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Husserl's Idealism Revisited

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In this chapter, I argue that Husserl's deepening understanding of his fundamental thesis of the intentionality of consciousness (every experience is object-directed) eventually led him to prioritize consciousness and embrace transcendental idealism, albeit of a fundamentally new kind,[1] one built on the primacy of *intersubjectivity*. Husserl's transcendental idealism has interesting allegiances with—and deviations from—traditional German Idealism, although Husserl was not particularly interested in pursuing these relations; he did not want to simply add a new theory to the history of philosophical positions. His transcendental idealism has an entirely new sense, as he writes in the *Crisis of European Sciences*[2]:

> I ask only one thing here at the outset, that in reference to these prejudices, one's intentional presupposing [*vermeintliches Im-voraus-Wissen*], one keeps whatever is meant by the words 'phenomenology', 'transcendental', 'idealism' (as transcendental-phenomenological idealism, etc.), locked tightly in one's breast, as I have fitted them out with completely new meanings. (*Crisis*, Hua VI 440, my translation)

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One must put to one side all previous conceptions of transcendental idealism as found within the European philosophical tradition and rethink the concept anew (Hua VI 440). Husserl is not even happy with the term "idealism" *tout court*, preferring "transcendental-phenomenological idealism" or "phenomenological idealism" (FTL, §66, 170; Hua XVII 152),[3] in contrast to "argumentative idealism," based on speculative philosophy (FTL §42g, 119; Hua XVII 105), or "psychological idealism." Husserl could never accept traditional "psychological" idealism (*Ideas* II, 417; Hua V 150).[4] He consistently rejects the "bad idealism" of Berkeley or Hume as "psychologistic" (FTL §66). Husserl partly praises the German Idealist tradition (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), but also criticizes it for being seduced by speculative concepts, no matter how it was committed to absolutely grounded science. Additionally, Husserl always rejected the Hegelian "dialectic" and thought that Schelling and Hegel employed unclear concepts. However, as we shall see, Husserl's construal of egoic subjectivity as always implicated in intersubjectivity (in what he calls the "we-world" [*Wir-Welt*] of "absolute spirit") brings him closest to Hegel.

The first major publication in his lifetime (most of his works were published posthumously in the Husserliana series)[5] to announce this turn to idealism is *Ideas* I (1913),[6] although, strictly speaking, he did not use the term "idealism" there.[7] The term "transcendental idealism" (*transzendentaler Idealismus*) begins to appear from around 1915[8] and is omnipresent after 1916.[9] Thus, Husserl proudly proclaimed his idealism in his *Fichte Lectures* of 1917/1918 (where he treats Fichte's transcendental ego as activity),[10] *Encyclopedia Britannica* article (1928),[11] *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), especially §§94–100, and perhaps gave his strongest articulation in *Cartesian Meditations* (1931, especially §§11, 34, 40, 41)[12] and *Crisis of the European Sciences* (1936/1954). Moreover, his transcendental idealism deepened as he expanded his focus to transcendental intersubjectivity and the constitution of the world as such.

Intentionality as Starting Point

Intentionality as sense-making is Husserl's bedrock philosophical starting point. Every conscious experience is directed to an object. Intentionality involves an *a priori* correlation between subject and object that can be mapped. Indeed, Husserl claims he had this insight concerning *a priori* correlation already in 1898 (*Crisis*, 165; Hua VI 168) while writing his *Logical*

Investigations. Phenomenology seeks "clarification of sense" through intentional analysis, i.e., clarifying the sense of both act and object, but the source of all sense-making is precisely subjectivity.[13] Subjectivity has the overall constituting function in the correlation; therefore, subjectivity has ultimate ontological priority.[14] Subjectivity, furthermore, is always first-personal, or, as Husserl puts it "egoic" (*ichlich*). For Husserl, the first and foremost starting point is "I am." As he puts it in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), I am the "primitive ground [*Urgrund*]" (FTL 237) for my world. Husserl states that for "children in philosophy" this claim is haunted by fear of solipsism and psychologism, but he aims to fill this "dark corner with light" (FTL §95).

Beginning with the transcendental ego as the source of all "meaning and being" undoubtedly makes Husserl an idealist in some Cartesian sense. But Husserl rejects the claim that all of the world can be anchored in the ego understood as some "bit of the world" (*Endchen der Welt*, Hua I 9). Traditional idealism (e.g., Berkeley) was misled, according to Husserl, because the transcendental (i.e., sense-giving) ego was mistakenly confused with the empirical ego: "the confounding of the ego with the reality of the I as a human psyche" (FTL 230; Hua XVII 238).[15] As he put it later, the countersense was to assume the relation between world and ego to be a natural, causal relation, whereas, in fact, it is a correlation inside of transcendental subjectivity (FTL 252; Hua XVII 223).

Husserl himself also offers a re-interpretation of the history of the idealist tradition (which for him begins with Descartes' turn to the *cogito*) in several texts, including a detailed critical engagement with Kant, a shorter one with Fichte, and the brief expression of some qualified sympathy for Hegel (in *Crisis*). In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) §100, he embarks on a "historico-critical digression [*nach diesem historisch·kritischen Exkurs*]" (FTL 266; Hua XVII 235), offering a short history of the development of transcendental philosophy, especially in relation to its treatment of formal logic and the *a priori* analytic. Here, he briefly discusses Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant (with a brief mention of Brentano). Husserl appreciates Hume for taking Descartes seriously to reduce everything to inwardness but he criticizes him for overlooking the essential element of intentionality. Kant also failed to set up a "genuine intentional psychology" (FTL 257; Hua XVII 227). Even Brentano did not grasp the essence of intentionality as a transcendental problem. Husserl is the first to put intentionality on a new footing. For Husserl, Kant's failure, furthermore, was to assume that the purely concrete ego was just a "senseless bundle or collection of data—which come and perish … according to a senselessly accidental regularity" (FTL 255; Hua XVII

226). Kant assumed that what was given empirically was a flow of sensations, whereas Husserl understands givenness as a meaningfully structured flow of subjective experiences directed to their objects in horizonal contexts.[16]

Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism (1908–1938)

Husserl's transcendental idealism is complex, and the scholarship on it is immense.[17] To a large extent, Husserl's idealism was resisted by the realist phenomenologists of the Göttingen school (e.g., Reinach, Stein, Ingarden). Husserl himself could not understand the "scandal" generated among his followers by his embrace of idealism and dismissed the battle between realism and idealism as "sterile [*unfruchtbar*] and unphilosophical" ("Epilogue," *Ideas* II, 421; Hua V 154). As he states in 1930, he does not deny the existence of the world or reduce its status to mere semblance ("Epilogue," *Ideas* II 420; Hua V 152). Rather, he is, in contemporary parlance, a kind of Putnamian internal realist *avant la lettre*, who maintains that the very concepts of "being," "reality," and so on are constituted in consciousness and to think of them as "things-in-themselves" is countersensical.[18] He also thinks being must be correlated to mind, either actual or possible mind.[19] But his idealism contains more complex strands, as I shall argue, and can only be grasped from *within* the transcendental attitude. It is not a philosophical "theory" as such, not merely one philosophical position among others. It is not a bald ontological assertion about subjectivity. Rather, Husserl's idealism is an ultimate science that encompasses "the universal horizon of the problems of philosophy" (*Ideas* II, 408; Hua V 141).

