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes* (1913), wherein he developed his theory of social acts (see the contribution by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski in the present volume). Reinach also assisted Husserl in his ongoing revision of the *Logical Investigations*.<sup>25</sup>

The Göttingen school produced some remarkable original works of philosophy. Hans Lipps wrote on mathematics and logic, and later developed an analysis of the nature of being that comes close to the discussion of Being in Heidegger's 1927 *Being and Time*. Alexandre Koyré did work on logic with Husserl and Hilbert prior to becoming famous for his work in the history and philosophy of science. Moritz Geiger, who participated in both the Munich and Göttingen Circles, developed an original phenomenological account of the splitting of the Ego (*Ichspaltung*) in two papers, written in 1911 and 1913. Husserl read the 1911 paper as he was working on preliminary manuscripts to *Ideas I*. Husserl himself used the term "ego-splitting" but did not distinguish it carefully from regular reflection in which the ego brings itself into view as an object of its inspection (see the papers in this volume by Michele Averchi and Dalius Jonkus). Geiger also wrote interesting studies on the nature of feelings and emotions (see the paper by Mariano Crespo herein).<sup>26</sup> Jean Hering did pioneering work on the idea of essentiality (see the article by Daniele De

<sup>24</sup> Reinach 1982.

<sup>25</sup> See Husserl's Foreword to the Second Edition (LU, p. 50; Hua XVIII: xvii).

<sup>26</sup> Geiger 1911.



Santis in this volume, as well as the supplementary items edited by Thomas Vongehr, Sylvain Camilleri, and Arun Iyer) as did Roman Ingarden.<sup>27</sup> They distinguished between general essences and essences of individuals (*So-Sein*). Edith Stein, who had come to Göttingen to study with Husserl at the insistence of her cousin, the mathematician Richard Courant, contributed greatly to the phenomenological accounts of empathy and community (see the contribution by Francesca De Vecchi in the present volume), and Hedwig Conrad-Martius to the field of ontology—specifically the connection between essences and existence.<sup>28</sup> The papers in this volume only begin to scratch the surface of what the early phenomenologists managed to accomplish.

One interesting characteristic of the Göttingen Circle was their critical stance toward both Husserl's idealism and his *Aktphänomenologie* (see the papers by Simon Calenge and Faustino Fabbianelli in this volume). The majority of the early phenomenologists were realists, and advocated for a *Gegenstandsphänomenologie*. Their interest was in real essences and qualities of objects, rather than the constituting acts of transcendental subjectivity. Philosophers outside of the Munich and Göttingen Circles—such as Nicolai Hartmann, Joseph Geysler, and Paul Ferdinand Linke—became proponents of this conception of phenomenology as well.

### *The Bergzabern Circle*

The First World War and Husserl's move to Freiburg resulted in the dissolution of the Göttingen Circle. While many of these students had completed their studies at Göttingen, they remained dedicated to phenomenological research throughout the 1920s. Herbert Leyendecker followed Scheler to Cologne to work on his Habilitation, and Margarete Ortmann followed Hering to his new post in the faculty of protestant theology in Strasbourg. After their wedding in 1912, Theodor Conrad and Hedwig Conrad-Martius moved to a farm in Bad Bergzabern, a small town on the border of Germany and France. After the war, the farmhouse became the meeting place of the Conrads, Hering, Koyré, Stein, H. Lipps, and von Sybel. With financial backing from Winthrop Bell, the Bergzabern Circle attempted to establish an institute for phenomenology with its own library and archive, in fulfillment of a plan conceived by Hering and Reinach before the war.

In Bergzabern, the research of Hedwig Conrad-Martius flourished. From the farm she developed her work on ontology and natural philosophy, and worked with Edith Stein on translating Koyré's *La philosophie de Jacob Boehme* into German. Despite her Jewish heritage, Conrad-Martius survived the Second World War and was one of the few phenomenologists to return to a Chair

<sup>27</sup> Ingarden 1925.

<sup>28</sup> See Conrad-Martius 1923 and Miron 2014.

of Philosophy in Germany (see the edition of her acceptance speech upon receiving the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany in this volume, translated and edited by Susi Ferrarello and Dietrich Gottstein).

