Dermot Moran is an internationally recognized expert in phenomenology (esp. Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) and medieval Christian philosophy (especially Neoplatonism, Johannes Scottus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa), with 5 published monographs, 1 co-authored book, 10 edited books (some multi-volume), 34 peer-reviewed journal articles (in top-ranking, international, peer-reviewed journals e.g. Synthese, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Continental Philosophy Review), 100 chapters in refereed collections (major publishers: Oxford UP, Cambridge, Routledge, Stanford), and over 280 invited scholarly and conference presentations, including more than 50 plenary and keynote addresses.
Dermot Moran’s first monograph, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena: A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge UP., repr. 2004), was extensively, favourably reviewed (18 reviews; 116 citations), and is internationally a standard reference work. His 600-page monograph, Introduction to Phenomenology (Routledge 2000; 2nd ed in press) won the Ballard Prize for Phenomenology, USA (2001), has been translated into Chinese (2 versions: Simplified and Classic) and Spanish, with over 20 favourable reviews and 1426 citations. His 2005 monograph, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology (Polity), has 9 positive reviews (“outstanding” Times Higher Education Supplement) and 110 citations. Moran’s fourth monograph Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Cambridge U.P. 2012) already has 4 reviews and 10 citations. Dermot Moran’s The Husserl Dictionary (Bloomsbury 2012), co-authored with Joseph Cohen has 19 citations.
Dermot Moran’s edition of Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Routledge, reprinted 2012) has 2487 citations.
Dermot Moran’s The Phenomenology Reader, co-edited with Tim Mooney (Routledge, 2002) has 169 citations.
Although the h-index is not usually used in European philosophy, Prof. Moran’s h-index is currently a very respectable 12 [i-10-index = 15] with 4676 citations [2267 since 2010] (Google Scholar, accessed 17 April 2015).
Gurwitsch is the philosopher of consciousness par excellence. This paper presents
a systematic exposition of Aron Gurwitsch’s main contribution to phenomenology,
namely his theory of the ‘field of consciousness’ with its a priori structure of theme,
thematic field, margin (halo and horizon). I present Gurwitsch as an orthodox defender
of Husserlian descriptive phenomenology, albeit one who rejected Husserl’s
reduction to the transcendental ego and Husserl’s overt idealism. He maintained with
Husserl the priority of consciousness as the source of all meaning and validity but he
rejected Husserl’s transcendental idealism in favour of a ‘levels of existence’ approach.
Gurwitsch’s project was to show the continuity between Gestalt psychology (stripped
of its naturalism) and Husserlian eidetics. I explain his concepts of theme, thematic
field, margin and horizon as a consistent development of Husserlian thought. I conclude
by claiming that neither Gurwitsch nor Husserl fully appreciate how the horizons
of an entity can support radical novelty and the application of entirely new
In this paper I outline the main features of the phenomenological approach, focusing on the central themes of intentionality, embodiment, empathy, intersubjectivity, sociality and the life-world. I argue that phenomenology is primarily a philosophy of intentional explication that identifies the a priori, structural correlations between subjectivity and all forms of constituted objectivities apprehended in their horizonal contexts. Intentional description reveals the structurally necessary, meaning-informing interactions between embodied subjectivity (already caught in the nexus of intersubjectivity) in the context of embeddedness in the temporal, historical, and cultural life-world. I shall defend phenomenology as a holistic approach that rightfully defends the role of subjectivity in the constitution of objectivity and recognizes the inherent limitations of all forms of naturalism, objectivism and scientism.
The New Yearbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy is entitling Part I of its 17th volume “Phenomenonology, Idealism, and Intersubjectivity: A Festschrift in Celebration of Dermot Moran’s Sixty-Fifth Birthday.”
The collection includes works from Dr. Moran’s former students, and from colleagues, past and present, and he is grateful to all involved for this honor!