Husserl continued to refine his idealism between 1913 and 1937. For Husserl, transcendental phenomenology is a "radical and genuine" and indeed the "final form" (*Endform*) of transcendental philosophy as inaugurated by Descartes (*Crisis* §14). Classical Greek philosophy was world-oriented and naively objectivist. Although a first breakthrough was made by the ancient Sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias) who introduced a new distinction between how things appear to the subject and how they are in reality, the truly radical turn to subjectivity was first made by Descartes, who also inaugurated the transcendental turn by seeking the "ultimate foundations in the subjective" (*Crisis* §19, 81; Hua VI 83) of all being.

The Starting Point: Intentionality and the Ontological Priority of Subjectivity

In *Logical Investigations* (1901), Husserl states that the central feature of consciousness is *intending* (*Vermeinen*, *Intention*),[20] and in *Ideas* I (1913), he calls intentionality the "main theme" (*Hauptthema*) of phenomenology (Husserl, *Ideas* I, §91, 161; Hua III/1 168). In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), similarly, he speaks of intentionality as "the own-essentiality of the life of consciousness [*das Eigenwesentliche des Bewußtseinslebens*]" (FTL §97, 245; Hua XVII 216). Phenomenology, then, becomes the "uncovering of the constitution of consciousness [*Enthüllung der Bewußtseinskonstitution*]" (FTL §97).

From *Ideas* I onward, constituting consciousness is located by Husserl in the transcendental ego. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl says, therefore, that the "self-explication [*Selbstauslegung*]" (Hua I 97, 116, 118) of the transcendental ego presents a set of "great tasks" (CM §29) for transcendental philosophy. Similarly, in the *Crisis*, Husserl proposes a "critical reinterpretation and correction of the Cartesian concept of the ego" (*Crisis* 184; Hua VI 188), as the task of transcendental philosophy. It seems therefore that the exploration of the transcendental ego is the primary focus of his transcendental idealism. But this is only part of the story. There is also the puzzle of the constitution of world-consciousness and intersubjective community of egos.

For Husserl, all meaning and being (*Sinn und Sein*)—sometimes he speaks contractedly of the "being-sense [*Seinssinn*]"—arise out of the "achievements" or "accomplishments" (*Leistungen*) of this intentional, egoic consciousness, including the very sense of "being-in" and belonging to a *world* with others (a conception that Husserl developed quite independently of Heidegger). The very *sense* of both the natural and the cultural worlds (as well as all ideal and possible worlds) is produced in this way. The transcendental ego is even responsible for constituting the basic sense of being and non-being. For Husserl, intentionality involves a correlation; it is simply impossible to think of being without consciousness, unless one is objectifying for a particular goal, e.g., to establish the laws of nature in itself.[21] As he summarizes in his *Amsterdam Lectures* (1928), true being is an accomplishment of knowing consciousness:

> Every real thing, and ultimately the whole world as it exists for us in such and such a way, only exists as an actual or possible *cogitatum* of our own *cogitatio*, as a possible experiential content of our own experience; and in dealing with the content of our own life of thought and knowing, the best case being in

> myself, one may assume our own (intersubjective) operations for testing and proving as the pre-eminent form of evidentially grounded truth. Thus, for us, true being is a name for products of actual and possible cognitive operations, an accomplishment of cognition [*Erkenntnisleistung*]. (*Trans. Phen.*, 236; Hua IX 329)

True being is an achievement or accomplishment of the subject's knowing. This is a striking formulation. The essence of transcendental idealism, for Husserl, then, involves acceptance not just of the *a priori* correlation between objectivity and subjectivity, but the ontological primacy of subjectivity (or "consciousness"), although that is not meant in the sense of simply positing subjects as things-in-themselves. Thus, in *Ideas* I and in *Cartesian Meditations*, he asserts the absolute being of consciousness over and against the relative being of all other entities. According to Husserl, transcendentalism overcomes objectivism in knowledge and maintains that "the ontic meaning [*der Seinssinn*] of the pregiven life-world is a subjective structure [*subjektives Gebilde*], it is the achievement [*Leistung*] of experiencing, prescientific life" (*Crisis* §14, 69; Hua VI 70). Roman Ingarden summarizes Husserl's position very well:

> Thus the fundamental thesis of "transcendental idealism" is obtained: what is real is nothing but a constituted noematic unity (individual) of a special kind of sense which in its being and quality [*Sosein*] results from a set of experiences of a special kind and is quite impossible without them. Entities of this kind exist only for the pure transcendental ego which experiences such a set of perceptions. The existence of what is perceived (of the perceived as such) is nothing "in itself" [*an sich*] but only something "for somebody," for the experiencing ego. "*Streichen wir das reine Bewusstsein, so streichen wir die Welt*" ("If we exclude pure consciousness then we exclude the world") is the famous thesis of Husserlian transcendental idealism which he was already constantly repeating in lectures during his Göttingen period.[22]

All being is dependent on consciousness. As Husserl writes in *Ideas* I: "the world itself has its entire being as a certain 'sense' that presupposes absolute consciousness as a field affording sense" (*Ideas* I, 103; Hua III/1 107). Furthermore, the terms "reality" and "world" are "just headings for certain valid unities of 'sense' related to certain connections of the absolute pure consciousness" (*Ideas* I, 102; Hua III/1 107). Similarly, in *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl speaks of "the essential rootedness [*Verwurzelung*] of any Objective world in transcendental subjectivity" (CM §59, 137; Hua I 164).

The Sense of the World—Horizon-Intentionality

In his mature years, moreover, Husserl expands his account of intentionality to include not just intended objects (and "objectivities," i.e., states of affairs) but also their contexts and *horizons*. For Husserl, things are always encountered within the *background* (*Hintergrund*) of the "surrounding world" (*Umwelt*, *Ideas* II § 51). The "horizon of all horizons" is the world (*Ideas* I § 27), which is infinite and unbounded temporally, spatially, and in terms of unfolding possibilities. Intentionality takes place within the "world-horizon" (*Welthorizont*). Husserl now realizes "horizon-intentionality" (*Horizont-Intentionalität*) must complement object-intentionality. Furthermore, he construes the "world" as the horizon of horizons and, thus, the constitution *of the world as such* becomes the key problem for his mature transcendental phenomenology. Husserl's transcendental idealism therefore addresses world-constitution. As he puts it in his 1930 "Epilogue" (*Nachwort*) to *Ideas* I[23]: "Its [phenomenological idealism's] sole task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this world, precisely the sense in which everyone accepts it—and rightly so—as actually existing" (*Ideas* II, 420; Hua V 152). Husserl's transcendental philosophy, then, investigates the *phenomenon of worldhood*, how a world is presumed in all our experiencing, providing its horizon. Moreover, the world is experienced as the one-world-for-all, the *same* world for every subject. Intersubjectivity provides the basis for this experiencing of one, harmonious world.