### *Husserl's Freiburger Schüler*

After Husserl moved to Freiburg in 1916, no circle of students seems to have emerged like there had been in Göttingen. Husserl regularly invited students to his home to discuss phenomenology, but the atmosphere was not the same as it had been under Reinach. Husserl had come more and more to rely on Reinach to train his young students, and when Reinach lost his life in the Great War in 1917—shortly after Husserl lost his own son at Verdun—Husserl lost one of his greatest advocates.<sup>29</sup> Stein accompanied Husserl to Freiburg as his assistant, Ingarden followed as well, and Mahnke returned to complete the dissertation that he had abandoned prior to the war, but with the loss of Reinach the phenomenological movement had suffered a setback which exacerbated the growing distance between the realist phenomenology of the Munich school and Husserl's transcendental idealism. This was quickly followed by another event that would spell the end of the early phenomenological movement—the arrival in Freiburg of a young Martin Heidegger.

Husserl became very close to Heidegger in the period from 1917 to 1929 although it is now clear that Heidegger was openly critical of aspects of Husserl's phenomenology in his lectures right from the beginning in Freiburg (where Heidegger began lecturing in 1919 in the “Emergency War Semester” when the university re-opened). Nevertheless, Husserl openly supported Heidegger against Mahnke, one of his closest allies, for the Chair in Marburg, as he later did, supporting Heidegger against Pfänder as his successor for the Chair in Freiburg in 1928 (for which he later apologized to Pfänder).

The golden age of early phenomenology may also be said to have ended with the publication of Heidegger's *Being and Time* in the 1927 volume of the *Jahrbuch*. Heidegger had made a reputation as a hugely popular lecturer in Freiburg (1919–1923) and Marburg (1923–1928), and he was soon to be crowned as the new leader of German philosophy after his debate with the leading Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929, a debate that Heidegger was largely thought to have won. The arrival of the young, brilliant Eugen Fink moved phenomenology away from Husserl's conception and closer to that of Heidegger. Fink was a student and assistant to Husserl in Freiburg when Heidegger arrived in 1928 to take up Husserl's Chair, and was an early reader and admirer of *Being and Time*. He was particularly struck by

<sup>29</sup> Husserl wrote several moving obituaries for Reinach. See his *In Memoriam* for Reinach in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on 6th December 1917 and again in *Kant-Studien* in 1918. Both are included in Hua XXV, 296–303.

Heidegger's emphasis on being and finitude and the historical nature of human being-in-the-world.

As we see with the case of Fink, it becomes increasingly difficult to classify who belong to the early phenomenological movement after Heidegger's arrival and Husserl's retirement in 1928. There are, however, a few members of the Freiburg school worth mentioning whose work, at least in part, deserves to be included under the banner of early phenomenology. Dorion Cairns arrived with letters of recommendation from Hocking and Bell in 1924, and became one of the strongest advocates for phenomenology in North America. William Ralph Boyce-Gibson came from Australia to study with Husserl, and translated *Ideas I* into English. Hering sent the Lithuanian born but French domiciled Emmanuel Levinas to work with Husserl. Levinas accompanied Husserl to Paris and Strasbourg in 1929, and worked with Koyré on the French translation of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*. Gerda Walther studied the phenomenology of religious/mystical intuition and published a study on the phenomenology of religious intuition in 1923.<sup>30</sup> Theodor Celms studied with Husserl and received his doctorate from the University of Freiburg with the thesis *Kants allgemeinlogische Auffassung vom Wesen, Ursprung und der Aufgabe des Begriffes* supervised by Joseph Geysler. In the summer of 1925, Celms returned to study with Husserl and conduct research for this Habilitation. Husserl allowed Celms access to his unpublished manuscripts during this time, and much of their content went on to inform Celms' critical work, *Die phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls* (1928)—a work which blindsided Husserl, and saw his former student turn his back on the transcendental idealism he once accepted in favor of realist phenomenology.