For more information: https://www.routledge.com/The-New-Yearbook-for-Phenomenology-and-Phenomenological-Philosophy-Volume/Burns-Szanto-Salice-Doyon-Dumont/p/book/9780367183691
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy Volume 17, 1st Edition (2018)
Part 1: Phenomenology, Idealism, and Intersubjectivity: A Festschrift in Celebration of Dermot Moran’s Sixty-Fifth Birthday
Table of Contents:
1. Editors’ Introduction Timothy Burns, Thomas Szanto, Alessandro Salice,
2. Husserl’s Account of Action: Naturalistic or Anti-Naturalistic? A Journey through the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins Andrea Staiti
3. Essence, Eidos, and Dialogue in Stein’s ‘Husserl and Aquinas. A Comparison’ Mette Lebech
4. Twenty-first Century Phenomenology? Pursuing Philosophy With and After Husserl Steven Crowell
5. Merleau-Ponty and Developing and Coping Reflectively Timothy Mooney
6. Grief and Phantom Limbs: A Phenomenological Comparison Matthew Ratcliffe
7. Back to Space Lilian Alweiss
8. Hating as Contrary to Loving Anthony J. Steinbock
9. Do Arguments About Subjective Origins Diminish the Reality of the Real? Thomas Nenon
10. God Making: An Essay in Theopoetic Imagination Richard Kearney
11. Husserl’s Awakening to Speech: Phenomenology a ‘Minor Nicolas de Warren
ABSTRACT. In this paper I discuss Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological
account of the constitution of the social world, in relation to some
phenomenological contributions to the constitution of sociality found in
Husserl’s students and followers, including Heidegger, Gurwitsch,
Walther, Otaka, and Schutz. Heidegger is often seen as being the first to
highlight explicitly human existence as Mitsein and In-der-Welt-Sein, but it
is now clear from the Husserliana publications that, in his private research
manuscripts especially during his Freiburg years, Husserl employs many
of the terms associated with Heidegger, e.g. Mitwelt, Weltlichkeit,
Allt.glichkeit, Zeitlichkeit, and Geschichtlichkeit, and had detailed
discussions of various forms of social constitution. It is clear that Husserl
and Heidegger were exploring these themes in dialogue with one another,
and that Husserl, in fact, has a rich phenomenology of sociality that is
worth exploring in its own right. In this paper, I will outline some of the
key aspects of Husserl’s contribution.
KEYWORDS. Phenomenological Movement; Social World; Husserl; Schutz;
The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl had a permanent and profound impact on the philosophical formation of Paul Ricoeur. One could truly say, paraphrasing Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s brilliant 1959 essay “The Philosopher and his Shadow,” that Husserl is the philosopher in whose shadow Ricoeur, like Merleau-Ponty, also stands, the thinker to whom he constantly returns. Husserl is Ricoeur’s philosopher of reflection, par excellence. Indeed, Ricoeur always invokes Husserl when he is discussing a paradigmatic instance of contemporary philosophy of “reflection” and also of descriptive, “eidetic” phenomenology. Indeed, I shall argue in this chapter that Husserl’s influence on Ricoeur was decisive and provided a methodology which is permanently in play, even when it has to be concretized and mediated by hermeneutics, as Ricoeur proposes after 1960.
In this paper I explore Husserl’s and Foucault’s approaches to the historical a priori and defend Husserl’s richer notion. Foucault borrows the expression ‘historical a priori’ from Husserl and there are continuities, but also significant and ultimately irreconcilable differences, between their conceptions. Both are looking for ‘conditions of possibility,’ forms of ‘institution’ or instauration, and patterns of transformation (breakthroughs, disruptions), for scientific knowledge. Husserl identifies the ‘a priori of history’ with the ‘historical a priori’ and believes that the ‘invariant essential structures of the historical world’ (Crisis of European Sciences) can be identified. Foucault, on the other hand, is less interested in the Kantian inquiry into the limits or legitimization of knowledge than in the relation between knowledge and power. Foucault rejects the idea of universal and necessary a priori structures and denies that the structure of the conceptual framework (‘episteme’) governing an era can be fully determined. Both Foucault and Husserl contrast ‘inner’ history with external history, but, I argue, Foucault misconstrues Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a form of ‘absolute subjectivity’ against which his ‘archaeological’ method reacts. In fact, Foucault’s own conception of the historical a priori is ambiguous and fails to have explanatory value precisely because it misunderstands the need for the a priori to be both universal and necessary, and offers no account of the ‘a priori of historicity’ which, for Husserl, is essential to human cultural life.