Husserl claimed that transcendental subjectivity (or intersubjectivity), understood as constituting the world, was unknown in previous philosophy, which was primarily objectivist. Thus, in a draft paper written in 1935 entitled "Antiquity did recognize the correlation between subjectivity and world" (Hua XXVII 228–31), he maintains that the ancient world has no knowledge of functioning, constituting subjectivity:

> Even the teleological worldview of Aristotle is objectivist. Antiquity did not yet behold the great problem of subjectivity as functioning, achieving consciousness-subjectivity [*als fungierend leistender Bewusstseinssubjektivität*], as world- and being-in-the-world human subjectivity [*als Welt und in der Welt seiender menschlicher Subjektivität*] … (Hua XXVII 228, my translation)

It is because of this focus on *world-constituting subjectivity* that, for Husserl, the real breakthrough to transcendental philosophy was brought about not by Immanuel Kant (who is rightfully associated with the explicit terminology of "transcendental" inquiry), but by Descartes, whose radical exclusion of the world led to his discovery of the apodictic *cogito ergo sum* and its life

of experiences. Descartes re-oriented the pole of philosophy from being to consciousness. Thus, in the *Crisis of European Sciences*, Husserl applies the term "transcendental" to the "regressive inquiry" (*Rückfragen*) of Descartes:

> I myself use the word "transcendental" *in the broadest sense* for the original motif … which through Descartes confers meaning on all modern philosophies. … It is the motif of inquiring back [*Motiv des Rückfragens*] into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the knower's reflecting upon himself [or herself] and his [or her] knowing life in which all the scientific structures that are valid for him [or her] occur purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions, and have become and continue to become freely available. … it is the motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in this source and thus ultimately grounded [*letztbegründeten Universalphilosophie*]. This source bears the title *I-myself*, with all of my actual and possible knowing life and, ultimately, my concrete life in general. (*Crisis* 97–98, trans. modified; Hua VI 100–1)

Husserl had already made a similar articulation in his 1924 lecture to the Kant Society:

> In fact, my adoption of the Kantian word "transcendental," despite all remoteness from the basic presuppositions, guiding problems, and methods of Kant, was based from the beginning on the well-founded conviction that all senseful problems which Kant and his successors had treated theoretically under the heading of transcendental problems could, at least in their finally clarified formulation, be redirected to this new basic science. ("Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy," 9–10; Hua VII 230)[24]

Husserl's Engagement with Kant and Transcendental Idealism

Husserl began a serious re-reading of Kant around 1905.[25] His most explicit engagement with Kant was in his 1924 lecture to the Kant *Gesellschaft* (Hua VII) and in the *Crisis*. He was always critical of Kant's "mythical constructions." Thus, in the *Crisis*, he expresses his unhappiness with the German Idealists for mixing their will to system with purely speculative metaphysical ideas:

> All the transcendental concepts of Kant—those of the "I" of transcendental apperception, of the different transcendental faculties, that of the "thing in itself" (which underlies souls as well as bodies)—are constructive concepts

> which resist in principle an ultimate clarification. This is even more true in the later idealistic systems. (*Crisis* 199; Hua VI 203)

Husserl regarded his transcendental idealism as an advancement over Kant. He summarizes Kant's idealism in his *Fichte Lectures* as follows: "Space and time, the great forms of the presentation of natural reality, have, according to Kant, no transcendent-real meaning whatsoever. They originate purely out of the knowing subjectivity as the 'forms of intuition' produced (*beigestellten*) by and in subjectivity" (*Fichte Lectures* 115; Hua XXV 272). After Kant, German Idealism, specifically Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, sought to overcome the residual dualism in Kant and especially the dualism between appearances and the unknowable thing-in-itself. Eventually, it evolved into the Absolute Idealism of Hegel where the infinite realization of the identity of subjectivity and objectivity is seen as the self-realization of Absolute Spirit.

Schelling especially regarded transcendental philosophy, the attempt to explain how knowledge is possible, as a way of identifying and seeking the grounds for the "prejudice" *that there are things outside us*. Indeed, he regards as one of the great achievements of modern philosophy that it has succeeded in uncoupling the conviction that objects exist outside us from the conviction *that I exist*. According to Schelling, idealism results from thinking of the self as the fundamental principle of all knowledge, whereas realism consists of thinking of the object without the self. His claim is that it is necessary to think the two together, leading to what he calls "ideal-realism" or "transcendental idealism" (*System of Transcendental Idealism*, 1800).[26] This bears a resemblance to Husserl's correlationism; there is, however, no evidence that Husserl ever read Schelling.

Husserl thought of Fichte's work as obscure: "Someone raised as a theoretician in the spirit of rigorous science will find almost unendurable the many demanding acrobatics of thought [*Denkkünsteleien*] of his *Wissenschaftslehren*."[27] But he credits Fichte with overcoming Kant's dualism by positing the self as action. Unlike Kant, the ego does not act on the basis of a prior passivity but is always active, in development, and goal-directed, and Husserl sees merit in this approach in his *Fichte Lectures*. Husserl appears never to have read Hegel in any serious way.

Consciousness as an Original Region of Being

In his mature works, Husserl consistently posits consciousness as a distinct and ontologically prior realm or "region" of being. Thus, *Ideas* I introduces pure consciousness as "*a new region of being never before delimited in its own*

peculiarity" (*Ideas* I §33, 63; Hua III/1 58), and as "the all of absolute being [*das All des absoluten Seins*]" (*Ideas* I §51). In *Ideas* I, Husserl speaks, furthermore, of the "intrinsic detachability [*prinzipielle Ablösbarkeit*] of the entire natural world from the domain of consciousness" (*Ideas* I §46, 84; Hua III/1 87), which he presents as an insight implicit, but unexplored, in the Cartesian *cogito*. The transcendent world has "meaning and being" (*Sinn und Sein*) *only in essential interconnection* with consciousness.

In *Ideas* I, §49 Husserl introduces a notorious thought experiment in which he imagines the "annihilation of the world" (*Weltvernichtung*), according to which the entire world is thought of as losing all sense and coherence. But even if all experience is reduced to pure chaos, according to Husserl constituting consciousness cannot be done away with.

In his *Kant Lecture* (1924, reprinted in Hua VII), Husserl explains the new approach of *Ideas* I as a discovery of phenomenology as the eidetic science of *pure* consciousness itself that is the culmination of the Cartesian turn to subjectivity:

> With the *Ideas* the deepest sense of the Cartesian turn of modern philosophy is, I dare to say, revealed, and the necessity of an absolute self-contained eidetic science of pure consciousness in general is cogently demonstrated—this, however, in relation to all correlations [*Korrelationen*] grounded in the essence of consciousness, to its possible really immanent moments and to its noemata and objectivities intentionally-ideally determined therein. ("Kant and the Idea," 12; Hua VII 234)

Similarly, in his 1930 "Epilogue" to *Ideas* I, Husserl conceded that his rather bold Cartesian-inspired claim in *Ideas* I was "incomplete" and "suffered from imperfections" (*Ideas* II, 417; Hua V 150), primarily because it left out of consideration the nature of *transcendental intersubjectivity*, of subjects operating together in the co-constitution of a harmonious world of possible experience. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl insists on the priority of constituting consciousness as productive of all sense and being—including the divine being. He writes:

> The relation of my consciousness to a *world* [*Bewußtseinsbeziehung auf eine WeIt*] is not a matter of fact imposed on me either by a God, who adventitiously decides it thus, or by a world accidentally existing beforehand, and a causal regularity belonging thereto. On the contrary, the subjective Apriori precedes the being of God and world, the being of everything, individually and collectively, for me, the thinking subject. Even God is for me what He is, in consequence of my own productivity of consciousness … (FTL 251; Hua XVII 221–22)

Husserl's radical idealism inverts that of Berkeley. Even the being of God is constituted by transcendental subjectivity. One cannot stop, however, with the assertion of the priority of consciousness; one must now clarify this claim through the transcendental reduction. Otherwise idealism, too, would remain in the grip of naturalism.