In the years leading up to Husserl's retirement in 1928, his barring from the university in 1933, and his death in 1938, his followers also included Hermann Ammann, Aron Gurwitsch, Felix Kaufmann, Ludwig Landgrebe, Arnold Metzger, Hendrik Pos, Hans Reiner, and Erica Sehl. Husserl also began attracting a number of Japanese students who belonged to the Kyoto School, most notably Hajime Tanabe. But it was in these years that Heidegger came to be the leading voice in phenomenology, drowning out those of Husserl and the Munich phenomenologists. It was the end of early phenomenology, and the beginning of the second stage of the movement—the turn to existential phenomenology.

### *The End of Early Phenomenology*

It is difficult to put an exact death date on the early phase of the phenomenological movement. The events of the First World War and Husserl's move to

<sup>30</sup> Walther 1923.

Freiburg in the dealt a blow to the movement, but not a fatal one. Phenomenology continued to flourish in Munich and Freiburg, and began to take root in France as well (see the essay by Christian Dupont herein). But the rise to prominence of Heidegger, the deaths of Husserl, Pfänder, Geiger, and Scheler, the Holocaust, and the Second World War all mark-out the end of early phenomenology. The decline of the early phenomenological movement, then, can be attributed to a number of factors. Husserl himself sought to distance himself from the “realist” phenomenologists of the Munich school and, in return, the early phenomenologists largely rejected Husserl’s embrace of transcendental idealism in *Ideas I* (1913)—a work published in the very first volume of the *Jahrbuch*. Husserl had begun to read Kant carefully in 1907 and he publicly embraced idealism in his lectures thereafter. Husserl’s transcendental idealism was challenged by Edith Stein, Roman Ingarden, Jean Hering, Theodor Celms, and others. Another break off point is the rise of the Vienna Circle with its Manifesto of 1929, which challenged both the Neo-Kantians and the phenomenologists. While in many ways phenomenology had come to eclipse Neo-Kantianism in Germany (see the article by Bernardo Aibinder in this volume), logical positivism would soon dethrone Husserl and his school.<sup>31</sup>

The coming to power (*Machtergreifung*) of the National Socialists in Germany in 1933 changed everything. Husserl, already retired, was forbidden to publish or to represent Germany at official congresses, and, after 1935, was forced to wear the yellow star. Jewish students could no longer habilitate, and those academics who wanted to gain or retain their posts had to complete a special new “habilitation.” Dietrich von Hildebrand was deemed an enemy of the state and had to flee to USA. As a result of these upheavals, the early phenomenologists were scattered across the globe. While phenomenology enjoyed great successes after the war, particularly in France, it had undergone a serious change. Not only had many of the faces changed, but phenomenology itself in the wake of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*. While Father van Breda attempted a revival of the early school of phenomenologists with the *Colloque international de phénoménologie*, first held in Brussels in 1951, this effort was met with limited success—in part due to Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party, and Fink’s endorsement of Heideggerian phenomenology.

Sadly, nothing like the movement that flourished in Göttingen and Munich has re-emerged. The attempts in North America by Marvin Farber, Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz never managed to gain the same momentum, despite the success of the New School for Social Research and the later founding of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Herbert Spiegelberg, Karl Schuhmann and his school (Barry Smith and

<sup>31</sup> There were some connections between Husserl’s students and the Vienna Circle notably through Felix Kaufmann and also through Rudolf Carnap, who had attended Husserl’s seminars in Freiburg in 1925.

Kevin Mulligan), Eberhard Ave-Lallemant, and Josef Seifert (with the journal *Aletheia* and his *Anthologie der Realistischen Phenomenologie*), have all attempted resurrect early phenomenology, particularly the realist phenomenology of the Munich school, to limited success. In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in early phenomenology, due in part to research into the school of Brentano by Robin Rollinger, Carlo Ierna, Denis Fisette, and others. In 2010, the North American Society for Early Phenomenology was founded. This group of phenomenologists and historians of philosophy is dedicated to the study and advancement of the figures and ideas that comprised the early phenomenological movement from roughly 1900–39. The first official conference was held in Toronto in 2012, and has been held subsequently in London, Ontario in 2013, Boston in 2014, and Mexico City in 2015.

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