This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenology and its relation to the nature of conscious thinking more generally. We firstly introduce the question of cognitive phenomenology, the motivation for the debate, and situate the discussion within the fields of philosophy (analytic and phenomenological traditions), cognitive psychology and consciousness studies. Secondly, we review the main research on the question, which we argue has so far situated the cognitive phenomenology debate around the following topics and arguments: phenomenal contrast, epistemic arguments and challenges, introspection, ontology and temporal character, intentionality, inner speech, agency, holistic perspective, categorical perception, value, and phenomenological description. Thirdly, we suggest future developments by pointing to four questions that can be explored in relation to the cognitive phenomenology discussion: the self and self-awareness, attention, emotions and general theories of consciousness. We finalise by briefly presenting the six articles of this Special Issue, which engage with some of the topics mentioned and contribute to enlarge the discussion by connecting it to different areas of philosophical investigation.
The early medieval Irish Christian philosopher John Scottus Eriugena is important both for translating into Latin the works of Greek mystical writers such as Dionysius the Areopagite and for his major treatise Periphyseon (On the Division of Nature, c. 867CE) in which he produced a cosmology which included both God and nature. Eriugena thinks of the divine nature as a ” nothingness ” that transcends all being and non-being. Creation is to be understood as the self-manifestation of this transcendent nothingness in the from of being. Eriugena thinks of the human mind too as a form of nothingness which escapes all limitation and definition. Eriugena’s work was hugely influential on later medieval mystics including Meister Eckhart. His work has been compared with Buddhism. I will explore in this paper whether this comparison is justified.
This is a draft document. Please do not quote without permission. See the published version in Moran, Dermot. (D. 莫兰), 一个论及‘无’的西方思想家：约翰.司各脱.爱留根那 , “A Western Thinker of Nothingness: John Scottus Eriugena,” translated into Chinese by 刘素民, Prof. Liu Sumin, 世界哲学, World Philosophy Vol. 6 (2016), pp. 52–57.
Human Studies. Special Issue on Edith Stein. 2015. DOI 10.1007/s10746-015-9363-3
in Ľubica Učník, Ivan Chvatík, and Anita Williams, eds, The Phenomenological Critique of Mathematisation and the Question of Responsibility – Formalisation and the Life-World. Contributions to Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), pp. 107–132
Thane Martin Naberhaus reviews Dermot Moran’s Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction for the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Please see the attached link.
David J. Bachyrycz reviews Dermot Moran’s Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction for Husserl Studies.
The person is a concept that emerged in Western philosophy after the ancient Greeks. It has a multiple origination in Alexandrine grammar (first, second, third person), Roman Law (free person versus slave) and Latin Christian Trinitarian theology, epitomized by Boethius’ definition – a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. In this paper I trace some aspects of the history of the concept of person and evaluate contemporary analytic approaches in the light of the Husserlian phenomenological account of the person.
Phenomenology, person, naturalism, Husserl, first-person, embodiment, Lynne Rudder Baker
Donald Landes reviews Dermot Moran’s Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction for the Canadian Journal of Philosophical Review.
The 17 original essays of this volume explore the relevance of the phenomenological approach to contemporary debates concerning the role of embodiment in our cognitive, emotional and practical life. The papers demonstrate the theoretical vitality and critical potential of the phenomenological tradition both through critically engagement with other disciplines (medical anthropology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, the cognitive sciences) and through the articulation of novel interpretations of classical works in the tradition, in particular the works of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. The concrete phenomena analyzed in this book include: chronic pain, anorexia, melancholia and depression.
Sebastian Luft reviews Dermot Moran’s The Husserl Dictionary for the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
Christian Lotz reviews Dermot Moran’s Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology for Teaching Philosophy.
Please see attached link.
Javier Carreño reviews Dermot Moran’s Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology for the Tijdschrift voor Filosofie.