The Ontology of the Natural Attitude: Naïve Realism and Naturalism

Although *Logical Investigations* gave birth to a movement known as Realist phenomenology,[28] Husserl himself rejected this "realism," because of its naïve acceptance of the ready-made world of our everyday objectivist attitude. For Husserl, the natural attitude could easily give rise to "naturalism" or "naturalistic objectivism" that thought of the world as detached from consciousness. Already, in his 1906/1907 *Lectures on Logic and Epistemology*,[29] Husserl refers to naturalism (and psychologism) as the "original sin" (Hua XXIV 176), as the "sin against the Holy Spirit of philosophy" (Hua XXIV 177). Beginning with "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1910/1911),[30] naturalism is portrayed as an inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the "natural attitude" (*die natürliche Einstellung, Ideas* I §27) into the "naturalistic attitude" of scientific objectivism (see, for instance, *Ideas* II §49). He writes: "It is not easy for us to overcome the primeval habit [*die urwüchsige Gewohnheit*] of living and thinking in the naturalistic attitude and thus of naturalistically falsifying the psychical" (PRS 271; Hua XXV 31).

Husserl's move to idealism—in part a rejection of the earlier phenomenological realism of the Munich school—was partly an attempt to overcome *naturalism* and *objectivism* and partly a way to explore the realm of consciousness as a sphere of absolute being.[31] From *Ideas* I (1913) onward, he became more sympathetic to the Neo-Kantians, Rickert and Natorp. Thus, in a letter to Heinrich Rickert, December 20, 1915, Husserl allies himself with German Idealism against "our common enemy" (*als unseren gemeinsamen Feind*)—the "naturalism of our time."[32] For Husserl, all forms of naturalism—or what he sometimes calls "naturalistic objectivism"—harbor an inbuilt "absurdity" or "countersense" (*Widersinn*). This absurdity consists in the attempt to *naturalize* consciousness:

> What characterizes all forms of extreme and consistent naturalism … is, on the one hand, the *naturalization of consciousness* [*Naturalisierung des Bewußtseins*], including all intentionally immanent givens of consciousness, and, on the other hand, the *naturalization of ideas*, and thus of all absolute ideals and norms. (PRS 254; Hua XXV 9)

One of Husserl's unique contributions to his transcendental idealism in a new key is his identification of objectivism as the outlook of a specific attitude—the natural attitude. The natural attitude is the everyday outlook of humanity from its earliest stages. In this sense, the attitude itself is "prior to all theory" (*Ideas* I §30) but it can lead to "naturalism" in philosophy because it is seduced by the spirit of unquestioning ("naïve") acceptance of the world that permeates the natural attitude. Naturalism leads to the "reification" (*Verdinglichung*) of the world and its "philosophical absolutizing [*Verabsolutierun*]" (*Ideas* I, §55, 129; Hua III/1 107).[33]

For the mature Husserl, the natural attitude, despite its indispensability in everyday human life, is essentially "naïve," "one-side" (*einseitig*), "close"' (*geschlossen*, *Crisis* Hua VI 209), and "blind," because it fails to recognize its own outlook as an "attitude" (*Einstellung*). To be in the natural attitude means precisely not to recognize it as such—hence it is an attitude lived in ignorance of its own nature and thereby it assumes it is not an attitude but a transparent access to its objectual domain. In fact, as Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological analysis purports to disclose, the natural attitude itself is, despite its omnipresence and everydayness, relative to the "absolute" transcendental attitude.

The Centrality of the Epochē to the Transcendental Outlook

Husserl's transcendental idealism seeks to overcome naturalism by suspending its "belief-in-being" (*Seinsglaube*) through the reduction, thus making the *epochē* and transcendental-phenomenological reduction central to his idealism. As Husserl writes in his *Encyclopedia Britannica* article (Draft A):

> The transcendental reduction opens up, in fact, a completely new kind of experience that can be systematically pursued: transcendental experience. Through the transcendental reduction, *absolute* subjectivity, which functions everywhere in hiddenness [*in Verborgenheit fungierende absolute Subjektivität*], is brought to light along with its whole transcendental life [*mit all ihrem transzendentalen Leben*] … (*Trans. Phen.*, 98; Hua IX 250)

In *Ideas* II, he says that the reduction frees us "from the sense restrictions of the natural attitude [*Sinnesschranken der natürlichen Einstellung*] and of every relative attitude" (*Ideas* II §49(d), 189; Hua IV 179). He writes:

> What is *educational* in the phenomenological reduction, however, is also this: it henceforth makes us sensitive to grasping other attitudes, whose rank is equal to that of the natural attitude (or as we can say more clearly now, the nature attitude) and which therefore, just like the latter, constitute only relative and restricted correlates of being and sense. (*Ideas* II §49(d), 189; Hua IV 179)

The reduction allows us to see our naïve everyday outlook precisely *as an attitude* and furthermore an attitude that can be suspended or altered at will. Furthermore, only phenomenology allows us to investigate *attitudes* and understand also "the correlates constituted by them" "through the relation of the ontological distinctions of the constituted objects to the correlative essential nexuses of the corresponding constituting manifolds" (*Ideas* II §49(d), 190; Hua IV 180).

In his 1928 *Amsterdam Lectures*, Husserl makes clear that the function of the "transcendental phenomenological *epochē*" is to expose the naiveté of the natural attitude and all thinking based on the assumption of the world. Husserl writes there:

> The transcendental problem arises from a general turning around of the natural attitude [*aus seiner allgemeinen Umwendung der natürlichen Einstellung*], in which the whole of daily life flows along [*das gesamte alltägliche Leben verläuft*]; in which also the positive sciences continue operating. In this attitude the *real* world [*die reale Welt*] is pregiven to us, on the basis of ongoing experience, as the self-evidently existing, always present to be learned about world to be explored theoretically on the basis of the always onward movement of experience. (*Trans. Phen*., 238 [translation modified]; Hua IX 331–32)

Husserl elaborates in a quasi-Biblical "expulsion from the Garden of Eden" rhetoric about what happens under the universal *epochē*:

> We have been driven out, expelled, from the naivete of natural living-along [*aus der Naivität des natürlichen Dahinlebens herausgedrängt*]; we have become aware of a peculiar split or cleavage [*Spaltung*], so we may call it, which runs through all our life; namely, that between the anonymously functioning subjectivity [*zwischen der anonym fungierenden*], which is continuously constructing objectivity for us, and the always, by virtue of the functioning [*dieses Fungierens*] of anonymous subjectivity, pregiven objectivity, the world. (*Trans. Phen*., 243 [translation modified]; Hua IX 336)

The *epochē* of the natural attitude lays bare the transcendental insight that all being is correlated with consciousness and even splits the ego itself between natural and transcendental.

Ontologies are revealed under standpoints through transcendental phenomenology. Each material ontology is relative to an "attitude" (*Einstellung*) or "standpoint" (albeit not in the sense employed by the Neo-Kantians).[34] There are different constituting accomplishments correlated with different objectivities. The everyday life-world ontology is made visible through the natural-personalistic attitude attuned to life-world. Genuine phenomenological ontology, for Husserl, requires the clarification of the constitutive conditions that make these ontologies possible. Husserl's "fundamental ontology"—a term he never uses—is a transcendental inquiry into the intersubjective preconditions for the possibility of both a subjective and an objective world.

The Enigma of Subjectivity as Both "in the World" and "for the World"

As we have seen, the discovery of transcendental, world-constituting subjectivity is the first "Cartesian" step in Husserl's transcendental idealism. Subjectivity is not a mere piece of the world (Descartes' mistake) but transcends the world or is "for the world," in Husserl's terms, i.e., *world-constituting*. In the *Crisis*, Husserl presents transcendental idealism as a response to "the paradox of human subjectivity" (*Crisis* §53), namely how it is possible that human beings are both subjects "for the world" and also objects "in the world."[35] Husserl presents this paradox as a serious difficulty and challenge to his investigation of what he calls the "pure problems of correlation" (*Crisis* 174; Hua VI 178) opened up by the phenomenological-transcendental *epochē*, and what he elsewhere calls the "full transcendental *epochē*" (*Crisis* 263; Hua VI 267). Subjectivity is bifurcated between its transcendental and its natural dimension. Husserl writes:

> Only a radical inquiry back into subjectivity—and specifically the subjectivity which *ultimately* brings about all world-validity [*Weltgeltung*], with its content and in all its prescientific and scientific modes, and into the "what" and the "how" [*das Was und Wie*] of the rational accomplishments—can make objective truth comprehensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic meaning [*Seinssinn*] of the world. Thus it is not the being of the world [*Sein der Welt*] as unquestioned, taken for granted, which is primary in itself; … rather what is primary in itself is subjectivity, understood as that which naïvely pregives the being of the world and then rationalizes or (what is the same thing) objectifies it. (*Crisis* 69; Hua VI 70)

In *Crisis* Part Three—as elsewhere—Husserl makes a distinction between "psychological," "natural or mundane" subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity—that is designated as "absolute." For Husserl, "achieving subjectivity [*die leistende Subjektivität*]," or as Carr translates it "functioning subjectivity" (*Crisis* 67; Hua VI 68)—that is, the intentionality that constitutes the sense of the world itself and which will later be distinguished from active intentionality—is transcendental and cannot be adequately understood by the naturalized science of psychology, as early modern philosophy (Locke) had attempted to do. Husserl begins from the ego as a "concrete world-phenomenon" (*Crisis* 187; Hua VI 191) and inquires back to the transcendental ego in its "concreteness" also.

> At the onset of the *epochē* the ego is given apodictically but as a "mute concreteness." It must be brought to exposition, to expression, through systematic intentional "analysis" which inquires back from the world-phenomenon. In this systematic procedure one at first attains the correlation between the world and transcendental subjectivity as objectified in humankind. (*Crisis* 187, trans. modified; Hua VI 191)

There is a mutual interdependence between the natural and transcendental ego in both directions. Both natural and transcendental egos are singular and concrete, and both are wrapped up in nexuses of intentional implication. But only the natural or "mundane" ego is an extant being in the world. It is "in the world," Husserl repeatedly says, embodied, embedded, acting, and suffering. The transcendental ego cannot be thought of as a real being in the same sense. Husserl often talks of the *self-objectification* of the transcendental ego as a mundane worldly ego. There is a sense (expressed by Sartre as *le néant*) of the transcendental ego being a kind of "pre-being" or a source of meaning that cannot itself be objectified since its objectification is precisely its mundanization as the natural, psychological ego. Hence, Husserl insists on the difficulty of maintaining the transcendental stance. In his posthumous *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* volume, Hua XV, he writes:

> But the Eidos "transcendental ego" is unthinkable without a transcendental ego as factual. As long as, based on the fact of my transcendental subjectivity and on the world that is valid for me, I modify and research systematically into the Eidos, I stand in the absolute ontology and correlatively in the mundane ontology. (Hua XV 385, my translation)[36]

We inhabit two worlds, as it were—transcendental and mundane. We live naively in the constituted world, but subjectivity also lives a world-constituting life (entangled with an open-ended stream of other egos, as we shall now discuss).

Transcendental Intersubjectivity (Transzendentale Intersubjektivität) as Monadology

I have been arguing in support of Husserl's own claim that he was a transcendental idealist in a radically new, post-Kantian sense. There is one ego that is bifurcated between natural and transcendental dimensions. Another novelty is his account of transcendental intersubjectivity—the key to his later phenomenology. The ego constitutes itself as an ego that has other egos (*Crisis*, Hua VI 417). There is not just one transcendental ego; rather, there is an open plurality of transcendental egos, extending into the past and open to an indefinite future of possible transcendental egos, constituting "humanity" (*Menschheit*) as such. As Eugen Fink puts it: "Transcendental egology becomes transcendental 'monadology.'"[37]

In articulating his vision of transcendental intersubjectivity, Husserl turns not to Hegel's concept of absolute spirit (with which Husserl was profoundly unfamiliar and indeed to which he had an antipathy inherited from both Brentano and his Neo-Kantian colleagues, Rickert and Natorp), but turns instead to Leibniz's monadology. Thus, in *Cartesian Meditations*, he characterizes intersubjectivity as a *community of monads* acting harmoniously. Although monads are "absolutely separate unities" (CM 129; Hua I 157), nevertheless they are communalized in a "harmony of monads" (CM 108; Hua I 138), in a transcendental "universe of monads" (*Allheit der Monaden*, *Monadenall*, Hua XV 609); a "transcendental 'we'" (CM 107; Hua I 137). Unlike Leibniz's monads, however, Husserl's monads have "windows" and communicate with one another and indeed form a "communicative community."

What is this transcendental intersubjectivity and indeed what is his concept of "spirit" [*Geist*] that Husserl invokes in late texts? Husserl speaks generally of "intersubjectivity" (*Intersubjektivität*),[38] "all-subjectivity" (*Allsubjektivität*, Hua VI 468, 506, 530; *transzendentale Allsubjektivität*, Hua VIII 482), or "we-subjectivity" (*Wir-Subjektivität*, *Crisis* 109; Hua VI 111).[39] Husserl employs the term already in his Göttingen lectures of 1910–1911 (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology*) and discusses it in depth in his *Cartesian*

Meditations, and of course in *Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (1973).[40] In order for there to be an experience of a common shared world of publicly available objects as well as the realm of culture and language, there must be a transcendental structure of intercommunicating subjects. There could be no sense of one world, one space, one time, unless all subjectivities united to constitute it *as one*. In this sense, Husserl speaks of the world as the "achievement" (*Leistung*) of transcendental intersubjectivity (CM §49). In his 1928 *Amsterdam Lectures*, Husserl similarly proclaims that the ultimate ground is not the isolated transcendental ego but transcendental intersubjectivity:

> Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute and only self-sufficient foundation [*der absolute, der allein eigenständige Seinsboden*]. Out of it are created the meaning and validity [*seinen Sinn und seine Geltung*] of everything objective, the totality of objectively real existent entities, but also every ideal world as well. An objectively existent thing is from first to last an existent thing only in a peculiar, relative and incomplete sense. It is an existent thing, so to speak, only on the basis of a cover-up of its transcendental constitution that goes unnoticed in the natural attitude. (*Trans. Phen.* 249; Hua IX 344)

Indeed, for Husserl, the great challenge of phenomenology is to grasp the deepest meaning of the transcendental subject *as* interwoven with transcendental intersubjectivity (see *Crisis* §73).[41] Husserl writes in the *Crisis*—in a passage that Merleau-Ponty famously highlights in his Preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception*—that subjectivity can only function within a nexus of intersubjectivity: "Now everything becomes complicated as soon as we consider that subjectivity is what it is—an ego functioning constitutively [*konstitutiv fungierendes Ich*]—only within intersubjectivity" (*Crisis* §50, 172; Hua VI 175). Each transcendental ego, for Husserl, as for Hegel, is a "for itself" (*für sich*), as we have seen. At the same time, transcendental egos are not just "for themselves" constituting the world, they are also "for each other [*füreinander*]" (Hua VIII 505), cooperating sense-constituting subjects, who generate their own sense of the world and their sense of my subjectivity (CM V §43). Husserl is insistent that the world as the ultimate context and horizon of human experience cannot be conceived solipsistically as just *my* world but must be thought of as an inherently *communal* world, world "for others," a world potentially available "for everyone [*für jedermann*]" (*Crisis* 296; Hua VI 343; 358; Hua VI 369), or just, in short, *the one* world. Human subjects exist for-each-other in what he calls *Ineinanderleben* or *Ineinandersein*.[42] As he writes in the *Crisis*:

> But in *living with one another* [*Miteinanderleben*] each can take part in the life of others. Thus, in general, the world exists not only for isolated humans but for the human community; and this is due to the communalization [*Vergemeinschaftung*] of even what is straightforwardly perceived. (*Crisis* 163; Hua VI 166, trans. modified)

As subjects, we are always already caught up in the intersubjective domain. For example, we speak a language and practice culture inherited from others—anonymous others whom we do not know personally. But we also constitute ourselves in meaningful interactions with other subjects apperceived as *persons*. Intersubjectivity has to be understood in terms of each ego having its other, its "you," its "we," its "they." There can be no "you" or "we" except from the standpoint of an ego and this, for Husserl, always gives the first-person ego a certain primacy. But as Husserl constantly points out this is also true for other egos which also have their own "you's" and "we's." Although the factual number of egos is indefinite, Husserl emphasizes the *closed* nexus of intersubjectivity: "But each soul also stands in community [*Vergemeinschaftung*] with others which are intentionally interrelated, that is, in a purely intentional, internally and essentially closed nexus [*Zusammenhang*], that of intersubjectivity" (Husserl, *Crisis* §69, 238; VI 241). Husserl, then, conceives of the true domain of intersubjectivity as including all subjects in the past and future, not just all actual subjects but all possible subjects, functioning together to generate the entire world including its historical development. Husserl writes:

> Each human being as a person stands in his or her generative interconnectivities [*Zusammenhängen*], which, understood in a personal spiritual manner, stand in the unity of a historicity; this is not just a sequence of past factualities, but it is implicated in each present, in its factuality, as a hidden spiritual acquisition, as the past, which has formed that specific person, and as such is intentionally implicated in him as his formation or upbringing [*Bildung*]. (*Crisis* VI 488, my translation)

Thus, in 1934, for instance, Husserl had written in a fragment entitled "Human Life in Historicity" (*Menschlichesleben in der Geschichtlichkeit*, Hua XXIX):

> The human being [*der Mensch*] lives his [or her] spiritual life not in a spiritless world, in a world [understood] as matter, but rather as a spirit among spirits, among human and super-human, and this world-totality [*Weltall*] is, for him [or her], the totality of existing living, in the way of spirit, of the I-being, of the

> I-living among others as I-subjects, life in the form of a universal I-community. (*Ich-Gemeinschaft*, Hua XXIX 3, my translation)[43]

Similarly, in his 1935 *Vienna Lecture*, Husserl articulates a Hegelian-sounding conception of absolute spirit; one, however, that can only be explored by phenomenology:

> It is my conviction that intentional phenomenology has made of the spirit qua spirit for the first time a field of systematic experience and science and has thus brought about the total reorientation of the task of knowledge. The universality of the absolute spirit [*Universalität des absoluten Geistes*] surrounds everything that exists with an absolute historicity, to which nature is subordinated as a spiritual structure [*als Geistesgebilde*]. (*Crisis* 298; Hua VI 347).

Husserl insists on the final interconnecting unity of absolute spirit (*absoluter Geist*). In fact, in line with his anti-naturalism, it is the world of spirit (as the nexus of cooperating intersubjectivity) that has primacy. "Nature" as an independent realm governed by causality is achieved by subtracting the intentional activity of spirit. In the end, absolute spirit alone is "self-sufficient" (*eigenständig*), as he writes in the *Vienna Lecture*:

> The spirit, and indeed only the spirit, exists in itself and for itself, is self-sufficient [*Der Geist und sogar nur der Geist ist in sich selbst und für sich selbst seiend, ist eigenständig*]; and in its self-sufficiency, and only in this way, it can be treated truly rationally, truly and from the ground up scientifically. As for nature, however, in its natural-scientific truth, it is only apparently self-sufficient and can only apparently be brought by itself to rational knowledge in the natural sciences. (*Crisis* 297; Hua VI 345)

Once subjectivity is considered a part of transcendental intersubjectivity, then, the question of absolute priority is displaced. What is absolutely prior is subjectivity operating within the nexus of intersubjectivity, just like each speaker depends upon the network of language meanings and structures that are sustained by the ongoing community of those language speakers.

Conclusion

For Husserl, all consciousness is "egoic" (*ichlich*) or, as we would say, first-personal. Consciousness is always distributed to subjects each of whom experiences it as mine. There is an essentially irreducible first-person access to meaningful experience. Moreover, this ego or I is not static but is dynamic

and multi-layered and developing. As Husserl says in *Cartesian Meditations*, the ego unfolds in a unified history, and its experiences become sedimented to it through habit.[44] For Husserl, this egoic subjectivity is a temporal, synthesizing, flowing life that first has to constitute itself as a self and then constitutes everything it encounters in the world. Somehow, the ego *passively* assembles itself as an enduring presence, a "living present" (*lebedige Gegenwart*), out of its deepest layer of flowing time consciousness and primitive association, to concretize eventually as the full person or monad which encapsulates a set of capacities and dispositions. This transcendental ego, then, also, has a history and a set of sedimentations and habitualities that accrue to it. In this sense, the transcendental ego is dynamic and unfolds in history.

In Husserl's scheme, the transcendental ego is the counterpart of the empirical ego, providing the framework and enabling conditions to give the empirical ego its sense of worldliness. The ego is always mirrored and encapsulated in the "nexus" (*Zusammenhang*) of intersubjectivity. Husserl opposes all previous idealisms—Platonic, psychological (Berkeleyan, Humean), Kantian, Fichtean, or Hegelian (these devolved into speculative mysticism). As Sidney Hook put it perceptively in 1930:

> the only difficulty we are faced with is to find out what kind of an idealist Husserl is. This is not a difficulty to be sneered at, for all of philosophic Germany has been trying for the last twenty-five years to make it out. It is not Platonic idealism, since Plato's Ideas were stored up in heaven and were the models, not the instruments, of demiurgic creation. It is not Berkeleyan idealism, since that is a theory of mentalism which denies on principle the objectivity of non-mental ideal meanings. It is not Kantian idealism, for Kant stopped where he should have begun; instead of asking how logic itself was possible and submitting the ideal laws of logic to transcendental analysis … he accepted the Aristotelian logics as something finished and self-justifying. As distinct from all these Husserl's idealism is phenomenological idealism. It asks for the certification of everything found in consciousness—even the objective meanings. It asks how are meanings in general possible?[45]

Husserl's path to idealism comes through his conception of intentionality that led him to assert the absolute priority of constituting subjectivity as the source of all meaning and being. Furthermore, this constituting subjectivity is accessible only through the reduction that strips away all naturalization. It seems, however, that the mundane ego is responsible for discovering the transcendental ego but the transcendental ego in its essence enfolds all actual and possible egos. Somehow (and Husserl never succeeded in solving this issue) the ego not just constitutes *itself* but also all other egos as alien to it and

themselves having constitutive power within the overall nexus of intersubjectivity. One has to wonder whether Husserl's continued insistence on the strict parallelism between the transcendental and the "mundane" (Husserl rarely speaks of the "empirical" ego) does not create an indissoluble problem (that Michel Foucault has referred to the "transcendental doublet").[46]

Husserl thought that life lived in naiveté was natural, worldly, mundane life, *Dahinleben*. But he also thought that the transcendental reduction leads us back into a new domain and a new kind of life, namely transcendental *life*. Transcendental life, for Husserl, expresses the idea that human subjects can come to self-consciousness of their functioning in the overall network of rationality itself. The self is essentially split or doubled in what Husserl calls "*Ichspaltung*." I contemplate myself as part of the nexus of infinite, cooperative, intentional agency. Furthermore, this egoic transcendental life is always in progress and evolves in the form of history. Transcendental intersubjectivity is essentially embodied, incarnate subjectivities, embedded in the historical and cultural life-world. As Merleau-Ponty, in his magisterial commemorative essay on Husserl, "The Philosopher and His Shadow" (1959), puts it:

> One of its [the reduction's] "results" is the realization that the movement of return to ourselves—of 're-entering' ourselves, St. Augustine said—is as if rent by an inverse movement which it elicits. Husserl rediscovers that identity of "re-entering self" and "going-outside self" which, for Hegel, defined the absolute. To reflect (Husserl said in *Ideen* l) is to unveil an unreflected dimension which is at a distance because we are no longer it in a naive way, yet which we cannot doubt that reflection attains, since it is through reflection itself that we have an idea of it. So it is not the unreflected which challenges reflection; it is reflection which challenges itself.[47]

Notes

1. Vittorio DePalma questions why Husserl should even call it transcendental idealism, if it is really a new doctrine, see his "Eine peinliche Verwechslung. Zu Husserl Transzendentalismus," *Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy*, Special Issue, no. 1, ch. 1 (2015): 13–45. Husserl, however, often employed traditional concepts imbued with new meanings.
2. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, hrsg. W. Biemel, Husserliana [=Hua] VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962); partially trans. David Carr, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). Hereafter *Crisis* followed by the English

page number; and Husserliana volume and page number of the German edition.

3. Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Mit ergänzenden Texten*, ed. Paul Janssen, Hua XVII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974); trans. Dorion Cairns, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969). Hereafter FTL. For the early reception of Husserl's idealism in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, see Sidney Hook, "Husserl's Phenomenological Idealism," *Journal of Philosophy* 27, no. 14 (1930): 365–80. Hook sees Husserl as coming close to Hegel's version of idealism.
4. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. Marly Biemel, Hua IV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer as *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989); hereafter *Ideas II*, followed by English pagination and Husserliana volume and page number.
5. Edmund Husserl, *Gesammelte Werke*, Husserliana, ed. Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht: Springer, 1956–). Forty-three volumes to date. The English translations are ongoing in Husserl, *Collected Works*, ed. Julia Jansen (Dordrecht: Springer). Husserliana will be abbreviated to 'Hua.'
6. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Erstes Buch*: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* 1. Halbband: *Text der 1-3. Auflage*, ed. K. Schuhmann, Hua III/1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977); trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014). Hereafter the work will be cited as *Ideas* I followed by the paragraph number (§), page number of the English translation, and then the Hua volume number and page.
7. Strictly speaking, Husserl does not use the word 'idealism' to apply to his outlook in his *Ideas* I, but his student Gerda Walther added it to the Index of the 1921 edition. He does refer to "subjective idealism" or "Berkeleyan idealism" in *Ideas* I §55 (sometimes, he will call this "psychological idealism").
8. On the evolution of Husserl's transcendental idealism, see the Editors' Introduction to Edmund Husserl, *Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921)*, ed. Robin Rollinger and Rochus Sowa, Hua XXXVI (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), ix–xxxvii. See also Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl. Founder of Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 174–201; and idem, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
9. See Edmund Husserl, *Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921)*, op. cit. Husserl uses the term to refer to the thesis that the existence of real objects is dependent on an actually existing consciousness.

10. Edmund Husserl, "Fichtes Menschenheits Ideal: Drei Vorlesungen," in *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911–1921*, ed. Hans Rainer Sepp, Thomas Nenon, Husserliana XXV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986), 267–93; trans. James Hart, "Fichte's Ideal of Humanity: Three Lectures," *Husserl Studies* 12 (1995): 111–33. See Denis Fisette, "Husserl et Fichte: Remarques sur l'apport de l'idéalisme dans le développement de la phénoménologie," *Symposium* 3, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 185–207.
11. Edmund Husserl, "Der Encyclopaedia Brittannica Artikel," in *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, ed. W. Biemel. Hua IX (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), 237–301; trans. T. Sheehan and R. E. Palmer, in E. Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–31), the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article, the Amsterdam Lectures "Phenomenology and Anthropology" and Husserl's Marginal Note in Being and Time, and Kant on the Problem of Metaphysics*. Husserl Collected Works VI (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 80–196. Hereafter *Trans. Phen.*
12. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, ed. S. Strasser, Hua I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); trans. Dorion Cairns as *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). Hereafter CM, followed by English pagination and Husserliana volume and page number.
13. Dermot Moran, "Making Sense: Husserl's Phenomenology as Transcendental Idealism," in *From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental*, ed. J. Malpas (London: Routledge, 2003), 48–74.
14. Sophie Loidolt argues that Husserl's idealism in fact stems from an ontological presupposition, i.e., the absolute priority of consciousness over being ("Transzendentalphilosophie und Idealismus in der Phänomenologie," *Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy*, Special Issue, no. 1, ch. 1 [2015]: 103–35). See Julia Jansen, "On Transcendental and Non-Transcendental Idealism in Husserl: A Response to De Palma and Loidolt," *Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy* (2017): 27–39.
15. Husserl uses the term "the ego'" (*das Ego*) or the "I" (*Ich*) for the "empirical ego" (*Logical Investigations*), "psychological" ego (CM § 11), or "mundane" ego, that is the subject of experiences, and provides identity across experiences, and for what he terms the "pure" (*rein*, *Ideas* I § 57, § 80) or "transcendental" ego (*das transzendentale Ego*). The transcendental ego is not just the formal condition for the possibility of the empirical ego but actually is an intentional center of sense-giving (*Sinngebung*), giving the empirical ego its concrete sense and capacities. See David Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Husserl's transcendental ego is not the essence (*eidos*) ego. Husserl's transcendental ego is the ego which relates to the transcendence of the world.

16. See Sebastian Luft, "From Being to Givenness and Back: Some Remarks on the Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 15, no. 3 (2007): 367–94.
17. For recent discussions, see Dominique Pradelle, "Husserl's Criticism of Kant's Transcendental Idealism: A Clarification of Phenomenological Idealism," *Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology* 4, no. 2 (2015): 25–53; and Rudolf Bernet, "Transcendental Phenomenology?" in *Phenomenology in a New Key: Between Analysis and History*, ed. Nicholas de Warren and Jeffrey Bloechl (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 115–33.
18. See Dan Zahavi, "Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism," *Synthese* 160, no. 3 (2008): 355–74; and Uwe Meixner, "Husserls transzendentaler Idealismus als Supervenienzthese. Ein interner Realismus," in *Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes*, ed. Manfred Frank and Niels Weidtmann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2010), 178–208.
19. See Rudolf Bernet, "Husserl's Transcendental Idealism Revisited," *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 4 (2004): 1–20; and Ullrich Melle, "Husserl's Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus," in *Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences*, ed. Carlo Ierna et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 93–106.
20. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. Erster Band: *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage, hrsg. Elmar Holenstein, Hua XVIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), and *Logische Untersuchungen*. Zweiter Band: *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, in zwei Bänden, hrsg. Ursula Panzer, Hua XIX 1 and 2 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984); trans. J. N. Findlay, *Logical Investigations*, edited with a new introduction by Dermot Moran (London: Routledge, 2001). Hereafter LU. The reference here is LU, vol. 1, 384–85.
21. Quentin Meillassoux is therefore correct to call Husserl (and Kant) a "correlationist," see his *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008). However, Meillassoux's own attempt to get to the "Great Outdoors" beyond consciousness through mathematical science precisely re-introduces the correlationism he is trying to overcome.
22. Roman Ingarden, *On the Motives That Let Husserl to Transcendental Idealism* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1975), 21.
23. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, ed. Dermot Moran, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: Routledge Classics, 2012).
24. Edmund Husserl, "Kant und die Idee der transzendentalphilosophie," *Erste Philosophie (1923/24).* Erster Teil: *Kritische Ideengeschichte*, hrsg. R. Boehm. Hua VII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), 230–87; trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl, "Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy," *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 5 (Fall 1974): 9–56.
25. Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant*. *Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1964).

26. Rather it was Eugen Fink and Martin Heidegger in Freiburg, from 1928 onward, who were discussing German Idealism.
27. Edmund Husserl, "Fichte's Ideal of Humanity," 113.
28. See Alessandro Salice, "The Phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/phenomenology-mg/.
29. Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07*, hrsg. Ullrich Melle, Hua XXIV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1985).
30. Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, in *Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911–1921*, ed. H. R. Sepp and Thomas Nenon, Hua XXV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986), 3–62; trans. by Marcus Brainard as "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* vol. II (2002): 249–95.
31. See Dermot Moran, "Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy and the Critique of Naturalism," *Continental Philosophy Review* 41, no. 4 (December 2008): 401–25.
32. Edmund Husserl, letter to Rickert, 20 December 1915, in *Briefwechsel*, 5:178. See Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant*, 35.
33. See later Hua XXXIV 258, where Husserl accuses anthropologism of "falsely absolutizing a positivistic world."
34. See Andrea Staiti, *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology. Nature, Spirit, and Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
35. Ernest Wolfgang Orth has pointed out that this paradox, whereby the transcendental ego both constitutes the world and is itself constituted as an entity within the world, was raised as a problem for Fichte's transcendental idealism by Herbart (*Edmund Husserls "Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie": Vernunft und Kultur* [Darmstadt: WBG Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999], 93).
36. "Aber das Eidos transzendentales Ich ist undenkbar ohne transzendentales Ich als faktisches. Solange ich, im Faktum meiner transzendentalen Subjektivität und der mir geltenden Welt stehend, abwandle und zum Eidos übergehend systematisch forsche, stehe ich in der absoluten Ontologie und korrelativ in der mundanen Ontologie."
37. Eugen Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism," in *The Phenomenology of Husserl. Selected Critical and Contemporary Readings*, ed. Roy Elveton (London: Routledge, 2003), 121.
38. According to Zahavi, the German term *Intersubjektivität* was first used by Johannes Volkelt in 1885 and then by James Ward in English in 1896. See Dan Zahavi, *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 97.
39. Although Husserl did not invent the term 'intersubjectivity,' he gives the most extensive philosophical conception of it. Iso Kern points to the years 1913–1914 when Husserl wrote a group of 16 texts amounting to 80 pages on

intersubjectivity, part of which was included in *Ideas* II, see Iso Kern, "Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity," in *Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications*, ed. Frode Kjosavik, Christian Beyer, and Christel Fricke (London: Routledge, 2019), 11.

40. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1905–1920*, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana XIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973); *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte Aus Dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921–1928*, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana XIV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973); and *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil. 1929–1935*, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana XV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973).
41. See Arun Iyer, "Transcendental Subjectivity, Embodied subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Husserl's Transcendental Idealism," in *Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics: Current Investigations of Husserl's Corpus*, ed. Pol Vandevelde and Sebastian Luft (London: Continuum, 2010).
42. Dermot Moran, "The Phenomenology of the Social World: Husserl on *Mitsein as Ineinandersein and Füreinandersein*," *Metodo*, ed. Elisa Magrì and Danielle Petherbridge, 5, no. 1 (2017): 99–142.
43. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlaß 1934–1937*. Hrsg. Reinhold N. Smid, Husserliana Volume XXIX (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992).
44. See Dermot Moran, "'The Ego as Substrate of Habitualities': Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of the Habitual Self," *Phenomenology and Mind* 6 (July 2014): 27–47.
45. Sidney Hook, "Husserl's Phenomenological Idealism," 367.
46. See Dermot Moran, "*Sinnboden der Geschichte*: Husserl's Mature Reflections on the Structural A Priori of History," *Continental Philosophy Review* 49, no. 1 (2016): 13–27.
47. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 161.